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Abstract 
Over the past thirty years, the provision of social welfare changed 
dramatically in much of the developing world. Economic and political reforms 
limited the role of the state and promoted private sector involvement in service 
delivery. Explosive growth in the number of non-governmental organizations and 
community-based organizations followed, as non-state actors attempted to fill gaps 
in social service provision left by state retrenchment. This dissertation explores how 
the increase in non-state provision and the ceding of what is traditionally viewed as 
the responsibility of the state to a diverse group of actors has affected poor 
households’ access to health and education services.  
Using data from an original survey of 1,054 households in Kibera and 
Korogocho, two informal settlements in Nairobi, Kenya, the study deviates from 
conventional theoretical and empirical approaches to research on service provision 
in developing countries. I adopt a multi-dimensional conceptualization of access 
that expands on standard indicators and includes perceptions of accessibility and 
quality and satisfaction with services. Furthermore, I explore the relational and 
contextual nature of service provision through a multi-level analysis that includes 
micro- and meso-level sociopolitical factors and meso-level organizational factors. 
This approach yields several findings relevant to research and policy. First, 
perceptions matter; health and education outcomes depend on both service quality 
and households’ service-seeking behavior, and behavior is shaped by perceptions. 
This work argues for the consideration of social demand factors in the development 
of policies and interventions. Second, in contrast to narratives in public and 
scholarly discourses, I find broad support for public health services; in the 
fragmented service environment in the settlements, the state plays an important 
	   xii 
role in ensuring access to care for the most impoverished households. Access to state 
services also depends less on households’ social positionality. These findings suggest 
that efforts to improve equity and access should focus on strengthening state 
capacity and improving public provision rather than supporting a fragmented 
system of non-state providers. Finally, the community-level sociopolitical and 
organizational context shapes households’ perceptions and experiences. A multi-
level approach is needed to more effectively improve health and education outcomes 
in low-income urban communities.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
 
Over the past thirty years, the provision of social welfare services has 
changed dramatically in much of the developing world. The rise of neoliberal 
globalization and the associated economic and political reforms imposed on 
governments by international financial institutions limited the role of the state, 
channeled an increasing portion of foreign aid money to non-state actors, and 
promoted private sector involvement in health, education, and other basic services. 
At the same time, rapid urbanization and weak economic growth generated 
increasing concentrations of poor people in urban areas (Chen & Ravallion, 2007; 
UN-Habitat, 2010). The influx of people exceeded the capacity of cities to provide 
adequate housing, infrastructure, and health and education services, and state 
retrenchment further limited governments’ ability to meet the demand for services 
(Portes & Hoffman, 2003; UN-Habitat, 2010). Explosive growth in the number of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) followed, as these non-state actors attempted to fill the gaps in social service 
provision left by state retrenchment. 
When the state ceases to provide universal, citizen-based services and 
subsidize access for the poor, wealthier citizens can afford higher-cost private 
options and rely on the market to meet their welfare needs. One of the key 
arguments for state provision of services, however, is the recognition that the 
market is not likely to provide an adequate level of services for the poor (Barr, 
1998). This dissertation explores how the increase in non-state provision and the 
ceding of what is traditionally viewed as the responsibility of the state to a diverse 
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group of actors has affected poor households’ access to services. What are the 
relative contributions of state and non-state actors to health and education service 
provision? What household-level characteristics are associated with service access, 
utilization, and satisfaction? Are any individuals or groups systematically excluded 
from access? Finally, how do community-level factors shape households’ experiences 
with service provision? 
The shift toward non-­‐state social welfare provision is the subject of a 
significant body of research, but findings offer a limited understanding of the 
consequences of non-state provision for vulnerable individuals and groups (Bratton, 
2012; MacLean, 2011). Analyses using macro-level data such as government 
expenditures on social welfare, national poverty indices, infant and maternal 
mortality rates, and other aggregate measures predominate existing studies, and 
the results do not indicate whether any individuals or groups are un- or under-­‐ 
served and why. Using data from an original survey of 1,054 households in Kibera 
and Korogocho, two informal settlements in Nairobi, Kenya, one goal of the 
dissertation is to discover the extent to which systematic differences exist in health 
and education service accessibility, utilization, and satisfaction among poor 
households. 
The restricted focus of existing research also obscures the effects of the 
changing service environment on households’ experiences and livelihood strategies. 
Much of the literature has been preoccupied with technical solutions and 
organizational designs to improve models of service provision (Levy & Walton, 2013; 
Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006; McLoughlin, 2011; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). 
These relatively narrow debates miss important features of the larger picture. 
Studies focus on questions of “how much?” (e.g., how much money is spent) and 
“how many?” (e.g., how many students registered for school, how many vaccines 
administered), but not enough attention is paid to questions of “how?” and “what 
happened?” in terms of health or education outcomes, beneficiaries’ experiences, 
and distributional impacts. When individuals’ access to social welfare is considered, 
it is typically conceptualized according to a quantitative level of services or an 
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objective measure of access like physical proximity, both of which fail to account for 
differences in quality and service utilization.  
This dissertation broadens the scope of the inquiry, adopting a multi-
dimensional conceptualization of the micro-experience of health and education 
provision that captures households’ utilization of services, perceptions of 
accessibility, and satisfaction with service quality. Achieving targets for health and 
education outcomes in developing countries depends on both the quantity and 
quality of available services and individuals’ service-seeking behavior (Cahn, 1997; 
Gilson, 2003). Research across the developing world has shown that perceptions of 
service quality and accessibility influence utilization patterns (Amooti-Kaguna & 
Nuwaha, 2000; Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Bazant et al, 2009; Bratton, 2007; 
Dipankar Rao & Peters, 2007; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; Gertler & van der Gaag, 
1990; Kiguli et al, 2009; Muriith, 2013; Onah et al, 2006; Prata, Montagu, & 
Fefferys, 2005; Sahn et al, 2003; Tooley & Dixon, 2006), but the pervasive focus on 
the supply side of provision in both research and policy ignores a key determinant of 
outcomes. By including perceptions in the analysis, this dissertation provides a 
more complete account of the consequences of state retrenchment and the growth of 
non-state provision for poor households and highlights the need for policy and 
interventions to consider demand factors in order to more effectively influence 
health and education outcomes.  
Additionally, most existing research limits the of study non-state provision to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thereby ignoring the contributions of the 
plethora of community-based organizations (CBOs), religious groups, and private 
for-profit providers involved in social welfare provision (Mares & Carnes, 2009; 
Otiso, 2000; Tukahirwa et al, 2011). Households’ access to services and ability to 
meet their health and education needs depends on the full range of providers in the 
community, so all providers in the target geographic areas are included in this 
study. 
Finally, the dissertation bridges the persistent separation between 
macroeconomic and social analyses of service provision. Provision is not an 
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“apolitical, technocratic solution to a policy problem” (Cammett & MacLean, 2014, 
p. 2), but existing studies rarely delve deeper than the formal institutional level to 
examine the intricate sociopolitical contexts that shape individuals’ access to social 
welfare services. Critics of decentralization have shown how local hierarchies of 
economic and political power create unequal access to social welfare (Bardhan, 
2002; Cammett & MacLean, 2011; Diaz-Cayeros, 2005; Hyden, 2006), and the 
literature on clientelism demonstrates how political behavior affects access to social 
welfare, public goods, employment, and other benefits (Cammett & MacLean, 2011; 
Gough & Wood, 2004; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In the context of non-state 
service provision, however, the micro-politics of incentives and relationships 
between actors at the point of service delivery has been neglected (Levy & Walton, 
2013; McLoughlin & Batley, 2012; Michielson et al, 2011).  
By introducing household- and community-level sociopolitical and 
organizational factors to the analysis, the dissertation highlights the relational 
nature of service provision and offers insight into the non-monetary resources on 
which households rely to access services. Drawing on secondary data on civil society 
organizations and healthcare providers in Kibera and Korogocho, the chapters that 
follow explore the potential contributions of community and organizational contexts 
to the equity, sustainability, and inclusivity of health provision. By examining these 
questions, the dissertation addresses both the theoretical debates on the role of the 
state and the best organizational forms of service provision and the practical debate 
regarding how to improve health and education provision in low-income urban 
communities throughout the developing world.  
The remainder of the introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, it 
summarizes the argument supported throughout the dissertation. Second, it 
provides an overview of non-state social welfare provision, including the historical 
context that contributed to the growth of the sector, a typology of providers, and a 
brief review of literature on the advantages and disadvantages of non-state 
provision. The third section introduces the research design and offers justification 
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for key methodological choices, and the conclusion supplies a roadmap of the 
chapters that follow. 
A Summary of the Argument   
Within the literature on public and private provision during the era of state 
retrenchment, there are two pervasive narratives.1 In the first, non-state providers 
meet the demand generated by the absence of or limitations in state provision 
(Batley & Rose, 2011; Brett, 1993; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Douglas, 1987; Korten, 1987; 
Sood, 2000). In the second, the growth in non-state provision offers higher quality 
options for those who can afford to pay, and those who cannot must rely on 
underfunded, inadequate government facilities (Adésínà, 2009; MacLean, 2011). In 
the context of Nairobi’s informal settlements, survey data reveal that the effects of 
state retrenchment on households’ experiences of health and education provision 
are far more complex than either narrative suggests.  
Thirty-five percent of survey respondents reported that the health provider 
most frequently visited by members of the household is operated by the 
government, and 41 percent of households with school age children have at least 
one child enrolled in a public school. Furthermore, when asked where they would go 
for medical treatment if they had the means to seek the services of any type of 
health provider, 53 percent of households selected the government as their 
preferred provider. Disaggregating preferences by quintile of lived poverty status 
revealed that higher portions of more impoverished households prefer public 
providers, but 46 percent of the most secure households also expressed a preference 
for public health facilities.  
Public provision clearly plays a larger role in meeting slum-dwellers' health 
and education needs than public and scholarly discourses suggest. The inclusion of 
perceptions in the survey revealed trends that contradict the conventional wisdom 
driving the shift toward non-state provision (e.g., Harding, 2009). Respondents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These narratives are general versions of more complex theories discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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acknowledged the challenges associated with inadequate staffing levels, drug and 
supply shortages, and long waiting times at public health facilities, but the majority 
nevertheless views the state as a credible and desirable health service provider. 
Furthermore, the survey revealed negative perceptions of the services provided by 
NGOs, and very few households expressed preferences for health facilities or schools 
operated by these organizations.  
The second largest portion of respondents prefers private for-profit health 
providers. Though the low-cost private for-profit sector constitutes 85 percent of 
health providers in Korogocho and 84 percent in Kibera (APHRC, 2013), very little 
is known about the quality of care available. As described in Chapter 2, most of 
these facilities are small in scale, not regulated by the government or any other 
regulatory body, and practitioners have often received no formal training (APHRC, 
2013; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; Muriithi, 2013; Muthaka et al, 2004). Deregulation 
was a key component of the “enabling” environment created by neoliberal reforms, 
and accompanied limitations on government spending hindered efforts to enforce 
remaining regulations. Similar developments occurred in other low-income 
countries; the growth of private for-profit provision is not limited to Kenya or sub-
Saharan Africa (Basu et al, 2012; Mills et al, 2002; Patouillard et al, 2007; 
Sudhinaraset et al, 2013). What little research does exist on the sector suggests that 
providers often over-prescribe medicines and repeatedly treat symptoms rather 
than underlying causes, contributing to poor health outcomes (Basu et al, 2012; 
Bhatia et al, 2004; Brugha & Zwi, 1998; Gbotosho et al, 2009; Gupta et al, 2009; 
Marriott, 2009; Muhuri et al, 1996; Pongsupap & Van Lerberghe, 2006; Siddiqi et 
al, 2002).  
Rather than discounting the state and continuing to shift resources toward 
non-state health provision, this dissertation argues that more efforts should be 
directed toward improving the capacity and quality of public provision. The 
competition between state and non-state providers for staff and funding directly 
contributes to the problems households encounter at public facilities, and the 
complex, fragmented service environment that has developed as a consequence of 
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the promotion of non-state provision makes accessing quality services increasingly 
challenging for vulnerable households.  
Just as expanding the conceptualization of access to include perceptions and 
preferences shed light on the importance of public health provision, the addition of 
sociopolitical characteristics to demand-side explanatory factors revealed that 
conventional indicators do not capture the social factors that constrain the demand 
for, access to, and effective use of services. Spatial proximity to a service provider is 
standard in most models; in urban areas with high concentrations of providers of all 
types, however, physical access is a relatively minor issue.2 Despite the abundance 
of clinics and schools, survey data showed that households’ ability to successfully 
navigate the system and utilize quality services varies widely. Households located 
in close geographic proximity to one another offered disparate estimates of the 
number of providers in their communities, signaling that this variation begins with 
the perception of service availability.  
In individual-level analyses on service utilization, education is routinely 
employed as a proxy for information. People with higher levels of education are 
more likely to be informed about service availability and the advantages of service 
utilization, and they are also better able to successfully demand access to quality 
services (Berry et al, 2004; Krishna, 2008; MacLean, 2011; Montgomery & Ezeh, 
2005; Tukahirwa et al, 2011; World Bank, 2004). Throughout the analysis in this 
dissertation, however, the level of education attained by the household head was 
almost never significantly associated with perceptions of accessibility, utilization, 
and satisfaction. Formal education may contribute to households’ awareness of their 
service needs and make it easier to seek out the necessary information, but it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to help households’ navigate the service 
environment in the slums.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Physical access can be an obstacle when it is unsafe to travel even a short distance to a school or 
clinic, particularly at night. Spatial proximity measures do not capture this challenge, however, as 
the concern is a contextual factor rather than the distance to the provider. 
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Most informal settlements have organically grown economic, social, political, 
and communal systems that form a tightly woven social fabric where social capital, 
bartering, and community support are central to slum dwellers’ livelihood strategies 
(Mutua, 2015). In this context, relationships facilitate access to services; households 
rely on advice and support from formal and informal community groups, political 
connections, and other social ties (Gilson, 2003). Some of this information 
transmission is formalized through the mission and nature of the group—for 
example, welfare groups, self-help groups focused on health and education, and 
community insurance cooperatives—and some is derived from being connected to 
more people who can share their information, experiences, and knowledge (Adhikari 
& Goldey, 2010; Agrawal et al, 2008; Binzel & Fehr, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; 
Coleman, 1988; Cranston, 1996; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Sorenson et al, 2006; 
Uphoff, & Wijayaratna, 2000).  
To examine the influence of non-monetary resources on the dimensions of the 
micro-experience of services (e.g., perceptions of accessibility, utilization, and 
satisfaction with quality), I employ household-level measures of political activism, 
community involvement, and interpersonal trust. Although several sociopolitical 
factors are significantly associated with outcomes, there is less consistency across 
the various dimensions of the micro-experience than expected. Despite the similar 
socio-demographic composition of Kibera and Korogocho and the shared 
institutional context as informal settlement communities within Nairobi, 
household-level analyses of the full sample frequently revealed distinct differences 
between slums and among villages within each settlement that cannot be attributed 
to household characteristics.  
While conventional wisdom recognizes the importance of contextual factors to 
service provision and welfare outcomes, existing studies seeking to explain welfare 
policies and outcomes largely focus on the preferences of political and bureaucratic 
elites acting within the formal institutional framework (Mares & Carnes, 2009). 
Macro-level factors, including global and state institutions, policies, and norms, are 
routinely employed to account for context. One of the key insights from the 2004 
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World Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People, however, is that 
service provision and welfare outcomes depend on three key (and deeply political) 
relationships: between citizens and service providers; between citizens and 
policymakers; and between policymakers and service providers. Many of these 
relationships operate on the meso level, which includes both sociopolitical 
characteristics of the community and organizational factors that describe individual 
service providers and the collective “system” of provision that households must 
navigate in order to meet their health and education needs.  
I use household-level data to generate aggregate measures of community-
level sociopolitical factors and examine the interaction between household- and 
community-level sociopolitical contexts and the associated effects on the micro-
experience of health provision. Furthermore, I draw on secondary data on service 
provision and civil society in Kibera and Korogocho to qualitatively explore key 
differences between the settlements that become evident during quantitative 
analyses.  
This meso-level examination yields two major findings. First, as the role of 
centralized state provision decreases and more citizens utilize localized and 
community-based providers, these meso-level relationships and conditions become 
increasingly important. Household- and community-level sociopolitical factors are 
much more relevant to outcomes in the context of non-state provision. To the extent 
that accessibility and affordability of health services provided by the state are less 
dependent on households’ social positionality and communities’ sociopolitical 
context, this work suggests that efforts to improve equity should focus on 
strengthening and expanding public provision rather than supporting a fragmented 
system of NSPs. 
Second, meso-level contextual factors condition the effects of household-level 
characteristics. Experiences in Kibera and Korogocho suggest that the relationships 
and resources that facilitate access to quality services in one community may be 
insignificant in others, even when the macro-level conditions are identical. This 
raises concerns about generalizability, but it also suggests the need for a different 
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methodological approach. Few attempts have been made to introduce community-
level factors to analyses, largely due to a lack of data, analytical difficulties, and 
conceptual challenges (Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Phillips et al, 1998). Though the 
sample size is small, insights from quantitative and qualitative comparisons 
between Kibera and Korogocho suggest that standard quantitative measures 
customarily employed in research on service provision in developing countries do 
not capture the concepts and mechanisms of theoretical and practical interest at the 
meso level. Instead, the goal should be to develop an understanding of the most 
relevant processes, key relationships, and interactions at the confluence of the 
individual, community, organizational, and institutional contexts. To that end, I 
identify four mechanisms that, based on this research, incorporate the meso-level 
factors that wield the most influence over households’ experiences with health and 
education provision and the non-monetary resources that facilitate access. 
Exploring the operation of these mechanisms in diverse settings should offer 
generalizable strategies for promoting equitable and responsive service provision in 
low-income urban communities. 
Historical Context: The Growth of Non-State Provision 
The extent and nature of non-state social welfare provision varies widely 
across the developing world. Internal factors specific to each country’s historical, 
institutional, political, and socioeconomic context account for this variation, but the 
increasing prominence of non-state provision can be partially attributed to two 
interrelated global-level trends: the retrenchment of the state and the increase in 
both the number of civil society organizations seeking to provide services and the 
resources they command (Kanyinga, 1995; Mehrotra, 2005). The largely external 
nature of the factors driving these trends accounts for the overall pattern of growth 
in non-state social welfare provision (Cammett & MacLean, 2011).      
First, the emergence of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s supported by the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral donors 
prompted a shift in the strategy guiding social welfare provision. Neoliberals argue 
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that excessive and inefficient state intervention in the economy is to blame for the 
poor macroeconomic conditions in many developing countries. Similarly, neoliberal 
supporters argue that low literacy rates and poor health outcomes stem from 
weaknesses in state social service provision, including: 1) poor coordination among 
agencies, inadequate technical capacity, financial constraints, and lack of political 
will; 2) inflexibility and inability to respond to the unique needs of diverse citizens; 
3) allowing elite groups to benefit from government policies at the expense of the 
poor; and 4) widespread corruption, rent-seeking behavior, and misallocation of 
resources (Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Kyessi, 2005; Otiso, 2000, 2003; Syagga et al, 
2001; UN-Habitat, 2003). 
Guided by this understanding of the challenges facing developing countries, 
the World Bank, IMF, and other leaders created a policy agenda designed to restore 
free market principles, drastically reduce state intervention, and promote the 
development and growth of the private sector (Stein, 2008). In response to the 
perceived failure of centralized governments to provide basic services efficiently and 
equitably, the neoliberal prescription envisioned a new role for the state in creating 
an “enabling” environment in which partnerships within the private and 
community sectors would take the lead in the provision of basic services (Baken & 
Van der Linden, 1993; Beall, 2000; Harris & Giles, 2003; Jones & Ward, 1994; 
Mkandawire, 2001). The structural adjustment policies imposed on governments 
borrowing money from the IMF and World Bank prompted institutional changes 
like decentralization and deregulation (Devas, 2004; Rakodi, 1997).  
With respect to social welfare provision, the most salient policy changes 
included the reduction in state expenditure on social services, the privatization of 
government units—many of which were responsible for infrastructure and basic 
service provision—and a de-emphasis on social welfare in policymaking (Adésínà, 
2009; DiMuzio, 2008; Mkandawire, 2001; Rono, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2003). User fees 
for utilizing public goods like education and healthcare were introduced to promote 
efficiency in their allocation (Stein, 2008). The newly reduced role of the state left 
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many citizens without access to services, and the emphasis on enabling non-state 
providers created space and opportunity for non-state actors to fill the gaps. 
A second, albeit related, external factor driving the growth in non-state 
provision was a shift in development theory and best practices concerning foreign 
aid (Kanyinga, 1995). The neoliberal view challenged the prescriptions for state-led 
development that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s, and reports of widespread 
corruption and graft at all levels of government in developing countries fueled a 
distrust of the state and a search for development alternatives (Fowler, 1995; 
Obiyan, 2005; Peet & Hartwick, 2015). Civil society organizations were increasingly 
viewed as a viable alternative, owing to their purported efficiency relative to the 
state, potential to serve as agents of democratization, and alignment with the 
emerging consensus favoring participatory development (Obiyan, 2005). Foreign 
governments, international organizations like the United Nations and World Bank, 
and international NGOs escalated their support of and engagement with civil 
society organizations (international, regional, and indigenous) working in 
developing countries. The number of NGOs formally consulting with the United 
Nations increased from 700 in 1992 to more than 3,400 in 2012; an additional 
23,000 organizations currently work with the NGO Branch of the organization.3     
Donors increasingly diverted foreign aid from states and channeled it 
through these civil society organizations. Between 1990 and 1999, the amount of 
external aid channeled to NGOs in Africa increased from less than $1 billion to 
nearly $3.5 billion (Hearn, 2007). The involvement of civil society organizations in 
development projects funded by the World Bank increased from 21 percent of all 
projects in 1990 to more than 80 percent in 2009.4 The influx of donor money 
created incentives for individuals and groups to form new organizations and 
compete for funds, which contributed to the explosive growth in the number of 
organizations. Since the shift occurred at a time when many countries were facing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Data from the website of the NGO Branch of the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, http://csonet.org, accessed 12 February 2013. 
4 World Bank, “Defining Civil Society,” http://go.worldbank.org/Y55YH23K50, accessed 12 February 
2013. 
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cuts in state budgets that left many government bureaucrats unemployed and 
stagnant economies that limited other economic opportunities, the incentives to 
start and grow non-governmental development organizations were particularly 
strong (Fowler, 1995). A feedback effect reinforced the prominence of the non-state 
sector: as the number of viable organizations increased and the scope of their 
development efforts expanded, funding them became even more attractive to 
donors.   
Several internal factors explain the growth of civil society organizations and 
their increasing involvement in service provision in Kenya. Following independence, 
political elites responded to shrinking budgets and citizens’ increasing demands for 
services5 by encouraging people to form self-help groups, known as harambee, to 
provide social welfare. The community-based groups took the initiative (by, for 
example, building schools and health facilities) and applied for matching funds from 
the state to support their endeavors. Though the institutionalized support for 
groups eventually waned as state funding disappeared and structural adjustment 
policies were implemented, the strategic choice of political elites to structure social 
welfare around harambee contributed to the growth of civil society organizations 
and their role in social service provision (Semboja & Therkildsen, 1995). Between 
1992 and 2002, the number of registered CBOs (harambee groups and their 
successors) skyrocketed from 30,000 to 220,000 (Brass, 2010; Kanyinga, 1995). 
Additionally, the number of registered NGOs increased from 511 in 1996 to more 
than 7,000 by 2013,6 and a 1990 survey indicated that the combined yearly budget 
of NGOs involved in social welfare was $200 million, a figure equivalent to 31 
percent of yearly government expenditures on education, health, and social welfare 
(Obiyan, 2005). By 1991, the World Bank estimated that NGOs provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 According to Kanyinga (1995), citizens’ increasing demands for services largely resulted from the 
political strategy pursued by elites seeking to achieve independence by promoting popular 
nationalist movements. In order to win support for their efforts, they promised that an independent 
Kenyan state would provide the services and public goods that were under-provided or exclusionary 
under the colonial regime. 
6 Government of Kenya NGO Coordination Board website, http://www.ngobureau.or.ke, accessed 12 
February 2013.	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approximately 40 percent of all health services in Kenya (Semboja & Therkildsen, 
1995).  
Comprehensive data documenting the nature and scope of non-state social 
welfare provision across the developing world is scarce, but most observers agree 
that Kenya’s experience is not unique. In their introduction to a special issue of 
Public Administration and Development devoted to the subject, Batley and Rose 
note that:  
Governments have widely failed to provide adequate public services. In 
many developing countries, non-state providers could be seen as filling 
the gaps left by the failure of government services. Indeed, the situation 
is often reversed—it is the government that is the minority provider. 
(2011, p. 230) 
 
As the preceding historical account illuminates, the key forces generating this 
reality stemmed from lack of government resources and weak state capacity, 
external pressures to liberalize the economy, and a general distrust of the 
developmental state rather than a theoretically- or empirically-based preference for 
non-state provision (Mehrotra, 2005; Semboja & Therkildsen, 1995). As Fowler 
(1995) argues in the context of East Africa, “the division of labor between NGOs and 
the government results from historical circumstances and imperatives, it is not a 
product of conscious choice” (p. 61). Despite an incomplete understanding of the 
dynamics and effects of this unconscious choice, policymakers, international 
organizations, and donors continue to promote non-state provision and allocate 
significant portions of aid funds to non-state providers. The analysis in this 
dissertation suggest, however, that strategies to promote and fund non-state 
provision rarely consider contextual factors and often contribute to an increasingly 
fragmented service environment that has negative consequences for households’ 
access to services.  
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Overview of Non-State Social Welfare Provision 
Typology of Providers 
Non-state provision of services is defined as all providers operating outside 
the public sector, and it includes both for profit and not-for-profit entities (Moran & 
Batley, 2004). The range of providers that meet this criterion is extensive and 
diverse, incorporating organizations of varying sizes, scopes, and missions (Assaad, 
1999; DiMuzio, 2008; Otiso, 2000; Otiso, 2003). Most typologies in the literature 
tend to classify providers according to their origins (e.g. international, domestic, 
local), sources of funding (international, domestic, the state, self-funding), and the 
degree of formality or informality of the organization’s structure and operation (see, 
for example, Cammett & MacLean, 2014; Moran & Batley, 2004). Table 1.1 
indicates the main types of non-state providers that operate across the developing 
world.  
Table 1.1: Typology of Non-State Service Providers 
 FORMAL           INFORMAL 
For-Profit 
Companies 
Secular Non-
Governmental 
Organizations 
(NGOs) 
Ethnic/Sectarian 
Organization 
Faith-Based 
Organizations 
(FBOs) 
Community-
Based 
Organizations 
(CBOs) 
Informal 
Providers 
L
E
V
E
L
 O
F
 
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
 
International Multi-national corporations 
International 
NGOs/INGOs (e.g. 
Oxfam, CARE) 
Transnational ethnic 
organizations and 
networks 
International 
religious charities 
(e.g. World Vision) 
N/A N/A 
Domestic 
For-profit firms 
and 
institutions 
Domestic NGOs Ethnic and sectarian political groups 
Local FBOs and 
religious groups 
Village or 
neighborhood-
based, sometimes 
formed on the basis 
of common identity 
(e.g. ethnicity) 
Small scale 
informal 
providers and 
individual 
practitioners 
Adapted from Cammett & MacLean (2014) 
 
Of the types of providers listed in the table, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) populate most of the literature on non-state provision (see, for example, 
Bebbington, 2004; Brass, 2010; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Clayton, 1998; 
Fowler, 1991, 1995; Hearn, 1998, 2007; Mercer, 2002; Rose, 2007). In the context of 
Kenya, non-state social welfare is predominantly provided by secular non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and 
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community-based organizations (CBOs, which also include harambee groups) 
(Kanyinga, 1995; Brass, 2010). An NGO, according to the Government of Kenya, is: 
A private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations not operated for 
profit or for other commercial purposes but which have organized themselves 
nationally or internationally for the benefit of the public at large and for the 
promotion of social welfare, development, charity, or research in the areas 
inclusive but not restricted to health, relief, agricultural, education, industry 
and supply of amenities and services (Republic of Kenya, 1992). 
 
This definition and the legal classification and registration of organizations based 
upon it do not differentiate between secular and non-secular orientations, though 
the majority of NGOs registered with the government are secular (Brass, 2010).  
Although non-secular organizations are sometimes considered a subset of 
NGOs, MacLean and Cammett (2014) characterize faith-based organizations 
(FBOs) by their “administrative, cultural, and/or financial connections to religious 
communities, traditions, or places of worship” (p. 47). In Kenya, many individual 
churches or national-level church organizations operate schools and clinics but do 
not register as NGOs.7 An examination of non-state provision focusing solely on 
NGOs would miss the significant contributions of these groups.  
Community-based organizations (CBOs) comprise another category of non-
state providers.8 Cammett and MacLean (2014) define CBOs as “self-organized 
grassroots associations formed to serve the shared, vested interests of the members 
of a neighborhood or community” (p. 48). CBOs often formalize connections made in 
schools, churches, ethnic groups, youth, sports, or cultural associations; the 
grassroots organizational framework they provide is often utilized as a vehicle for 
service provision (Otiso, 2000; Post & Mwangi, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003; Vakil, 
1996). CBOs are funded primarily by contributions from community members or 
NGOs, and there is wide variation in the degree of formalization and connection 
with the state or other external institutions (Kyessi, 2005; Otiso, 2003).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As Brass (2010) notes, the fact that many faith-based organizations engaged in activities that fall 
within the definition of NGOs do not register as such with the NGO Coordination Board makes it 
very difficult to assess the extent of FBO involvement in service provision.  
8 While NGOs are registered by the NGO Coordination Board, CBOs register with the Ministry of 
Culture and Social Services as specified in the Societies Act (Brass, 2010). 
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Though typologies like the one depicted in the chart are useful for thinking 
about the diversity of service providers, the distinctions tend to be less clear in 
practice. It is often difficult, for example, to differentiate between services provided 
by NGOs and those provided by CBOs. Many NGOs in Kenya rely on CBOs to 
implement their work; observers often discover “nested” relations in which 
international NGOs fund the programs of a Kenyan NGO, which then redistributes 
funds and organizes services through various CBOs (Brass, 2010). Additionally, just 
because an organization is considered a CBO does not mean it is self-organized or 
grassroots in nature. The emergence of community participation as a “best practice” 
and donor emphasis on CBO involvement sometimes lead external actors to impose 
organizational structures where none exist. In Kenya, Post and Mwangi (2009) 
state that “many official CBOs have not arisen spontaneously, but rather in 
response to the desire of NGOs to have a community counterpart” (p. 673). The 
extent to which these CBOs are representative of community interests, supported 
by community residents, and equal partners with external actors should be 
questioned, as social cohesion and bottom-up collective action are difficult to 
externally impose (Beall, 2000; DiMuzio, 2008; Gilbert & Ward, 1985).   
NSPs: Improving Service Provision or Contributing to the 
Problem? 
Until the mid-1990s, the development policy-making community produced 
most of the literature on non-state service provision, and it promoted non-state 
provision based on both neoliberal theory and the emerging emphasis on 
participation within development studies (Hearn, 2007). From the neoliberal 
perspective, economic models suggest that the introduction of multiple non-state 
providers (NSPs) creates competition that promotes efficiency, a greater diversity 
and customization of services, and improved accountability between providers and 
users (Brett, 1993; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Hansmann, 1987; Sood, 2000; Weisbrod, 
1975). Organizational theory suggests that the less hierarchical, more flexible, and 
more democratic structure of NSPs (compared to government bureaucracies) allows 
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them to be more innovative and aware of and responsive to the needs of local 
communities, and thus more effective in service delivery (Brett, 1993; Brinkerhoff, 
2002; Douglas, 1987; Sood, 2000). Because the NSP literature focuses mainly on 
non-profit NGOs, the lack of profit-seeking motivation and widespread perception of 
these organizations as altruistic and committed to serving the poor lead proponents 
to argue that non-state providers are more capable than the state of addressing the 
myriad problems with social welfare provision observed across the developing world 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002; Douglas, 1987; Korten, 1987; Sood, 2000).   
A second strand of literature promotes non-state provision because of NSPs’ 
potential to contribute to positive development outcomes beyond service provision 
itself. In response to the failures of state-led development in Africa and elsewhere, 
Korten (1989) articulates a new vision for development which views NGOs as 
“instruments of voluntary people’s action, capable of enhancing democracy (broadly 
defined to include both economic and political democracy), social justice, self-
reliance ...sustainability [and] the elimination of exploitation” in development 
programs (p. 2). Many scholars (e.g., Bratton, 1989) generally agree that the 
proliferation of NGOs and other NSPs usually strengthens civil society by 
facilitating the involvement of previously disenfranchised groups and individuals 
and promoting collective action for improved service provision. Others extend this 
argument, claiming that the increased participation in civil society reduces 
economic differentiation, mitigates class and other identity-based conflicts, and 
contributes to the integration of society as a whole (Brett, 1993). By exposing 
citizens to democratic practices, creating opportunities for organization and 
collective action, and increasing expectations and demands for services, the growth 
of NGOs and non-state provision can act as a force for democratization.    
By the mid-1990s, a strand of literature more critical of NGOs and non-state 
service provision began to emerge. Observers with experience in developing contexts 
claimed that existing accounts were overly optimistic about NGO capacity and 
contributions (Gideon, 1998; Mukhija, 2005):   
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NGOs have been heralded as important urban partners, reaching where 
governments and international agencies cannot reach and objectively 
addressing urban poverty and representing the urban poor. Nevertheless, it 
is highly questionable whether on their own, NGOs have the potential to 
bring about fundamental transformation or to assault the structural causes 
of poverty. (Beall, 2000, p. 850) 
 
As Edwards and Hulme (1996) note, “much of the case for emphasizing the role of 
NGOs and grassroots organizations [in the early literature] rests on ideological 
grounds rather than empirical verification” (p. 961). Donors’ decision to divert aid 
resources from states to non-state actors ensures that state service provision will be 
less effective, even if the non-state actors do not have a true comparative advantage 
(Fowler, 1995; Hearn, 1998; Hearn, 2007; Mkandawire, 2004; Semboja & 
Therkildsen, 1995).    
Though empirical data was (and is) still scarce, the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies and donor priorities that favored NGOs resulted in 
increased involvement of non-state actors in service provision, and case studies 
documented the experiences. Robinson and White’s (1997) study of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in service provision, based on an extensive review of available 
case studies, found that non-state provision plays an important role when state 
provision is weak or non-existent, but the sector is nevertheless characterized by a 
number of deficiencies. Problems highlighted by Robinson, White, and other studies 
include: 
•   Little evidence supports the claim the NGO service provision is more effective 
than state provision; 
•   The cost-effectives of NGOs is questionable and unsupported by empirical 
evidence; 
•   NGOs are not necessarily more democratic, accountable, or less hierarchical 
or bureaucratic than the state; 
•   NGOs may not reach the poorest groups in society; 
•   The scale of coverage is often limited and patchy, the quality of services is 
highly variable, and competition between NGOs can lead to fragmentation 
and overlap in services; 
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•   NGOs often have little autonomy from donor agencies, leading to services 
that are more responsive to the priorities of donors than those of local 
communities; and 
•   NGOs are highly dependent on external assistance, so the services are not 
sustainable if the funding disappears 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002; Edwards & Hulme, 1998; Fisher, 1997; Fowler, 1997; Hilhorst, 
2003; Lewis & Opuku-Mensah, 2006; Oyugi, 2008; Robinson & White, 1997; Sood, 
2000; Tvedt, 2006; Zaidi, 1999).   
The perception of NGOs as transparent, accountable entities whose interests 
are always in harmony with the interests of the communities in which they work 
should, based on experiences recounted in the literature, be questioned (DiMuzio, 
2008; Ganapti, 2009; Gideon, 1998; Otiso, 2003; Post & Mwangi, 2009; Wit & 
Berner, 2009). Very little is actually known about the NGO sector. Most NGOs have 
poor evaluation procedures, and few studies seek to understand how variations in 
type, ideology, and organizational structure affect both the nature and outcome of 
NGO involvement (Fernandez-Maldonado & Bredenoord, 2010; Otiso, 2003; Vakil, 
1996). Otiso spent several years working with NGOs in the slums of Nairobi, and he 
cautions against accepting conventional wisdom: 
Many NGOs are not paragons of financial responsibility as is widely believed, 
but are opportunistic moneymaking schemes, especially in an era of increased 
donor funds flows through NGOs rather than the state. This opportunism not 
only causes some NGOs to shift locations and objectives to attract donor 
resources, it also causes others to make sufficient impact to attract funds but 
not enough to empower their beneficiaries. (2003, p. 224)  
 
Additionally, NGOs are not necessarily the best vehicle for promoting community 
participation and equitable resource allocation. Case studies reveal a tendency to 
ignore – either unknowingly or intentionally in an attempt to avoid conflict – 
existing social cleavages and the distribution of power among various groups 
(Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Otiso, 2000; Post & Mwangi, 2009). According to Mercer’s 
(2002) review of the literature, “the social, political, cultural, or economic cleavages 
that exist in society are more likely to be replicated in (and even exacerbated by) 
NGOs than they are to be challenged” (p. 18).     
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Another point raised by some scholars is the issue of “philanthropic 
particularism.” One source of non-state providers’ relative efficiency arises because 
they do not face the same expectations of universality and equity as the state 
(Bebbington, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Douglas, 1987; Salamon, 1987). Although 
there may be some conditionality attached to external funding, NGOs are generally 
able to choose their location, clientele, projects, and services. Some studies attribute 
NGOs’ failure to reach the poorest citizens to philanthropic particularism 
(Bebbington, 2004).  
In addition to concerns raised about the services themselves, many scholars 
argue that the provision of services by NGOs and other non-state actors undermines 
state legitimacy and capacity and reduces accountability between states and 
citizens (Clayton et al, 2000; Obiyan, 2005). A growing body of research continues to 
explore the consequences of both state retrenchment and non-state service provision 
on the state itself and notions of citizenship, but there is little consensus among 
scholars. Some argue that when NSPs fill gaps in service provision, state legitimacy 
is often enhanced because people give the state credit for providing services even 
when the state is not involved (e.g., Brass, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Tsai, 2007). 
Others disagree, suggesting that when NGOs compensate for the absence of the 
state, their continued presence and community-centered approach to provision can 
justify the state’s continued under-provision of infrastructure and services, foster a 
dependency relationship between the NGO and community, and weaken 
accountability between the state and citizens (DiMuzio, 2008; Gulyani & Bassett, 
2007; Otiso, 2003).  
In general, existing research on non-state provision is fragmented. 
McLoughlin (2011) describes the literature as “prescriptive, incomplete, 
anecdotal…and dominated by subjective accounts of selected case studies largely 
produced within the NGO community” (p. 242), while Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 
(2006) lament that “an overemphasis on organizational case studies leaves a picture 
that is rich in detail but lacking in contextualization and weak theorization” (p. 
699). Furthermore, the focus on the service providers, the services themselves, the 
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effects on state legitimacy, and other organizational and macro-level outcomes offer 
no account of the consequences for individuals.  
Overview of Research Design 
The dependent variable in the dissertation is the micro-experience of social 
service provision. There are multiple dimensions to the concept, and I describe the 
research design and methodology in detail in Chapter 3 and the operationalization 
of the various dimensions in the context of the models and research questions 
throughout the chapters. What follows is a conceptual overview and an explanation 
of key methodological choices.  
Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable 
Access to social welfare is typically conceptualized according to a quantitative 
level of services or an objective measure of access like physical proximity, both of 
which fail to account for differences in quality and service utilization. In order to 
gain insight into households’ qualitative experiences of accessing services provided 
by non-state actors and examine whether utilization rates, perceptions of quality, 
and satisfaction with services vary systematically, I follow MacLean (2011) and 
Bratton (2012) and adopt a multi-dimensional conceptualization of the micro-
experience of accessing services. By examining the multiple dimensions, I generate 
a broader understanding of the consequences of state retrenchment and the growth 
of non-state health and education provision for households’ access to services.   
The first dimension is service utilization. By documenting whether 
individuals (or members of their household) have accessed services provided by non-
state actors, it is possible to identify any systematic differences between individuals 
that interact with NSPs and those that do not. 
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Table 1.2: Dimensions of the Micro-Experience of Social Welfare Provision 
Conceptual 
Dimension Indicators 
Service 
Utilization 
•  Utilization and/or attempted utilization of health or education services 
provided by non-state actors in the past year (and frequency of use) 
•  Utilization and/or attempted utilization of health or education services 
provided by the state in the past year (and frequency of use) 
Perceived 
Accessibility 
•  Awareness of services provided by state and non-state actors in the 
community 
•  Are the services user-friendly? Inclusive? 
•  Are there any barriers (transportation, affordability, exclusion based on 
identity or other characteristic, etc.) to accessing the services? 
Perceived 
Quality 
•  Three sub-dimensions: service product (i.e., technical quality), service 
delivery (i.e., functional quality), and service environment 
•  Specific quality-related issues with health and education services 
(facilities, staff, etc.) 
Overall 
Perception of 
Social Welfare 
Provision 
•  Are the health and education services provided in the community able to 
meet individuals’ and households’ needs? The needs of the community in 
general? 
•  How confident are residents that in the event of a medical emergency they 
would be able to access and afford quality care (regardless of provider)?   
•  Are the educational services in the community equipping members of their 
household with the skills necessary to escape poverty and build sustainable 
livelihoods? What about other people in the community? 
 
 
The second dimension is perceived accessibility. Previous research on service 
provision suggests that the objective criterion of physical proximity – commonly 
used as an indicator of access – and the subjective judgment of accessibility and 
ease of use are independent (Bratton, 2007).9 Although spatial proximity may be 
correlated with perceived accessibility, Bratton’s (2012) research in sub-Saharan 
Africa suggests that spatial proximity is merely one component of individuals’ 
perceptions of access and is often a weak predictor. In order understand the micro-
level consequences of non-state provision, it is important to document individuals’ 
perceptions of service accessibility, including their awareness of services being 
provided in the community, ease of use and degree of inclusivity, and any barriers 
that prevent or make it difficult to access services (e.g., transportation, cost, 
exclusionary practices, etc.). Previous research suggests that awareness of service 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Bratton (2007, p. 17) includes both physical proximity and ease of use in a multivariate explanation 
of service satisfaction. 
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availability and the salience of particular barriers may vary systematically between 
population groups (Goddard & Smith, 2001). Furthermore, several studies have 
established the importance of perceptions of accessibility to service-seeking 
behaviors (Amooti-Kaguna & Nuwaha, 2000; Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Bazant et al, 
2009; Ngware et al, 2013; Onah et al, 2006).  
The third dimension is perceived quality. There is an extensive literature on 
the conceptualization of service quality (for a review, see Brady & Cronin, 2001), 
but I employ a three-component model developed by Rust and Oliver (1994) that has 
been widely used in health care surveys. Soliciting users’ perceptions regarding the 
three components—the service product (i.e., technical quality), the service delivery 
(i.e., functional quality), and the service environment (e.g., facilities)—allows the 
researcher to examine the sub-dimensions individually or to create an overall index 
of service quality. While subjective judgments about quality are not equivalent to 
objective measurements of quality or the quantitative outcome indicators commonly 
employed in the literature (e.g., number of vaccines administered, school attendance 
rates, money spent on health and education), research shows that perceptions of 
quality affect individuals’ willingness to utilize services, particularly when there are 
real or opportunity costs to doing so (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; 
Karkee et al, 2014; Kiguli et al, 2009; Leonard, 2003; Muriithi, 2013; Prata, 
Montagu, & Fefferys, 2005; Tooley & Dixon, 2006). In the case of education, for 
example, parents are less willing to pay school fees and accept decreases in 
children’s contributions to the household due to school attendance if they are 
unsatisfied with the quality and do not anticipate long-term benefits to materialize 
(Hillman & Jenkner, 2004; Tooley et al, 2008). The situation is similar for health 
care, as people are less likely to seek out and pay for some level of preventative and 
prenatal care unless they believe the quality of care is acceptable (Amooti-Kaguna 
& Nuwaha, 2000; Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Bazant et al, 2009). In this way, 
perceptions of quality are of first-order importance and a crucial component of the 
micro-level experience of service provision.    
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The fourth and final dimension involves individuals’ overall perceptions of 
the ability of the social welfare providers (state and non-state) in their community 
to meet the needs of members of their households and the community at large. This 
dimension is not included in other studies that seek to broaden the 
conceptualization of access (e.g., Bratton, 2012; MacLean, 2011), but it provides a 
subjective assessment of the degree to which the system of health and education 
services promotes individual and community well-being. In the event of a medical 
emergency, for example, how confident are individuals that they would be able to 
access and afford quality care, and do confidence levels vary systematically? This 
dimension, though highly subjective, seeks to illuminate the extent to which the 
system as a whole reduces vulnerability and promotes sustainable livelihoods. 
Why Surveys? 
An understanding of the micro-dynamics of non-state social welfare provision 
cannot be gleaned from expenditure data, objective measures of spatial proximity, 
school attendance and immunization rates, and standard health and education 
outcomes. Though commonly employed in existing research, these indicators offer 
no insight into individuals’ experiences and perceptions of service quality, and their 
contribution to discussions of the mechanisms underlying distributional outcomes 
and obstacles to access and utilization are inferential.   
Furthermore, analyses of household-level Afrobarometer survey data on 
satisfaction with government health and education services reveal that subjective 
criteria exert more influence over satisfaction than objective criteria (Bratton, 2007, 
p. 23). For Afrobarometer respondents, the most important determinant of 
satisfaction is ease of use, or the degree to which citizens “regard services as being 
open to all types of clientele and as being uncomplicated to operate” (Bratton, 2007, 
p. 24). Objective criteria like physical proximity were far less significant. Similarly, 
Carlson (2011) surveyed residents in Uganda about the quality of state service 
provision in their communities and compared the results to her own inventory of 
providers and assessment of facility and service quality. She found that respondents 
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accurately estimate objective quality indicators (e.g. the number of textbooks or 
medical center staff), but that their subjective assessment of overall quality is also 
impacted by their attitudes towards the government and the regime in power. 
Utilizing survey methodology in the context of this dissertation research allowed me 
to gather data on a mixture of objective and subjective variables related to service 
provision as well as the demographic and sociopolitical variables necessary to 
examine contextual factors and construct community-level indices for meso-level 
analyses.  
Why Health and Education? 
Social welfare encompasses a broad array of services, but I chose to focus on 
health and education for three reasons. First, the links between health and 
education and economic growth, poverty reduction, individual welfare and well-
being, and other desirable macro- and micro-level phenomena are well established 
in the literature. Empirical evidence indicates that the provision of social welfare 
services like health and education has important effects on poverty, democracy, 
economic growth, political stability, and social cohesion (Easterly & Levine, 1997; 
Stewart, 2001). Healthier and better-educated individuals are less likely to fall into 
poverty and more likely to build livelihood opportunities, protect themselves from 
economic shocks, and contribute to long-term economic growth (Berry et al, 2004; 
Bratton, 2007; Krishna, 2007; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005). Spink (2007) argues that 
absent or inequitable services actually generate poverty and perpetuate individuals’ 
and families’ vulnerability. It is important to note, however, that the effects on 
poverty, democracy, and economic growth associated with improvements in social 
welfare provision are different if access to quality services is inequitably 
distributed. The development of systematic differentiation in access to health and 
education services between groups produces effects in other areas, as initial 
differences condition outcomes and limit future possibilities. Unfortunately, such 
inequalities are remarkably durable, even if formal mechanisms of exclusion are 
eliminated (Stewart, 2007; Tilly, 1998). Experience within settings differentiated by 
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levels of exclusion provides individuals across groups systematically different and 
unequal preparations for future economic, social, and political contexts, and this 
inequality is subject to increasing magnitude with each ensuing generation. 
Second, the majority of health and education services are provided through 
what Cammett and Issar (2010) call “bricks and mortar” institutions. Whereas the 
nature of some services allows non-state actors to be minimally involved in service 
delivery and have no physical location within the community, providers of health 
and education services necessarily interact with beneficiaries on some level and 
have some physical existence (however informal or rudimentary) in or near the 
community. In addition to being logistically easier to locate, individuals are more 
likely to be aware of the presence of the NSPs.  
Finally, I chose health and education services because of the prominence of 
non-state provision in these sectors and the applicability of the services to a broad 
segment of the population. Most households have a need for health care at some 
point and many have (or had) school-age children, so information about their 
experiences related to these services (or lack thereof and why) provide fruitful data 
for analysis.   
Why Kenya? 
Kenya is a prime case study for this research. The country falls near the 
middle of the less-developed countries internationally, making it representative of 
the category of countries as a whole. Kenya ranks 145th out of 186 countries in the 
2012 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013); this ranking locates it near the top 
of the list of countries that fall in the “low human development” category. Similarly, 
Freedom House scores Kenya the average “partly free” 4.0 out of 7.0 in its annual 
Freedom in the World index (Freedom House, 2013).    
In addition to being generally representative of less-developed countries, 
Kenya offers an interesting context for an examination of non-state social welfare 
provision for several reasons. First, the relationship between NGOs and the Kenyan 
government has varied over time. The regime of President Moi, who governed from 
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1978 to 2002, was clearly threatened by the prominence of NGOs and viewed them 
as a potential threat to state legitimacy. Moi instituted the NGO Act in 1990 and 
used the oversight and regulatory mechanisms it granted the NGO Coordination 
Bureau to harass and de-register several NGOs during the 1990s. When President 
Kibaki came to power in 2002, the administration attempted to work with NGOs in 
a more complimentary manner. Several popular NGO leaders were hired into the 
civil service, and state cooperation with (or co-optation of, according to some 
observers) NGOs and other NSPs has been widely publicized (Brass, 2010). As a 
consequence of these shifting attitudes and policies, Kenya serves as somewhat of a 
middle ground between countries with extremely hostile relationships with NSPs 
and those that welcome and enable non-state providers.   
Second, public service provision in Kenya has long been fraught with 
distributional issues related to ethnic identity and political affiliation. Recognizing 
the importance of inequalities between categorical groups, Stewart (2001) 
differentiates horizontal inequalities, which exist between culturally defined 
groups, from vertical inequalities, which exist across individuals and households.  
During the more than 45 years since independence, Kenya has amassed significant 
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups and regions (Stewart, 
2010).10 Social welfare provision is one dimension of these inequalities, as reflected 
by significant differences in social expenditures and outcomes by region.11 In an 
examination of public spending patterns, Barkan and Chege (1989) find that, while 
overall levels of expenditure are nearly equal under two different administrations, 
the percentages going to road construction in two districts comprised of different 
ethnic groups shifted from 44 percent and 32 percent in 1979 to 20 percent and 65 
percent by the end of the 1980s. Additionally, Miguel (2004) finds that higher local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Stewart’s article provides an extensive historical overview and empirical support for this claim. 
11 Ethnicity is highly correlated with geographic region in Kenya, as most regions are dominated by 
a particular ethnic group. The Kikuyu are predominately in Central Province, Luhya in Western 
Province, Luo in Nyanza and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley. The Rift Valley (the location of the worst of 
the violence in 2008) contains sizeable numbers of Kikuyu and Luhya as well (Stewart, 2010).	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ethnic fragmentation in Kenyan school districts leads to lower funding and worse 
school facilities. 
Why Informal Settlements? 
Informal settlements are visible and enduring manifestations of urban 
poverty. According to UN-Habitat,   
...a slum is an area that combines, to various extents, the following 
characteristics: inadequate access to safe water, inadequate access to 
sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing, 
overcrowding, and insecure residential status. (2003, p. 12)   
 
Currently, nearly one billion people live in informal settlements around the world 
(Acioly, 2007; Greene, 2010; Martínez et al, 2008), and that number is projected to 
increase by five million each year based on recent growth rates (UN-Habitat, 2010).   
Informal settlements in Nairobi are a prime location to conduct research into 
the micro-level consequences of non-state service provision for several reasons. 
Because one of the defining features of informal settlements is the inadequate 
public provision of infrastructure and basic services, non-state actors provide the 
majority of the health and education services utilized by residents. The limited 
access to services provided by the state offers a useful context for studying non-state 
provision. At the same time, there are differences in the landscape of non-state 
providers among the settlements in Nairobi, allowing for variation in the 
community-level factors. 
Additionally, locating the research in Nairobi’s slum communities makes it 
possible to conduct a meaningful examination of distributional consequences. 
Unlike other areas of the city or locations across the country, residents of informal 
settlements reflect the ethnic diversity of the country. Groups often cluster in 
neighborhoods within a slum, but existing surveys suggest that the demographics of 
most settlements as a whole generally mirror the demographics of the country 
(K’Akumu & Olima, 2007). Previous studies concerned with equity of non-state 
provision used the geographic distribution of NGOs across the country as a proxy 
for the distribution of services and interviews with NGO leaders about how and why 
they chose where to locate to explain the patterns observed (e.g., Bebbington, 2004; 
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Brass, 2012). In the context of Brass’s research in Kenya, region served as a proxy 
for ethnicity. Neither proxy is an ideal indicator, but the geographic distribution of 
NGOs offers no insight into service quality or micro-level trends in access or service 
utilization. Furthermore, existing studies seeking to cover broader geographic areas 
focus solely on NGOs (Brass, 2010, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Hearn, 1998, 2007; 
Mercer, 1999, 2002; Teamey & McLoughlin, 2009). By locating this research in 
informal settlements where a large, ethnically diverse population resides in a small 
geographic area, it is possible to include the entire spectrum of non-state providers 
in the study. Expanding the scope contributes to a more comprehensive assessment 
of the micro-level consequences of non-state provision 
Finally, locating the study in informal settlements has value because the 
residents are among the most in need of access to high-quality health and education 
services. Data collected by the United Nations indicates that informal settlement 
dwellers are more likely to die earlier, experience more hunger and disease, attain 
less education, and have fewer opportunities for employment than urban residents 
occupying formal housing (UN-Habitat, 2007). Results of a 2009 UN-Habitat survey 
show that, in all 27 cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America covered by the survey, 
informal settlements and their inhabitants are  
…systematically excluded from mainstream economic, social, cultural and 
political programs and initiatives…when asked to rank the most vulnerable 
groups in their respective cities for the purposes of the survey, experts 
reckoned that along with the disabled, slum dwellers were the most 
vulnerable in terms of exclusion. (UN-Habitat, 2010, p. 86)  
 
A plethora of survey and census data indicates that, compared to the inhabitants of 
non-slum areas, slum dwellers are often subject to multiple layers of exclusion, as 
they are far more likely to be poor and uneducated, migrants or ethnic minorities, 
and female (Abdenur, 2009; Acioly, 2009; Amis, 1984; Brakarz, 2002; Gulyani et al, 
2010; UN-Habitat, 2010; Wekesa et al, 2010). 
Though residents of informal settlements are among those most in need of 
health and education services, they are also among those with the fewest resources 
to pay for them. Current events suggest that the need for accessible, equitable, and 
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sustainable health and education services in poor urban communities will only 
intensify in the future. Displaced by war and persecution, masses of people—
estimated at nearly 60 million and increasing daily—are pouring into refugee 
camps, existing informal settlements, and villages destroyed by violence 
(Silverstein, 2015). Koonings and Kruijt (2009) predict that the concentration of 
large segments of the urban poor “will have fundamental socioeconomic and 
political consequences and will involve the possibility of destabilization of the 
economic, social, and political order” (p. 8). Examining the consequences of state 
retrenchment and the growth of non-state provision for some of the most vulnerable 
and excluded members of society serves as an important test of the theoretical 
arguments propelling state retrenchment from social welfare provision.      
Roadmap of the Chapters Ahead 
In the chapters that follow, I aim to successively deepen our understanding of 
the micro-dynamics of health and education provision in Kibera and Korogocho, 
tying findings to research from other low-income urban communities and developing 
countries to show that surveyed households’ experiences are not unique. Chapters 2 
and 3 provide the background necessary to interpret the subsequent findings: 
Chapter 2 supplies a detailed description of the study context and the systems of 
health and education provision in the communities. Chapter 3 outlines the research 
design and methodology employed throughout the analysis.  
Chapters 4 and 5 focus solely on the household-level characteristics 
associated with access, utilization, and satisfaction. Chapter 4 explores the 
household-level consequences of the simultaneous processes of state retrenchment 
and the growth in non-state provision. It examines the relative contributions of 
state and non-state providers to health and education provision in the communities 
and the micro-level characteristics associated with interaction with state and non-
state services. Chapter 5 introduces the concept of social proximity and estimates 
the extent to which household-level sociopolitical factors are associated with various 
dimensions of the micro-experience of provision.  
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Chapters 6 and 7 broaden the analysis to include the role of the community-
level context in shaping households’ experiences with health provision. Chapter 6 
examines the community-level sociopolitical context, while Chapter 7 looks at the 
organizational context, which includes characteristics of both service providers and 
civil society organizations. Finally, the conclusion reviews findings and implications 
for policy and practice.  
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Chapter 2 
Study Context: Nairobi, Informal Settlements,  
and Fragmented Systems of Health  
and Education Provision 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, I described the historical context that led to the 
growth of non-state social welfare provision across the globe and furnished a 
typology of common non-state providers. In this chapter, I focus on the historical 
events, policy changes, and demographic shifts that have contributed to the 
development of the systems of health and education provision present in Nairobi’s 
informal settlements. While I focus specifically on Kenya in this study, I include 
literature from other countries to highlight commonalities between Nairobi and 
other cities in the developing world. Throughout the chapter, I draw on an 
interdisciplinary compendium of literature and data to construct a picture of the 
social, economic, and political contexts in which survey participants reside.  
Following a brief description of Nairobi, I outline some of the challenges 
associated with life in informal settlements. Slums play an important role in 
housing low-income individuals and families in urban areas of the developing world. 
Because of this, slum formation must be viewed as a key aspect of poor households’ 
livelihood strategies. Informal settlements provide housing for migrants, 
theoretically enabling them to acclimate to the city, obtain employment, and save 
enough money to move to higher quality, formal sector housing (Gulyani & 
Talukdar, 2008; Smit, 2006). Slum residents provide a continuous supply of low-cost 
labor and drive the informal economy, offering services and commercial activities 
for community members and the city at large (UN-Habitat, 2003). As Gulyani and 
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Bassett (2007) note, the development literature often “valorizes” informal 
settlements for these reasons.   
In reality, however, while a minority of slum dwellers may experience 
upward mobility, the majority are unable to escape the inadequate living conditions 
of the slums (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008). The living conditions impede the 
development of residents’ human and economic capital and impose negative 
consequences on the city as a whole (Ferguson & Navarrete, 2003). The review of 
the micro- and macro-level consequences of informal settlements in this chapter 
reinforces the critical importance of high-quality, equitable, affordable, and widely 
accessibile education and health service provision in these communities.    
The next two sections successively address health and education provision in 
Nairobi. For each service type, I review the historical evolution of provision and 
offer a brief account of the services currently provided by state and non-state actors. 
Together, these sections provide an overview of the service environment that shapes 
surveyed households’ experiences. The picture of the systems of health and 
education provision—in both Nairobi at large and the slums in particular—that 
emerges portrays a fragmented, opaque, and exceedingly diverse service 
environment. The chapter concludes with descriptions of Kibera and Korogocho and 
the logic that informed their selections as the sites for this research. 
Generating an understanding of how and to what extent households 
successfully navigate the service environment and access quality healthcare and 
schools is one of the primary goals of the dissertation. The background information 
in this chapter reveals an unfortunate paradox: while slum dwellers face multiple 
dimensions of exclusion and vulnerability, the service environment in the 
communities that developed following state retrenchment and the growth of non-
state provision is among the most unregulated and difficult to navigate.    
Nairobi: A City of Contrasts 
Nairobi, the capital of Kenya and the largest city in East Africa, is located in 
the highlands of the south-central area of the country. The city’s name comes from a 
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Maasai phrase meaning “a place of cool waters” (Mitullah, 2003). It was founded in 
1899 during the construction of the Uganda Railway and quickly grew into a 
European settlement and the eventual commercial and business hub of British East 
Africa. Throughout its history, Nairobi has been a divided city with widespread 
marginalization and inequity. The colonial regime designed and enforced a system 
of racial residential segregation that eventually transformed into socioeconomic and 
legal-tenural segregation following independence in 1963 (K’Akumu & Olima, 
2007).  
Pursuing the development of “modern” economic sectors, the nascent Kenyan 
government redirected resources from agriculture to manufacturing and other 
urban enterprises. They provided incentives and supports to urban workers, doing 
nothing to address falling agricultural profits and the needs of rural residents. 
People migrated to Nairobi and other urban areas en masse to escape rural poverty 
and access government benefits, but the industries did not expand at similar rates. 
The supply of affordable housing was small, so un- and under-employed migrants 
and other low-income residents were unable to obtain formal sector housing. 
Informal settlements multiplied in number and size as these residents were forced 
to acquire land through informal (and often illegal) means and build structures with 
whatever materials were available (Annez, Buckley, & Kakarickal, 2010; UN-
Habitat, 2003).  
Currently, an estimated 70 percent of Nairobi’s more than three million 
residents reside in informal settlements that occupy only 5 percent of the city’s land 
area (UN-Habitat, 2012). Most dwellings within these slums are rented by the 
room, and many households occupy single rooms. Despite the lack of basic services 
and the poor quality of the structures, the rents are high (Amis, 1984; Gulyani & 
Talukdar, 2008). Nevertheless, youth and families continue to move to Nairobi from 
rural areas to look for work, and they are joined by an increasing number of 
refugees from Somalia and other surrounding countries. Many of these migrants 
seek shelter in the slums, and the communities are home to members of all of 
Kenya’s ethnic groups (Dafe, 2009).  
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Today, Nairobi is the hub of East Africa, a bustling economic and political 
capital home to Kenya’s richest and most powerful citizens. It is also home to 
Kenya’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens. Standing on the roof of the 28-story 
Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) in Nairobi’s central business 
district (CBD), the view across the city lays bare the stark contrasts contained 
within its borders. The cluster of modern office buildings in the CBD gives way to 
the leafy enclaves populated by the sizable expat community and wealthy Kenyans 
who work in the financial and commercial enterprises or the plethora of 
international organizations and NGOs based in the city. The relative lushness 
stretching out to the expansive Nairobi National Park and the Ngong Hills is 
evidence of the relatively low population density. Modern shopping malls, well-
stocked supermarkets, restaurants, cinemas, and other amenities cater to residents 
of these areas, and their parking lots are filled with late model Land Rovers and 
Mercedes. Only the tall gates topped with razor wire, armed guards searching 
entering vehicles and using long mirrors to check for explosives, and additional 
teams of armed guards ushering patrons through metal detectors and rifling 
through bags suggest that life here may be less idyllic than it appears.  	  
	  
Figure 2.1 View from the KICC to the Ngong Hills with Kibera in the foreground. 	  
Shifting one’s gaze in either direction, the green is, with the exception of the 
occasional park or group of trees, replaced by dirt, asphalt, and concrete. Apartment 
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buildings, businesses, and other structures are constructed closely together as the 
population density increases. The most notable feature of the view from the KICC, 
however, is the sea of corrugated metal visible on the outskirts of the city and in 
swathes between the leaves and concrete. Underneath the corrugated metal roofs of 
the slums, most of Nairobi’s residents live without—or with limited access to—
schools, health care, water, sanitation, and public transportation. The patterns of 
land utilization and residential segregation observable from the aerial view of the 
city have contributed to a systematic and inequitable distribution in both the 
quantity and quality of public services (K’Akumu & Olima, 2007). As the overview 
of health and education provision in Nairobi later in this chapter highlights, the 
inequitable access to services is a product of the interaction between spatial 
segregation and the system of service provision in Nairobi and Kenya as a whole.   
Challenges of Life in Informal Settlements 
Micro-Level Consequences 
Inadequate living conditions in informal settlements affect residents’ health, 
economic opportunities, and prospects for upward mobility. The inadequacy begins 
with the housing units comprising informal settlements. Most dwellings are 
constructed with weak, impermanent building materials, including mud, discarded 
timber, straightened oil drums, used corrugated metal sheets, plastic and canvas 
sheets, and cardboard cartons (Gulis et al, 2004; UN-Habitat, 2003). A survey of 
slums in Nairobi reported that only 12 percent of houses have external walls 
constructed with permanent materials (brick, stone, or concrete blocks), while 32 
percent of houses have dirt floors (Gulyani et al, 2010). The structures provide 
inadequate protection against the weather, and the dirt floors magnify the 
dampness, which has been associated with rheumatism, arthritis, and respiratory 
diseases like pneumonia and bronchitis (Smit, 2006). The impermanent materials 
are particularly susceptible to catching fire; the risk is heightened by indoor 
smoking and cooking without sufficient ventilation (Murray, 2009; Smit, 2006). 
Furthermore, the discarded iron sheets and wood pieces used in construction often 
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contain particles of lead paint and other harmful chemicals associated with stunted 
intellectual growth and behavior problems. Poorly constructed houses create injury 
hazards and breeding grounds for mold, mice and rats, flies, and cockroaches 
(Sheuya et al, 2007). Small, overcrowded housing units facilitate the transmission of 
diseases and contribute to higher rates of diarrhea in children, higher prevalence of 
HIV and AIDS among residents, and higher infant mortality rates in informal 
settlements compared to non-slum areas in the same city (Ambert, 2006; 
Amuyunzu-Nyamongo & Taffa, 2004).    
Aside from the physical structure of the housing units, one of the defining 
features of informal settlements is the inadequate provision of infrastructure and 
basic services. Deficits include lack of (or inadequate levels of): sanitation; piped 
water; electricity; waste collection; storm drainage; street lighting; paved sidewalks 
and roads; emergency routes; schools, clinics, and other institutional buildings; and 
safe leisure areas for adults and children, including playgrounds, parks, and 
meeting spaces (Abdenur, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003). The electricity connection rate 
in the slums of Nairobi was 22 percent in 2010; 77 percent of households rely on 
kerosene or paraffin as an alternative source of lighting (Gulyani et al, 2010). As 
with all other basic services in informal settlements, the quality of connections 
varies but is typically less reliable than in other areas of the city. Frequent outages 
and extended service disruptions are common, and services may only be available 
for a few hours a day even when fully functioning (Baker, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2003). 
Without access to electricity and proper ventilation, households depend on unvented 
biomass fuels for cooking and heating. In addition to the risk of fire, the 
implications for respiratory health include higher rates of lung cancer in adults, low 
birth rates, asthma, bronchitis, pneumonia, and ear infections in children (Adler, 
1994; Sheuya et al, 2007).           
Limited access to clean water is another defining feature of informal 
settlements. Lack of consistent access to clean drinking water and inadequate 
sanitation contribute to outbreaks of chronic diseases, parasitic infections, 
waterborne diseases like cholera, and airborne diseases such as influenza, 
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pneumonia, and tuberculosis (Adler, 1994; Brakarz, 2002). Only 19 percent of slum 
households in Nairobi have access to private, piped water connections via an in-
house receptacle or a yard tap (Gulyani et al, 2010). Due to the lack of availability of 
public services and the unwillingness of private providers to serve low-income 
neighborhoods, the remaining households must rely on alternative sources of 
supply, including kiosks, water resellers, and other small-scale providers 
(Dagdeviren & Robertson, 2009).   
In addition to the lower quality of many of these sources, the alternative 
delivery systems are significantly more expensive. Data from 47 countries and 93 
locations indicates that average water prices charged by private vendors compared 
to the formal network are 1.5 times higher for piped network operators, 4.5 times 
higher for point sources, and up to 12 times higher for mobile distributors; overall, 
the median price of water in informal settlements is almost five times the average 
price (Baker, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2003). As a consequence of the high cost, 
households in informal settlements generally use less than half the amount of water 
as the average household in the same city (UN-Habitat, 2003).   
As Amis (1995) and Gulyani and Talukdar (2008) highlight, the lower-
quality, higher-cost paradox for water provision in slums is part of a general 
problem these households face. The lack of access to affordable formal sector 
provision – either housing or social welfare services – forces low-income households 
to spend more money than should be necessary for low quality, informal housing 
and services. Lack of transportation and easy access to central markets, for 
example, compels slum dwellers to buy lower quality food in small quantities from 
local outlets at higher prices. Incidences of nutritional deprivation are more 
numerous and more extensive than would be expected if low incomes were the only 
limiting factor (UN-Habitat, 2010).          
Toilets, sanitation, and garbage collection are also inadequate in informal 
settlements. Gulyani, Talukdar, and Jack (2010) report that the average number of 
households sharing a toilet facility is 19.1 in Nairobi, translating into averages of 57 
and 60 people sharing one toilet. Approximately 6 percent of Nairobi households 
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have no access to toilet facilities, relying instead on the bush or the use of bags 
discarded on communal piles, railroad tracks, and rivers. The latter option is 
commonly described as the “flying toilet.” Despite the obvious sanitary concerns 
associated with piles of human waste from flying toilets and other garbage, most 
slum households dispose of solid refuse by dumping, burning, or burying it (Dafe, 
2009).   
Estimates for access to organized garbage collection vary by location, but only 
12 percent of households in Nairobi’s informal settlements report some type of 
collection. Only 1 percent of those households are served by a public system, and the 
other 11 percent must pay for private collection; residents complain that both are 
irregular and infrequent (Dafe, 2009; Gulyani et al, 2010). Ooi and Phua (2007) 
emphasize the links between inadequate sanitation and rates of illness and 
mortality, citing studies indicating that poor sanitation explains why Dhaka, 
Bangladesh—where only a quarter of the population has access to the piped sewer 
system and only two-thirds of households are connected to the city’s potable water 
supply—has one of the highest rates of death from infectious diseases in Asia.   
Disposal of liquid waste and stormwater drainage are similarly problematic. 
Although 58 percent of Nairobi slum households have a drain outside their house, 
only 44 percent of these residents report that the drains work properly most of the 
time (Gulyani et al, 2010). The inadequate and poorly functioning drainage 
infrastructure leads to frequent flooding, which has devastating consequences for 
the poorly constructed dwellings. Stagnant water is another byproduct, creating 
fertile conditions for mosquitoes. In malarial countries, the effects on health include 
rises in infant mortality, periodic episodes of debilitating disease among adults, and 
increases in health care costs as residents cope with malaria (Martin & Mathema, 
2010). 
At the level of the neighborhood, informal settlements face additional 
inadequacies. Many settlements are located on environmentally disadvantageous 
land. Areas around railroad tracks, steep slopes, dump sites, marshes, riverbeds 
and other areas prone to flooding, land with contaminated soil or other pollutants, 
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and abandoned railroad or port yards are very common, as are locations subject to 
noxious industrial waste (Brakarz, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2003; Wekesa et al, 2010). 
Korogocho, one of the sites for this study, is located next to the Dandora Municipal 
Dumpsite on the outskirts of Nairobi. The site is an unrestricted dumping site 
containing many hazardous materials. A 2007 study commissioned by the United 
Nations Environment Program examined more than 300 children at St. John’s 
Informal School in Korogocho and found that about 50 percent of the students had 
respiratory problems and 30 percent had blood abnormalities that signaled heavy-
metal poisoning (Kimani, 2008). 
Physical layouts of informal settlements range from fairly organized to 
haphazard, but the density of even highly organized settlements makes the 
introduction of roads, pathways, drainage, water, sanitation, and other 
infrastructure very challenging, practically guarantees that fires will quickly spread 
to multiple dwellings, and limits the ability of fire and rescue services to respond to 
crises (Adler, 1994; Murray, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003). A September 2011 fire in a 
Nairobi slum caused by an oil leak killed at least 75 people and injured hundreds 
more, but the death toll and damage were arguably consequences of – or at least 
exacerbated by – the slum conditions more than the oil leak itself. The Guardian 
quoted a businessman and slum dweller:   
There is no government here…if there was an official presence, the authorities 
would have noticed that the spillage had been going on for several hours 
before the blast and stopped it. But we are left to live like this with no 
services, access roads or security.  (Mutiga, 2011) 
 
Rescue workers had to navigate through overcrowded dwellings and dodge hanging 
wires that bring illegal power to the tin shacks, which lengthened response time 
and intensified fire damage (Mutiga, 2011).   
The multi-dimensional challenges slum dwellers face, both individually and 
collectively, perpetuate their vulnerability and social exclusion. Vulnerability, 
which Moser and Satterthwaite (2008) define as insecurity in the well-being of 
individuals, households, and communities, can be conceptualized as a lack of 
resilience to changes that threaten welfare. Changes can be environmental, 
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economic, social, and political, and can occur as sudden shocks, long-term trends, or 
seasonal cycles (Moser & Satterthwaite, 2008). Resilient households are able to cope 
with hardships by drawing on assets they have acquired to protect themselves from 
negative shocks and improve their well-being over time. These assets may be 
physical (e.g. housing), human (e.g. labor, skills, good health), financial (e.g. 
savings, access to credit), social (e.g. support networks), or political (e.g. channels of 
representation and influence) (Rakodi, 2002). Households without assets that can 
be mobilized in the face of hardship are vulnerable to increasing poverty and the 
negative consequences that accompany it. The conditions in many informal 
settlements both contribute to the occurrence of hardships and ensure that 
residents are more vulnerable to the negative effects. 
Though its meaning is contested, social exclusion is ubiquitous in the 
development literature and “provides a useful heuristic tool for understanding both 
persistent and mutating patterns of social disadvantage” by illuminating the 
“relational and institutional dynamics that serve to include some and keep others 
out” (Beall, 2002, p. 50). Poverty is clearly a contributing factor, but social exclusion 
is multi-dimensional; exclusion may be exacerbated by poverty, but the processes of 
exclusion can cause poverty and trap people in a state of chronic poverty (Beall, 
2002). In the context of informal settlements, social exclusion encapsulates the 
processes that prevent slum dwellers from participating fully in the social, political, 
and economic life of cities and constrain their ability to acquire sufficient assets to 
weather hardships and move out of the slums.    
Though the potential for accessing and building the physical, human, 
financial, social, and political assets necessary for resilience is at least somewhat 
dependent on individual households’ skills, circumstances, and strategies, slum 
dwellers’ social exclusion creates obstacles to asset accumulation and social mobility 
(Bhatia & Chatterjee, 2010; Rashid, 2009). The market failures in the land and 
housing sectors that force residents to seek shelter in informal settlements limit 
their ability to acquire and improve physical assets like housing. The shortage of 
infrastructure and the lack of secure tenure present similar obstacles. The majority 
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of slum dwellers rent their homes (92 percent in Nairobi), and the illegal nature of 
informal housing renders tenants powerless in the face of exploitation, 
mistreatment, or eviction by landlords (Abbott, 2002; Abdenur, 2009; Apiyo, 1998; 
Grudgings, 2011; Milbert, 2006).   
Human assets are similarly difficult to accumulate, as lack of access to 
sanitation, clinics, and schools reduces residents’ ability to acquire the education 
and skills necessary to obtain formal employment and remain healthy in order to 
maximize return from their labor (Mugisha, 2006). Based on a systematic 
comparison of slum and non-slum populations within the same city,12 UN-Habitat 
concludes that nutritional, health, and educational outcomes of the populations are 
significantly different, with slum dwellers consistently experiencing more 
nutritional deprivation, ill health, and poor educational outcomes than their non-
slum counterparts (2010). Barriers to human capital development pose cumulative 
challenges to slum dwellers, as poor hygienic conditions for babies and children are 
associated with poor educational outcomes and early dropout, which are then 
associated with higher rates of early pregnancy, domestic violence, and criminal 
activity (Brakarz, 2002).   
For residents of informal settlements, this multi-dimensional exclusion 
presents significant obstacles to accumulating the assets necessary to develop 
resilience and become upwardly mobile. Without sufficient assets to cope with 
changes, slum dwellers may be forced to sell any physical assets they have acquired, 
move into inferior accommodation (magnifying the health and safety risks and lack 
of access to services), send children to work rather than school, reduce the quality 
and quantity of food consumed, postpone medical treatment, or withdraw from 
informal reciprocity arrangements such as rotating savings and credit associations 
(Rakodi, 2002). Slum dwellers face unique challenges that make chronic poverty 
difficult to escape, leaving many of them “trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and 
deprivation” (Rakodi, 2002, p. 256). Improving the accessibility, quality, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The survey of slum and non-slum populations was conducted in 2009 in 27 cities located in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. Conclusions are based on statistical analyses of differences. 
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effective use of health and education services in these communities is crucial to 
addressing the exclusion and barriers to human capital development that 
perpetuate residents’ vulnerability.     
Macro-Level Consequences 
Slum dwellers bear the majority of the burden, but the negative consequences 
of informal settlements extend beyond the level of the settlements and impose costs 
on the city at large. Social and political tensions are often heightened in informal 
settlements, and eruptions of violence in slum communities have generated public 
attention. After the Kenyan national elections in December 2007, two months of 
violence in Kibera caused over 1,100 deaths, led to destruction that rendered nearly 
350,000 people homeless, cost the country billions of dollars in economic loss, and 
very nearly destabilized the entire country (de Smedt, 2009). Oversimplified 
accounts of the violence portray it as a conflict between ethnic groups but, as de 
Smedt describes, socioeconomic and political exclusion in Kibera explain why 
conflict manifested there rather than in non-slum communities (2009). According to 
Kruijt and Koonings,     
Exclusion has increasingly become ‘segregation,’ in which geographical 
distance as such is less important than the boundaries drawn by social, 
political and symbolic attributions. Urban segregation refers not only to the 
geographical distribution of poverty but also to the territorial and social 
division of cities in ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ areas, from the perspective of the local 
public administration, even the police. The slums come to be seen as genuine 
enclaves that obey a different set of rules and codes of conduct. (Koonings & 
Kruijt, 2009, p. 13) 
 
The gradual loss of the state’s enforcement of the rule of law in slums has left a void 
filled by militias, gangs, and other vigilante groups which, in the case of Kibera, 
were mobilized by politicians in pursuit of electoral victory (de Smedt, 2009). 
Perlman (2010) observed a similar proliferation of drug gangs and armed militias in 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro; these groups charge residents exorbitant fees for 
“protection” and permission to travel in and out of the settlement, buy food, and 
conduct many aspects of their daily lives. The lack of effective governance and the 
informal structures that arise in its absence create fear and distrust, “erode the 
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associational capacity of grassroots actors, and distort the channels of participation 
and empowerment” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009, p. 176). The violence and other social 
ills that often arise impose significant costs that extend far beyond the settlement 
and even the city, as the case of Kibera’s post-election conflict illuminates.  
Slums reduce the efficiency of cities and the economic growth of countries and 
stunt the human potential of enormous numbers of people. The insecurity, 
underinvestment, and obstacles to the accumulation of human, financial, social, and 
physical capital characterizing informal settlements limit the economic potential of 
the communities and the residents. Given the scale of informal settlements and the 
proportion of urban residents occupying them in cities across the developing world, 
the economic potential of these cities, and the countries in which they are located, 
are limited by the conditions in informal settlements. The benefits of improvements 
in health and education provision in these communities should extend far beyond 
the boundaries of the slums. 
Health Provision in Nairobi 
Historical Background 
The health system is Kenya is pluralistic. A variety of actors, including the 
national Ministry of Health, Local Authorities, NGOs, faith-based groups, 
community organizations, and private for-profit institutions, provide an extensive 
range of services at widely varying costs to users. After independence, the Kenyan 
government identified free health services as an important component of its 
development strategy (Kanyinga, 1995; Muriithi, 2013). While public health 
facilities had charged user fees under the colonial regime, the new government 
quickly abolished fees, opting to fund the health system largely from general taxes. 
By 1988, however, pressure from the IMF and the World Bank and the need for 
revenue to address deteriorating facilities and service quality led the government to 
reintroduce fees for all public health services (Chuma & Okongu, 2011). The 
government’s strategy for shedding some of the financial burden of healthcare was 
two-pronged. The reintroduction of user fees shifted some of the burden to 
	   46 
consumers. At the same time, the government sought to create an enabling 
environment for increased private sector involvement in health service provision 
(Muthaka et al, 2004). Non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, 
community groups, and a wide variety of private for-profit providers established 
services to meet the demand and provide an alternative to public facilities that were 
widely perceived as low quality and inadequate (Chuma & Okongu, 2011).  
Though the proliferation of private provision shifted some of the burden off of 
the state, the deregulation that enabled the growth of private sector involvement 
also allowed for an enormous diversity in all aspects of the sector (Muthaka et al, 
2004). Non-state providers currently account for more than 50 percent of registered 
health facilities in Kenya,13 ranging from chemists dispensing over-the-counter 
medications to modern hospitals and including everything in between. Many 
additional non-state providers are unregistered and unlicensed, and mechanisms 
for oversight, quality control, cost limitations, service coordination, and other 
regulatory functions are either non-existent or largely unenforced (Chuma & 
Okongu, 2013; Luoma et al, 2010; Muthaka et al, 2004; Republic of Kenya, 2011). 
Given the volume of providers, the difficulties inherent in identifying and 
classifying the diverse array of private providers, and the government’s limited 
resources, regulating the private health sector is a persistent challenge.  
An additional notable feature of the system of state and non-state provision 
in Kenya is the absence of contracting mechanisms between the Ministry of Health 
and private providers (Luoma et al, 2010). Unlike the public-private partnerships 
prevalent in many other developing countries, the Kenyan government’s 
enablement strategy encouraged the growth of the private sector to relieve some of 
the strain on public facilities but opted to keep the sectors completely separate 
(Muthaka et al, 2004). Cooperation between the Ministry of Health and non-state 
providers has been historically limited (Luoma et al, 2010; Republic of Kenya, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This figure was calculated using the Master Facility List of all operational service providers 
maintained by the Ministry of Health. The list was accessed on 25 May 2015 at 
http://www.ehealth.or.ke. 
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2011). The lack of coordination and formal channels for communication between 
sectors has resulted in service duplication, uneven and inequitable coverage, 
technical delays and complications, and other sources of inefficiency in the health 
system. Although there are current and future initiatives that aim to give the 
private sector a voice in the government’s strategic planning for health provision, 
the sectors continue to operate largely independent of one another (Luoma et al, 
2010).  
Public Health Provision 
The public health system in Kenya is structured like a pyramid. Dispensaries 
and health centers, located in communities, form the base of the pyramid and offer 
preventative care and curative outpatient treatment for basic ailments and 
illnesses. Dispensaries are the most prevalent type of public health facility in the 
country, comprising 76 percent of all government facilities (see Table 2.1 for the 
distribution). They are staffed by enrolled nurses and medical assistants and 
provide outpatient care for minor ailments such as the common cold and basic 
antenatal care. Health centers account for 17 percent of facilities and provide a 
wider range of services. Staffed by a clinical officer, midwives or nurses, and 
occasionally a doctor, they offer basic curative and preventative services for children 
and adults, reproductive services, and minor surgical procedures such as wound 
stitching (Muga et al, 2005). In 2004, the failure to meet targeted metrics for 
improvements in health outcomes among the poorest citizens led the government to 
eliminate user fees at dispensaries and health centers and institute a registration 
fee of 10 Ksh (approximately $0.12 USD) for dispensaries and 20 Ksh for health 
centers. The registration fees can be waived for children under five, the poor, and 
treatment for malaria and tuberculosis (Muriithi, 2013).  
Individuals in need of services not provided by dispensaries and health 
centers are referred to facilities in the middle of the public health system pyramid, 
including sub-district and district hospitals. These facilities offer higher levels of 
care, but patients pay a fee based on services rendered (Muriithi, 2013). Sub-district 
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hospitals are similar to health centers, but generally include doctors on staff and 
are able to perform more surgical procedures, including cesarean sections. District 
hospitals account for 3 percent of public facilities, and they are the first referral 
hospital for patients treated at lower level care centers in the district. The training, 
skill, and competence of the staff is expected to be significantly higher than 
dispensary and health center staff, and the hospitals should be equipped to offer 
accident and emergency services and preventative and curative care on an 
outpatient and inpatient basis. Surgical theaters are also greatly enhanced at the 
district hospitals, and they are able to offer anesthesia for appropriate procedures 
(Muga et al, 2005).  
Table 2.1: Distribution of Public Health Facilities in Kenya                          
by Level of Services 
Facility type n % 
Dispensary 3693 76% 
Health Center 834 17% 
Sub-District Hospital 140 3% 
District Hospital 137 3% 
Provincial Hospital 9 0% 
National Referral Hospital 2 0% 
Other Hospital 14 0% 
TOTAL 4829 100% 
Source: Ministry of Health Master Facility List, Republic  of Kenya (2015) 	  
The top two levels of the health system pyramid are occupied by provincial 
and national referral hospitals. There are nine provincial hospitals in Kenya, and 
they serve the geographical province in which they are located. Individuals are 
referred to these facilities when district hospitals are not able to offer the services or 
level of care necessary. They are staffed by a variety of medical professionals, 
including specialists in fields such as surgery, pediatrics, psychiatry, emergency 
medicine, ophthalmology, and dermatology, and they include intensive and 
progressive care units (Muga et al, 2005). The two national referral hospitals—Moi 
Referral and Teaching Hospital in Eldoret and Kenyatta Hospital in Nairobi—offer 
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the highest level of care available in the country. They have the most sophisticated 
equipment, the most qualified staff, the highest concentration of resources, and the 
most rigorous clinical standards and treatment protocols (Muga et al, 2005). These 
facilities offer the most specialized care, but patients are required to pay fees for 
services (Muriithi, 2013).   
While the hierarchical public health system may be efficient in theory, the 
reality is much more complicated. Neither the physical health facilities nor the 
inputs—qualified staff, functioning equipment, supplies, financial resources, etc.—
are equitably distributed across the country, and the accessibility and quality of 
care varies widely (Luoma et al, 2010). The system has been consistently 
underfunded since independence, so equipment and facilities are in need of repair 
and replacement (Muthaka et al, 2004). The Service Provision Assessment 
conducted by the Kenyan government in 2010 revealed that, among all public 
health facilities in the country, 80 percent have basic client amenities (functioning 
latrine, waiting area protected from the elements, and a basic level of cleanliness), 
32 percent have a regular water supply, 21 percent have a regular electricity supply 
or generator, and only 6 percent have basic amenities, water supply, and electricity 
(Republic of Kenya, 2011). According to the 2013 Service Delivery Indicators data 
collected by the World Bank, over 29 percent of public health providers are absent 
on any given day, and the absence rate is even higher—44 percent—among large 
urban health centers. Furthermore, only 58 percent of public health providers were 
able to correctly diagnose at least 4 out of 5 very common conditions, and public 
providers followed only 44 percent of the correct treatment procedures for maternal 
and neonatal complications (Martin & Pimhidzai, 2013).   
Though utilization of public health facilities increased by about 30 percent 
following the elimination of user fees at dispensaries and health centers in 2004, 
reports of cash shortages at some facilities and widespread collection of informal 
user fees and bribes suggest that the benefits of the new fee structure may not be 
widely or equitably distributed (Chuma & Okongu, 2013). The national household 
expenditure and utilization survey conducted in 2007 by the Government of Kenya 
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estimated that households paid Ksh 7 billion to public providers during the same 
period in which Ksh 1.5 billion in user fee revenue was formally processed by public 
providers (Luoma et al, 2010). Although no recent data on informal user fees is 
available, the magnitude of the disparity between households’ costs and formal 
registration fees implies that government health services may be more expensive 
and access may be more restricted than policies indicate.    
Private Provision 
Unlike the well-defined hierarchy of the public health system, the private 
healthcare sector in Kenya is diverse, defies classification, and exists at many levels 
of formality. Though the government has formulated a classification system for 
private providers, deregulation and limited enforcement of existing regulations 
have led to a lack of adherence that causes confusion for clients and researchers 
alike. Some facilities identify themselves as hospitals when their level of services is 
equivalent to a dispensary, and staff sometimes refer to themselves as doctors even 
if they have no formal medical training (Muthaka et al, 2004). Only some private 
facilities are registered, so existing studies only partially account for the size of the 
sector and the volume and nature of services they provide to citizens. In general, as 
depicted in Table 2.2, non-state providers operating in the country can be classified 
by ownership, economic orientation, and the approximate level of care they offer 
(Muthaka et al, 2004).   
The private health sector has experienced sustained growth since 
independence, particularly since the 1980s, but the quality and coverage of services 
provided by non-state actors varies widely. The not-for-profit sub-sector, which 
includes non-government organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), 
and community-based organizations (CBOs), constitutes a minority of the registered 
providers in the private sector. Some of these organizations choose to locate in low-
income areas and offer free or heavily subsidized care to those who could not 
otherwise afford it, some aim to provide a high quality alternative to government 
facilities and charge fees to cover the costs of care, and others are established to 
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provide services to a specific constituency at varying costs (Muga et al, 2005; 
Muriithi, 2013).  
Table 2.2: Typology of Non-State Health Service Providers in Kenya 
NOT-FOR PROFIT SUB-SECTOR FOR-PROFIT SUB-SECTOR 
Faith-based organizations 
(FBOs) 
Other non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) 
 
Christian Health 
Association of Kenya 
Hospitals, health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries 
383 registered facilities 
NGOs involved in family 
planning 
Stand-alone VCT centers 
114 registered facilities 
Private enterprises 
(institutions) 
Hospitals, health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries, maternity 
homes, pharmacies 
1,355 registered facilities 
Kenya Episcopal 
Conference – Catholic 
Secretariat 
Hospitals, cottage hospitals, 
health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries 
412 registered facilities 
Community-based 
organizations and providers 
(CBOs) 
Community health workers, 
community pharmacies, 
community clinics 
150 registered facilities 
Private practices (sole 
practitioner or group) and 
clinics 
Medical specialists (162 registered) 
Clinical officers (565 registered) 
Nurses/midwives (995 registered) 
General practitioners (414 
registered) 
Unspecified practice (237 
registered) 
Supreme Council for Kenya 
Muslims 
Health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries 
13 registered facilities  
Other NGOs (international 
and domestic) 
Hospitals, health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries, temporary 
medical camps 
349 registered facilities 
Workplace clinics 
Industrial and academic clinics, 
dispensaries, pharmacies, chemists 
95 registered 
Other FBOs 
Hospitals, health centers, 
clinics/dispensaries 
277 registered facilities 
 Individual pharmacies 
Registered pharmacists/chemists 
and/or pharmaceutical 
technologists 
 
Individual laboratories 
Radiological laboratories, clinical 
laboratories 
 
Stores and shops 
Drug stores, chemists, and market 
vendors 
 
Traditional health 
practitioners 
Traditional birth attendants, 
herbalists, bonesetters, diviners, 
etc. 
Source: adapted from Muthaka et al (2004) using data from the Ministry of Health Master Facility List 
(Republic of Kenya, 2015) 
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Similar variation in both cost and quality exists within the for-profit sub-
sector. Citizens across the socioeconomic spectrum utilize for-profit providers, but 
there is significant stratification within the system of providers. At the top of the 
distribution are the high quality, high cost facilities that developed in response to 
the demand among affluent Kenyans for an alternative to the public sector facilities 
they perceived as inadequate, unresponsive, overcrowded, and incompetent (Muga 
et al, 2005). As the level of care, qualifications of staff, availability of equipment and 
supplies, and condition of the facilities decrease, the cost of care goes down and 
services become affordable for a larger portion of the population. The fees at all 
private for-profit facilities are generally higher than those charged in government 
facilities for the same services, but surveys show that a majority of the public 
perceives private providers are more accessible and reliable (Bratton, 2012).  
The greater accessibility of private for-profit providers is particularly true in 
urban areas. Table 2.3 displays the distribution of registered health facilities by 
operator type in Kenya and Nairobi, where government provision comprises only a 
small portion of operational facilities. Only 15 percent of facilities in Nairobi are 
operated by the government compared to 46 percent nationwide; the city’s ratio of 
one public facility per 98,009 persons renders it the worst served district in the 
country (Muriithi, 2013). Long waiting times and travel distances to public facilities 
creates incentives for private providers to enter the market to meet the demand. 
Whereas private for-profit facilities account for 38 percent of facilities nationwide, 
they constitute 61 percent of registered facilities in Nairobi (Republic of Kenya 
MOH, 2015). The for-profit sub-sector also dominates the private sector in Nairobi 
for all facility types with the exception of stand-alone VCT centers that offer HIV 
testing and counseling and family planning services (see Table 2.4 for the 
distribution of facilities by provider type). There is intense competition among these 
providers for staff and patients; as a consequence, the private for-profit sector in 
Nairobi and other urban areas is highly fragmented and uncoordinated (Muga et al, 
2005).  
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Table 2.3: Registered Health Care Providers in Kenya and Nairobi             
by Operator Type 
Operator type Kenya Nairobi 
Government 
4,737 134 
46% 15% 
NGO 
349 100 
3% 11% 
Faith-based 
1,083 117 
11% 13% 
CBO 
150 12 
1% 1% 
Private 
3,875 559 
38% 61% 
TOTAL 10,194 922 
Source: Republic of Kenya Ministry of Health Master 
Facility List (2015) 	   	  
Table 2.4: Registered Health Service Providers in Nairobi                            
by Facility Types 
Type of Facility Public Private Total 
    For-profit NGO CBO FBO 
Total 
private   
Dispensaries 77 39% 
61 
31% 
18 
9% 
4 
2% 
37 
19% 
120 
61% 197 
Clinics/Medical 
Centers 
17 
4% 
357 
78% 
51 
11% 
2 
0% 
30 
7% 
440 
96% 457 
Health Centers 29 33% 
38 
44% 
7 
8% 
2 
2% 
11 
13% 
58 
67% 87 
Hospitals 9 20% 
28 
62% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
8 
18% 
36 
80% 45 
VCT Centers 
(stand-alone) 
8 
14% 
4 
7% 
29 
52% 
3 
5% 
12 
21% 
48 
86% 56 
Source: Republic of Kenya Ministry of Health Master Facility List (2015) 
 
Health Provision in Informal Settlements 
Like Nairobi as a whole, the city’s informal settlements are not widely served 
by public health facilities. A study of four slums in Nairobi conducted by the African 
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Population and Health Center (APHRC) in 2002 found that, out of the 125 health 
facilities located in or near the four communities, only 4 were public; 15 were 
private not-for-profit and the other 106 were private for-profit (Fotso & Mukiira, 
2012). Furthermore, only 38 percent of all facilities were licensed by the Kenyan 
Medical Practitioners and Dentist Board, the entity charged with licensing health 
providers. The Clinical Officers Board and the Nursing Council had licensed 20 
percent of the facilities, 27 percent had business licenses from the City Council, and 
16 percent were not licensed at all. Additionally, 72 percent of all of the health 
facilities had no working guidelines or standard protocols for services; more than 75 
percent of these were private for-profit providers and half of all private for-profit 
facilities claimed never to have been supervised by any agency (Fotso & Mukiira, 
2012). 
By 2009, the number of non-state providers in the settlement areas had 
quadrupled but public provision and oversight remained low. Out of 503 health 
facilities serving the slum communities, 6 (1 percent) were public, 79 (16 percent) 
were private not-for-profit, and 418 (83 percent) were private for-profit (APHRC, 
2013). Furthermore, the level of care offered at both public and private facilities 
near the slums is basic, with the exception of Kenyatta Hospital which requires a 
referral for services. Four of the six public facilities were health centers and the 
other was a dispensary. Among the private providers, 81 percent were clinics,14 9 
percent were dispensaries, and 3 percent were health centers (APHRC, 2013).  
Education Provision in Nairobi 
Historical Background 
The history of primary and secondary education provision in Kenya and the 
growth of the private sector follow a similar trajectory as health provision, with a 
few notable exceptions. The post-independence government prioritized education 
and devoted considerable resources to the expansion of the public school system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The services provided by clinics vary widely, but the most sophisticated are equivalent to a health 
center and the most rudimentary resemble pharmacies or dispensaries (Muga et al, 2005). 
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(Ogola, 2010). Due to budget crises and the implementation of neoliberal structural 
adjustment policies mandated by the IMF and the World Bank, however, the 
government introduced a cost-sharing system for public primary and secondary 
schools in 1988 (Ogola, 2010). Whereas the government’s strategy for shifting costs 
of health provision created space for private providers but kept the sectors separate, 
the cost-sharing system for education relied on a partnership between the 
government, communities, parents, NGOs, religious organizations, and other non-
state actors. Under the new framework, parents, communities, and other 
organizations were responsible for the construction and maintenance of schools, all 
physical infrastructure, textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, 
uniforms, examination fees, compensation for non-teaching staff, security, 
transport, and other capital and indirect costs. The government paid the teachers 
and all expenses for general administration and planning and curriculum 
development (Onsomu et al, 2004). To supplement the funds provided by local 
governments and other organizations—which varied widely across communities—
schools charged fees to each enrolled student (Ogola, 2010).     
As economic conditions in the country continued to decline after the 
implementation of the cost-sharing system, decreases in government funding for 
education placed an increasing financial burden on parents and communities. 
Fewer families could afford the fees, and communities did not have the resources to 
address deteriorating facilities and declining education quality (Onsomu et al, 
2004). By 2002, net primary school enrollment was just 61.7 percent (Kimenyi, 
2013). The increasing global focus on the right to education and the emphasis on 
universal free primary education in the Millennium Development Goals, 
accompanied by a need for the poverty reduction and economic growth associated 
with educational attainment, led the Kenyan government to implement a Free 
Primary Education (FPE) policy in 2003 and eliminate tuition fees at public 
primary schools (Ngagi, 2012; Oketch et al, 2008; Wildish, 2011). In 2008, the policy 
was expanded to include public secondary schools (Ohba, 2011). To compensate for 
the loss of revenue, the government allocated capitation grants to schools; for each 
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student enrolled, a school receives approximately $14 USD per year (Bold et al, 
2013). The announcement of FPE generated widespread interest in education 
among households unable to afford to send their children to school under the prior 
fee structure, but the policy itself was formulated and enacted with relatively little 
planning. The government did not allocate funds to construct additional classrooms 
and hire more teachers to accommodate the influx of students (Ngware, 2013; 
Oketch et al, 2008). As was the case with the growth of the private health sector, 
the inability of public schools to meet the demand and the negative public 
perceptions of overcrowded and poorly maintained facilities led to the growth of 
private education provision, particularly in urban areas.   
Public Provision 
While public/government schools still comprise the majority of primary and 
secondary schools in Kenya, public education continues to be provided through a 
partnership between the government, communities, parents, NGOs, FBOs, and 
other non-state actors. The government pays teachers’ salaries and capitation 
grants for textbooks and provides supervision, curriculum development, and 
support for other pedagogical and administrative processes. Local governments (city 
or county councils) contribute additional funds to some schools, often in the form of 
salaries for non-teaching staff or grants for capital costs. Communities continue to 
finance some school construction, maintenance, and other operational costs, 
including feeding programs (Chuck, 2009; Onsomu et al, 2004). The amount the 
government grants for electricity and water, for example, is insufficient; providing 
these utilities requires additional contributions (Chuck, 2009). Communities are 
also involved in the management of schools through participation on school 
committees. Primary school parents’ associations and secondary school boards of 
governors manage the schools’ finances, physical infrastructure, provision of 
textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, and other aspects of the day-
to-day operation of the institutions (Onsomu et al, 2004).  
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Though direct school fees were abolished with the introduction of FPE, 
parents continue to pay a number of indirect costs for all enrolled students, 
including the purchase of mandatory uniforms, examination fees, stationary, 
transportation, and other ancillary costs. For 2014, the average cost of uniforms and 
materials for a public primary school student ranges from $20 to $50 USD; 
secondary students must pay an average of $250 per year (Ohba, 2011). The 
education non-profit Uwezo Kenya published estimated 2015 fees for Olympic 
Primary and Secondary schools, public institutions located on the periphery of the 
Kibera settlement in Nairobi that serve students from the slum. At the primary 
school, official fees are $7.48 USD per month, and yearly expenses can total as 
much as $180. For secondary school students, the monthly fees are $23.65 and 
yearly expenses can reach $250.15 Across the country, research indicates that 
indirect costs associated with public school enrollment comprise more than 25 
percent of household income for households in the lowest income quintile (Njagi, 
2012).  
In addition to community and parental involvement, the Ministry of 
Education formalized a mechanism for sponsorship of public schools. As defined in 
the Republic of Kenya Basic Education Act No. 14 of 2013, a sponsor refers to “a 
person or institution who makes a significant contribution and impact on the 
academic, financial, infrastructural and spiritual development of an institution of 
basic education” (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Sponsors can be private individuals, 
entrepreneurs, religious groups, NGOs or CBOs, or even local government 
authorities (Onsomu et al, 2004). Sponsors are expected to:  
…participate and make recommendations of review of syllabus, curriculum, 
books and other teaching aids; be represented in the School Management 
Committees and Board of Management; provide supervisory and advisory 
services in matters regarding spiritual development in schools including the 
appointment of chaplains at their own expense; maintain spiritual 
development while safeguarding the denomination or religious adherence of 
others; and offer financial and infrastructural support. (Republic of Kenya, 
2013) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 http://www.uwezakenya.org/our-work/sponsorship/estimated-costs-of-education-in-kibera/ 
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After the implementation of FPE and the elimination of fees for secondary 
education, enrollment in primary schools across the country increased from 5.9 
million students in 2002 to 7.6 million in 2006 and 9.9 million in 2011 (Ngware et 
al, 2013). Among enrolled students, the primary school completion rate surged from 
63 percent in 2002 to 81 percent in 2007, and the transition rate from primary to 
secondary school increased by 10 percent (Chuck, 2009). By 2007, the net secondary 
school enrollment rate reached 25 percent for males and 23 percent for females 
(Ohba, 2011).  
There are, however, increasing concerns about the quality of education being 
provided to students. Schools are overcrowded, facilities are inadequate, and there 
is a severe shortage of teachers. Classrooms designed to accommodate 30 students 
are regularly packed with 90 students or more, and multiple classes are often forced 
to share one room (Chuck, 2009). The primary school student-teacher ratio has 
increased from 40 students per one teacher to 60-90 students per teacher (Ogola, 
2010). According to research for the World Bank’s 2013 Service Delivery Indicators 
for Kenya, only 35 percent of public school teachers demonstrated mastery of the 
curriculum they teach, and neither seniority nor years of training correlated with 
teacher competence. Furthermore, absenteeism and a general lack of effort are big 
problems; only 55 percent of public school teachers are in class teaching on a given 
day (Martin & Pimhidzai, 2013). Among public school teachers in Nairobi, 
researchers from the African Population and Health Research Center found that the 
average score on a standardized math knowledge test was less than 50 percent, and 
some individuals score as low as 17 percent (Ngware, Oketch & Ezeh, 2011).  
In addition to the general concerns about the quality of public education in 
the country, evidence is gradually supporting the hypothesis that FPE exacerbates 
inequity in the quality of education between schools (Chuck, 2009). The increases in 
enrollment following the implementation of FPE were not evenly distributed, 
because the new enrollees largely came from families who had been previously 
unable to afford to send their children to school. Schools located in wealthier areas 
experienced little change in enrollment, as children from the area served by the 
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schools could already afford an education. Schools in poorer areas—including 
slums—absorbed a large influx of students but did not have the infrastructure to 
support them. The cost-sharing framework of public school financing, the dearth of 
financial resources in these low-income communities, and the inability of the 
government grants to support construction of new classrooms and other operating 
costs led to deteriorating conditions and fueled the disparity between schools 
(Chuck, 2009). Though sponsorship can alleviate some of the financial burden and 
fund infrastructure and instructional support that parents and the community 
cannot, not all schools benefit from generous sponsors.  At public primary schools 
serving Nairobi’s informal settlements, teacher-student ratios regularly approach 
and exceed 1:100 (Chuck, 2009, Uwezo, 2010).  
Private Provision 
Prior to the implementation of FPE the private education sector in Kenya 
was dominated by schools catering to affluent residents. School ownership was 
diverse and included private entrepreneurs, religious organizations, and NGOs, but 
the high quality education they sought to provide required tuition fees unaffordable 
to the majority of households (Onsomu et al, 2004). After FPE, enrollment in 
Kenya’s private schools swelled from 4.4 percent in 2005 to 10.5 percent in 2009 
(Kimenyi, 2013). The majority of this growth in private provision can be attributed 
to the establishment of low-cost private schools accommodating the poor, most of 
which are located in urban areas.   
The introduction of FPE generated more interest in education, both because 
the elimination of fees made school affordable and because politicians and other 
organizations working in the country emphasized the benefits associated with 
educational attainment. An increasing number of low-income parents recognized 
the value of education and prioritized school enrollment, but the public schools 
serving informal settlements and other poor communities were unable to meet the 
demand and/or are perceived as low quality by parents and community members 
(Chuck, 2009; Motala, 2009; Njagi, 2012, Rose, 2006; Tooley, 2009; Wildish, 2011). 
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In response, community groups, FBOs, NGOs, and private entrepreneurs 
established what are known in Kenya as non-formal schools (NFS). These schools, 
referenced in the international literature as “low-cost private schools” or “private 
schools for the poor,” are not necessarily as informal as the name suggests. Some of 
them utilize the government’s formal primary and secondary school curricula, are 
recognized by the Ministry of Education, and register as private institutions 
(Wildish, 2011). Others do not offer the same formal structure but provide 
alternative learning opportunities for students who do not have the opportunity or 
financial resources to pursue a formal education; some of these schools are 
registered by the Ministry of Culture and Social Services (Onsomu et al, 2004).   
Because many non-formal schools are neither registered nor overseen by a 
government department or umbrella organization, the size of the sector is largely 
unknown. A 2004 study identified approximately 349 non-formal primary schools in 
Nairobi enrolling almost 41,000 students—almost 17 percent of all primary 
students in the city at the time (Onsomu et al, 2004). Several years later research 
conducted in one informal settlement in Nairobi located 76 additional NFS attended 
by more than 12,000 students (Tooley et al, 2008), and the total number of students 
enrolled in non-formal schools in the city was estimated to exceed 120,000 (Hoppers, 
2011). 
In addition to uncertainty surrounding the number of non-formal schools and 
the size of the population they serve, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive 
description of the schools and assess the quality of the education they provide. In 
general, most non-formal schools are small and located in impoverished 
communities. They are established and operated by a wide range of non-state 
actors, from private individuals to international NGOs. Those that are able to 
secure financial support and other resources from outside the community may 
attract qualified staff, but most rely on volunteers and unqualified teachers 
(Mugisha, 2006). In the slum areas of Nairobi, 75 percent of non-formal schools are 
temporary structures constructed with either mud or iron sheets, and electricity, 
water, sanitation, and other infrastructure are absent for most schools and deficient 
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when they exist. Ventilation is generally poor, and the environment facilitates the 
transmission of communicable diseases (Ngome & Kimiywe, 2007). 
Non-formal schools are not free, but the fees are low compared to formal 
private schools and exceptions are often made for orphans and families who are 
unable to pay. As part of a study on educational attainment in slum communities, 
APHRC collected data on fees paid to public, formal private, and low-cost private 
schools in Nairobi. For grade three students, annual charges average 1,720 Ksh at 
government schools, 10,100 Ksh at formal private schools, and 3,245 Ksh at low-cost 
private schools (Ngware et al, 2013). Despite the fact that fees at non-formal 
primary schools are almost double the cost of public primary schools, enrollment in 
non-formal schools continues to grow. Data from APHRC’s demographic 
surveillance system in two slums in Nairobi reveal that 44 percent of students 
residing in the communities attend low quality, fee charging private schools (Oketch 
et al, 2010). More recent studies suggest that number now exceeds 50 percent 
(Uwezo, 2014).  
Observers of Kenya’s experience with FPE were initially puzzled by the 
growth of non-formal schools and poor parents’ decision to pay higher fees to send 
their children to schools with unqualified teachers, limited textbooks and other 
supplies, and inadequate facilities when more “appropriate” public schools were free 
and located nearby (Oketch et al, 2010). Some NFS enrollments can be explained by 
the limited spaces available in public schools, but survey research shows that many 
parents have strong negative perceptions of the quality of public schools and believe 
their children will receive a better education at non-formal schools (Hoppers, 2011; 
Ngome & Kimiywe, 2007; Ngware et al, 2013; Oketch et al, 2010; Wildish, 2011).  
The surge of enrollment following FPE at public schools near slums and other 
poor communities resulted in teacher-student ratios of 1:100, and parents express 
concern with overcrowded conditions and poor supervision (Chuck, 2009; Hopper, 
2011). Non-formal schools may have inferior inputs (e.g. facilities, teacher 
qualification, textbooks, supplies, etc.), but a higher value is placed on the much 
smaller teacher-student ratio; one study estimated that there are 28 students per 
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teacher at informal schools in Kibera (Tooley et al, 2008). As an increasing number 
of non-formal schools are registering with the Ministry of Education and 
participating in standardized testing—providing a means to compare student 
achievement across the sectors—emerging data supports parents’ perceptions about 
school quality. Even though the per-student funding is, on average, 64 percent 
lower at non-formal schools than public schools, students from the non-formal 
schools outperform their public school counterparts by a large margin (Kimenyi, 
2013).   
Selection and Description of Study Sites  
There are currently at least 134 informal settlements in Nairobi, and there is 
wide variation in land area, population size and density, types of housing, and the 
demographic composition and socioeconomic status of residents (Owuor & Mbatia, 
2012; UN-Habitat, 2012). The availability of public health and education facilities 
also varies by settlement, as does the landscape of non-state providers serving the 
communities. In order to capture some of the variation between and within slums, I 
conducted the survey in particular villages within two settlements. I employed 
purposive sampling to choose the locations. This allowed me to select a sample 
population representative of key aspects of the diversity among residents of 
Nairobi’s informal settlements—particularly the ethnic composition of the 
communities, the average household income, and the specific service providers 
located within close proximity to the survey respondents. At the same time, limiting 
the sample to particular villages within two settlements made it possible to gain 
insight into the experiences and perceptions of enough households with spatial 
access to the same schools and health providers to develop an understanding of how 
household-level characteristics affect access to, utilization of, and satisfaction with 
health and education provision.  
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Figure 2.2 Map of metropolitan Nairobi showing the location of Kibera and Korogocho. 	  
Kibera  
The first settlement chosen for the study, Kibera, has been widely cited as 
the largest slum in sub-Saharan Africa (UN-Habitat, 2003). Situated on 
approximately 250 hectares (or 1.5 square miles) of land located seven kilometers 
southwest of the center of Nairobi, Kibera is one of the oldest and most established 
informal settlements in the city (Otiso, 2000). Kibera was established in 1912 by the 
Colonial government to house African veterans, largely of Nubian and Boran origin, 
who served in the British army during World Wars I and II (Marx et al, 2014; 
Muriithi, 2013). The nascent Kenyan government formally reclaimed the land after 
independence, but the population continued to grow as Kibera became a landing 
point for migrants from rural areas (Amis, 1984). The 2009 Kenya Population and 
Housing Census reports Kibera's population as 170,070, whereas UN-Habitat 
estimates range between 350,000 and 1 million people (Marras, 2009). 
Enumerations by several NGOs working in the settlement over the last few years 
have reported estimates ranging between 235,000 and 270,000 (Marx et al, 2014).   
As Kibera rose to prominence in both popular media and scholarly research, 
numerous NGOs established programs in the community and journalists, 
filmmakers, and visiting dignitaries have toured the slum over the past few years. 
Though the number of shared pit latrines is increasing, the “flying toilet” 
(defecation in a plastic bag that is then thrown onto a nearby heap of trash) still 
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predominates. Most people cook over open flames fueled by charcoal, and vendors 
along the paths sell various sized buckets of charcoal pieces for 30, 40, and 50 
shillings; some residents spend 30 percent or more of their income on fuel for 
cooking (Crosson, 2005). There are pubs, food stands, stalls selling used clothing 
and other items, churches, schools, clinics, restaurants, and more constructed out of 
anything and everything from reclaimed wood and corrugated metal sheets to rocks, 
mud, tarps, and sticks. Some dwellings have electricity through mostly illegal 
hookups, and there are communal water taps in central locations available for those 
who can afford the fees. Structures are built practically on top of one another and 
the pathways separating the rows are narrow, uneven, and flooded with water when 
it rains.  
Kibera is divided into thirteen villages, and settlement patterns, population 
composition, and density vary widely across the villages (Otiso, 2000). Because 
Kibera’s population growth was fueled by rural-urban migration from all parts of 
Kenya, the slum is a microcosm of the country as a whole. All Kenyan (African) 
ethnic groups are represented, although they are not distributed evenly across 
villages. Most villages house people of all ethnic groups, but one group is often 
dominant (De Maio, 2013; de Smedt, 2009; Marx et al, 2014).  	  
	  
Figure 2.3 Map of Kibera highlighting surveyed villages. 	  
Governance in Kibera is multi-layered, mixing formal and traditional 
institutions. The slum is divided between two parliamentary constituencies and 
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multiple city council wards, and elected councilors provide political representation 
to local government. At the same time, however, the Department of Provincial 
Administration—a division of the national government’s Office of the President—
appoints chiefs to govern each of the four locations that include portions of the slum. 
These locations are divided into 9 sublocations, and assistant chiefs (also appointed 
by the Provincial Administration) report to the location chief. The sublocations are 
further divided into villages, and elders selected from each village comprise the 
customary governance structure, which is separate from both the local and 
provincial administrations (Marx et al, 2014; Omenya & Lubaale, 2012). 
In order to capture the diversity within the settlement without incorporating 
too much variation in the geographic location of respondents, I purposefully chose to 
conduct the survey in four villages within Kibera: Laini Saba, Raila, Kisumu Ndogo, 
and Kianda. Although data on slum populations is very limited, previous qualitative 
and quantitative research indicates that the variation in average income, ethnic 
composition, and number of service providers found in these villages is 
representative of the variation found in Kibera as a whole (Crosson, 2005; de 
Smedt, 2009; Marx et al, 2014; Matheka & Erulkar, 2007; Otiso, 2000). Laini Saba 
is considered one of the most affluent villages, and the most prevalent ethnic groups 
are the Kikuyu and Kamba. Raila and Kianda are among the poorest villages, but 
Raila contains a high concentration of Luos while multiple ethnic groups are 
significantly represented in Kianda. Economically, Kisumu Ndogo constitutes the 
middle ground between the relative affluence of Laini Saba and the relative poverty 
of Kianda and Raila. Though Luos are the most prevalent ethnic group in the 
village, the highest concentration of Nubians in Kibera resides in Kisumu Ndogo. 
Kenyans of Nubian origin constitute a small fraction of Kibera’s population, but 
they are well represented in the local administration and among structure owners 
(Crosson, 2005; De Maio, 2013; de Smedt, 2009; Desgroppes & Taupin, 2011; Marx 
et al, 2014; Muriithi, 2013).    
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Korogocho 
The second settlement selected for the study is Korogocho, a community 
founded by rural immigrants to Nairobi in the 1960s. Though Korogocho was 
developed more than 60 years after Kibera, it has become the fourth largest slum in 
Nairobi. A Participatory Urban Appraisal (PUA) conducted in 2010 on behalf of UN-
Habitat and the Republic of Kenya estimated Korogocho’s population to be between 
100,000 and 120,000, but the 2009 Census data indicates that 42,000 people reside 
in 12,909 households within the settlement (APHRC, 2013; Gathuthi et al, 2010; 
KNBS, 2010). Whereas the population of some other informal settlements in the 
city is relatively transient, the average length of time respondents surveyed by UN-
Habitat had been living in their communities was 10 years for Kibera (Crosson, 
2005) and over 17 years for Korogocho (Gathuthi et al, 2010). Located 
approximately eleven kilometers from Nairobi’s central business district in the 
Eastern part of the city, Korogocho occupies 50 hectares (approximately 0.2 a 
square miles) of a mix of government-owned land that was allocated by the City 
Council of Nairobi as reserve for the Nairobi and Gitathuru rivers and private land 
onto which the settlement has expanded to accommodate the growing population 
(Gathuthi et al, 2010; Oketch et al, 2008).   
	  
Figure 2.4 Map of Korogocho highlighting surveyed villages. 
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The population of Korogocho is diverse; residents represent 30 ethnic groups, 
engage in a wide range of legal and illegal livelihoods, and form a variety of 
household structures (Gathuthi et al, 2010). The slum is divided into eight different 
villages, each with a distinctive character and history, autonomous leadership, and 
ethnic composition (Kago, 2009). Korogocho comprises one location in the Kenya 
Provincial Administration structure headed by a Chief and is further divided into 
three sub-locations headed by assistant Chiefs; these leaders are civil servants 
appointed to time-limited terms by the Provincial Administration. Each village 
selects or elects elders to work with the Chiefs as representatives of the people 
(Gathuthi et al, 2010).  
Due to its close proximity to the main Nairobi dumping site and the heavily 
polluted Nairobi river, human and industrial waste pose a major health problem for 
residents (APHRC, 2013). Mud is the most common building material for dwellings, 
followed by corrugated iron sheets. No flooring is installed in a majority of homes, 
and corrugated iron sheets are almost universally utilized for roofs (Gathuthi et al, 
2010). A 2005 survey of 9,00 households in Korogocho found that 94.5 percent of 
residents purchase water from communal taps, 77.3 percent utilize shared 
traditional pit latrines, and 85.6 percent rely mainly on kerosene or paraffin to light 
their homes (Epari et al, 2008). Most residents generate household income by 
operating small businesses, as opportunities for wage employment are extremely 
limited (APHRC, 2013). Across Korogocho’s eight villages, the percentage of 
households with incomes below the poverty line ranges from 42 percent to 78 
percent, making it among the poorest areas of Nairobi (Zulu et al, 2011).  
Although Korogocho and Kibera share many characteristics of slum 
communities—widespread poverty, high population density, inadequate housing, 
poor sanitation and water quality, and limited access to basic services—
comparatively high levels of insecurity and poor accessibility in Korogocho introduce 
additional sources of exclusion and vulnerability. Safety is a major concern in 
Kibera, especially after dark, but if reasonable precautions are followed most 
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residents and visitors can securely travel the main thoroughfares during daylight 
hours. The situation in Korogocho is much different, however, and conditions have 
continued to worsen following the post-election violence in 2007-08. High levels of 
unemployment, especially among youth and young adults, has fueled participation 
in gang violence and organized crime; incidences of robbery, rape, kidnapping, 
stabbing, shooting, and drug and alcohol abuse (and associated violence) are 
disturbingly frequent (UN-Habitat, 2012). According to survey results from the 
2010 PUA, insecurity was the number one concern among residents: between 43 
and 71 percent (depending on village of residence) of respondents reporting feeling 
unsafe in their home and community (Gathuthi et al, 2010).  
Another survey conducted in four slum communities in Nairobi revealed that 
58 percent of respondents from Korogocho reported having “personally been a victim 
of a crime” within the preceding 12 months, compared to 34 percent of respondents 
from Kibera. When victimization propensities were extrapolated from the survey 
data, results suggest that residents of Korogocho are 32 percent more likely to be a 
victim of crime than the overall average, whereas the propensity in Kibera was 23 
percent lower than average (Teresia, 2011). Certain areas of Korogocho, including 
the bridge connecting Korogocho to Babadogo—a place where many residents travel 
for employment and basic services—have become “no go” zones for pedestrians and 
motorbikes as gangs have asserted control over territory (Gathuthi et al, 2010; UN-
Habitat, 2012). Even though a plethora of formal and non-formal health and 
education facilities are located within the settlement, residents report that 
insecurity is a critical barrier to utilization (Amnesty International, 2010; Mudege 
et al, 2008; personal interviews, 2014). Additionally, the PUA focus group 
participants believe that violence and safety concerns have driven away NGOs and 
other individuals and groups who wish to help. 
One factor contributing to the comparatively high levels of insecurity in 
Korogocho is the settlement’s poor accessibility. Streets that facilitate access into 
and within slums are associated with enhanced safety and reduced fear of crime, as 
the flow of people into and out of the slum raises the level of activity (UN-Habitat, 
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2012). Transportation in and out of Kibera is not difficult; multiple paved roads lead 
from the surrounding relatively affluent areas to different entrances to the 
settlement, and a constant flow of buses and matatus (privately owned minibuses) 
are available nearby for transportation to other parts of Nairobi. The connections 
between Kibera and the formal areas of the city bridge, to some extent, the socio-
spatial gap that marginalizes informal settlements.  
Korogocho, however, is located in the Eastland outskirts of Nairobi city. The 
roads leading to the settlement from nearby formal areas are poor quality, 
congested with garbage trucks leading to the Dandora dumpsite, and are neither 
serviced by public transportation nor pedestrian friendly. The nearest public bus 
stop is several kilometers away, and many residents walk up to two hours or more 
each way to get to jobs and other activities around Nairobi (UN-Habitat, 2012). 
Though matatus formerly transported residents and visitors from bus stops to the 
entrances to the settlement, insecurity has driven them away in recent years. 
During a 2012 street flow survey conducted over a period of 24 hours at all 
entrances and exits to the settlement, observers spotted only one matatu (UN-
Habitat, 2012). During fieldwork in the summer of 2014, matatus no longer 
ventured into Korogocho, most taxi drivers refused to travel to an entrance, and 
those that could be convinced to do so charged exorbitant fees unaffordable to 
residents (personal interviews, 2014). 
Based on insights from the PUA and other secondary sources, I selected 
Grogon B, Kisumu Ndogo, and Highridge as representative villages within the 
settlement. Kisumu Ndogo (Luo) and Grogon B (Kikuyu) are each dominated by one 
ethnic group, while Highridge appears to be the most ethnically diverse village 
(Kago, 2009). Additionally, the average income of survey respondents in each of the 
selected villages is representative of the range found the in settlement: the average 
in Kisumu Ndogo was the highest, Grogon B was the lowest, and the average 
income in Highridge was nearly identical to the average across all seven villages 
(Gathuthi et al, 2010). Once fieldwork commenced, however, it quickly became 
apparent that the security situation in Grogon B had deteriorated to the point 
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where it was unsafe for enumerators to enter the village, even if they were familiar 
with the area and members of the predominant ethnic group. The interview team 
met with the local chief and elder and was strongly advised to leave immediately; 
the entire village has become a “no go zone.” After discussions with chiefs and elders 
from several neighboring villages, I selected Korogocho B to replace Grogon B. Data 
from the PUA indicated that the median income is the second lowest among the 
villages and, though there are higher concentrations of other ethnic groups 
compared to Grogon B, the majority of residents are Kikuyu (Gathuthi et al, 2010; 
Kago, 2009).       
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methodology 	  
Introduction 
One of the key shortcomings of existing studies on service provision in 
developing countries is the pervasive reliance on aggregate macro-level data and 
objective micro-level measures that offer limited insight into households’ 
experiences. Spatial proximity to a service provider, aggregate spending on social 
services, school enrollment rates, indicators of maternal and infant mortality, and 
other routinely employed measures do not capture individuals’ perceptions of 
service accessibility and quality. Furthermore, such measures do not shed light on 
the barriers to access or the challenges households encounter throughout the 
service-seeking experience. As a consequence of these omissions, efforts to improve 
service provision informed by the research may fail to consider important 
determinants of individuals’ service-seeking behavior. Health and education 
outcomes depend on the effective use of services, and perceptions of accessibility 
and quality influence individuals’ decisions regarding whether or not to utilize 
services and the choice of provider (Amooti-Kaguna & Nuwaha, 2000; Bazant et al, 
2009; Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; Karkee et al, 2014; Kiguli et al, 
2009; Leonard, 2003; Onah et al, 2006; Prata, Montagu, & Fefferys, 2005; Tooley & 
Dixon, 2006). 
In order to incorporate households’ perceptions and preferences into the 
analysis, I adopted a multi-dimensional conceptualization of the micro-experience of 
service provision inspired by MacLean (2011) and Bratton’s (2007, 2012) work with 
Afrobarometer data. I created an original household survey to collect information on 
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the multiple dimensions of access to, utilization of, and satisfaction with health and 
education services in Nairobi’s informal settlements. In the remainder of this 
chapter I review the research design and methodology employed in the dissertation. 
First, I describe the survey instrument and data collection procedures, including 
mechanisms for quality assurance. Next I highlight the key limitations and 
challenges of the survey data and, where applicable, the strategies used to minimize 
bias. In the third section, I explain the models and statistical techniques used in the 
analyses and justify the application of principal component analysis to facilitate 
modeling and interpretation. The final section includes descriptive statistics on the 
survey sample. 
Survey Description  
To obtain information about residents of Kibera and Korogocho and their 
experiences of health and education provision, I created an original household 
survey. I did not want to limit the study to the perceptions and experiences of one 
individual, because I saught to gain insight into the ways in which households 
access services and into the collective contributions of state and non-state providers 
to the accessibility, equity, and quality of the service environment. Each household 
unit with its members is the unit of analysis, and the survey collected information 
about all members of the household. A household was defined as either a group of 
people living together in one housing unit, or people living in the vicinity but not 
necessarily the same unit who depend on the same source(s) of income and food and 
share in the decisions, financing, and experiences of health and education 
provision.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The second definition is intended to account for situations in which families are spread among 
several housing units, either because they are residing with extended family members, there is not 
enough room in one unit, a child attends boarding school, etc. If a person does not sleep in the unit 
but fully depends on the occupant or occupants for financial support and the occupant(s) are involved 
in the decisions, financing, and experiences of health and education provision, the person can be 
considered a member of the household. This situation was encountered infrequently, and most cases 
involved a minor child attending boarding school or living with extended family in a rural area to 
attend school. 
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The first goal of the survey was to document the micro-experience of health 
and education provision: awareness of provision in the community, perceptions of 
the accessibility and quality of state and non-state provision, utilization, and 
satisfaction with the quality of services. The micro-experience also includes 
respondents’ overall assessments of health and education service provision in the 
communities, including the degree to which they feel they are able to meet the 
health and education needs of household members and their perceptions of the 
accessibility and equity of provision throughout the community. 
The second goal of the survey was to collect demographic and sociopolitical 
characteristics of the household to facilitate an examination of household-level 
factors that affect the multiple dimensions of the micro-experience of service 
provision. Demographic questions include a household roster, ethnicity, religion and 
religious attendance, educational attainment, occupation, income, length of 
residence in community, and an index of lived poverty adapted from Afrobarometer 
surveys (Mattes, 2008). Sociopolitical questions include political affiliation and level 
of involvement, interest in public affairs, membership and extent of involvement in 
community organizations, and trust in various individuals, groups, and institutions. 
Many of the questions were adapted from Afrobarometer and Demographic 
and Health (DHS) surveys. While I designed the survey and oversaw its 
implementation, I hired Ipsos Kenya, the Nairobi-­‐based subsidiary of international 
survey research firm Ipsos, to translate the survey into Swahili and conduct the 
interviews in Kibera and Korogocho.17 Ipsos Kenya is the largest survey firm in 
East Africa and has extensive experience in public opinion polling and survey 
research for clients such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
Afrobarometer, and other American scholars. Before finalizing the survey 
instrument, I met with several members of the Public Affairs department, including 
those whose focus is health, education, and urban development, to review the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Formerly known as The Steadman Group and then Synovate, the company was founded in Kenya 
and had recently been acquired by Ipsos, a global market and public opinion research firm that is 
currently the third largest research company in the world.  
	   74 
questions. Their feedback on both the questions themselves and the pre-coded 
response options contributed to the efficacy of the survey by ensuring that the 
wording was appropriate for the context and that my understanding and 
interpretation of the responses are accurate.  
Prior to data collection, I spent five full days reviewing and pre-testing the 
survey with the 26 Kenyan enumerators assigned to the project. All enumerators 
had received extensive training from Ipsos on survey protocol and techniques such 
as avoiding biasing the results or leading respondents. Additionally, all of the 
enumerators were young Kenyans fluent in both English and Swahili and able to 
blend into the communities in which the survey was conducted. During the first 
part of the training we went through all of the questions as a group and practiced 
interviewing one another in order to illuminate any ambiguity or confusion 
regarding the questions and pre-coded responses. Feedback from these sessions and 
the pilot interviews conducted in a nearby informal settlement was incorporated 
into the final version of the survey instrument.  
Although the survey collected far more information than can be analyzed in 
this dissertation, I use the data to compare state and non-state services, explore 
differences between communities, and examine how factors beyond poverty status 
affect households’ experiences with health and education provision.  
Data Collection 
Due to the difficulties inherent in conducting surveys in informal 
settlements, Ipsos selected supervisors familiar with both Kibera and Korogocho to 
oversee the data collection. All supervisors and enumerators participated in five 
days of training, pre-testing, and pilot interviews led by project managers from 
Ipsos and myself. I was not present during the interviews to avoid bias in the 
results. Supervisors met with village elders and chiefs prior to sending enumerators 
into the field to discuss the study and survey and proactively address any suspicions 
or problems that could have arisen during data collection. Additionally, the entire 
team of enumerators stopped by the chief’s office each day before beginning 
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interviews so that leaders were aware of their presence and knew who to talk to if 
any issues arose.  
After the survey had been translated into Swahili and all revisions from 
training sessions and pilot interviews were incorporated, the survey instrument—
preceded by the verbal consent agreement and screening questions and 
programmed with skip logics—was uploaded to smartphones furnished by Ipsos. 
Both English and Swahili versions were available, and enumerators were able to 
select a language at the beginning of the interview based on respondents’ 
preferences. All of the questions were closed-ended and a number of pre-coded 
responses were included, but enumerators were able to enter a different response if 
the answer did not match any of the existing codes. All responses were encrypted 
and sent wirelessly to Ipsos, along with the GPS coordinates of the household, at 
the completion of each interview. 
The sample size of 1,000 households was divided evenly between the two 
settlements. Within each settlement, the interviews were distributed among the 
selected villages in proportion to village population. This process involved 
estimates; accurate population data for villages within Kibera and Korogocho are 
not available, as village boundaries do not correspond with census enumeration 
areas.18 For Korogocho, I obtained population estimates for Highridge, Kisumu 
Ndogo, and Korogocho B from the African Population and Health Research Center 
(APHRC). Since 2002, APHRC has managed the Nairobi Urban Health and 
Demographic Surveillance System (NUHDSS)19 in an area that includes Korogocho. 
For Kibera, I relied on a number of sources, including disaggregated census data 
obtained by Ipsos and estimates from Map Kibera and other NGOs working in the 
settlement. Though the numbers varied somewhat by source, the proportion of the 
population residing in each village was generally consistent and interviews were 
allocated accordingly. The targeted and actual sample sizes by settlement and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Additionally, census counts for informal settlements are highly contested.  
19 http://aphrc.org/projects/nairobi-urban-health-and-demographic-surveillance-system-nuhdss/ 
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village are provided in Table 3.1. The actual number of interviews completed 
exceeded the target for each location.  
Table 3.1: Targeted and Actual Sample Size by Location 
Location Targeted Sample Size Actual Sample Size 
Kibera                                                        500 520 
 Kianda 125 131 
 Kisumu Ndogo 80 86 
 Laini Saba 220 226 
 Raila 75 77 
Korogocho                                                500 534 
 Highridge 241 240 
 Kisumu Ndogo 158 166 
 Korogocho B 101 128 
Total                                                  1,000 1,054 
 
Sampling Procedure 
Since addresses and phone numbers of potential respondents were 
unavailable, enumerators employed a random route sampling procedure commonly 
used to generate approximately random samples in informal settlements and 
similar areas (Häder & Gabler, 2003). First, the enumerators identified a prominent 
fixed landmark in each village such as a school, clinic, or religious institution. They 
then proceeded away from the landmark using the “left hand rule,” which required 
them to select houses on their left side only. If there were no residential dwellings 
immediately to the left of the landmark, they kept walking until they reached the 
first dwelling on the left. Enumerators used the date to determine which house to 
sample first. If they were working on the 2nd day of the month, for example, they 
would skip the first two houses and stop at the 3rd house. If they were sampling on 
the 21st of the month, they would stop at the 4th house (2+1=3, so skip the first three 
and stop at the 4th).  
Once the first dwelling was identified, the enumerator introduced the survey 
and asked for the adult member of the household who is most familiar with the 
health and education experiences of all members of the household. After 
administering a successful survey, the enumerators would skip four houses before 
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attempting to conduct another interview. If they were unsuccessful, they would 
continue to try the next house on the left until completing or scheduling an 
interview. Then they would skip four houses again and keep going. If an 
individual(s) was present at a dwelling but it was not the person most qualified to 
answer the questions, enumerators were instructed to find out when the 
appropriate person would return and schedule a repeat visit. They then skipped 
four houses and attempted another interview at the fifth house. Enumerators 
revisited a second and third time; if they were unable to conduct the interview after 
three visits, the interview was closed. 
In order to ensure that portions of the population were not over or under 
sampled, I established soft quotas for both gender and age group. Since the 
locations do not correspond with census enumeration areas, I used district level 
statistics.20 The quotas and achieved sample by gender and age group are displayed 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Gender and Age of Respondents by Location 
 Gender Age  
 Male Female 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ Total 
   Quota Actual Quota Actual Quota Actual Quota Actual Quota Actual  
Kibera 247 273 144 147 185 188 95 97 47 58 29 30 520 
Kianda 64 67 36 37 46 46 24 21 12 19 7 8 131 
Kisumu Ndogo 48 38 23 26 30 29 15 16 7 10 5 5 86 
Laini Saba 105 121 63 62 81 85 42 45 21 21 13 13 226 
Raila 30 47 22 22 28 28 14 15 7 8 4 4 77 
Korogocho 176 358 155 159 190 214 89 92 41 44 25 25 534 
Highridge 81 159 75 76 91 92 43 41 20 19 12 12 240 
Kisumu Ndogo 49 117 49 52 60 61 28 29 13 16 8 8 166 
Korogocho B 46 82 31 31 39 61 18 22 8 9 5 5 128 
Total 423 40% 
631 
60% 
306 
29% 
402 
38% 
189 
18% 
102 
10% 
55 
5% 
1,054 
100% 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Nairobi West District census data was used for Kibera and Nairobi North District data was used for Korogocho. 
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Quality Assurance 
There were a number of procedures established to ensure that interview 
protocols were followed and to minimize bias and other sources of error in the 
results. A supervisor was assigned to each village to oversee all of the enumerators 
working in the village. The supervisor and all members of the interview team met 
daily to discuss any issues and go over the tasks for the day. The supervisors 
monitored enumerators’ call sheets, traced their routes, and randomly revisited 
households to ensure that all procedures had been followed and to seek clarification 
if there were any inconsistencies in the data. Additionally, the surveys were 
submitted electronically to the Ipsos office at the time of completion, and project 
managers reviewed incoming data in real time. They plotted the GPS coordinates of 
each interview to ensure that enumerators stayed within village boundaries and 
that all areas of each village were covered. The managers consulted regularly with 
field supervisors to address any problems as they arose and to monitor progress on 
soft quotas.  
The smartphones used by the enumerators were programmed for the 
microphone to turn on automatically for one random question during each interview 
and to record audio until the response was submitted and the next question 
appeared. No indication was given that the microphone was enabled, so while 
enumerators were aware that a question would be recorded, they never knew when 
recording would occur. The audio files were transmitted to Ipsos with the survey 
responses, and project managers reviewed the audio to ensure that all enumerators 
were following protocol, refraining from leading the respondent or otherwise biasing 
the results, and coding responses correctly. Furthermore, each response was time 
stamped; if the timing was off (i.e., significantly shorter or longer than average or 
expected durations) or if there were other inconsistencies that could not be 
corroborated by field supervisors, the interview was dropped from the data set.  
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Key Challenges and Limitations of the Survey 
The most obvious limitation of this study is that the sample was drawn from 
small geographic areas that may not be representative of the population of slum 
dwellers in Nairobi and is certainly not representative of the global population of 
poor households affected by the state retrenchment and the growth of non-state 
health and education provision. Although conclusions from this study cannot be 
generalized beyond Nairobi, I employed purposive sampling to choose both 
settlements and villages as representative of the broader population as possible 
within the financial constraints of the project and the limitations posed by safety 
concerns. Security is poor, particularly in Korogocho, and it had deteriorated to the 
point that one of the villages originally chosen was unsafe for enumerators to enter 
and another village was substituted. Some of the slum’s most vulnerable residents 
were not represented in the sample as a consequence, but the enumerators’ safety 
was paramount. 
A second key limitation is that, given the lack of census data or other 
information with which to construct a sampling frame, the sample is not completely 
random. This was unavoidable given the characteristics of informal settlements. 
Random route sampling and soft gender and age quotas were employed to ensure 
the sample was as random as possible and particular categories were not 
significantly overrepresented. Additionally, in order to avoid the overrepresentation 
of households with unemployed adults arising from absenteeism during the 
weekdays, enumerators conducted interviews on both weekdays and weekends. 
Safety concerns precluded interviewing after dark, but visits were made at varying 
days and times in order to minimize sampling errors. 
As is the case for any survey, there are several identifiable challenges and 
sources of response biases. The first is suspicion among respondents about the 
project and its purpose, the presence of “outsiders,” and how their responses will be 
used. This suspicion can be heightened as residents see enumerators conducting 
interviews over the period of several days, and it can either discourage people from 
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participating or elicit guarded responses or responses they think we want to hear. 
In order to reduce suspicion, the supervisors and interview teams met with chiefs 
and elders prior to and throughout the fieldwork to inform the community and 
garner the support of respected leaders. Furthermore, enumerators and supervisors 
were assigned to villages based on their ethnicity, their ties to and familiarity with 
the communities, and their ability to blend in and not draw unnecessary attention 
to themselves.21 
Bias is particularly likely for questions involving sensitive matters like 
ethnicity, religion, and politics. Due to the legacy of the post-election violence that 
caused widespread unrest and destruction in both Kibera and Korogocho and the 
ongoing tension and insecurity—particularly in Korogocho—suspicion and wariness 
are heightened among residents. Enumerators reported encountering a great deal of 
suspicion about who exactly was conducting the survey. Many people seemed to 
believe that the government was somehow involved and thus were initially guarded. 
All sensitive questions were placed at the end of the survey instrument to give 
respondents time to understand the nature of the research and feel comfortable 
talking with the enumerators. The enumerators reported that suspicion among 
respondents did subside during the interviews and they sensed authenticity in the 
responses. Nevertheless, these are subjective assessments and some of the 
responses were likely influenced by suspicion and distrust. 
A second challenge is research fatigue. Nairobi’s informal settlements—
especially Kibera—are frequently chosen for studies on poverty. The United Nations 
Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) is based in Nairobi, and the city’s 
relative accessibility and developed infrastructure have attracted many NGOs and 
researchers. On one hand, Kibera’s notoriety and the presence of many non-state 
service providers in the settlement facilitated this study of non-state provision. On 
the other hand, frequent participation in research causes fatigue among 
respondents who may not see any direct benefits of the research in their lives. There 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Assignments were also made using these criteria for safety reasons. People who are obviously not 
from the area are often targets for crime and harassment.  
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is understandably considerable frustration. The enumerators’ training included a 
thorough description of the project, research goals, and how findings would be 
disseminated so they were able to respond when challenged by frustrated 
participants. 
Data Analysis  
Factor and Principal Component Analysis 
Given the number of variables comprising some of the dependent and 
independent variables in the study, it was necessary to reduce the dimensionality of 
the dataset to facilitate statistical modeling. The survey questions capture 
particular aspects of the theoretical constructs of interest, but no single variable 
provides an adequate proxy for the concept. Satisfaction with services includes 
respondents’ assessments of the technical and functional quality of services and the 
adequacy of the facility, for example, and the response to a single question does not 
account for all of the dimensions. The same situation arises for other concepts, 
including community involvement, political activism, interpersonal trust, 
perceptions of service accessibility and quality, and socioeconomic status. Selecting 
one variable as a proxy would provide an inaccurate indicator of the theoretical 
construct and lose valuable information from the data (Bro & Smilde, 2014). 
Including all of the variables in the models was not feasible because many of the 
component variables for each concept are highly correlated; the individual 
coefficient estimates and variances would be biased and may lead to inaccurate 
conclusions (Greene, 2008). 
Consequently, I employed factor analysis (FA) and principal component 
analysis (PCA) to aggregate information contained in numerous variables. The 
resulting components or factor scores are treated as indicators of the underlying 
constructs or latent variables that are not measured directly (Kolenikov & Angeles, 
2009). The advantage of FA and PCA over more crude indices obtained by summing 
or averaging variables is that the factors capture more of the variation in the 
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original data (Abdi & Williams, 2010; Comrey, 1973; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; 
Jolliffe, 2002; Pearson, 1901; Rencher, 2002).  
Though FA and PCA are both commonly used for dimension reduction, the 
two methods are different. The factors produced by FA seek to explain as much of 
the common variance across the variables included in the analysis, while PCA 
factors explain as much of the total variance among all the variables (Abdi & 
Williams, 2010; Caudill et al, 2000; Comrey, 1973; Jolliffe, 2002). Both techniques 
have been widely utilized to create measures of socioeconomic status from survey 
data (Abeyasekera, 2005; Caudill et al, 2000; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Kolenikov & 
Angeles, 2009; MacLean, 2011; Mattes, 2008; Mberu et al, 2014; Rutstein & 
Johnson, 2004; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006) as well as indices of social capital 
(Bjørnskov, 2006; Harpham et al, 2002; Narayan & Cassidy, 2001; Onyx & Bullen, 
2000; Portela et al, 2013; Portes & Vickstrom, 2015) and satisfaction with social 
services (Afolabi et al, 2012; Jehu-Appiah et al, 2012; Khamis & Njau, 2014; Ware 
& Hays, 1988), but PCA is most prevalent.  
In applying both FA and PCA to this data, my goal was to identify the most 
important information from the multiple variables and to extract this information 
to simplify the data and facilitate statistical modeling (Abdi & Williams, 2010). 
After selecting the relevant variables for each concept, I used Stata to perform PCA 
and FA using Pearson, Spearman, and polychoric correlation matrices. Factors and 
principal components summarize the correlation structure of the data, so the 
validity of scores depends on the matrix containing the correlation coefficients 
between each variable and the other variables (Joliffe, 2002). Each correlation 
coefficient (Pearson, Spearman, and polychoric) is calculated based on different 
assumptions, so the choice of correlation was important.  
In all but one case, I opted to use principal component analysis with 
polychoric correlation because this method accounted for the largest amount of 
variance in the original variables and produced factors that are substantively 
interpretable. Instead of treating ordinal variables as continuous like the more 
widely employed Pearson coefficient, polychoric correlation takes the ordinal nature 
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of survey data into account (DiStefano, 2002; Kolenikov & Angeles, 2009; Medina-
Solís et al, 2006). It presumes that there is an underlying continuous variable—
such as satisfaction with health services—that is associated with the ordinal data 
generated by the survey (e.g., adequacy of equipment and supplies, capability of 
staff, recovery of patients, etc.). Each ordinal variable is assumed to come from a 
normally distributed latent continuous variable (e.g., satisfaction with health 
services). The ordinal variable and the latent variable are connected by cut points, 
or thresholds, representing the point on the continuum of the latent variable at 
which the value of the ordinal variable changes (Choi et al, 2010; Kolenikov & 
Angeles, 2009; Rigdon & Ferguson, 1991). For the latent variable measuring 
satisfaction with health services and an ordinal variable signifying the perception of 
the capability of health facility staff, for example, the cut points indicate the values 
of the latent satisfaction variable at which a respondent’s perception of staff 
capability changes from “not capable” to “somewhat capable.”  
In generating the correlation matrix for PCA, the cut points represent the 
joint probability of the ordinal variables and they are estimated by maximum 
likelihood. The polychoric correlation coefficient is therefore a maximum likelihood 
estimate of the correlation of the underlying continuous distribution connecting the 
variables (Choi et al, 2010). Numerous studies have used simulations to show that, 
compared to Pearson and Spearman coefficients, polychoric correlation it is 
consistent, asymptotically normal and efficient, and more accurately estimates the 
variance explained by the factors for ordinal and discrete data (DiStefano, 2002; 
Holgado-Tello, 2010; Kolenikov & Angeles, 2009; Olsson, 1979).  
The tables in Appendix A detail each factor used throughout the dissertation. 
The tables provide the method and correlation structure employed for each variable, 
the percent of variation in the original variables it represents, the constituent 
variables, and the descriptive statistics. The factor loadings in parentheses 
following each variable included in the factor indicate the correlation between the 
original variable and the factor score (Abdi & Williams, 2010; Jolliffe, 2002). The 
loadings facilitate substantive interpretation, as the factor is more strongly 
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influenced (and therefore more closely represents) the variables with higher 
loadings. 
Models and Presentation of Quantitative Data 
Many of the dependent variables (DVs) used in the analyses are binary, 
ordinal, or categorical. Variables of quintiles were generated for those that were 
initially continuous, including the factors obtained using principal component 
analysis, to facilitate meaningful interpretation of the results. Though the specific 
models used in the analyses will be detailed in the chapters in which they appear, 
the techniques employed throughout the dissertation include logistic, ordered 
logistic, and multilevel mixed effects logistic and ordered logistic models.  
Logistic Models for Binary Outcome Variables 
For the basic logit model, depicted in equations 3.1 and 3.2, the probability of 
an outcome occurrence (e.g., Y=1 if a household has not received treatment from a 
health care provider in the past year) is a function of a set of explanatory variables 
X1 to Xk. Following the example, the probability that a household has not accessed 
health services, p, depends on the set of values of the explanatory variables. 	  
 [Equation 3.1]       Pr(Y = 1 | X1,X2 ,...Xk ) = F(β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ...βk Xk )  
 
 [Equation 3.2]       Pr(Y = 1 | X1,X2 ,...Xk ) =
exp(β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ...βk Xk )
1+ exp(β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ...βk Xk )
 	  
The estimates generated for the coefficients ß0 through ßk are in log-odds units and 
are not easily interpretable. I often choose to display the model results as odds 
ratios, which are calculated as eßk and represent the odds of Y=1 (or p) when Xk 
increases by one unit.  
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To interpret the results of logit models, I calculate predicted probabilities of 
outcomes given a particular set of values of the independent variables (IVs) using 
equation 3.3: 	  
 [Equation 3.3]       pc = 1+ exp(−X j(c ) )β j − X *β *[ ]−1    	  
where c is a chosen value of Xj and X* ß* is a vector of the remaining independent 
variables set at particular values. I also estimate changes in the probability of an 
outcome for different values of explanatory variables, D, as follows: 	  
 [Equation 3.4]   Dlog it = 1+ exp(−X j(b ) )β j − X *β ∗[ ]−1 − 1+ exp(−X j(a ) )β j − X *β *[ ]−1       	  
where Xja and Xjb are different hypothetical values of Xj. Holding other variables in 
X* constant, the statistic equals the estimated effect on Pr(Y=1) of an increase in Xj 
from a to b. Since the logit function is not linear, the change will have a different 
effect depending on the points on the curve at which the chosen values fall. 
Ordered Logit Models for Ordinal Outcome Variables 
When the dependent variable is ordinal rather than binary, I employ ordered 
logit models in the analyses. In the ordered logit model, there is a continuous, 
unmeasured latent variable, Y*, from which the values of the observed ordinal 
variable, Y, are derived (equation 3.5). There are cut points or thresholds, v, of Y* 
where the value of the ordinal dependent variable Y changes.  	  
[Equation 3.5]       yi* = β0 + β1x1i + ...βk xki + ε i   	  
If, for example, there are three values of ordinal variable yi  (M=3), then: 	  
Yi = 1  if Yi* ≤ ν1  
[Equation 3.6]        Yi = 2  if ν1 ≤ Yi* ≤ ν 2  
Yi = 3  if Yi* ≥ ν 2  	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The conditional probabilities of each outcome M (1, 2, and 3) can be 
calculated as follows: 
[Equation 3.7]        
P(Yi = 1) = 1−
exp Xiβ −ν1( )
1+ exp Xiβ −ν1( )
P(Yi = 2) =
exp Xiβ −ν1( )
1+ exp Xiβ −ν1( )
−
exp Xiβ −ν 2( )
1+ exp Xiβ −ν 2( )
P(Yi = 3) =
exp Xiβ −ν 2( )
1+ exp Xiβ −ν 2( )
  
The ordered logit model is only useful, however, if the effects of each IV on the DV 
are constant across all values of the ordinal dependent variable (Borooah, 2002). If 
this parallel regression or proportional odds assumption is not met, however, the 
coefficients and odds ratios can suggest incorrect, incomplete, or misleading results 
(Williams, 2006).  
For analyses involving ordinal dependent variables, I used the Brant test of 
parallel regression assumption in Stata (Long & Freese, 2006). If either the model 
as a whole or any independent variables violated the assumption, I employed a 
partial generalized ordered logit model that estimates separate coefficients for 
different values of the dependent variable for the regressors with non-uniform 
effects across values of the DV. For IVs with consistent effects, a single coefficient 
estimate is generated. In equation 3.8, the Pr(Y= j) is the same across all values of j 
for the vector of IVs X’. For the subset X”, the Pr(Y= j) varies and the model 
estimates a separate vector of coefficients βj for each of the j-1 values of the DV. 	  	  
 [Equation 3.8]       Pr Yi = j | Xβ( ) = F vj − Xi'β − Xi"β j( )− F vj−1 − Xi'β − Xi"β j( )   	  
By only estimating separate coefficients for the regressors that fail to meet the 
proportional odds assumption, the partial generalized ordered logit model preserves 
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efficiency, simplifies interpretation, and conveys information about how the effects 
of certain IVs vary across the values of the dependent variable (Williams, 2006). 
Multilevel Mixed Effects Logit and Ordered Logit Models 
The introduction of village-level covariates to the analyses in Chapter 6 
necessitates the use of multilevel mixed effects models. In earlier chapters, I employ 
fixed effects to control for the settlement of residence; the coefficient on the fixed 
effect parameter estimates the extent to which variation in outcomes not explained 
by the household-level covariates may be attributed to location-specific factors. With 
the addition of village-level covariates, however, ignoring the nested structure and 
assuming that all observations are independent could lead to biased coefficient 
estimates and deflated standard errors (Hedeker & Gibbons, 1994; Larsen & Merlo, 
2005; Subramanian, 2004). Mixed effects models improve estimation by accounting 
for correlations within clusters. They include fixed effects intended to describe 
variation in the full sample, while the random effects allow for varying intercepts 
and slopes across subgroups (Hamilton, 2013). The random intercepts represent the 
combined effect of all omitted cluster-specific covariates that cause a change in the 
dependent variable, allowing us to model unobserved heterogeneity (Santos et al, 
2008; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). 
The general formula for a multilevel mixed effects ordered logit regression 
with two levels is displayed in Equation 3.9. 	  
       
λijc = log
Pijc
1− Pijc
= γ c − xij' β + zij' vi
  
 
   [Equation 3.9]          Pijc = Pr Yij ≤ c v;γ c ,β,∑v( ) = 11+ exp −λijc( )   
 
                                pijc = Pr Yij = c v;γ c ,β,∑v( ) = Pijc − Pijc −1  
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In this equation, the values of i index the clusters in the second level, the values of j 
index the units in the first level (e.g., individuals or households), and the values of c 
indicate the response categories or values of the ordinal dependent variable. Yij is 
the ordinal response of cluster i and unit j, γc represent the threshold parameters on 
the latent continuous variable where the value of ordinal DV changes, xij is the 
covariate vector that includes variables from both levels, zij is the vector for random 
effects, β are the fixed effects parameters, and vi is the random effect for cluster i 
(Hedeker & Gibbons, 1994).  
For most of the models in Chapter 6, however, there are four levels: 
household, ethnicity, village, and informal settlement.22 The general four-level 
model is described in Equation 3.10: 
   [Equation 3.10]      Level 1 (Household): Log Phevs( ) / 1− Phevs( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = β0hevs + ahevs   
   Level 2 (Ethnicity): β0evs = δ 00vs + b0evs   
   Level 3 (Village): δ 00vs = γ 000s + c00vs   
   Level 4 (Slum): γ 000s = d0s   
 
where hevs index the household, ethnicity, village, and slum. β represents the 
parameter estimates for fixed effects at the household level, γ represents fixed 
effects at the village level, and ahevs, b0evs, c00vs, and d0s refer to the random effects of 
intercepts at the household, ethnicity, village, and slum level.  	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For dependent variables measuring affordability of fees or satisfaction with health services at a 
particular facility, a fifth level is added to allow a random effect for each facility. 
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Descriptive Statistics23 
Table 3.3: Gender of Household Head 
Location  Gender Of Household Head 
 Male Female 
 # % # % 
Kibera  428 82% 92 18% 
 Kianda 107 82% 24 18% 
 Kisumu Ndogo 71 83% 15 17% 
 Laini Saba 187 83% 39 17% 
 Raila 63 82% 14 18% 
Korogocho    378 71% 156 29% 
 Highridge 161 67% 79 33% 
 Kisumu Ndogo 116 70% 50 30% 
 Korogocho B 101 79% 27 21% 
Total                                                              806 76% 248 24% 
 
Table 3.4: Ethnic Distribution of Respondents 
Ethnicity Frequency Percentage 
Kamba 126 12% 
Kikuyu 194 18% 
Kisii 44 4% 
Luhya 280 27% 
Luo 299 28% 
Other 104 10% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 7 <1% 
Total 1047 100% 
 
Table 3.5: Religious Affiliation of Respondents 
Religion Frequency Percentage 
Catholic 275 26% 
Protestant (mainstream) 96 9% 
Protestant (evangelical/Pentecostal) 316 30% 
Christian (general) 223 21% 
Muslim 88 8% 
Traditional religion 23 2% 
None 30 3% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 3 <1% 
Total 1054 100% 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Additional descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 4 
The Micro-Level Consequences of State 
Retrenchment and the Growth of  
Non-State Provision 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters provided a general overview of the ways in which the 
rise of neoliberal globalization and the associated policies imposed on governments 
by international financial institutions necessitated economic and political reforms 
that limited the role of the state and promoted private sector involvement in health, 
education, and other basic services. It is generally assumed that non-state actors fill 
gaps in social service provision left by state retrenchment, but the ways in which 
the simultaneous processes of state retrenchment and the growth of non-state 
provision are experienced at the household level are not adequately explored in 
existing literature. Taking advantage of survey data that includes experiences with 
both state and non-state providers, this chapter explores the consequences of both 
processes. What are the relative contributions of state and non-state providers to 
health and education provision in Kibera and Korogocho? At the micro level, what 
are the characteristics of un- and under-served households? Does experience with 
state and non-state services depend on household attributes? Furthermore, using 
respondents' perceptions of the technical quality, functional quality, and service 
environment of their most frequently visited health provider and school, I examine 
whether perceptions of quality and satisfaction vary by provider type and 
household-level characteristics. 
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As originally conceived, this dissertation was to focus solely on non-state 
health and education provision. I assumed, based on prior surveys and published 
research, that residents of Nairobi's informal settlements would have very limited 
access to public providers and that an overwhelming majority of respondents would 
have no interaction with government-operated facilities. I intended to examine how, 
in the absence of universal public provision, non-state actors shape households' 
access to and experiences of health and education provision.  
Though the focus was to be on non-state provision, I opted to include identical 
sets of questions about government providers and to collect respondents' perceptions 
of the technical quality, functional quality, and service environment of their most 
frequently visited health provider and school, regardless of the operator. Initial 
visits to the communities reinforced the assumption of limited government 
provision, but a new government clinic opened in Korogocho roughly a year before 
my fieldwork and I realized that gaining any insight into the micro-experience of 
health and education provision in the settlements would only be possible with data 
on households' interactions with the full range of providers.  
The decision to broaden the scope of the survey proved to be a good one, as far 
more respondents utilize government schools and health facilities than expected. 
Thirty-five percent of survey respondents reported that the health provider most 
frequently visited by members of the household is government-operated, and 41 
percent of households with school-age children have at least one child enrolled in a 
public school. Furthermore, when asked where they would go for medical treatment 
if they had the means to seek the services of any type of health provider, 53 percent 
of households selected the government as their preferred provider. The findings 
challenge prevailing narratives about the role of the state in social service 
provision, particularly for health services. Furthermore, the complexity, 
fragmentation, and lack of regulation characterizing the diverse non-state sector 
highlights the shortcomings in our understanding of the sector and its contributions 
to poor households’ health and education outcomes. 
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The chapter begins with a review of existing literature, followed by 
descriptions of the dependent and independent variables and empirical strategy 
used in the analysis. The third section documents respondents’ perceptions of the 
accessibility and quality of state and non-state health and education provision and 
provider preferences using descriptive statistics from the survey. The fourth section 
includes the results and interpretation of regression models examining the 
relationship between household characteristics and interaction with state and non-
state providers and satisfaction with services. The concluding section summarizes 
findings and discusses implications for policy.  
The Micro-Level Consequences of State Retrenchment 
Existing literature on the consequences of state retrenchment with respect to 
social welfare provision has several threads. The first, which I reviewed in Chapter 
1, originally accompanied the development and implementation of neoliberal 
economic theories and policies. The second strand of literature emerged in response 
to the experiences of widespread implementation of structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs) in developing countries during the 1980s and the growing realization of the 
social costs of the approach. Though many countries experienced varying degrees of 
economic growth, unemployment increased drastically as domestic firms were 
unable to compete with foreign companies operating locally as a result of the 
liberalization policies. Exporters captured most of the benefits of economic growth 
and both inequality and poverty rose steadily (Green, 1996; Gwynne & Cristobal, 
2000). Data from multiple countries revealed sharp increases in infant mortality 
rates and worsened nutritional status of many children after the implementation of 
SAPs (Cornia et al, 1987), and post-independence gains in health and education 
outcomes in many African countries eroded (Rono, 2002).  
With respect to social welfare, the criticisms of the neoliberal model and 
concerns with state retrenchment took several forms. At the macro level, the focus 
was largely on the state and the economic objectives of the reforms. Some examined 
the social outcomes through the lens of neoliberal theory, highlighting unrealistic 
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assumptions, disregard for the many contextual factors24 that influence both the 
implementation process and the outcomes, and the failure of governments to fully 
implement the reforms (Portes, 1997; Rudra, 2002; Van De Walle, 2001). As Rodrik 
(1998) argues, the paradox of globalization is that the focus on market liberalization 
exported from developed countries is accompanied by demands on the state for a 
social safety net (widely available in developed countries in some form or another). 
The prescriptions for stabilization and adjustment involve a severe reduction in 
government expenditures and the elimination or privatization of many state 
programs, thereby rendering governments incapable of providing the most basic 
public goods (roads, public education, health, etc.). A lack of access to these goods is 
an impediment to human capital development and a social consequence that poses a 
threat to political stability and undermines long-term potential for development and 
future growth (Mkandawire, 2001).  
 Other studies began to examine the consequences of state retrenchment from 
social service provision for the citizens of countries where SAPs were implemented. 
The prevailing theme was that social conditions of vulnerable groups, particularly 
children, women, and the poor, deteriorated significantly after structural 
adjustment (Cornia et al, 1987). As the cost of health and education provision 
shifted from the state to recipients of the services, financial barriers led to non- or 
under-utilization of services among the poor (Adésínà, 2009; Mwega & Ndulu, 1994; 
Rono, 2002). Case studies showed that women's health worsened as they put the 
nutrition and health of their children above their own, and school enrollment among 
girls stagnated or dropped as boys' education was prioritized when families could 
not afford school fees (Afshar & Dennis, 1992; Elson, 1991; Okuonzi, 2004).  
While many studies published in the wake of state retrenchment focused on 
social outcomes and service distribution, the analyses were conducted using macro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Portes (1997) noted that the results of any comprehensive economic development program depend 
on the internal characteristics of the state and its external relationship with the class structure of 
civil society. Though the effectiveness depends on other factors, such as human capital, the 
characteristics of market organizations, and the structure and capacity of political institutions, the 
policy prescriptions were the same for all countries. 
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level data such as government expenditures on social welfare, national poverty 
indices, infant and maternal mortality rates, and other aggregate measures. As 
economist and former World Bank staff member Ravi Kanbur highlights in his 
discussion of disagreements within the development community, however, this level 
of aggregation fails to capture community- and household-level experiences: 
If the bus service that takes a woman from her village to her sister's village is 
cancelled, it will not show up in these measures. If the health post in the 
slum runs out of drugs, it will not show up. If the primary school textbooks 
disappear, or if the teacher does not turn up to teach, it will not show 
up…focusing on [these measures] solely misses out on disaggregated detail. 
(Kanbur, 2001, p. 1087) 
 
Furthermore, changes in national or other aggregate measures can be driven by 
significant divergence among geographic or social groups. A decline in the national 
poverty rate, for example, may be composed of a decrease in poverty in rural regions 
and an increase in urban areas; similar variation can occur along gender, ethnic, or 
religious lines (Kanbur, 2001). For the portions of the population experiencing 
worsening conditions and facing greater hardship, aggregate improvement is 
meaningless.  
The third, nascent strand of the literature seeks to address the shortcomings 
of the macro-level studies by introducing micro-level analyses. Most micro-level 
research has occurred in the literature on non-state provision, and the focus is often 
on the work of one organization or a specific group or type of providers. What these 
studies tend to neglect, however, are the connections between the service providers 
and the meso- and macro-level contexts in which they operate. As Mkandawire 
(2001) notes, “As a consequence of this ‘projectizing and micro-izing,’ they tend not 
to address the impacts of their activities on efficiency in the allocation of scarce 
resources, their incentive compatibility in large market economies, or their effects 
on long-term economic growth” (p. 3). Additionally, case and single-sector studies 
rarely undertake systematic examinations of how the entire landscape of non-state 
actors providing services in a particular geographic area affects residents’ micro-
experience of social welfare provision.  
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Within the literature on state retrenchment that focuses on the effects of 
declining public provision, very little research has examined household- and 
individual-level consequences of state retrenchment (MacLean, 2011; Rondo, 2002). 
In a 2011 article in World Development, Lauren MacLean highlighted the dearth of 
micro-level analyses and examined the consequences of state retrenchment through 
what she termed the "micro-experience" of public social welfare provision. Her 
initial conceptualization of the micro-experience of health and education services 
involved two dimensions: individuals' perceptions of accessibility and perceptions of 
quality (MacLean, 2011). Using data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 18 
African countries during 2005-2006, MacLean intended to examine individual-level 
perceptions of accessibility and quality. She discovered, however, that "a 
statistically and substantively significant number of Africans reported that they 
had 'no experience' with public schools and/or clinics" (MacLean, 2011, p. 1157). She 
consequently added a third dimension to the micro-experience—interaction with 
public social services—and limited the study to comparing characteristics of the 
population that has experience with public health and education provision to the 
characteristics of the population that does not.  
MacLean’s analysis of data, collected twenty years after Adjustment with a 
Human Face highlighted the social consequences of SAPs for the poor, presents a 
very different picture than the studies that generated publicity in the late 1980s. 
She discovered that the poor were actually more likely to utilize government health 
and education services than the wealthier citizens who opted for more expensive—
but seemingly higher quality—private providers. State retrenchment in Africa, she 
concluded, "has not meant the absolute exclusion of the poor but instead might have 
stimulated the growth of a two-tiered social service system where those who could 
pay frequently chose to opt out of what the state had to offer" (MacLean, 2011, p. 
1161). This conclusion was echoed by South African sociologist Jìmí Adésínà in a 
retrospective review of social policy in sub-Saharan Africa:  
The paradox of the dual system of social service delivery (public versus 
private), developed under the neoliberal regime, is that the people with a voice 
had relocated to the private sector largely as a result of poor service induced by 
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underfunding. The public sector was then condemned for its inability to match 
the private sector in service delivery. (2009, p. S48) 
 
From this perspective, state retrenchment has led to an erosion in the quality of 
government health and education services, and non-state provision meets the 
demand for higher quality services among those who can pay for it. The poor and 
vulnerable continue to rely on lower quality, albeit less expensive, public providers.  
Synthesizing (and somewhat oversimplifying) the literature on public and 
private provision during the era of state retrenchment, two narratives on the 
simultaneous reduction of state provision and growth in non-state provision can be 
identified. In the first, non-state providers meet the demand generated by the 
absence of or limitations in state provision. This is a welcome development for some, 
particularly those who view government provision as inefficient and corrupt and 
those who argue that non-state actors can more flexibly meet the needs of citizens. 
In the second, the growth in non-state provision offers higher quality options for 
those who can afford to pay, and those who cannot must rely on underfunded, 
inadequate government facilities. 
Although both narratives suggest that NSPs meet a demand generated by 
state retrenchment, the predicted consequences for the poor are quite different. In 
the first, the accessibility of government provision may become more restricted for 
the poor, but non-state providers may fill in the gaps and offer higher quality 
services. In the second, the poor are forced to rely on low quality government 
provision. Which of these narratives more accurately describes the situation in 
Nairobi's informal settlements?  
Methodology 
Dependent Variables 
The various dependent variables used throughout the chapter measure 
utilization of and satisfaction with health and education services at the household 
level, capturing different dimensions of the micro-experience of service provision. 
Interaction with service providers, interchangeably referred to as utilization, is 
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conceptualized in several ways in the models that follow. To gain insight into the 
households that are unable to access or face difficulties in accessing services, I 
employ multiple measures of non- and under-utilization of services. For health, the 
dichotomous variable no_health equals 1 if the respondent reported that no 
members of the household have sought medical treatment at a health facility of any 
type over the past five years. Because this indicator also includes households whose 
members had no need for services during the period and not just those for whom 
financial and other barriers restricted access,25 a second indicator variable was used 
in some models. The dichotomous variable no_care equals 1 if the respondent or 
another member of the household was unable to receive treatment the last time 
medical care was needed. Even though the household may have utilized health 
services at some point over the preceding year, the inability to access care when 
needed indicates the under-utilization of services. As a measure of under-utilization 
of education, low_enroll equals 1 if at least one age-eligible member of the 
household is not enrolled in school (i.e., if the percentage of eligible children 
enrolled is less that 100). 26 
Table 4.1: Households with Low Utilization of Services 
 Percentage of households 
No experience with health providers of any type over the past 5 years 
 
8% 
Difficulty accessing health services 18% 
No enrollment in school 6%+ 
Less than full enrollment 28%+ 
+ percentage of households with school age children 	  
The percentages of households reporting non- or under-utilization of services 
are displayed in Table 4.1. Eight percent of households had no experience with 
health providers of any type over the past five years, and 18 percent were unable to 
access health services the last time a member of the household needed treatment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In response to follow up questions about why no members of the household had utilized health 
services over the past five years, 68% said they were not in need of medical care. 
26 If there are no school age individuals, the value is missing so as to exclude households with no 
need for services from the analysis.	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Among households with school age children, 6 percent reported that none of the 
eligible children are enrolled in school and 28 percent indicated that at least one of 
the age-eligible members is not enrolled. 
Households reporting an inability to access medical treatment when needed 
were asked a follow-up question to investigate the barriers to care. The responses 
and the frequency with which they were cited by survey participants are listed in 
Table 4.2. The majority of reasons related to financial concerns: “could not afford 
the cost of the visit” was the most common response, followed by “weren’t sick 
enough to justify the cost of the visit.” Other households were unable to afford the 
cost of transport to a health facility. A smaller portion of responses mentioned 
problems with health providers ranging from inadequate supplies and equipment 
and inadequate skills to being denied care, long lines, and previous negative 
experiences.   
Table 4.2: Reasons for Under-Utilization of Health Services 
Reason for not being able to access health care last time it was needed Frequency of Response 
Could not afford the cost of the visit 74 
Could not afford the cost of transport 10 
Could not get transport to a facility 7 
Could not take time off work 4 
Weren’t sick enough to justify cost of visit 22 
Did not know where to go 1 
Badly treated previously 3 
Facility was not open when needed 5 
Waited too long without being attended to 2 
Tried but were denied health care 8 
The health care provider was not available 1 
The health care provider’s drugs or equipment are inadequate 12 
The health care provider’s skills are inadequate 5 
 
The second set of dependent variables measure households’ interaction with 
state and non-state service providers. For health, any_gov_health and 
any_ngo_health indicate whether any member of the household has sought 
treatment from a public health facility or non-government facility, respectively, over 
the past year. Similarly, any_public_school and any_ngo_school indicate whether 
any member of the household was enrolled in a government or non-government 
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school during the preceding year. The descriptive statistics for each of these 
measures are displayed in Table 4.3. In her analysis of Afrobarometer data, 
MacLean (2011) found that 31 percent of respondents had no interaction with public 
schools, while 60 percent had some. Among surveyed households in Kibera and 
Korogocho with age-eligible members, more than half (59 percent) have no 
experience with public schools and 20 percent have no children enrolled in non-state 
schools.  
For health services, MacLean (2011) reported that 77 percent of Africans 
have some experience with public health facilities and 17 percent do not. Given the 
limited availability of public provision in informal settlements and existing research 
citing very limited interaction with government clinics among slum dwellers, it is 
surprising that 51 percent of households surveyed in Kibera and Korogocho have 
experience with public providers. A larger portion—68 percent—has utilized non-
state health services, and 28 percent reported interaction with both state and non-
state providers.    
Table 4.3: Interaction with Public and Private Providers 
 
Percentage 
with no 
experience 
Percentage with 
some experience 
Government schools 59%+ 41%+ 
Non-state schools 20%+ 80%+ 
Government and non-state schools 79%+ 21%+ 
Public health providers 49% 51% 
Private health providers 32% 68% 
Public and private health 
providers 72% 28% 
+ percent of households with school age children 
 
 In order to examine the relationship between household-level factors and 
each of the measures of utilization described above, I use a simple logit model to 
estimate how changes in household characteristics affect the probability that the 
household utilizes services and interacts with state and non-state providers. 
Therefore, Pr(DV=1) = f (α+βpoverty_f1_qt + βpoverty_f2_qt + βAge_hh + βAge_hh2 + βfemale=1 + 
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βfemale=2 + βlow_ed + βhigh_ed + βhealth_status_qt + βkibera + ε), where each of the variables 
used is described in Table 4.4. 
The last set of dependent variables in the chapter measure satisfaction with 
health and education services. The survey questions used to construct the measures 
are very specific in nature and refer to aspects of the technical quality, functional 
quality, and adequacy of the facilities. For health services, components include 
satisfaction with opening hours of facility; availability, capability, and 
respectfulness of staff; adequacy of equipment and other supplies; and recovery of 
patients treated by the provider. For education, the factor indicates the degree to 
which the following are a problem at the school: insufficient number of teachers; 
poor performance on exams; poor quality of school buildings or facilities; classroom 
overcrowding; textbook shortages; poor teaching; lack of student safety in either the 
school building or the area around the school; and financial corruption. I divided the 
factor scores for satisfaction into quintiles and employed ordered logit models to 
assess the impact of household characteristics on the probability of falling within 
each quintile of satisfaction. Therefore, Pr(DV=1,2,3,4,5) = f (α+βpoverty_f1_qt + βpoverty_f2_qt + βAge_hh + βfemale=1 + βfemale=2 + βlow_ed + βhigh_ed + βkibera + ε), where each of 
the variables used is described in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Used in the Chapter 
Variable 
(Stata name) 
Description 
Dependent Variables 
No health care 
utilization 
(no_health)  
Indicates whether any member of the household has sought treatment 
at a health care facility over the past 5 years. 
0 = at least one visit; 1 = no visits.  
No health care access 
(no_care) 
Indicates whether the respondent or a member of the household was 
able to access health care services the last time he or she needed care. 
0 = able to access care last time it was needed; 1 = unable to access care 
last time it was needed. 
Experience with 
government providers 
(any_gov_health) 
Indicates whether any member of the household has sought treatment 
at a public health facility in the past year. 0 = no experience with 
government providers; 1 = a member of the household has visited at 
least one government provider. 
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Experience with non-
government providers 
(any_ngo_health) 
Indicates whether any member of the household has sought treatment 
at a non-state health facility in the past year. 0 = no experience with 
non-state providers; 1 = a member of the household has visited at least 
one non-state provider. 
Low enrollment 
percentage 
(low_enroll) 
Indicates whether the percentage of school age children in the household 
enrolled in school is less that 100%. 0 = all school age children are 
enrolled; 1 = at least one school age child is not enrolled; missing if there 
are no school age children in the household. 
Experience with public 
schools 
(any_public_school) 
Indicates whether any member of the household is enrolled in a public 
school. any_public_school: 0 = no children enrolled in public school; 1 = 
at least one child is enrolled in public school; missing if there are no 
school age children in the household. 
Experience with non-
state schools 
(any_ngo_school) 
Indicates whether any member of the household is enrolled in non-state 
school. any_ngo_school: 0 = no children enrolled in a non-state school; 1 
= at least one child is enrolled in a non-state school; missing if there are 
no school age children in the household. 
Satisfaction with health 
services 
(healthsat_pc_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring satisfaction with health 
services. If members of household visited more than one provider, 
responses relate to experiences with most frequently visited provider. 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the least satisfied to 5 = household 
among the most satisfied quintile. For additional details see Appendix A 
in Chapter 3. 
Satisfaction with 
education services 
(satedu_pc_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring satisfaction with education 
services. If members of household are enrolled in more than one school, 
responses relate to experiences with school in which most children are 
enrolled. Ranges from 1 = household is among the least satisfied to 5 = 
household among the most satisfied quintile. For additional details see 
Appendix A in Chapter 3. 
Independent Variables and Controls 
Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of daily 
experiences (income, frequency of going without food, water, etc.). 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the most impoverished quintile to 
5 = household among the least impoverished quintile. For additional 
details see Appendix A in Chapter 3. 
Poverty (assets) 
(poverty_f2_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of assets 
(ownership of radio, bicycle, electricity, etc.). Ranges from 1 = household 
is among the most impoverished quintile to 5 = household among the 
least impoverished quintile. For additional details see Appendix A in 
Chapter 3. 
Age of household head 
(Age_hh) 
Age of household head (measured in years). 
Age squared 
(Age_hh2) 
Square of the age of the household head (in years). Controls for the 
curvilinear relationship between age and interaction with/need for 
health care services. 
Female  
(Female) 
Indicates the sex of the respondent and whether the household head is 
female. 0 = male respondent and household head; 1 = female respondent 
and male household head; 2 = female household head 
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Low education 
(low_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or some primary school; 1 = completed primary school 
or higher. 
Medium education 
(med_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or only some primary school or completed secondary 
education or more; 1 = completely primary school up to some secondary 
education (but did not complete secondary education). Used as the 
control so it does not appear in the models. 
High education 
(high_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education through some secondary education; 1 = completed 
secondary education or beyond. 
Kibera 
(kibera) 
Indicates settlement of residence. 0 = household lives in Korogocho; 1 = 
household lives in Kibera. 
Number of school-age 
children 
(num_children) 
Indicates the number of school-age children in the household. 
Public health 
(health_public) 
Indicates the operational entity of the most frequently visited health 
provider. 0 = not operated by the government; 1 = operated by the 
government. 
Public school enrollment 
(pub_sch_pct) 
Measures the percentage of school age children enrolled in a public 
school. Ranges from 0 = no children enrolled in public school to 1 = all 
children enrolled in public school. 
Perception of 
government health 
quality 
(qualgovhealth_pc) 
Continuous principal component variable measuring perceptions of the 
quality of government health care. Constituent variables include 
frequency of encountering long waiting times, absent doctors, dirty 
facilities, inadequate medicines/supplies, etc. For additional details see 
Appendix A in Chapter 3. 
Perception of non-state 
health quality 
(ngohealthqual_pc) 
Continuous principal component variable measuring perceptions of the 
quality of non-state health care. Constituent variables include frequency 
of encountering long waiting times, absent doctors, dirty facilities, 
inadequate medicines/supplies, etc. For additional details see Appendix 
A in Chapter 3. 
Health status 
(health_status_qt) 
Quintiles of a continuous variable capturing the number of days 
members of the household are unable to participate in their regular 
activities due to poor health in an average month.  
Government health 
service accessibility 
(GovHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of public health services 
measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain medical 
treatment at a public clinic or hospital?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 
= easy; 4 = very easy. 
Non-state health service 
accessibility 
(NGOHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of health services provided 
by non-state actors. Measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it 
to obtain medical treatment from non-government providers?” 1 = very 
difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = easy; 4 = very easy. 
Public school 
accessibility 
(GovEduAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of public primary schools 
measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain a place in a 
public primary school for a child?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = 
easy; 4 = very easy. 
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Non-state school 
accessibility 
(NGOEduhAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of non-state primary schools. 
Measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain a place in 
a private primary school for a child?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = 
easy; 4 = very easy. 
 
Explanatory Factors 
The choice of explanatory factors for the chapter was based on Andersen’s 
widely used behavioral model of health service utilization (Andersen, 1995; 
Andersen & Newman, 1973; Hendryx et al, 2002; Phillips et al, 1998). According to 
the model, access is a function of the need for medical care, socioeconomic and other 
factors that enable individuals to successfully seek treatment, and predisposing or 
perception factors such as preferences and expectations of quality.  
Need for Medical Care/Educational Enrollment 
For the models examining utilization of and satisfaction with health services, 
the need for medical care is assessed by the total number of days in an average 
month that members of the household are unable to participate in their normal 
activities (e.g., work or school) due to poor health. To limit the influence of outliers, 
I divided the values into quintiles and generated an ordinal variable indicating 
relative self-reported health status. Households in the lowest quintile are the least 
limited by health problems, while those in the fifth are the most limited. Because 
the regressions involving education are limited to the subsample of households with 
at least one school-age member, no measure of need is included in the models. 
Lived Poverty Status 
In studies on access to social welfare provision, income and other measures of 
poverty are widely cited as key predictors of access (Berry et al, 2004; Bratton, 
2007, 2012; MacLean, 2011; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Tukahirwa et al, 2011; 
World Bank, 2004). Although some services at both public and NGO health facilities 
are free or heavily subsidized, most existing research still finds that poverty 
remains associated with statistically significant reductions in access (see, for 
example, Tukahirwa et al, 2011). Throughout the dissertation, poverty is 
conceptualized and measured as the lived experience of poverty. The majority of 
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slum dwellers derive most of their income from casual work in the informal sector, 
and economic systems within the communities often involve bartering; measuring 
average income is difficult and may not capture all the resources on which 
households rely to meet their basic needs (Chant, 2002; Mutua, 2015; UN-Habitat, 
2010).  
To generate a conceptually relevant measure of poverty, I included the 
Afrobarometer questions related to lived poverty in the survey and used principal 
component analysis to calculate indices for each household (Bratton, 2007, 2012; 
Mattes, 2008; MacLean, 2011). The first factor variable includes the households’ 
average monthly income as estimated by respondents as well as the frequency with 
which members of the household have gone without food, clean water, medical 
treatment/medicines, fuel for cooking, and a cash income. The second factor is a 
measure of asset poverty, and it includes electricity and ownership of a radio, 
television, motorcycle, and bicycle. To facilitate interpretation, I divided the factor 
scores for both poverty measures into quintiles.  
Education of Household Head 
Existing research on access to health and education services identifies 
education as an enabling factor: people with higher levels of education are more 
likely to be informed about service availability and the advantages of service 
utilization, and they are also better able to successfully demand access to quality 
services (Berry et al, 2004; Krishna, 2008; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Tukahirwa et 
al, 2011; World Bank, 2004). I collapsed the level of education obtained by the 
household head into three categories—high, medium, and low. The dummy variable 
for high education equals 1 if the household head completed secondary school or 
beyond. Medium education includes the completion of primary school through some 
secondary school, and it is the reference category. The dummy variable for low 
education indicates that the household head either has no formal education or 
attended primary school but did not complete. 
	   105 
Perceptions of Service Quality and Accessibility 
Previous research suggests perceptions of the quality of social services affect 
individuals’ decisions to utilize services and their choices between state and non-
state service providers (Bratton, 2007; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; Karkee et al, 2014; 
Kiguli et al, 2009; Muriithi, 2013; Prata, Montagu, & Fefferys, 2005; Tooley & 
Dixon, 2006). To investigate the extent to which this is the case in Kibera and 
Korogocho, I generated factor variables measuring the perceived quality of health 
services provided by state and non-state actors and public schools.27 I review 
descriptive statistics for the components of these factors in the next section. I also 
include ordinal variables indicating respondents’ perceptions of the degree of 
difficulty associated with accessing health and education services provided by both 
state and non-state actors, as research in multiple countries document a connection 
between perceptions of access and utilization (Amooti-Kaguna & Nuwaha, 2000; 
Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Bazant et al, 2009; Ngware et al, 2013; Onah et al, 2006). 
Demographic Controls 
Several additional variables are included in the models as controls. The first 
of these is the age of the household head. Research on healthcare utilization shows 
that the young and the old access medical care more frequently than others; to 
control for this curvilinear relationship, I included both age and age2 in all models 
measuring utilization of health services (Muriithi, 2013). Age was included in all 
other models to ascertain if certain age groups are more likely to prefer or utilize 
state services compared to non-state services (or vice versa). The second set of 
control variables indicates the ethnicity of the household. In some contexts, 
mechanisms of social exclusion (deliberate or unconscious, e.g., by tailoring services 
to the preferences of one group or failing to make accessing services transparent 
and user-friendly for all) on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and other aspects of one’s 
identity can operate to limit access or reduce satisfaction with services (Berry et al, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For detailed descriptions of each factor and factor loadings, see Appendix A. I was unable to use a 
measure of the perceived quality of non-state schools because a relatively large portion of 
respondents was unable to answer some of the questions included in the measure. The large number 
of missing values significantly reduced the sample size.  
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2004; Tukahriwa et al, 2011). Indicator variables for female respondent and female-
headed households are included, as is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
household is located in Kibera. The fixed effect for settlement of residence should 
capture the effect of community-specific characteristics not included in the models.  
Respondents' Perceptions of Accessibility and Quality 
Health  
In general, there were clear differences between perceptions of public and 
private health provision. For difficulty obtaining treatment, the responses for 
government and non-government providers were similar, though more respondents 
found it “very easy” to get treatment from non-government providers and fewer 
found it “difficult.” Interestingly, pairwise correlations comparing the degree of 
difficulty or ease with which households are able to access services from government 
and non-government providers are strongly and significantly negatively correlated 
(the Pearson correlation is -0.4082 and the p-value is 0.000).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Difficulty obtaining health services from 
government and non-government health providers. 
 
When asked about affordability, the majority of respondents (57 percent) 
reported that services from non-government providers are “often” too expensive, 
compared to only 12 percent for government providers. Fifty percent of respondents 
“never” find services from government providers too expensive, while only 14 
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percent never encounter financial barriers to non-government provision. Though 
assessments of the difficulty of obtaining treatment at public and private facilities 
do not differ drastically, government provision appears to be more widely financially 
accessible.  
Respondents were also asked a series of questions about specific problems 
they may have encountered when seeking treatment at both government and non-
government facilities. All problems were encountered more frequently with 
government provision, but the largest disparity occurs with waiting times: more 
than 57 percent often encounter long waiting times at government providers, 
compared to less than 8 percent for non-government providers. Lack of medicines 
and other supplies is also more prevalent for government providers; 40 percent 
indicated that it was often a problem, 20 percent encountered it “a few times,” and 
an additional 21 percent reported “once or twice.” Comparatively, 67 percent never 
experience medicine or supply shortages at non-government facilities and less than 
4 percent often face the problem. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, absent doctors, rude 
and/or unhelpful staff, and dirty facilities are also encountered more frequently 
with government providers. 	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Figure 4.2 Perceived quality of health services provided by state and non-state actors. 
 
Education 
Whereas nearly all respondents were able to answer questions about both 
non-government and government health provision and appeared to have well-
formed perceptions about both types of providers, fewer people were able to answer 
similar questions about schools.28 Nearly every respondent gauged the difficulty of 
obtaining a place in both types of schools and most reported the frequency of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The purpose of these questions was to document perceptions about state and non-state health and 
education provision, so the questions were posed to everyone regardless of whether they had utilized 
the services in the past year. Similar questions were asked later about the particular providers they 
utilized, but respondents were not asked whether these perceptions are based on personal 
experience, the experiences of others, or general impressions. Therefore, some respondents may have 
answered some of the questions about a particular service and indicated they did not know for 
others.  
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encountering unaffordable fees, but fewer could answer the questions about specific 
problems, particularly in relation to non-government schools. One possible 
explanation for the disparity is that respondents without school-age children are 
more likely to have perceptions and opinions about government schools because 
there are fewer of them and there is widespread media coverage of teacher strikes, 
the poor condition of many public schools, and allegations of corruption. The diverse 
non-state sector is less prominent in the public discourse.  
The distribution of responses for difficulty obtaining a place in school mirrors 
the responses for health services for both provider types. More respondents find it 
very easy to get into non-government schools (21 percent) than government schools 
(12 percent), a slightly larger portion say it is easy (42 percent vs. 39 percent), and 
about 12 percent reported that it is very difficult to obtain a place in both types of 
schools. As was the case with health services, the pairwise correlation between the 
degree of difficulty or ease with which households are able to enroll a child in public 
and private schools was strong, significant, and negative (the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is -0.405 and the p-value is 0.000). It appears there may be an either/or 
perception of the accessibility of state and non-state health and education services: 
households view either public or private services as accessible. The extent to which 
household- and community-level characteristics contribute to this pattern will be 
examined throughout the dissertation. 
The introduction of free primary education (FPE) in 2003 increased the 
affordability of public schools, as reflected by the 60 percent of respondents who 
never encounter unaffordable fees at government schools. Less than 10 percent 
never face financial barriers at non-government schools, and 61 percent indicate 
that affordability was a problem a few times. There is a slight reversal at the other 
extreme, however, as only 3 percent often find fees too expensive at non-government 
schools and 10 percent respond similarly for government schools. Although purely 
speculative, the comparatively fewer households that regularly encounter 
unaffordable fees at non-state schools may be attributed to the greater flexibility in 
fees at non-state schools (Chuck, 2009). 
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Figure 4.3 Difficulty obtaining places in government and  
non-government primary schools. 	  	  
For the remaining questions about specific problems, the large proportion of 
respondents who were unable to answer in relation to non-government schools 
render it difficult to make meaningful comparisons of perceptions by type. The 
problems are encountered more frequently at government schools, but that is 
mostly due to the fact that a much larger percentage answered the question. The 
notable exception is overcrowded classrooms; 56 percent encounter overcrowded 
classrooms often in public schools, and it is highly unlikely that figure would be 
matched for non-state schools in a similarly large sample based on the distribution 
of responses in the current sample. 
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Figure 4.4 Perceived quality of government and non-government schools. 
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Preferred Providers  
Given the frequency with which respondents encountered problems with 
public health provision, it was surprising that a majority of respondents—almost 53 
percent—chose the government as their preferred health care provider. Forty-seven 
percent prefer non-state health providers, with 32 percent of all respondents opting 
for private for-profit providers rather than other non-state providers. NGOs, CBOs, 
and FBOs receive significant portions of foreign aid and donor support due to their 
purported efficiency and effectiveness, but households appear to have a much less 
favorable view of the services they provide. This finding directly contradicts an 
assertion by the Center for Global Development that poor people “want to go’’ to 
private providers and will ‘‘persist in doing so’’ (Harding, 2009). 
Table 4.5: Preferred Type of School and Healthcare Provider 
 School Health Provider 
Government 36% 52.6% 
NGO 5% 11% 
CBO 13% 0.7% 
Faith-based 3% 2.6% 
Private for-profit 42% 32.2% 
Traditional healer -- 0.1% 
Pharmacy/chemist -- 0.3% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 1% 0.5% 
 
When preferences are disaggregated by quintile of lived poverty in Table 4.6, 
it is evident that more impoverished households prefer government provision than 
those facing less material hardship; 67 percent of the lowest quintile opt for public 
facilities compared to 46 percent of the highest quintile. However, 46 percent is still 
a substantial share of the most secure households, and the finding challenges the 
narrative that anyone who can afford private services utilizes the non-state sector 
and the poor are forced to rely on inadequate public provision. This preference is not 
limited to slum communities; the 2007 Household Health Expenditure and 
Utilization Survey conducted by the Government of Kenya showed that wealthier 
households in the country are more likely to utilize government hospitals than other 
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types of providers (Muriithi, 2013). The data also corroborate findings from 
Afrobarometer surveys in which majorities of citizens prefer public to private 
services in 10 of 12 countries (Bratton, 2007). In spite of limited capacity and 
uneven quality, the state still has credibility as a service provider. 
Table 4.6: Preferred Provider by Lived Poverty Status 
Poverty Quintile 
poverty_f1_qt Government NGO CBO FBO 
Private for-
profit 
 Health School Health School Health School Health School Health School 
 (most impoverished) 1 67% 44% 10% 9% 1% 12% 2% 4% 22% 32% 
2 57% 40% 11% 4% 1% 10% 4% 4% 28% 41% 
3 50% 33% 15% 7% 0% 13% 3% 6% 33% 43% 
4 44% 34% 13% 5% 1% 11% 2% 1% 39% 48% 
(least impoverished) 5 46% 30% 9% 2% 1% 17% 3% 1% 40% 50% 
 
The preference for public provision was not the case for schools, however, as 
only 36 percent prefer government-operated schools. Sixty-four percent prefer non-
state schools, among which private for-profit institutions were most frequently 
selected (42 percent of all respondents) followed by community-based organizations 
with 13 percent. Once again, NGOs fared poorly; only 5 percent of respondents 
prefer schools operated by NGOs. 
Respondents were asked to state and rank the reasons why they prefer to 
utilize services from their preferred provider, and the most common reasons and the 
number of households citing each reason are displayed in Table 4.7 for health 
services and Table 4.8 for schools. “Reliable, effective treatment” was the most 
common response for all types of health providers except CBOs, for which 
convenient location is the primary motivating factor. A larger share of those that 
prefer private for-profit providers cites effective treatment as the primary reason 
compared to other types. With 36 percent, the second most cited reason households 
prefer public providers is that services are “free or affordable”; a similar pattern 
occurs for NGOs and FBOs, but few that prefer private for-profit facilities are 
motivated by financial considerations. Among the other reasons, 18 households 
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prefer government providers because the staff are more qualified, and 9 refer to the 
higher quality treatment at public facilities compared to others. These reasons are 
cited less frequently for other types of providers, but less waiting time and cleaner 
facilities account for more households’ preference for private for-profit providers. 
Table 4.7: Reasons for Health Provider Preference 
Reason 1 for Health Provider Preference Public NGO CBO FBO Private for-profit 
Reliable, effective treatment 277 66 2 19 253 
Convenient location 35 12 3 1 31 
Less waiting time 0 3 1 1 11 
Free or affordable 197 30 1 4 9 
I know the providers 4 1 0 1 4 
Cleaner facilities 4 0 0 0 12 
Higher number of staff 3 1 0 0 2 
More qualified staff 18 1 0 1 5 
Friendlier or more respectful staff 0 0 0 0 2 
Higher quality treatment than others 9 1 0 0 5 
Medicines are available 1 1 0 0 2 
Staff are more available 0 0 0 0 3 
 	  
Turning now to school preferences, 54 percent of households that prefer 
public schools cite affordability as the primary reason and 18 percent cite the 
availability of space. Among households preferring private for-profit schools, an 
almost equal number refer to the availability of spaces and “better teachers and 
instruction” as their motivating factor. The larger number of teachers and the 
regular presence of teachers are the second and third most common reasons, 
followed by convenient location. The number of teachers, the regular presence of 
teachers, and the higher quality of teachers and instruction are also the most 
frequently cited advantages for schools operated by CBOs, but the preference for 
NGOs is overwhelmingly driven by affordability. In general, it appears that 
preferences for public schools are more likely to be based on affordability and 
availability, whereas the higher number of teachers, lower absenteeism rates, and 
quality instruction make private for-profit and CBO schools more attractive. An 
inadequate number of trained teachers plagues public education in many 
developing countries, and the shortage is exacerbated by the competition with non-
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state schools for staff and funding (e.g., Ngware et al, 2013; Njagi, 2012; Rena, 
2011). 
Table 4.8: Reasons for School Preference 
Reason 1 for School Provider Preference Public NGO CBO FBO 
Private 
for-
profit 
Only schools with available spaces 69 4 8 15 82 
Convenient location 28 7 9 2 54 
Free or affordable 208 23 10 8 23 
Have more teachers 14 3 21 2 67 
Teachers are regularly present 12 2 12 2 65 
Better teachers and instruction 30 5 54 3 80 
Offer extracurricular activities 4 2 4 1 13 
School provides more resources than others 3 3 1 4 13 
School building and facilities are better 0 0 1 1 4 
Safer 1 0 2 1 4 
Better exam results 1 1 8 0 23 
Better reputation 1 1 2 1 4 
Easy recognition for secondary school entrance 7 0 0 0 0 
 
Access and Utilization 
Although perceptions of accessibility and quality may influence health- and 
education- seeking behaviors, they do not in and of themselves reveal any 
information about the degree to which perceptions affect utilization or about 
whether and how utilization varies according to household-level characteristics. In 
this section, I examine measures of access and utilization for both health and 
education services to determine: 1) the characteristics of households that report no 
interaction with service providers of any type; 2) the characteristics of households 
that interact with public providers; and 3) the characteristics of households that 
interact with non-state providers. 
What are the characteristics of un- and under-served households? 
Health  
 As expected, the two versions of the dependent variable for utilization 
produced somewhat different results (see Table 4.11). One noticeable difference is 
the effect of lived poverty status: reductions in poverty appear to decrease the 
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likelihood of being unable to access health services when treatment is needed but 
increase the probability of receiving no care. When access was measured using the 
indicator for interaction with any healthcare provider over the past five years, the 
coefficient estimate for poverty status was positive. A one-quintile improvement in 
the household’s lived poverty status (i.e., the household becomes less impoverished) 
may increase the probability of having no interaction with health providers. Though 
this may initially seem counterintuitive because affordability is a frequent barrier 
to utilization, it likely reflects the fact that poverty is also negatively associated 
with health status, particularly in developing countries. More and better quality 
food, sanitation, clean water, and other amenities promote health and well-being, 
and less impoverished households are better able to access these resources (Gulyani 
& Talukdar, 2010). 
 In order to examine the extent to which the regression results throughout the 
chapter reflect correlations between poverty status and health, Table 4.9 compares 
the mean factor score for lived poverty by utilization indicator using Welch’s t-test 
for means with unequal variances. On average, households that have not utilized 
any health services over the past five years are significantly less impoverished than 
those that have accessed care (higher factor scores indicate improvements in living 
conditions). Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in Table 4.10 reveal that the 
number of days in an average month that members of the household are unable to 
engage in their usual activities due to poor health generally decreases as living 
conditions improve. When the outcome variable indicates households’ inability to 
access health services last time treatment was needed, poverty has the opposite 
effect. The average poverty factor score for households reporting under-utilization is 
significantly lower and more impoverished households appear to face poor health 
with greater frequency. 
 The other notable observation from Table 4.9 is the significant difference in 
poverty scores between households that have experience with government health 
provision compared to those that do not. The fact that households reporting no 
interaction with public health facilities are significantly less impoverished seems to 
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tentatively confirm MacLean’s hypothesis that the poor are forced to rely on 
government provision, though the magnitude of the difference is small and may 
reflect the lack of need for care among less impoverished households.  
Table 4.9: Relationship between Poverty Status and Access to Healthcare 
 Poverty Status 
(poverty_f1) 
 
Outcome Variable 
Positive 
outcome 
mean 
Negative 
outcome 
mean 
Welch’s t-
statistic 
No health utilization 
(no_health) 3.644 3.273 3.84*** 
Inability to access care when needed 
(no_care) 2.730 3.374 -7.78*** 
Experience with government health provision 
(any_gov_health) 3.209 3.407 -3.38*** 
Experience with non-state health provision 
(any_ngo_health) 3.288 3.348 0.93 
Higher factor scores for poverty reflect increases in standard of living/reductions in poverty. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
 
Table 4.10: Healthcare Intensity and Health Status by Poverty Quintile 
  Healthcare Intensity a Health Status b 
Poverty Quintile 
poverty_f1_qt 
Obs Mean St. Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
 (most impoverished) 1 195 1.344 0.819 8.140 0.728 
2 195 1.133 0.720 6.347 0.634 
3 193 1.104 0.764 5.980 0.590 
4 193 0.979 0.661 6.005 0.640 
(least impoverished) 5 192 0.927 0.627 4.070 0.519 
a Number of times members of the household sought medical treatment over the past year. 0 = never; 1 = 1-5 
times; 2 = 6-10 times; 3 = more than 10 times 
b Number of days members of the household are unable to participate in normal activities due to poor health 
in a usual month 
  
Returning to the regression results in Table 4.11, when access was measured 
by whether or not the respondent or a member of the household was able to receive 
health services last time treatment was needed, a one quintile improvement in the 
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household’s lived poverty status is associated with a decrease in the probability of 
being unable to access services when needed. Because both the log-odds and the 
odds ratios reported in Table 4.11 are difficult to interpret, I provide a substantive 
interpretation of the results in Table 4.12. When the poverty status quintile is 1 and 
all other covariates are set at their means, the predicted probability that a member 
of the household was unable to access care the last time it was needed is 0.188. Put 
differently, 18.8 percent of the most impoverished households are likely to face 
difficulty accessing health services. When poverty status quintile is changed to 5 
and all other variables remain the same, the probability drops to 0.033; less than 4 
percent of the least impoverished households are expected to encounter similar 
difficulties. The difference between these two probabilities is large and statistically 
significant. The most impoverished households are more than 15 percent more 
likely to under-utilize health services than the least impoverished households. 
Table 4.11: Access to Health Care 
 MODEL 1:  
No utilization of health 
services over the past 5 
years 
(no_health) 
 MODEL 2:  
Unable to access services 
last time treatment was 
needed 
(no_care) 
 β	   Exp (β) Robust SE 
 β	   Exp (β) Robust SE 
Poverty (flow)  0.160* 1.174* 0.114  -0.477*** 0.621*** 0.051 
Poverty (assets)  0.028 1.029 0.109  0.074 1.077 0.088 
Age -0.163*** 0.849*** 0.036  -0.087** 0.917** 0.035 
Age2 0.002*** 1.002*** 0.000  0.001* 1.001** 0.0004 
Female respondent  -1.351*** 0.259*** 0.106  -0.242 0.785 0.202 
Female HH -0.032 0.969 0.296  -0.232 0.793 0.217 
Low education 0.164 1.178 0.435  0.536** 1.709** 0.425 
High education 0.107 1.113 0.341  -0.300 0.741 0.212 
Health status -0.568*** 0.567*** 0.081  0.018 1.019 0.080 
GovHealthAccess -0.344** 0.709** 0.109  -0.677*** 0.508*** 0.074 
NGOHealthAccess
s 
-0.173 0.841 0.115  -0.161 0.852 0.111 
Kibera -0.707** 0.546** 0.159  -0.138 0.871 0.208 
Constant 3.424** 30.699** 41.707  2.909** 18.335** 21.693 
Observations 990  962 
Wald Χ2 77.64***  86.80*** 
Ethnicity controls included in the model but not shown. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Another finding from the second model (DV indicates the inability to access 
services last time treatment was needed) is the significance of perceptions of the 
accessibility of government health services. The magnitude of the effect is actually 
larger than the effect of lived poverty. With all other covariates set at their mean 
values, the probability of being unable to access care for a household that views 
obtaining treatment from public health facilities as “very difficult” is 0.191; for an 
otherwise identical household that perceives obtaining treatment from public 
facilities as “very easy,” that probability decreases to 0.030. The effect of perceptions 
of non-state health service accessibility is not statistically significant, which 
suggests that improving perceptions of accessibility for public health facilities is 
more likely to reduce under-utilization of treatment than similar efforts within the 
non-state sector. It also reinforces the continued importance of state provision, 
particularly for the most vulnerable households. 
Table 4.12: Changes in Predicted Probabilities for Model 2 
Variable 
Range 
of 
Change 
Probability of not 
accessing health 
careb among the 
most impoverished 
Probability of not 
accessing health 
care among the 
least impoverished 
Change in 
probability 
Poverty 
Full 
range (1 
to 5) a 
0.188 0.033 -0.155*** 
  GovHealthAccess  “very difficult” 
GovHealthAccess  
“very easy”  
GovHealthAccess 
Full 
range (1 
to 4) 
0.191 0.030 -0.161*** 
a The bottom of the range (1) is the lowest quintile of the factor variable for lived poverty, whereas the 
least impoverished is defined as the highest quintile (5). Education dummies set at 0, all other 
covariates at their means. 
b The respondent or member of the household was unable to access health care last time it was needed.  
 	  
 In both models, the relationship between female respondents and female-
headed households and non- or under-utilization of health services was negative, 
but the only statistically significant coefficient estimates the relationship between 
interaction with health services and female respondents. In the first model, female 
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respondents were significantly less likely to report no interaction with health 
services during the preceding five years. Given that respondents are asked about 
the health-seeking behaviors of all members of the household and existing research 
suggests that women are often marginalized in service provision following state 
retrenchment (Okuonzi, 2004), the strong association between female respondents 
and household-level utilization patterns is somewhat surprising. The number of 
male and female respondents was roughly even both in the entire sample and 
within each settlement, so the coefficient is not driven by a small number of 
potentially unrepresentative cases. It is possible, however, that women are simply 
more aware of the healthcare experiences of household members. Research on 
gender and development highlights women’s frequent role as primary caregiver 
(see, for example, Elson, 1991), and it is possible that male respondents are less 
involved in interactions with health providers and thus less likely to recall specific 
services over a five-year period. The measure of access in the second model only 
draws on the most recent instance a member of the household needed healthcare, 
and the coefficient on female respondent is no longer significant.  
 The indicator for female-headed households was not significant in either 
model. Though most studies on the impacts of SAPs found that female-headed 
households were overrepresented among the poor (Buvinić & Gupta, 1997), targeted 
subsidies introduced in response to research drawing attention to the negative 
effects of SAPs on vulnerable households have likely lessened the negative 
relationship between female headship and access to services.    
 Among other demographic controls, both age and age2 are significant, 
reflecting the theorized curvilinear relationship in which the very young and the 
very old are generally more in need of healthcare services. Education was 
significant in the second model only. When access is conceptualized as the ability of 
individuals to access care when treatment is need, households in which the head 
has either no formal education or some primary school are more likely to face 
difficulty accessing treatment.  
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 The only other significant association occurs between Kibera residence and no 
reported interaction with healthcare providers. When no_health is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on the dummy variable for Kibera is large and negative; the 
predicted odds of a household in Kibera reporting no interaction with health 
services is 0.546 times that of a household in Korogocho with identical 
characteristics. The direction of the association is the same when no_care is the 
dependent variable, but the magnitude is much smaller and no longer statistically 
significant.  
Education 
The models for low educational enrollment are less informative than those for 
health services.29 Lived poverty status is insigificant with the exception of asset 
poverty. A one quintile improvement in households’ asset poverty status (i.e., as the 
household acquires more physical assets) decreases the likelihood that at least one 
age-eligible child is not enrolled in school. The the apparent insignificance of income 
and lived poverty is surprising, and I intitially thought the effect may be captured 
by the independent variable for the number of school-age children in the household 
since the addition of one child significantly increases the likelihood of less than full 
enrollment. I added interaction terms between the first poverty factor and the 
number of children to explore this further, but predicted probabilities generated 
using the model revealed that the effect on enrollment associated with increases in 
the number of age-eligible children was neither significantly nor substantively 
affected by poverty status (results not shown). Additionally, goodness-of-fit and 
other regression diagnostics indicate that the interaction terms decrease the utility 
of the model.  
There are two plausible explanations for the possible unimportance of lived 
poverty status, though exploring both further would require additional fieldwork. 
First, the emphasis on educational attainment within the Kenyan government and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This will be a common theme throughout the chapter and could be attributed to either the smaller 
sample size, the omission of important explanatory factors, or a combination of both. Additional 
explantory variables are added to the models in later chapters of the dissertation. 
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the international and domestic NGOs working in the informal settlements 
(especially Kibera) have increased the affordability of primary school significantly 
over the past decade (Chuck, 2009; Njagi, 2012, Oketch et al, 2010; Rose, 2006; 
Tooley, 2009; Wildish, 2011). Tuition at public schools was eliminated with the 
introduction of FPE in 2003, and the number of non-formal, low-cost private schools 
in the slums mushroomed to accommodate overflow from overcrowded and 
underfunded public schools. Many of these private schools—particulary those 
operated by faith-based organizations and NGOs—receive external funding that 
allows them to accommodate students whose families cannot afford tuition costs 
(observations from fieldwork, 2014; Chuck, 2009; Wildish, 2011).   
The second plausible explanation stems from prevalent livelihood strategies 
of slum households. Walking through the main thoroughfares of Kibera or 
Korogocho in the middle of a school day, the paths are lined with stands manned by 
children selling charcoal, used clothing, food, and other goods and services. A parent 
is sometimes nearby overseeing the operation, but older children are often left in 
charge while adults take on other work inside and outside the slum (Brakarz, 2002; 
Davis, 2006; Gulyani & Talukdar, 2010; Rakodi, 2002; Richards et al, 2007; UN-
Habitat, 2010; Wekesa et al, 2010). Limited employment opportunities, low wages, 
and the economic segregation of slums from the formal cities in which they are 
located mean that multiple members of households must engage in income-
generating activities in order to survive. Even the most economically secure 
households surveyed are still poor, and their relative security may be attributed to 
the involvement of children in economic activities rather than school. To the extent 
that low enrollment among less impoverished households helps account for their 
relative security, the real issue may not be the cost of school attendance but the lack 
of economic opportunities for adults to support households without contributions 
from children.   
In contrast to the health models in which perceptions of public service 
accessibility are correlated with utilization, the results from model 4 indicate that 
the perceived accessibility of non-state schools is more influential for enrollment. 
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The magnitude is small and the statistical significance is weak, but households that 
view non-state schools as easier to access are less likely to have at least one age-
eligible member not enrolled in school. Perceptions of public school access appear to 
have no effect on enrollment. 
The final significant association of note in the models is Kibera residence. 
The odds of low enrollment for a household in Kibera are about 0.68 that of an 
otherwise identical household in Korogocho. The significance of the fixed effect for 
settlement of residence is a recurring theme in many of the models in this chapter 
and will be explore further in subsequent chapters. 
Table 4.13: Educational Enrollment 
 
 Percent of school age children enrolled  
in school is <100 
(low_enroll) 
  Model 3  Model 4 
  Exp (β) Robust SE 
 Exp (β) Robust SE 
Poverty (flow)   0.926 0.073  0.935 0.074 
Poverty (assets)   0.821*** 0.058  0.837** 0.061 
Age  0.979** 0.010  0.976** 0.010 
Female respondent  1.014 0.238  1.033 0.245 
Female HH  0.592* 0.161  0.595* 0.164 
Low education  1.095 0.262  1.094 0.263 
High education  1.089 0.279  1.083 0.281 
Kibera  0.646** 0.140  0.678* 0.149 
# eligible children  1.518*** 0.116  1.511*** 0.113 
GovEduAccess     1.025 0.120 
NGOEduAccess     0.823* 0.095 
Constant  0.555 0.352  0.896 0.691 
Observations  605  594 
Wald Χ2  52.05***  54.41*** 
Ethnicity controls included in models but not shown. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01        
 
Does experience with state and non-state services depend on 
household attributes?  
Interaction with State and Non-State Health Providers  
Table 4.14 displays the results of logit regressions on dichotomous dependent 
variables indicating whether or not a member of the household has received services 
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from state and non-state health providers. There are two specifications for each 
provider type: models 5 and 7 include the full sample, and models 6 and 8 include 
only those households that have visited a health facility within the past five years. 
At first glance, it is clear that controlling for no interaction in the second set of 
regressions significantly reduces the explanatory power of the models.  
Looking first at results from the full sample in models 5 and 7, one of the 
more notable findings concerns the relationship between lived poverty status and 
experience with providers of both types. The absence of a statistically significant 
relationship between lived poverty and utilization of non-state services is surprising 
given that fees are generally higher at non-state facilities and respondents reported 
encountering unaffordable fees at NSPs more frequently. For government provision, 
however, there is a significant negative relationship between lived poverty and 
utilization; a one-quintile improvement in economic security decreases the 
probability of having experience with public health facilities, though the magnitude 
of the effect is small. Taken at face value, the negative relationship appears to 
partially affirm the two-tiered service experience MacLean (2011) described—
households that can afford services from non-state providers flock to higher-quality 
facilities and leave the poor to depend on lower-quality government provision.  
In light of the association between economic security and health documented 
earlier in the chapter, however, the results from model 5 warrant further 
exploration. Health status is included in models of healthcare utilization to control 
for need, and its significance in models 5 and 7 suggests that poor health is 
associated with experience with providers of both types. While the number of days 
members of the household are unable to engage in normal activities due to poor 
health is a measure of health status, it is not a perfect proxy for the number of 
times a household is in need of medical care as not every ailment requires 
professional treatment. It is possible that the coefficient on lived poverty is 
capturing residual differences in need.  
Consequently, models 6 and 8 examine the extent to which household 
characteristics explain experience with state and non-state providers among the 
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subset of households that have utilized health services. After controlling for 
utilization, none of the covariates are significantly associated with government 
provision. Lived poverty status is not a significant predictor of interaction with 
public facilities among households that have visited at least one provider, which 
contradicts the two-tiered service environment described in existing literature 
(Adésínà, 2009; MacLean, 2011).  
Table 4.14: Utilization of State and Non-State Health Facilities 
 Any Government Health  Any Non-State Health 
 Model 5 Model 6 no_health=0 
 Model 7 Model 8 no_health=0 
 Exp (β) Robst SE Exp (β) Robst SE  Exp (β) Robst SE Exp (β) Robst SE 
Poverty (flow)  0.894** 0.047 0.916 0.050  0.964 0.056 1.022 0.065 
Poverty (assets)  0.933 0.047 0.936 0.050  1.003 0.058 1.010 0.064 
Age 1.069** 0.031 1.044 0.031  1.057* 0.031 1.017 0.034 
Age2 0.999* 0.0003 0.999 0.0003  0.999** 0.0003 0.999 0.0003 
Female resp. 1.496** 0.240 1.292 0.213  1.301 0.232 0.995 0.191 
Female HH 1.335 0.243 1.334 0.258  0.861 0.168 0.809 0.175 
Low education 1.021 0.187 1.045 0.199  0.681* 0.137 0.643** 0.137 
High education 1.106 0.184 1.135 0.196  0.789 0.147 0.783 0.164 
Kibera 0.997 0.151 0.921 0.146  1.894*** 0.318 1.795*** 0.330 
Health status 1.122** 0.056 1.038 0.054  1.335*** 0.078 1.242*** 0.079 
Quality 1.123** 0.056 1.089 0.057  1.237** 0.116 1.194* 0.122 
Constant 0.184** 0.131 0.495 0.365  0.200** 0.151 0.791 0.681 
Observations 930 856  921 849 
Wald Χ2 45.91*** 24.66*  70.18*** 45.70*** 
Ethnicity controls included in models but not shown. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    
 
  
 
Moving on to non-state provision, the most striking finding—other than the 
insigificance of relative lived poverty—is the continued significance of many 
covariates after controlling for utilization. Households headed by individuals with 
low education are less likely to have experience with non-state providers, and the 
magnitude and statistical signifiance of the effect both increase in the second 
specification. Health status and perceived quality are more influential for non-state 
interaction than for experience with public providers, and poor health and favorable 
perceptions of quality continue to increase the probability of non-state utilization 
among households who have visited a heatlh facility. Finally, residents of Kibera 
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are significantly more likely to utilize non-state health services than households in 
Korogocho. 
Interaction with Public and Private Schools 
The last models in this section examine experience with government and non-
government schools. Less impoverished households are less likely to have a child 
enrolled in a government school. Aside from this correlation, the most notable 
finding is really the absence of findings. The intercepts imply that there is a low 
probability of interaction with public schools and a very high probability of 
experience with non-state schools, but the covariates in the models do not offer 
much insight into why this is the case or what household characteristics may 
explain the variation. 
Table 4.15: Utilization of State and Non-State Schools 
 Any Public School 
Model 9 
 Any Non-State School 
Model 10 
 Exp (β) Robst SE  Exp (β) Robst SE 
Poverty (flow)  0.860** 0.063  1.042 0.090 
Poverty (assets)  1.069 0.077  1.067 0.094 
Age 1.258*** 0.076  0.782*** 0.055 
Age2 0.998*** 0.001  1.003*** 0.001 
Female respondent 0.716 0.161  1.522 0.409 
Female HH 1.224 0.309  1.276 0.379 
Low education 1.130 0.260  0.933 0.264 
High education 0.891 0.208  1.037 0.284 
Kibera 1.155 0.231  0.752 0.181 
Quality of gov schools 1.079 0.050  0.978 0.055 
Constant 0.003*** 0.003  774.831*** 1273.124 
Observations 534  534 
Wald Χ2 46.27***  20.15** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 	  
Satisfaction with Services 
In the final section of the chapter, I examine the effects of both provider type 
and household characteristics on households’ satisfaction with health and education 
services. In addition to the inclusion of both state and non-state provision to the 
analyses, the use of satisfaction with services as a dependent variable is a key 
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extension to MacLean’s (2011) research on the micro-experience of service provision 
in the wake of state retrenchment.  
Health 
Satisfaction with health services is quantified by an ordinal variable 
indicating a household’s level of satisfaction relative to other households by quintile. 
If households had experience with multiple facilities in the preceding year, 
respondents answered the constituent questions for the facility most frequently 
visited by members of the household. Ordered logit models include a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the health facility is operated by the government. I also 
separated the measure of lived poverty into indicator variables for each quintile, 
relaxing the assumption of proportional odds and allowing for a non-linear 
relationship between poverty and satisfaction.  
Table 4.16: Impact of Provider Type on Satisfaction                                   
with Health and Education Services 
 Model 11: Health healthsat_pc1_qt 
 Model 12: Education 
satedu_pc1_qt 
 Exp (β) Robust SE  Exp (β) Robust SE 
Public 
health_public/pub_sch_pct 0.375*** 0.052 
 
0.521*** 0.204 
Poverty (flow)       
1st quintile ref ref  ref ref 
2nd quintile 1.525** 0.318  1.149 0.230 
3rd quintile 2.183*** 0.450  0.952 0.271 
4th quintile 1.846*** 0.384  1.138 0.273 
5th quintile 1.884*** 0.403  3.904*** 0.303 
Poverty (assets)  0.935 0.043  1.041 0.066 
Age 0.994 0.006  0.988 0.010 
Female respondent 1.150 0.171  0.802 0.200 
Female HH 0.959 0.169  0.868 0.216 
Low education 1.199 0.213  0.836 0.208 
High education 1.115 0.167  1.051 0.218 
Kibera 1.441** 0.211  0.948 0.204 
Observations 879   501  
Wald Χ2 94.47***   60.98***  
Ethnicity controls included in the models but not shown. 
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The regression results in Table 4.16 suggest that there is, in fact, a non-
linear relationship between lived poverty status and satisfaction with health 
services. The predicted probabilities in Table 4.17 offer a more substantive 
interpretation of the effect. The probability of being among the least satisfied when 
all other covariates are set at their means is 0.30 for the most impoverished, 0.16 
for households in the median quintile, and 0.18 for the least impoverished. A 
similar pattern occurs in the predicted probabilities of being among the most 
satisfied: the likelihood is 0.05 for the lowest quintile, 0.11 for the median, and 0.10 
for the highest.  
Table 4.17: Predicted Probabilities for Health Satisfaction 
 
Probability of 
being in the lowest 
quintile of 
satisfaction (1) 
Probability of 
being in the 
median quintile of 
satisfaction (3) 
Probability of 
being in the 
highest quintile of 
satisfaction (5) 
Change in 
probability 
(1-5) 
Public Health = 0 0.15 0.51 0.12 -0.03 
Public Health = 1 0.32 0.34 0.05 -0.27*** 
Change in 
probability 0.17*** -0.17*** -0.07*** 
 
Poverty status = 1 
(most impoverished) 0.30 0.36 0.05 -0.25** 
Poverty status = 3 
(median) 0.16 0.50 0.11 -0.05** 
Poverty status = 5 
(least impoverished) 0.18 0.48 0.10 -0.08*** 
Change in 
probability (1-5) -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 
 
Education dummies are set at zero and all other variables are set at their means.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 	  
Aside from the positive effect associated with Kibera residence, the only other 
statistically significant covariate is the indicator for public health facility. 
Households utilizing government provision are likely to be significantly less 
satisfied than an otherwise identical household receiving care at a non-state facility. 
However, predicted probabilities in Table 4.17 indicate a more nuanced 
relationship. At the first and third quintiles of satisfaction, the change in 
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probability associated with public versus private facilities is 0.17; households 
receiving services from public providers are 17 percent less likely to be among the 
least satisfied and 17 percent more likely to be in the median quintile. At the 
highest quintile of satisfaction, the change in probability decreases to 0.07. 
Furthermore, the relationship between non-state providers and satisfaction is not 
linear. When all other covariates are set at their means, households receiving 
services from non-state providers are slightly more likely to be in the lowest quintile 
of satisfaction than the highest.   
A look at the specific health facilities visited by survey participants and the 
average satisfaction scores by facility offers some insight into the impact of provider 
type on satisfaction. Households reported interactions with 1,753 facilities in the 
preceding year, 528 (30 percent) of which are operated by the government.30 Of the 
interactions with public facilities, 58 percent are national, district, sub-district, or 
provincial hospitals; the remaining 42 percent are health centers, clinics, and 
dispensaries. Of the lower-level facilities, 29 percent are health centers and 71 
percent are dispensaries. Upon calculating the average satisfaction score by facility 
for some of the most frequently visited public and private facilities, it becomes clear 
that the negative relationship between public services and satisfaction is largely 
driven by dissatisfaction with public health centers (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). 
While not among the most highly rated, respondents’ experiences with public 
hospitals are comparable to experiences with average non-state facilities. Also 
notable from the facility averages is the wide range of satisfaction among non-state 
providers.  
These findings suggest that the narrative in which government facilities are 
inadequate and higher quality NSPs cater to those who can afford their services 
oversimplifies both the public and the private sectors. The type of government 
facility affects households’ satisfaction, and non-state providers do not have a 
uniformly positive effect on satisfaction. Furthermore, research from other 
developing countries suggests that overly optimistic assessments of NSP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 These are the total facility counts, not the number of different facilities. 
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effectiveness and efficiency are not limited to Kenya or sub-Saharan Africa. In a 
systematic examination of peer-reviewed research including case studies, meta-
analyses, reviews, and case-control analyses, as well as reports published by NGOs 
and international agencies, Basu and colleagues (2012) found that private sector 
health providers more frequently violated medical practice standards, and patient 
outcomes were generally poorer at private facilities. Furthermore, efficiency was 
lower in the private sector, owing in part to financial incentives for unnecessary 
testing and treatment. The negative effect of consumer accountability on efficiency 
and health outcomes at private facilities has been highlighted in other studies as 
well (e.g., Bhatia et al, 2004; Brugha & Zwi, 1998; Gbotosho et al, 2009; Gupta et al, 
2009; Marriott, 2009; Muhuri et al, 1996; Pongsupap & Van Lerberghe, 2006; 
Siddiqi et al, 2002). Particularly when providers lack proper training and technical 
knowledge, catering to consumers with limited health literacy leads to the 
dispensation of unnecessary (and sometimes harmful) drugs and the repeated and 
inefficient treatment of symptoms rather than underlying causes. 
Though Basu and co-authors (2012) note the prevalence of long waiting 
times, inferior hospitality, and limited availability of equipment, medicines, and 
trained healthcare workers at public health facilities, the authors argue that many 
of these challenges arise from the competition between the public and private 
sectors for funding and staff. As long as donor support and international policies 
continue to shift resources from the public to the private sector, it is unreasonable 
to expect public health facilities to provide comparable care. Based on evidence from 
this dissertation and other research, however, patterns in households’ preferences 
and health outcomes challenge the theoretical arguments used to justify the shift 
toward private health provision. 
Education 
Returning briefly to the regression results in Table 4.16, satisfaction with 
schools is negatively associated with the percentage of students enrolled in public 
schools. Predicted probabilities in Table 4.18 show that the effect of public provision 
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is smaller for education than for health. The probability of falling within the median 
quintile of satisfaction is roughly the same regardless of the operating entity of the 
school. As was the case for health services, there is a non-linear relationship 
between poverty status and satisfaction. The estimated effect of poverty is not 
significant until the highest quintile, but the magnitude is large; the probability of 
being among the most satisfied is 0.13 for the most impoverished and 0.37 for the 
least impoverished.  
Table 4.18: Predicted Probabilities for Education Satisfaction 
 
Probability of 
being in the 
lowest quintile of 
satisfaction (1) 
Probability of 
being in the 
median quintile of 
satisfaction (3) 
Probability of 
being in the 
highest quintile of 
satisfaction (5) 
Change in 
probability 
(1-5) 
Public School 
Percentage = 0 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.04 
Public school 
percentage = 1 0.25 0.21 0.11 -0.14*** 
Change in 
probability 0.10*** 0.01 -0.08*** 
 
Poverty status = 1 
(most 
impoverished) 
0.21 0.22 0.13 -0.08*** 
Poverty status = 5 
(least impoverished) 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.31*** 
Change in 
probability -0.15*** -0.05** 0.24*** 
 
Education dummies are set at zero and all other variables are set at their means.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The review of existing literature on the simultaneous processes of state 
retrenchment and the growth of non-state social welfare provision at the beginning 
of the chapter identified two recurring narratives regarding the effects of these 
processes on households’ experiences with health and education provision. In the 
first, non-state providers meet the demand generated by the absence of or 
limitations in state provision. In the second, the growth in non-state provision offers 
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higher quality options for those who can afford to pay, and those who cannot must 
rely on underfunded, inadequate government facilities.  
In the context of Nairobi’s informal settlements, survey data reveal that the 
effects of state retrenchment on the micro-experience of health and education 
provision are far more complex than either narrative suggests. What some refer to 
as a two-tiered or dual social welfare system (Adésínà, 2009; MacLean, 2011) is 
actually comprised of multiple tiers separated by gaps of varying sizes, and the 
location of government providers among the tiers varies by facility and level of care 
and education. Deregulation was a key component of the enabling environment 
created by neoliberal reforms, and accompanied limitations on government 
spending hindered efforts to enforce remaining regulations. While this may have 
fostered the development of the higher-quality system of non-state provision 
referenced in the second narrative, it also fostered the development of a fragmented, 
opaque, and exceedingly diverse non-state sector accessible to the poor.  
There has been an increasing focus on the explosion of non-formal, low-cost 
schools in many African countries following the implementation of FPE (Mugisha, 
2006; Ngware et al, 2013; Oketch et al, 2010; Onsomu et al, 2004; Tooley et al, 2008; 
Wildish, 2011; Uwezo, 2014), but most studies on non-state health provision focus 
on NGOs and exclude the plethora of CBOs, FBOs, chemists, and other private for-
profit providers on whom many households rely for care. Based on insights from 
Kibera and Korogocho, the low-cost private sector is a critical component of the 
micro-experience of social service provision—and of the livelihood strategies of slum 
dwellers. Evidence suggests that these low-cost private providers are neither 
efficient nor effective, but more research is needed to understand their contributions 
to health provision and health outcomes in poor communities.  
State retrenchment has limited the ability of governments to meet the 
demand for services, and continued budget cuts have exacerbated overcrowded 
classrooms, insufficient stocks of medicines and other supplies, and shortages of 
teachers and health professionals. In spite of these problems, many households 
utilize public health facilities and schools. In fact, the majority of respondents would 
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prefer to obtain treatment from a government health provider if they could visit any 
type of service provider. Though the preference for public facilities is more common 
among more impoverished households, 46 percent of the most secure households 
still prefer government providers. NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs receive significant 
portions of foreign aid and donor support due to their purported efficiency and 
effectiveness, but households appear to have a much less favorable view of the 
services they provide. According to literature cited in Chapter 1, NGOs and other 
NSPs are just as susceptible to corruption as the state, and research reviewed 
earlier in this chapter suggests that NSPs as a whole are neither more efficient nor 
more effective at improving health outcomes. 
The state remains a credible health service provider, and households that 
perceive public health facilities as accessible are less likely to under-utilize services. 
Based on these findings, more resources should be directed toward improving the 
accessibility and quality of public health provision.  
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Chapter 5 
Beyond Poverty: The Influence of Social Proximity 
on the Micro-Experience  
of Health and Education Provision 
 
Introduction 
Macroeconomic approaches to service provision focus almost exclusively on 
affordability; after controlling for need and location, income and other measures of 
poverty are widely cited as the key individual-level determinant of both access and 
outcomes (Baru et al, 2010; Berry et al, 2004; Bratton, 2007, 2012; Chuma & 
Okongu, 2011; MacLean, 2011; Marriott, 2009; Moe & Rheingans, 2006; 
Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Tukahirwa et al, 2011; World Bank, 2004). The analysis 
in Chapter 4 confirmed this relationship in most cases, but the relatively narrow 
range of incomes and asset ownership present in informal settlements does not 
reflect the societal distribution. That widespread variation in access and utilization 
exists within the limited range of socioeconomic indicators suggests that factors 
beyond basic socioeconomic and demographic characteristics influence slum 
dwellers’ micro-experiences of health and education provision.   
Furthermore, the descriptions of the systems of service provision in Chapter 
2 illuminate the complexity of the service environment and the emergence and 
increasing dominance of the low-cost private sector of health and education 
providers that offer affordable services for the poor. As survey results reviewed in 
this chapter reveal, households located in close geographic proximity to one another 
offered disparate estimates of the number of providers in their communities, 
signaling that variation begins with the perception of service availability. More 
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than 300 of the 335 schools in Kibera identified by Map Kibera are non-formal, and 
minimal information is available to help parents locate schools and assess the 
quality of instruction (Map Kibera, 2015). A study conducted by the African 
Population and Health Research Center (2013) located 178 health facilities in 
Kibera and 184 in Korogocho, but the Ministry of Health Master Facility List of 
registered providers identifies 40 facilities in Kibera and 10 in Korogocho (Republic 
of Kenya MOH, 2015). The private sector is diverse, unregulated, opaque, and 
difficult to navigate; the absence of regulation has a negative impact on quality and 
cost (Baru et al, 2010; Barua & Singh, 2003; Kamat 2001; Michielson et al, 2011). 
No information is available for the vast majority of service providers in the 
communities, fees are rarely posted for price comparisons, and no mechanisms for 
quality assessments and the dissemination of findings exist (APHRC, 2013).  
In this environment, households’ ability to access quality services depends on 
more than spatial proximity and affordability. Sociocultural and cognitive barriers 
to access to health care include low levels of health literacy, lack of awareness about 
necessary care and treatment options, lack of information about where to go for 
quality care, demands for bribes, low levels of trust in general and in providers, 
staff disrespectfulness and abuse, and past experiences with inadequate supplies 
and facilities (Barua & Singh, 2003; Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Gilson, 2003; 
Krishna, 2011; Michielson et al, 2011). Similar sociocultural and cognitive barriers 
exist amidst the plethora of non-formal schools, programs operated by faith-based 
organizations, NGOs, CBOs, entrepreneurs, community members, private 
companies, and self-help groups, and the overcrowded and understaffed public 
schools (Ngware et al, 2013; Oketch et al, 2010). How do households overcome these 
challenges, and why are some able to do so while other households with the same 
economic resources and level of formal education are not? What non-monetary 
resources do households rely on to navigate the complex landscape of health and 
education provision and access services, and how does the process affect 
satisfaction?  
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There is a growing body of research, predominantly located in literature 
related to determinants of health and access to health care, that highlights the 
importance of micro-level sociopolitical mechanisms to individuals’ access to 
services. Consideration of these mechanisms with regard to health outcomes and 
mediating access to health care in developed countries is widespread (e.g., Allard, 
2009; Hendryx et al, 2002; Subramanian et al, 2002; Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006), 
and a body of literature is emerging in the development context as well (Baru et al, 
2010; Barua & Singh, 2003; Chen & Cammett, 2012; Krishna, 2011; Narayan & 
Pritchett, 1999; Tsai, 2007; Tukahirwa, 2011).  
Many studies invoke some form of social capital, a multifaceted concept that 
is defined and employed in numerous ways. The general factors of interest in social 
capital research include weak and strong network ties, bridging connections, 
notions of trust, collective efficacy, and social organization and structure (Bourdieu, 
1986; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 
2001; Harpham, et al, 2002; Islam et al, 2006; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Uphoff, 2000).31 While it makes sense that these factors could play an important 
role in overcoming financial, cognitive, and sociocultural barriers to accessing high 
quality health and education services, there is no consensus in the existing 
literature about how they operate and influence social welfare on the micro level 
(Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005). The distinct effects—positive and/or negative—of each 
component are understudied, particularly in developing countries and across a 
variety of institutional, cultural, and political contexts. 
In this chapter, I build on this literature and the analysis in the previous 
chapter by examining the relationship between the micro-experience of health and 
education provision and indicators of the depth and strength of households’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For a review of the social capital literature, including definitions and criticisms regarding the 
empirical and theoretical utility of the concept, see Appendix D. 
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community and political involvement and interpersonal and institutional trust.32 As 
I discuss in the review of social capital literature in Appendix D, I attempt to avoid 
the common theoretical and methodological criticisms directed towards social 
capital research by focusing on a subset of factors I collectively refer to as “social 
proximity” and exploring the ways in which constituent components operate as 
intervening variables within a particular institutional, sociocultural, and political 
context. I hypothesize that social proximity shapes the lens through which 
households assess opportunities, identify possibilities, and evaluate options for 
health and education services. Based on findings from the household-level analysis 
in this chapter and the inclusion of community-level sociopolitical factors in 
Chapter 6, I discover that the role of social proximity grows larger in the absence of 
universal state provision. As the landscape of providers becomes more fragmented 
and diverse, non-monetary resources increasingly facilitate access, utilization, and 
enhanced satisfaction with health and education services. 
Conceptualization of Social Proximity 
The term “social proximity” has been employed in many disciplines and 
defined in numerous ways. Social psychologists view social proximity as “the 
perceived distance between self and other” (IJzerman & Semin, 2009, p. 1215), and 
social network analysts refer to a quantitative “representation of the flow of 
communication between individuals in the network” (Alba & Kadushin, 1976, p. 77). 
Building on the work of Tukahirwa’s (2011) inclusion of social proximity factors as 
predictors of access to NGO and CBO sanitation services in Uganda, however, I 
adopt a more general definition whereby a household’s social proximity is a multi-
dimensional concept that captures the household’s social positionality—members’ 
social and political interactions and connections within and outside of the 
community.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Many scholars argue that it is not the household-level socio-political characteristics that are most 
important but the nature and extent of social, political, and associational interactions at the 
community level. While this chapter focuses solely on the household-level characteristics, I examine 
the community level in Chapter 6.   
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Social proximity cannot be reduced to a single indicator or an aggregate 
measure, because households’ relationships vary across the spectrum of 
sociopolitical activity and the effects on service provision are not uniform 
(Bjørnskov, 2006). Similarly, the effects are often context specific: a particular type 
of connection or relationship may be very beneficial in one community and 
irrelevant in another, particularly when the landscape of service providers and civil 
society organizations varies as widely as it does between different informal 
settlements (Sretzer & Woolcock, 2004).  
Potential Mechanisms 
Based on existing literature, I have identified three potential mechanisms by 
which households’ social proximity may affect perceptions, utilization, and 
satisfaction with health and education services: transmission of knowledge and 
information, material assistance, and direct facilitation of access to services.    
Transmission of Knowledge and Information 
Nearly every theory and study related to health service provision cites the 
paramount importance of information to health-seeking behaviors and healthcare 
provision (e.g., Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Cavill & Sohail, 2003; Fotso & Mukiira, 
2012; Gilson, 2003; Muriithi, 2013; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Steinberg & Baxter, 
1998). Lack of information is recognized as a key cognitive barrier to health care 
access for the urban poor in developing countries (Baru et al, 2010; Barua & Singh, 
2003; Kamat 2001; Michielson et al, 2011). This is unsurprising given the plethora 
of options for health and education services in and around slums and the dearth of 
formal mechanisms to provide residents information about service availability, 
quality, and costs. The absence of available information is particularly problematic 
given the low levels of health literacy and limited ability to judge the quality of 
services among the population. 
In micro-level analyses, education is routinely employed as a proxy for 
information. People with higher levels of education are more likely to be informed 
about service availability and the advantages of service utilization, and they are 
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also better able to successfully demand access to quality services (Berry et al, 2004; 
Krishna, 2008; MacLean, 2011; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Tukahirwa et al, 2011; 
World Bank, 2004). Throughout the analyses in Chapter 4, however, the only 
outcome with which the level of education attained by the household head was 
significantly associated was interaction with non-state health providers. There was 
no relationship between education level and the ability to access health services 
when needed, school enrollment rates, perceptions of accessibility, or satisfaction 
with services. Formal education may contribute to households’ awareness of their 
service needs and make it easier to seek out the necessary information, but it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to help households’ navigate the service 
environment in the slums.  
In this context, the extent of a household’s social connections may increase 
access to the knowledge and information. People likely rely on advice and support 
from formal and informal community groups, social, political, and professional 
associations, and other social ties. Some of this information transmission is 
formalized through the mission and nature of the group—for example, welfare 
groups, self-help groups focused on health and education, and community insurance 
cooperatives—and some is derived from being connected to more people who can 
share their information, experiences, and knowledge about when and where to seek 
care (Adhikari & Goldey, 2010). Even if the other person is not a close friend, the 
shared identity, interest, concern, or purpose that drew both to the group likely both 
facilitates the transmission of knowledge and increases the recipients’ perception of 
its accuracy (Agrawal et al, 2008; Binzel & Fehr, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; 
Coleman, 1988; Cranston, 1996; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Sorenson et al, 2006; 
Uphoff, & Wijayaratna, 2000).  
Material Assistance 
The financial cost is a second key barrier to accessing quality services for 
residents of informal settlements (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Fotso & Mukiira, 2012; 
Muriithi, 2013). As is the case with information asymmetries, social proximity 
factors may help overcome financial barriers by connecting households with 
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resources to pay for services. Access to support for fees can come through 
membership in formal savings groups, merry-go-rounds, and community-based 
insurance schemes; through relationships with socially advantaged individuals or 
groups; or through close personal relationships with family, neighbors, or other 
persons who would be willing to help out in an urgent situation (Islam et al, 2006; 
Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Sretzer & Woolcock, 2004). 
Similarly, existing research suggests that long-term relationships with service 
providers increase the likelihood that providers will work within the constraints 
imposed by the patients’ or students’ financial situation by lowering the fee or 
offering a payment plan (Hendryx et al, 2002). This is particularly likely among 
NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, and other non-state providers.  
Direct Facilitation of Access to Services 
A third potential barrier to services is “getting in the door” when there is high 
demand. At public health facilities in and around Kibera and Korogocho, for 
example, waiting times are long, staff and medicines are routinely unavailable, and 
demands for bribes reduce affordability (Chuma & Okongu, 2013; Martin & 
Pimhidzai, 2013). Classrooms at public schools are similarly overcrowded, and 
textbook shortages and fees pose challenges to residents even if they are able to 
secure a place in a public school (Chuck, 2009; Ogola, 2010). Among non-state 
providers, access to services provided by CBOs, churches, and self-help groups may 
require membership in the group (Tukahirwa, 2011). In these situations, social or 
political connections can directly facilitate access and, in the case of health services, 
ensure more personal attention, access to medicines during shortages, or higher 
quality care (Sretzer & Woolcock, 2004). Jha et al (2007) and Krishna (2011) find 
evidence of this in India, where connections with local leaders and informal power 
brokers help poor households gain access to public services.  
Operationalization of Social Proximity Factors 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that measuring social proximity 
is fraught with difficulties. Social and political relationships and networks are 
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complex and context-specific; any attempt to parsimoniously quantify social 
proximity necessarily ignores nuances and runs the risk of incorrectly attributing 
an observed effect to a particular social factor when a key variable is unknowingly 
omitted. A thorough understanding of the relationships in a community and 
households’ positions among them requires extensive local knowledge, cooperation 
from stakeholders, and an in-depth qualitative examination, all of which are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. In spite of these challenges, I selected three 
components of social proximity—community involvement, interpersonal and 
institutional trust, and political involvement—based on existing research and the 
potential mechanisms outlined above (Bjørnskov, 2006). Additionally, to ensure that 
social proximity factors are not proxies for poverty status, education, or other socio-
demographic variables, I confirmed that there is no significant correlation between 
social proximity factors and other explanatory factors (see correlation matrix in 
Appendix F). 
Community Involvement 
Community involvement is a structural component of social proximity that 
encompasses group membership, attendance at community meetings, and contact 
with community leaders (Harpham, et al, 2002; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Uphoff, 
2000). Using principal component analysis with polychoric correlation, I generated 
three factors corresponding to membership, attendance, and contact. For most of the 
analysis in this chapter, I created a summary measure by taking the sum of the 
three factors. 
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Table 5.1: Description of Community Involvement Factors 
Community Involvement Obs Mean StDev Min Max 
Community group 
membership 
(comm_pc1) 
Membership and level of 
involvement in religious group 
that meets outside of worship 
(0.46); membership and level of 
involvement in a savings group 
or merry-go-round (0.61); 
membership and involvement in 
a women’s group (0.63) 
1006 1.42 1.24 -0.35 5.28 
Contact with leaders 
(comm_pc2) 
Frequency of contact with a staff 
member of an NGO or CBO 
(0.65); frequency of contact with 
a traditional leader, religious 
leader, or other community 
leader (0.70) 
1006 0.97 1.11 -0.39 4.83 
Attendance at 
community meetings 
(comm_pc3) 
Frequency of attending any 
community meeting (0.71); 
frequency of getting together 
with others to raise an issue 
(0.67) 
1006 2.23 1.48 -0.44 5.83 
Community 
involvement 
(comm_pc) 
Sum of the 3 community 
involvement factors. This 
summary factor was created to 
resolve multicollinearity issues 
when the individual factors were 
used in models. 
1006 4.62 2.71 0 13.35 
Factor loadings in parentheses      
 
Trust 
The second component of social proximity, trust, is cognitive; existing 
research indicates that cognitive components are conceptually and empirically 
separate from structural characteristics like group membership (Harpham et al, 
2002; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006). Gilson notes that 
“trust is a relational notion: it generally lies between—people, people and 
organizations, people and events” (2003, p. 1454). Instrumentally, “trust covers a 
variety of cognitive phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with 
others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to 
standard definitions of self interest” (Levi, 1998, p. 78). As a form of faith, a basis of 
evaluation, or an expectation of reciprocity, trust is not an action or outcome like 
cooperation, but it can facilitate actions and outcomes.  
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In the context of social welfare, there are two potentially relevant types of 
trust. The first, interpersonal trust, exists between people. Interpersonal trust may 
facilitate access to quality health and education services through several channels. 
Some level of trust is required for the transmission of information and knowledge, 
as the recipient of the information must trust the source in order to accept and act 
on whatever advice or assistance is offered. Interpersonal trust is similarly crucial 
to any relationship with the potential to provide financial resources for services. 
People are unlikely to form savings or insurance groups with, extend loans to, or 
offer emergency assistance to individuals they don’t trust to reciprocate or fulfill 
obligations. Additionally, interpersonal trust facilitates direct access to services, as 
those in a position to assist others have little incentive to do so unless they either 
share a strong bond, feel a sense of moral obligation, or expect some form of 
reciprocation (Islam et al, 2006).  
Within the category of interpersonal trust, the social capital literature 
distinguishes between “bonding” and “bridging” trust. Bonding trust exists within a 
group with some shared social identity, whereas bridging trust refers to the 
relationships between people from different identity groups (Narayan & Pritchett, 
1999; Putnam, 2000; Sretzer & Woolcock, 2004). The extent to which the effects of 
bridging and bonding trust on access diverge both in direction and magnitude likely 
depends on the nature of social relations and the landscape of social service 
providers in the community.   
The second type of trust examined is institutional trust, and it exists between 
people and institutions. In the social capital literature, institutional trust is often 
classified as linking connections across vertical hierarchies of power (Gilson, 2003). 
Cross-national studies suggest that institutional trust is derived from views of 
legitimacy, based on the belief that the institution or its representatives are 
competent and honest (Tyler, 1998). There is empirical support for the importance 
of institutional trust to social welfare and service provision, particularly in poor 
communities where the nature and extent of respect and trust between individuals 
and representatives of formal institutions is strongly associated with their well-
	   144 
being (Krishna, 2002; Lipsky, 1980; Narayan, 2000). In slum communities in 
Uganda, Tukahirwa (2011) found that high levels of trust significantly increase the 
likelihood that households utilize sanitation services provided by NGOs and CBOs; 
the marginal effect of trust was the highest among all variables included in the 
model. Although the macro-level positive effects of institutional trust are realized 
when there is generalized trust between the individuals and the institutions, 
particularistic relationships cultivated through patronage, corruption, and nepotism 
fall within this category and benefit the individuals at the micro level (Sretzer & 
Woolcock, 2004). 
Table 5.2: Description of Trust Factors 
Interpersonal Trust  Obs. Mean StDev Min Max 
Bonding: close 
relations 
(bonding_rel) 
Trust in family (0.88); trust in 
neighbors (0.47); trust in 
members of your own ethnic 
group/tribe (-0.09) 
1043 2.62 1.07 -0.26 4.04 
Bonding: co-ethnic 
(bonding_ethnic) 
Trust in family (-0.69); trust in 
neighbors (-0.03); trust in 
members of your own ethnic 
group/tribe (0.73) 
1043 1.82 1.07 -0.35 3.91 
Bonding 
(bonding) 
Sum of two bonding factors. This 
single measure of bonding trust 
was created for use when effects 
of the two factors were strongly 
correlated. 
1043 4.44 1.79 0 7.34 
Bridging 
(bridging) 
Trust in acquaintances (0.71); 
trust in members of other ethnic 
groups/tribes (0.71) 
1018 2.36 1.11 0.21 5.39 
Institutional Trust  
Government 
(confidence_gov) 
Confidence in the President 
(0.48); Prime Minister (0.39); 
Parliament (0.57); Local 
government council (0.55) 
886 2.52 1.55 -0.16 6.47 
NGO 
(confidence_ngo) 
Confidence in Kenyan NGOs 
(0.71); confidence in 
international NGOs (0.71) 
886 2.60 1.46 -0.41 5.49 
Community 
(confidence_cbo) 
Confidence in CBOs (0.71); 
confidence in traditional leaders 
(0.71) 
886 0.65 1.12 -1.84 3.85 
Factor loadings in parentheses      
 
I constructed indicators of interpersonal and institutional trust using 
questions about how much respondents trust others (e.g., family, neighbors, 
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acquaintances, other communities, members of their own ethnic group, etc.) and 
how much confidence they have in various institutions (e.g., government leaders 
and legislative bodies, NGOs, CBOs, traditional leaders, etc.). As described in Table 
5.2, I generated factors for bonding and bridging interpersonal trust and confidence 
in government, NGOs, and community-level organizations and leaders using 
principal component analysis. 
Political Activism 
The final component of social proximity employed in this chapter is political 
activism. Existing research suggests that micro-level politics, defined as individual 
or household level political activity, participation, and contact with political and 
party officials, play a role in both promoting access to public social services for the 
politically connected and excluding those without similar ties (Chen & Cammett, 
2012; Edelman & Mitra, 2006; Jha et al, 2007; Krishna, 2011). This is particularly 
true in countries where clientelism, patronage, and other forms of particularistic 
political behavior are pervasive. Chen and Cammett’s (2012) empirical quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of access to health services in Lebanon, for example, 
consistently confirmed that individuals’ access to quality services was positively 
related to their level of political activism. Using survey data from slums in India, 
Edelman and Mitra (2006) show that political contact facilitates access to public 
services and basic amenities. The authors discovered that political contact is less 
influential in other Asian countries, however, reiterating the importance of 
contextual factors. 
Political connections are enormously beneficial in the short run, but 
politicians’ exploitation of slum populations through targeted patronage stymies 
development and perpetuates residents’ vulnerability. de Smedt confirms this 
pattern in the context of Kibera, where “politicians see Kibera not as a large slum, 
but as a strategic reservoir for votes” (2009, p. 594). Former Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga was Kibera’s long-time Luo patron and MP from 1992 to 2013, and though 
he did direct some resources to the community at large, residents’ rewards for 
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electoral and popular support were mostly targeted assistance, allowances, and 
even rent payments for active supporters (de Smedt, 2009). When Odinga was 
defeated in the 2007 presidential election, many observers argue that he 
encouraged—or at least did nothing to prevent—his supporters from participating 
in widespread violence and destruction in the community (de Smedt, 2009). This 
violence and the polarization that endures today have perpetuated residents’ 
vulnerability.  
In the context of health and education services in Kibera and Korogocho, the 
influence of political activism initially appears more relevant for access to public 
services. As Montgomery and Ezeh (2005) note, however, political involvement may 
be one indicator of the strength of individuals’ social network ties. The relationship 
between the non-state providers and the government could also affect the utility of 
political connections for NSP accessibility.  
To construct a measure of political involvement, I performed principal 
component analysis using survey responses regarding participation in various 
political functions, voting, party identification, contact with party officials, and 
campaign work.33  
Table 5.3: Description of Political Activism Factor 
Political Involvement 
Political Activism 
(political_pc1) 
Frequency of contacting a 
political party official (0.47); 
campaign meeting or rally 
attendance (0.49); tried to 
persuade others to vote for a 
particular candidate or party 
(0.53); worked for a candidate or 
party during the last election 
(0.52) 
1032 0.48 0.60 -0.003 1.73 
Factor loadings in parentheses      	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The correlation between voting and other activities was low, so whether or not at least one 
member of the household voted in the last election was excluded from the factor; the inactivity of the 
13 percent of respondents who did not vote was captured in the resulting factor. Nearly 43 percent 
did identify with a particular political party, but dummy variables for key parties were never 
significant in models and were therefore not included.  
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Models 
In the sections that follow, I examine the relationship between social 
proximity factors and three dimensions of the micro-experience of health and 
education provision: utilization, perceived accessibility, and satisfaction with 
services. Utilization is measured by binary variables indicating whether one or 
more members of the household were unable to access health services last time 
treatment was needed (no_care) and whether none of the school age children in the 
household are enrolled in school (not_enrolled). In some specifications, perceptions 
of the accessibility of state and non-state services were included to examine the 
extent to which perceptions affect utilization.34 Using logit models, Pr(DV=1) = f 
(α+βpoverty_f1_qt + βpoverty_f2_qt + βAge_hh + βAge_hh2 + βfemale=1 + βfemale=2 + βno_ed + βhigh_ed + βkibera + βcomm_pc_qt + βpolitical_pc1_qt + βbonding_rel_qt + βbonding_ethnic_qt + βbridging_qt + βNGOHealth(Edu)Access + βGovHealth(Edu)Access + ε), where each of the variables used is 
described in the tables above and below. 
In the second section, the dependent variables are perceptions of the 
accessibility of state and non-state health and education services, all of which are 
measured on ordinal scales. Respondents were asked: “How easy or difficult is to 
obtain treatment at a public/non-state clinic or hospital?” and “How easy or difficult 
is it to obtain a place for a child in government/non-state a primary school?” and 
chose between very difficult, difficult, easy, and very easy.35 The final section 
explores the effects of social proximity factors on satisfaction with the health facility 
most often visited by members of the household and the school attended by the 
majority of the children. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Before including perceived accessibility in the models I confirmed that the relationship was not 
tautological. Though perceptions and utilization were correlated, there was sufficient variation in the 
responses of households that did not utilize services to the ordinal question measuring perceived 
accessibility. 
35 To ensure that this measure portrays a more comprehensive indication of access and is not solely a 
proxy for affordability of services, I confirmed through pairwise correlations between responses to 
these questions and identically scaled questions about respondents’ ability to pay fees for services of 
each type from both public and private providers that correlation is low (all pairwise correlations 
were < |0.12|). 
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I used ordered logit models and included controls for socioeconomic status, 
age and education of the household head, ethnicity, gender of respondent and 
household head, and slum of residence. Each model has two specifications. The first 
specification includes the controls and indicators for community involvement, 
political activism, and interpersonal trust. The second adds indicators for 
institutional trust in government, NGOs, and CBOs. I use ordinal scales for 
quintiles of the social proximity factors in some models. For most specifications, 
however, I separated each factor into three quantiles—low, medium, and high—and 
generated dichotomous indicators for medium and high levels. Low levels became 
the reference category in the models. The use of indicator variables allows the 
model to capture non-linear effects across categories and simplifies the 
postestimation analysis. To test the robustness of this strategy, I compared the 
results to the original quintile specification (not shown). The predicted probabilities 
for the low and high categories were nearly identical.  
I ran all of the models several times to test both model specification and the 
robustness of findings to alternative measures of the social proximity factors. The 
mix of explanatory variables that appear in the sections that follow varies slightly 
according to the dependent variable, as I omitted variables for which the p value 
was nearly 1.000 and report specifications that most successfully account for 
variation while minimizing multicollinearity and other sources of bias and 
inefficiency.36 
Table 5.4: Dependent Variables and Controls Used in the Chapter 
Variable 
(Stata name) 
Description 
Dependent Variables 
No health care access 
(no_care) 
Indicates whether the respondent or a member of the household was 
able to access health care services the last time he or she needed care. 
0 = able to access care last time it was needed; 1 = unable to access care 
last time it was needed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I discovered, for example, that the two factors for bonding trust (close relations and co-ethnic) 
sometimes had opposite effects and in other models had similar effects. For the latter, I often used a 
single measure of bonding trust (bonding_qt) to avoid unnecessary multicollinearity. 
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Not enrolled in school 
(not_enrolled) 
Indicates whether at least one school-age member of the household is 
enrolled in school. 0 = At least one child is enrolled in school; 1 = none of 
the school-age children are enrolled in school; missing if there are no 
school age children in the household. 
Government health 
service accessibility 
(GovHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of public health services 
measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain medical 
treatment at a public clinic or hospital?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 
= easy; 4 = very easy. 
Non-state health service 
accessibility 
(NGOHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of health services provided 
by non-state actors. Measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it 
to obtain medical treatment from non-government providers?” 1 = very 
difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = easy; 4 = very easy. 
Government school 
accessibility 
(GovEduAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of public education measured 
by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain a place in a public 
primary school for a child?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = easy; 4 = 
very easy. 
Non-state school 
accessibility 
(NGOEduAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of non-state schools 
measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain a place for 
a child in a primary school that is not run by the government?” 1 = very 
difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = easy; 4 = very easy. 
Satisfaction with health 
services 
(healthsat_pc_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring satisfaction with health 
services. If members of household visited more than one provider, 
responses relate to experiences with most frequently visited provider. 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the least satisfied to 5 = household 
among the most satisfied quintile. For additional details see Appendix 
A. 
Satisfaction with 
education services 
(satedu_pc_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring satisfaction with education 
services. If members of household are enrolled in more than one school, 
responses relate to experiences with school in which most children are 
enrolled. Ranges from 1 = household is among the least satisfied to 5 = 
household among the most satisfied quintile. For additional details see 
Appendix A. 
Controls 
Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of daily 
experiences (income, frequency of going without food, water, etc.). 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the most impoverished quintile to 
5 = household among the least impoverished quintile. For additional 
details see Appendix A. 
Poverty (stock) 
(poverty_f2_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of assets 
(ownership of radio, bicycle, electricity, etc.). Ranges from 1 = household 
is among the most impoverished quintile to 5 = household among the 
least impoverished quintile. For additional details see Appendix A. 
Age of household head 
(Age_hh) 
Age of household head (measured in years). 
Age squared 
(Age_hh2) 
Square of the age of the household head (in years). Controls for the 
curvilinear relationship between age and interaction with/need for 
health care services. 
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Female  
(Female) 
Indicates the sex of the respondent and whether the household head is 
female. 0 = male respondent and household head; 1 = female respondent 
and male household head; 2 = female household head 
Low education 
(low_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or some primary school; 1 = completed primary school 
or higher. 
Medium education 
(med_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or only some primary school or completed secondary 
education or more; 1 = completely primary school up to some secondary 
education (but did not complete secondary education). Used as the 
control so it does not appear in the models. 
High education 
(high_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education through some secondary education; 1 = completed 
secondary education or beyond. 
Ethnicity 
(ethnicity_fewest) 
Categorical variable for ethnicity of respondent. 1 = Kamba; 2 = Kikuyu; 
3 = Kisii; 4 = Luyha; 5 = Luo; 6 = other ethnicity. 
Kibera 
(kibera) 
Indicates settlement of residence. 0 = household lives in Korogocho; 1 = 
household lives in Kibera. 
Public health 
(health_public) 
Indicates the operational entity of the most frequently visited health 
provider. 0 = not operated by the government; 1 = operated by the 
government. 
Public school enrollment 
(pub_sch_pct) 
Measures the percentage of school age children enrolled in a public 
school. Ranges from 0 = no children enrolled in public school to 1 = all 
children enrolled in public school. 
 
Findings 
Social Proximity and Awareness of Service Providers 
Most Respondents Recognize the Importance of Social Proximity 
Before examining the statistical relationships between the social proximity 
indicators and measures of perceived accessibility, utilization, and satisfaction, it is 
useful to consider whether respondents themselves believe that sociopolitical factors 
affect community members’ ability to meet their needs for health and education 
services. To what extent do they think participation and connections facilitate 
access? A cursory review of the distribution of responses to the questions below 
reveals that a majority of respondents either agree or strongly agree that holding 
leadership positions within the community or being connected to leaders makes it 
easier to access both health (58 percent) and education (62 percent) services. There 
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is variation between villages as well: 78 percent of respondents in Raila (Kibera) 
answered positively to leadership or leadership connections for health, and 75 
percent in Kisumu Ndogo (Kibera) did so for education.37  
The majority of respondents—55 percent for health and 60 percent for 
education—also view membership in community organizations as a facilitating 
factor. Interestingly, the pairwise correlations between responses for health and 
education, 0.37 for leadership connections and 0.35 for membership, are strong and 
significant but not as high as the nearly identical distributions might suggest. The 
pairwise correlations for all of the social proximity questions below are similar, 
implying that respondents’ perceptions of the utility of social proximity depends to 
some degree on the service in question.  
Being a community leader or having connections to or relationships 
with a community leader makes it easier to get adequate medical 
treatment/send your child to a good school. 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 11% 11% 
Agree 47% 51% 
Disagree 32% 30% 
Strongly disagree 8% 7% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 2% 1% 
 
Being a member of a community organization makes it easier to get 
adequate medical treatment/send your child to a good school. 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 8% 9% 
Agree 47% 51% 
Disagree 34% 32% 
Strongly disagree 8% 7% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 3% 1% 
  
Fewer respondents believe that political party affiliation, religion, and ethnic 
identity affect households’ ability to access health and education services. For 
health, 32 percent agree or strongly agree that particular political party affiliations 
influence access, 27 percent view religion as important, and 22 percent believe that 
ethnic identity plays a role.38 These factors are slightly more relevant for education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Community level differences will be explored further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
38 There may be some bias in responses involving sensitive matters like ethnicity, religion, and 
politics. 
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services: 47 percent responded positively for political party affiliation, 36 percent 
did so for religion, and 24 percent affirmed the connection with ethnic identity. As 
was the case with community involvement, there was some variation between 
villages. Regarding the influence of religion on health care access, for example, 17 
percent of respondents in Kianda (Kibera) agreed or strongly agreed, compared to 
36 percent in Kisumu Ndogo (Korogocho).   
Being affiliated with a particular political party makes it easier to 
get adequate medical treatment/send your child to a good school. 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 6% 7% 
Agree 26% 40% 
Disagree 46% 33% 
Strongly disagree 19% 18% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 3% 2% 
 
Belonging to a particular religion makes it easier to get adequate 
medical treatment/send your child to a good school. 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 3% 4% 
Agree 24% 32% 
Disagree 53% 46% 
Strongly disagree 18% 16% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 2% 2% 
 
It is easier to get adequate medical treatment/send your child to a 
good school if you are a member of a certain tribe (or tribes). 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 4% 4% 
Agree 18% 20% 
Disagree 50% 49% 
Strongly disagree 26% 25% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 2% 2% 
 
Awareness of Service Availability and Information about Quality is Unevenly 
Distributed 
An additional survey question of interest descriptively touches on the 
presence of a cognitive barrier to access generated by the complexity and opacity of 
the service environment and the lack of information about both providers and 
quality. When respondents were asked whether lack of information about service 
availability and quality prevents people from obtaining health and education 
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services, 43 percent answered affirmatively for health and 42 percent did so for 
education.39 
Many people are not able to get adequate medical treatment 
because they do not know where to go when they need treatment / 
send their children to good schools because they do not have 
enough information about schools in the community and the 
quality of those schools. 
 Health Education 
Strongly agree 7% 7% 
Agree 36% 37% 
Disagree 43% 41% 
Strongly disagree 13% 14% 
Don’t know/refused to answer 1% 1% 
 
As depicted in the series of distribution plots in Appendix E, there is little 
consensus among respondents about how many health and education facilities of 
various types are located in the communities. Awareness of service availability 
varies widely within each community, and alarmingly large portions of the 
population are unaware of the presence of the existing state and non-state health 
facilities. Both Kibera and Korogocho have an operational government health center 
and dispensary, for example, but 41 percent said there are no government health 
centers, and 65 percent reported that no public dispensaries are located in the 
community. Similarly, 39 percent of respondents indicated that there are no NGO 
clinics when each settlement has multiple large scale (for the area), internationally 
funded NGO facilities. Lack of awareness was somewhat less pronounced for 
government schools but, as the plots illustrate, there was a wide range of reported 
numbers, and knowledge of schools operated by NGOs and CBOs was low.    
Though I am unable to draw any conclusions about causality or whether the 
mechanisms outlined earlier are responsible for any observed associations, the 
variation in awareness of service providers and the general perception that 
information is not equally distributed and that information can facilitate access to 
health and education do suggest that any information transmitted through social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Community level differences were particularly striking for education. Much larger percentages of 
respondents from villages in Korogocho agreed or strongly agreed that lack of information is a 
barrier (58 percent in Korogocho B, 54 percent in Highridge, and 53 percent in Kisumu Ndogo) than 
in Kibera (27 percent in Kisumu Ndogo, less than 38 percent in Kianda, and less than 37 percent in 
Raila). 
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connections could have a positive effect on households. Furthermore, the visual 
comparison between the average number of health facilities of each type reported by 
households within quintiles of community involvement (comm_pc_qt) in Figure 5.1 
shows that, with the exception of NGO providers, awareness of providers generally 
increases as the household’s level of community involvement increases. This 
correlation is purely descriptive and does not control for any other factors, but 
comparisons of means across other explanatory factors such as poverty status, 
gender, age, and level of education attained by the household head showed no 
patterns in awareness.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Average number of health facilities of each type reported by 
respondents in each quintile of community involvement. 
 
Social Proximity and Service Utilization 
The results of logit models examining the effects of social proximity factors on 
whether or not the household was able to access health care last time it was needed 
and whether none of the school age children are enrolled are displayed in Table 5.5 
(health) and Table 5.7 (education). Both sets of models explain more of the variation 
in observed values of the dependent variables than the specifications without social 
proximity factors in Chapter 4.  
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The results for two specifications for health utilization are included in Table 
5.5. The first includes socio-demographic controls and social proximity factors, and 
the second adds dichotomous indicators for perceptions of accessibility of 
government and non-state health services.40 The coefficients for both state and non-
state accessibility are large and significant, a finding that corroborates existing 
research showing that individuals’ perceptions of service accessibility and/or quality 
affect utilization (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Leonard, 2003; Tukahirwa, 2011). The 
addition of these variables to the model had little effect on the coefficient estimates 
for other covariates; perceptions of accessibility appear to account for variation in 
utilization not captured by other covariates. 
Table 5.5: Relationship Between Social Proximity Variables                       
and Access to Health Care 
no_care 
Model 1  Model 2 
Exp (β) Robust SE  Exp (β) Robust SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.570*** 0.050  0.577*** 0.052 
Poverty (assets) 1.139 
 
0.101  1.142 
 
0.101 
Female resp. 0.659 
 
0.184  0.738 
 
0.210 
Female HH 0.628 
 
0.189  0.709 
 
0.214 
Kibera 0.946 
 
0.224  1.005 
 
0.247 
Community inv. 0.792*** 0.064  0.775*** 0.065 
Political activism 1.184** 0.085  1.197** 0.086 
Bonding (rel) trust 1.074 
 
0.102  1.089 
 
0.105 
Co-ethnic trust 0.833* 0.080  0.851* 
 
0.082 
Bridging trust 1.107 
 
0.094  1.125 
 
0.098 
GovHealthAccess    0.351*** 
 
0.096 
NGOHealthAccess    0. 587** 
 
0.159 
Constant 4.043 
 
4.138  8.051* 
 
8.679 
Wald Χ2 72.80***  85.85*** 
Observations 899  885 
Age, age2, and education controls are included in the models but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 	  
Among the socio-demographic variables, lived poverty status significantly 
affects health utilization. As will be the case throughout the chapter, I use predicted 
probabilities to offer a more meaningful interpretation of the regression results. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 GovHealthAccess and NGOHealthAccess are set at 1 if the respondent said that getting treatment 
at a government/non-state health facility is easy or very easy, 0 if access is perceived as difficult or 
very difficult. 
	   156 
Figure 5.2 displays the change in the predicted probability of being unable to access 
care across each quintile of poverty status when all other covariates are set at their 
means. The predicted probability for the most impoverished households is 0.2, while 
the probability decreases substantially to 0.027 for the least impoverished 
households. None of the other socio-demographic controls are significant. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The predicted probability of being unable to access 
health care last time it was needed by quintile of lived poverty 
status. Estimates are based on model 2 in Table 5.5. Education is 
set at medium and all other covariates are set at their means. 
 
Of the social proximity factors, three are significant: co-ethnic trust, political 
activism, and community involvement. The factor for co-ethnic trust is the only 
statistically significant measure of interpersonal trust, though it does increase the 
likelihood of utilization as expected. The significance is weak; the predicted 
probability of being unable to access care when needed decreases from 0.1 at the 
lowest quintile of co-ethnic trust to 0.06 at the highest quintile, but pairwise 
comparisons of the margins are only significant between the third, fourth, and fifth 
quintiles. Consequently, the results are somewhat inconclusive.  
The association between utilization and level of political activism is stronger 
but in the opposite direction. The predicted probability of being unable to access 
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treatment when needed is 0.06 for an average household in the lowest quintile of 
political activism and 0.1 for an otherwise identical household in the highest 
quintile. The negative effect was unexpected. Political organizations, like other 
community groups, can facilitate the transmission of information and knowledge 
and foster both interpersonal and institutional trust; activism might benefit 
households even if the political nature of the interaction is not relevant. The 
findings from this set of models do not support that hypothesis. 
Community involvement is the most influential social proximity factor in 
both magnitude and statistical significance. The constituent components of the 
community involvement factor include membership and level of activity in 
community groups, attendance at community meetings, and frequency of 
communication with community leaders. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the predicted 
probability of being unable to access health services decreases across each quintile 
of community involvement. When other covariates are set at their means, a change 
from the fifth quintile (most involved) to the first more than doubles the probability 
of being unable to access treatment; this change in probability is significant at the 
99 percent level.   
 
Figure 5.3 The predicted probability of being unable to access 
health care last time it was needed by quintile of community 
involvement. Estimates are based on model 2 in Table 5.5. 
Education set at medium, all other covariates set at their means. 
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The positive association between households’ level of community involvement 
and service utilization persists and increases in magnitude when the presence of 
non-enrolled school age children is the dependent variable (see regression results in 
Table 5.6). The specifications for models 3 and 4 are the same as the first two 
models, except for the changes in the dependent variable and the perceived 
accessibility indicators to education. Perceptions of accessibility are less important 
in the context of school enrollment, however, and lived poverty status is no longer 
significant. Non-enrollment is less likely among residents of Kibera, but the 
relationship is only significant at the p<0.1 level. The strongest predictor of non-
enrollment among the variables included in models 3 and 4 is the household’s level 
of community involvement. As depicted in Figure 5.4, the predicted probability of 
non-enrollment for an average household (all other covariates set at their means) in 
the lowest quintile of community involvement is at least three times greater than 
the probability for an average household in the highest quintile of community 
involvement. 
Table 5.6: Social Proximity and School Enrollment 
not_enrolled 
Model 3  Model 4 
Exp (β) Robust SE  Exp (β) Robust SE 
Poverty (flow) 1.020 
 
0.118  1.010 
 
0.115 
Poverty (assets) 0.865 
 
0.094  0.919 
 
0.105 
Female resp. 0.923 
 
0.359  0.956 
 
0.364 
Female HH 0.596 
 
0.264  0.594 
 
0.264 
Kibera 0.492* 
 
0.180  0.497* 
 
0.184 
Community inv. 0.685*** 
 
0.076  0.677*** 
 
0.074 
Political activism 1.047 
 
0.110  1.037 
 
0.114 
Bonding (rel) trust 1.057 
 
0.132  0.999 
 
0.120 
Co-ethnic trust 1.166 
 
0.142  1.174 
 
0.148 
Bridging trust 1.001 
 
0.122  1.032 
 
0.122 
GovEduAccess   1.425* 
 
0.267 
NGOEduAccess    0.801 
 
0.156 
Constant 1.308 
 
1.505  1.187 
 
1.807 
Wald Χ2 36.72***  38.94*** 
Observations 558  548 
Age and education controls are included in the models but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
	   159 
 
Figure 5.4 The predicted probability of non-enrollment by 
quintile of community involvement. Estimates are based on 
model 4 in Table 5.6. Education is set at medium and all other 
covariates are set at their means. 
 
Looking over all four models, most social proximity factors are either 
insignificant or weakly significant, with the notable exception of community 
involvement. The positive correlation between higher levels of involvement in the 
community and the probability of utilizing health services when treatment is 
needed and enrolling age eligible children in school suggests support for the 
hypothesis that participation and interaction with other community members can 
facilitate access to services.  
Social Proximity and Perceptions of Accessibility 
In the next set of models, I examine the effects of social proximity factors on 
respondents’ assessments of the level of difficulty or ease with which they are able 
to obtain treatment from state and non-state health care providers and enroll a 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 (n
ot
_e
nr
oll
ed
 =
 1
)
1 2 3 4 5
Quintile of community involvement (comm_pc_qt)
	   160 
child in a public or private primary school.41 At the outset, the most notable and 
unexpected finding from the results of ordered logit models displayed in Tables 5.7 
and 5.8 is the lack of consistency in the explanatory power of both socio-
demographic and social proximity factors across service and provider types. 
For perceptions of the accessibility of health services (see Table 5.7), the 
significant explanatory factors for one type of provider are either insignificant for 
the other provider type or significant in the opposite direction. Both measures of 
poverty (flow and assets) are highly significant for non-state providers (NSPs); as 
lived poverty decreases, households are more likely to access services with greater 
ease. The coefficients in the government models suggest that the opposite may be 
true, but the magnitude is both small and insignificant. Female respondents and 
household heads are much more likely to view government health services as 
accessible than male respondents, but female respondents are more likely to view 
NSPs as more difficult to access. When variables for institutional trust are added to 
the model, the statistical significance of female respondents for NSPs and female 
headed households for public providers disappears, but the coefficient for female 
respondents remains significant for government services.  
The observed relationships—or lack thereof—between lived poverty and 
gender and government health provision make sense in context. User fees for public 
health centers and dispensaries were eliminated in 2004 and replaced by a nominal 
registration fee that is waived in a number of circumstances, including for children 
under age five and the poor (Muga et al, 2005). Failures to meet targeted health 
outcomes prompted this change, and the government actively sought to improve 
accessibility among low-income populations. Even though financial barriers are only 
one of many obstacles to care, these changes do help in that regard. Without similar  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 It is important to acknowledge that the dependent variables in these models are perceptions; the 
intent is to examine respondents’ beliefs about service provision and their level of confidence in their 
ability to access services when needed. These perceptions may have developed in response to 
particular health- and education-seeking experiences, or they may arise from stories they have heard 
or long-held beliefs about particular institutions or providers. Nevertheless, perception factors exert 
significant influence over decisions regarding health and education and any attempt to improve 
access and outcomes must consider perceptions. 
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Table 5.7: Social Proximity and Perceptions of Health Service Accessibility 
 Government Health 
Access Non-State Health Access 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β) 
Poverty (flow) 0.994 0.964 1.147*** 1.199*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.056) (0.063) 
Poverty (assets) 0.923 0.965 1.139*** 1.130** 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060) 
Female respondent 1.525*** 1.468** 0.745** 0.829 
 (0.217) (0.233) (0.107) (0.133) 
Female HH 1.424** 1.246 1.068 1.171 
 (0.255) (0.242) (0.187) (0.228) 
Kibera 0.727** 0.745* 1.405** 1.314* 
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.206) (0.214) 
Med community inv. 0.820 0.811 0.774 0.741* 
 (0.129) (0.144) (0.124) (0.134) 
High community inv. 0.970 1.017 0.715** 0.679** 
 (0.165) (0.190) (0.116) (0.121) 
Med bonding (rel) 0.960 0.960 0.936 0.970 
 (0.150) (0.162) (0.145) (0.163) 
High bonding (rel) 1.089 0.989 0.698** 0.778 
 (0.189) (0.186) (0.124) (0.155) 
Med co-ethnic trust 1.599*** 1.531** 0.915 0.961 
 (0.272) (0.272) (0.155) (0.172) 
High co-ethnic trust 1.632** 1.547** 0.865 0.951 
 (0.328) (0.338) (0.174) (0.211) 
Med political activism 1.146 1.223 0.816 0.812 
 (0.187) (0.221) (0.135) (0.150) 
High political activism 0.947 0.925 0.814 0.780 
 (0.142) (0.148) (0.120) (0.123) 
Med bridging 0.932 0.869 1.201 1.207 
 (0.147) (0.144) (0.189) (0.203) 
High bridging 0.825 0.754 1.748*** 2.052*** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.337) (0.428) 
Med - NGOs  0.763  1.153 
  (0.137)  (0.210) 
High - NGOs  0.733*  1.105 
  (0.134)  (0.207) 
Med - CBOs  0.932  0.973 
  (0.162)  (0.177) 
High - CBOs  1.006  1.088 
  (0.185)  (0.191) 
Med - Govt  1.238  0.946 
  (0.217)  (0.159) 
High - Govt  2.055***  0.616*** 
  (0.376)  (0.113) 
Constant cut1 -2.562*** 0.0721*** -1.242*** 0.336** 
Constant cut2 -0.572 0.521 0.261 1.568 
Constant cut3 1.653*** 4.491*** 2.113*** 9.367*** 
Wald Χ2 45.94*** 69.37*** 54.60*** 64.66*** 
Observations 895 759 892 757 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age, education, and ethnicity controls included but not 
shown.        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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provisions at NSPs, costs are generally higher (Muriithi, 2013). Additionally, 
women generally have more contact with service providers. They bear more of the 
responsibility for tending to the health needs of children, and experiences with 
antenatal care and childbirth may require more health care (Abdenur, 2009; 
COHRE, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2010). Repeated interactions may foster relationships 
with particular providers, familiarity with the system, and increased health 
literacy, all of which may improve their ability to navigate the complexities of the 
service environment and access necessary treatment.   
Another socio-demographic factor with contradictory estimates is the fixed 
effect for Kibera. Perceptions of public health accessibility are much lower in Kibera 
and perceptions of the accessibility of NSPs are much higher; the magnitude and 
significance of the effect are nearly identical but in opposite directions. A 
government dispensary built by the Italian government and managed by the 
Ministry of Health recently opened in Korogocho, and it is the first government 
health facility located in the slum. This development enhances the accessibility of 
government provision there. Additionally, the non-state health sector is smaller in 
Korogocho and insecurity has limited the operation and growth of the sector.   
The effects of community involvement and interpersonal trust vary 
considerably by provider type. For public health services, the only significant factor 
is co-ethnic (bonding) trust. For non-state providers, community involvement, 
political activism, and both types of bonding trust are negatively associated with 
perceived accessibility. Most of the coefficient estimates are insignificant, however, 
with the exception of community involvement and a high level of bonding trust with 
close relations in one specification. The consistent finding is the large and highly 
significant relationship between accessibility and bridging trust. In the second 
specification, the odds ratio indicates that households with high levels of bridging 
trust are twice as likely to view non-state health services as easily accessible (vs. 
difficult to access) than otherwise identical households with low bridging trust.  
The addition of measures of institutional trust to the models (models 6 and 8) 
did not drastically affect the results for other explanatory variables, but trust in 
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government was strongly significant for both types of providers. Higher levels of 
trust in government increase the likelihood that households perceive public health 
services as easily accessible. Though the magnitude is not as large, trust in 
government has the opposite effect on perceptions of non-state service accessibility. 
High confidence in NGOs decreases perceived accessibility of public provision, but 
there is no significant corresponding positive effect of confidence in NGOs on non-
state accessibility.  
The effects of the most influential explanatory factors in each model—trust in 
government for public health access and bridging trust for non-state accessibility—
are illustrated in the graphs of predicted probabilities in Figure 5.5. With all other 
covariates set at their means and education set at medium, the predicted 
probability of finding it very easy and very difficult to obtain treatment are plotted 
over low, medium, and high levels of trust. A cursory glance reveals that the effects 
of each variable are clearly stronger at one end of the spectrum. Households with 
low levels of trust in government are much more likely to perceive access to public 
health services as very difficult, but the difference in probability decreases for a 
medium level of trust and is no longer significant at a high level of trust. The 
change in probability between low and high levels of trust for both very difficult and 
very easy is large and significant: a high level of trust more than doubles the 
probability of perceiving services as very easily accessible compared to an otherwise 
identical household with a low level of trust in government. 
The convergence in probability at one extreme is even more marked for 
bridging trust and perceptions of non-state health service accessibility. At a low 
level of bridging trust, the probability of viewing treatment from non-state services 
as very easy to access is indistinguishable from the probability for very difficult. As 
bridging trust increases, however, the predicted probabilities begin to diverge at a 
medium level of trust before separating completely; households with a high level of 
bridging trust are almost three times more likely to view obtaining treatment from 
NSPs as very easy than as very difficult.  
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Figure 5.5 The predicted probability of viewing health services as very easy or very difficult to 
access. Estimates are based on models 6 and 8 in Table 5.7. Education is set at medium and all other 
covariates are set at their means. 
 
Turning now to perceptions of access to state and non-state primary schools 
in Table 5.8, there are some similarities to the findings from health services and a 
few noticeable differences. Among the socio-demographic variables, relative lived 
poverty does not appear to be much of a factor. There is a very small and weak 
(significant at the 90 percent level) positive correlation between reductions in 
poverty and improved accessibility for public schools and a similarly positive, small, 
and weak association between decreases in asset poverty and access to non-state 
schools. In contrast to the health models, neither female respondents nor female 
headed households affect perceptions of accessibility, and the fixed effect for Kibera 
is insignificant for public schools. Kibera residents are still more likely to find it 
easier to enroll a child in a non-state school.  
For the social proximity factors, some results resemble the findings for 
health. Both types of bonding trust are positively associated with public school 
accessibility, but the statistical significance decreases considerably compared to 
health models. As was the case with health, neither measure of bonding trust is 
significant for non-state provision, but the negative effect of community 
involvement on non-state health accessibility does not carry over into education.  	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Table 5.8: Social Proximity and Perceptions of                                       
Primary School Accessibility 
 Public Education Access Non-State Education Access 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β) 
Poverty (flow) 1.102** 1.096* 1.033 1.044 
 (0.0510) (0.0565) (0.0494) (0.0544) 
Poverty (assets) 0.932 0.952 1.097** 1.058 
 (0.0440) (0.0490) (0.0517) (0.0548) 
Female respondent 0.983 0.949 0.838 0.857 
 (0.145) (0.156) (0.118) (0.137) 
Female HH 0.943 0.938 1.010 1.097 
 (0.155) (0.169) (0.178) (0.208) 
Kibera 1.189 1.182 1.361** 1.358** 
 (0.153) (0.167) (0.184) (0.208) 
Med community inv. 1.213 1.106 0.963 0.905 
 (0.191) (0.194) (0.155) (0.161) 
High community inv. 1.248 1.037 0.847 0.847 
 (0.201) (0.176) (0.141) (0.152) 
Med bonding (rel) 1.104 0.976 1.016 1.075 
 (0.169) (0.159) (0.157) (0.180) 
High bonding (rel) 1.387* 1.187 0.855 0.956 
 (0.235) (0.223) (0.143) (0.181) 
Med co-ethnic trust 1.023 1.166 0.966 0.969 
 (0.176) (0.213) (0.165) (0.176) 
High co-ethnic trust 1.229 1.490* 1.074 0.953 
 (0.236) (0.312) (0.210) (0.204) 
Med political activism 1.234 1.257 0.661*** 0.623*** 
 (0.204) (0.228) (0.103) (0.109) 
High political activism 0.856 0.885 0.637*** 0.608*** 
 (0.126) (0.140) (0.0989) (0.103) 
Med bridging 0.715** 0.697** 1.367** 1.492** 
 (0.112) (0.119) (0.216) (0.254) 
High bridging 0.765 0.683* 1.395* 1.747*** 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.272) (0.374) 
Med NGO   0.894  1.275 
  (0.152)  (0.223) 
High NGO  1.548**  0.931 
  (0.291)  (0.176) 
Med CBO  0.652**  1.091 
  (0.117)  (0.198) 
High CBO  0.743  1.314 
  (0.137)  (0.227) 
Med govt  1.030  0.803 
  (0.182)  (0.142) 
High govt  1.170  0.687** 
  (0.212)  (0.126) 
Constant cut1 0.135*** 0.106*** 0.237*** 0.244*** 
Constant cut2 0.936 0.698 1.026 1.111 
Constant cut3 7.231*** 5.844*** 6.617*** 6.499*** 
Wald Χ2 42.68*** 53.84*** 45.50*** 48.29*** 
Observations 891 758 897 762 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age, education, and ethnicity controls included but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.6 The predicted first differences, or the change in the probability of viewing places in 
schools as very easy to access given a change in the explanatory variables. The first differences are 
calculated from 0 to 1 for all dichotomous covariates and as a 1 standard deviation change for 
poverty status. Estimates are based on models 10 and 12 in Table 5.8. Education is set at medium 
and all other covariates are set at their means. 	  
The importance of bridging trust for NSP accessibility is one finding that all 
four models in Table 5.8 have in common. The magnitude of the effect is not as large 
as it was for health, but it becomes larger and more significant when measures of 
institutional trust are included. Additionally, the coefficients for bridging trust are 
statistically significant in the public education models, particularly at the medium 
level. The effect resembles that for non-state schools in magnitude and significance, 
but it is—once again—in the opposite direction.  
One of the most striking differences between health and education is the 
comparative effect of political activism. For education, high political activism 
significantly decreases perceptions of non-state school accessibility, but the 
relationship with government schools is not significant. This is somewhat 
surprising for two reasons. First, political activism is theoretically more influential 
in facilitating access to public facilities. Second, the benefits of social ties and 
network connections provided by political activity separate from its political context 
theoretically facilitates the transmission of information that could positively affect 
access to NSPs. At the same time, political activism may strengthen institutional 
trust in government that negatively affects trust in NGOs and other non-state 
actors. Though the correlation between the NGO and government factor variables is 
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strong (0.38) and highly significant across the entire sample (p=0.0000), there is no 
correlation among respondents with above average levels of political activism. 
Plausibly, political activity could negatively affect perceptions of NGO and CBO 
competence and trustworthiness, which in turn would negatively affect perceptions 
of health and education services provided by non-state actors.42  
High confidence in government is also negatively and significantly correlated 
with perceived accessibility of non-state schools, but the contrasting effects of trust 
in government and NGOs we saw in the health models—both between institutions 
in the same model and in the direction of the effects across service providers—is not 
replicated for primary schools. Instead, there is no statistically significant 
correlation between trust in government and access to public schools. Furthermore, 
as you can see in the plots of first differences in Figure 5.6, confidence in NGOs 
appears to have a fairly strong positive impact on perceptions of public school 
accessibility.  
In order to provide a more substantive and coherent interpretation of the 
results of the regressions examining the effects of social proximity factors on 
perceptions of service accessibility, I have created two hypothetical households with 
disparate socio-demographic and sociopolitical characteristics. Household 1 is more 
impoverished than the median household in the sample. The household head is 
male, but a female member participated in the survey. The household head is 34 
(the median age), has attained a medium level of education, is Kikuyu, and lives in 
Korogocho. Members of the household are highly involved in community groups and 
meetings and moderately politically active. The respondent expressed a high level of 
trust in relatives and close neighbors, a medium level of trust in other Kikuyus, and 
a low level of trust in members of other communities and people they do not know 
very well. They have average confidence in NGOs and a low level of confidence in 
CBOs, but reported a high level of trust and confidence in government.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This is purely speculation and cannot be examined further with this data. If strong negative 
correlations between political activism and access to non-state service providers are observed in 
other settings, however, it warrants further investigation. 
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Household 2, on the other hand, is among the least impoverished households 
in the sample; the respondent, who is also the household head, is male, 34, and has 
completed secondary school. The members of the household are Luo, reside in 
Kibera, and are moderately involved in community groups and meetings. Their level 
of political activism is low, and the respondent expressed a medium level of 
confidence in NGOs, CBOs, and government. The level of bonding trust with both 
close relations and co-ethnics is medium, and survey responses suggest a high level 
of bridging trust. 
Table 5.9: Characteristics of Hypothetical Households 
 Household 1 Household 2 
Poverty (flow) 2nd quintile 5th quintile 
Poverty (assets) 2nd quintile 5th quintile 
Age median median 
Female respondent neither 
Education medium high 
Ethnicity Kikuyu Luo 
Settlement Korogocho Kibera 
Community involvement high medium 
Political activism medium low 
Bonding (rel) high medium 
Co-ethnic trust medium medium 
Bridging trust low high 
Trust in NGOs medium medium 
Trust in CBOs low medium 
Trust in government high medium 
 
To calculate predicted probabilities, I follow the estimation strategy designed 
by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) and run simulations to generate 1,000 
predicted values for a household with the characteristics of each hypothetical 
household.43 The mean values and standard errors for predicted probabilities are 
displayed in Table 5.10, and Figure 5.7 depicts scatter plots of all simulated values. 
Probabilities for non-state services are plotted on the x axis, probabilities for state 
services are plotted on the y axis, and the colors indicate the outcome value (orange 
represents the probability of finding accessibility very easy, green is easy, red is 
difficult, and blue is very difficult).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I conducted the analysis using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s CLARIFY package for Stata. 
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Table 5.10: Predicted Probabilities for Hypothetical Households 
  Pr(Very 
Difficult) Pr(Difficult) Pr(Easy) 
Pr(Very 
Easy) 
Household 1 State Health Services 0.07 (0.02) 0.26 (0.06) 0.47 (0.04) 0.20 (0.06) 
 Non-State Health Services 0.35 (0.08) 0.36 (0.03) 0.23 (0.05) 0.07 (0.03) 
 Public Primary Schools 0.06 (0.02) 0.24 (0.06) 0.47 (0.03) 0.22 (0.06) 
 Non-State Primary Schools 0.33 (0.09) 0.35 (0.03) 0.24 (0.06) 0.08 (0.03) 
Household 2 State Health Services 0.24 (0.08) 0.44 (0.03) 0.26 (0.07) 0.05 (0.02) 
 Non-State Health Services 0.02 (0.01) 0.07 (0.03) 0.27 (0.06) 0.64 (0.09) 
 Public Primary Schools 0.23 (0.07) 0.42 (0.04) 0.29 (0.07) 0.07 (0.03) 
 Non-State Primary Schools 0.03 (0.01) 0.10 (0.03) 0.33 (0.05) 0.53 (0.09) 
Average probabilities and standard errors (in parentheses) calculated based on 1,000 simulations. 	  
The predicted probabilities and the visual representations highlight several 
themes in the results for this section. First, the households’ perceptions of service 
accessibility vary more by provider type (i.e., state and non-state) than by service 
(i.e., health and education). Household 1 generally views public health and 
education services as easier to access and non-state services as more difficult, 
whereas non-state services are easier to obtain for household 2 and state services 
are more difficult.  
Second, these differences are durable across values of the dependent variable 
for the hypothetical households, revealing an “either/or” pattern in which increases 
in perceptions of public service accessibility are matched by decreases in perceptions 
of the accessibility of non-state services. There is some convergence between 
perceived accessibility of state and non-state services at the “difficult” level for 
household 1 for both health and education and the “easy” level for household 2 for 
education, but differences are consistent across other outcomes. At a more basic 
level of analysis, simple pairwise correlations between the ordinal variables for 
perceived accessibility (GovHealthAccess, NGOHealthAccess, GovEduAccess, 
NGOEduAccess) show strong, highly significant (p < 0.0000) negative correlations 
between perceptions of access to state and non-state services. For health services, 
the pairwise correlation is -0.41; for education the correlation is -0.40.  
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HOUSEHOLD 1 
Health      Education 
 
HOUSEHOLD 2 
Health      Education 
 
Figure 5.7 Simulated predicted probabilities for the hypothetical households described in Table 5.9. 
Plots display 1,000 predicted values for each probability of interest in order to capture uncertainty. 
Health estimates are based on models 6 and 8 in Table 5.7. Education estimates are based on models 
10 and 12 in Table 5.8.  
 
Social Proximity and Satisfaction with Services 
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the relationship between social 
proximity factors and satisfaction with the health and education services utilized by 
members of the household. The perceptions of accessibility discussed in the previous 
section are key components of the micro-experience of social welfare provision 
because they help shape individuals’ sense of agency, their confidence in their 
ability to meet their welfare needs, and their service-seeking behavior. Another key 
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component includes interaction with providers and past experiences with services. 
Research indicates that past experiences strongly influence future behavior; 
particularly in health care, negative experiences may dissuade individuals from 
seeking care in the future, and positive experiences generally promote repeated 
interactions (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Haddad et al, 1998; Leonard, 2003; Martinez et 
al, 2012). Given the benefits—both collective and individual—of improved education 
and health outcomes, examining measures of satisfaction with specific aspects of 
service provision may provide insight into ways to improve the effectiveness of 
current programs and suggest targets for future interventions.  
In the context of this study, measures of satisfaction also offer more 
measurable indicators of the micro-experience of service provision. As important as 
perceptions are to the process, they are individually held beliefs that may or may 
not reflect reality. Satisfaction is similarly subjective, but the survey questions used 
to construct the measures are very specific in nature and refer to single components 
of the technical quality, functional quality, and facilities (see Appendix A for a list of 
the questions and factor loadings). As such, the models in this section capture a 
different dimension of the micro-experience of service provision. The dependent 
variable, satisfaction with services, is divided into quintiles for both health and 
education. I use ordered logit models and the quintile versions of the social 
proximity factors in addition to socio-demographic controls. The results for health 
services are displayed in Table 5.11 and those for education appear in Table 5.12.44  
Results from Chapter 4 showed that households that utilized public health 
providers reported significantly lower satisfaction with health services, and the 
addition of social proximity variables to the models did not affect that finding. As 
the first difference plots for the first, third, and fifth quintiles of satisfaction in 
Figure 5.8 illustrate, when all other covariates are set at their means, the predicted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I used the Brant test to confirm that the ordered logit models met the parallel regression 
assumption. The test indicated that the health model met the requirements but the education model 
did not. To address this problem, I employed a partial generalized ordered logit model for education 
satisfaction (described in more detail in Chapter 3). Covariates that meet the assumption still have 
one coefficient, and those that do not have four coefficients, one for each of the first four quintiles. 
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probability that a household will be in the lowest quintile increases by about 0.15 
when the facility is operated by the government rather than a non-state actor. At 
the median quintile of satisfaction, a change from private to public decreases the 
probability by roughly 0.17; at the highest quintile, utilization of a public provider is 
expected to decrease the likelihood of falling within the quintile by 0.07. The 
magnitude of the negative effect of public providers on satisfaction is not as large 
for education, but it remains significant. 
Table 5.11: Relationship between Social Proximity and Health Service 
Satisfaction 
healthsat_pc1_qt Model 13 Exp (β) Robust SE 
Public provider 0.370*** 0.055 
Poverty (flow)  1.177*** 0.061 
Poverty (assets)  0.946 0.046 
Female respondent 1.257 0.203 
Female HH 0.962 0.172 
Kibera 1.589*** 0.246 
Community 
involvement 
1.007 0.051 
Bonding (rel) trust  1.175*** 0.062 
Co-ethnic trust 0.957 0.052 
Bridging trust 1.137** 0.059 
Political activism 0.867*** 0.039 
Constant cut1 -1.037** 0.479 
Constant cut2 0.173 0.478 
Constant cut3 2.748*** 0.496 
Wald Χ2 108.60***  
Observations 811  
Age, education, and ethnicity controls included in the 
model but not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
Another result that was unchanged by the addition of the social proximity 
variables is the magnitude and significance of the positive effect of reductions in 
lived poverty status on both health and education satisfaction. For education, 
however, poverty status failed to meet the parallel regression assumption for the 
ordered logit model. A partial generalized ordered logit model revealed that the 
estimated effect of a one quintile decrease in poverty on satisfaction with the school 
experience is insignificant at the lowest quintile of satisfaction and then increases 
steadily in magnitude and significance across the quintiles of satisfaction. The 
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estimated coefficients for each quintile are consistent even with the addition of 
social proximity variables. The final carryover from Chapter 4 is the positive and 
significant increase in satisfaction with health services associated with living in 
Kibera compared to Korogocho. Settlement remains inconsequential for education.  	  
 
 
Figure 5.8 The predicted first differences for the most influential explanatory variables for the 
lowest quintile of health satisfaction (top left), median quintile (top right), and highest quintile 
(bottom). The first differences are calculated from 0 to 1 for all dichotomous covariates and as a full 
range of change (quintile 1 to quintile 5) for poverty status. Estimates are based on model 13 and in 
Table 5.11 and derived from 1,000 simulations. Education is set at medium and all other covariates 
are set at their means. 	  
Focusing now on the addition of the social proximity variables to the models, 
a quick glance at the results reveals several obvious changes. First, the larger set of 
covariates significantly increased the explanatory power of both the health and 
education models. Second, the addition of social proximity factors did not change 
the coefficients on the socio-demographic variables. This suggests that the 
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additional predictors help explain variation unaccounted for by socio-demographic 
characteristics. Third, the effects of several social proximity factors are statistically 
significant.  
Table 5.12: Relationship between Social Proximity Variables                      
and Education Satisfaction 
Model 14  Quintile of Satisfaction with Education Services satedu_pc1_qt 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Exp (β) Robust SE  Exp (β) SE  Exp (β) SE  Exp (β) SE 
Public school pct.  0.601** 0.127          
Poverty (flow)  0.986 0.084  1.190** 0.088  1.344** 0.127  1.494*** 0.143 
Poverty (assets)  1.087 0.074          
Female resp.  0.682* 0.143          
Female HH  0.837 0.189          
Kibera  0.878 0.184          
Community inv.  0.963 0.061          
Political activism  0.980 0.075  0.941 0.060  0.899 0.059  0.717*** 0.068 
Bonding (rel)  1.098 0.070          
Co-ethnic trust  1.20*** 0.085          
Bridging trust  0.965 0.071          
Constant  7.500*** 5.408  1.624 1.152  0.494 0.338  0.175** 0.128 
Wald Χ2  69.24***           
Observations  470           
Age, ethnicity, and education controls included but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
Political activism is significant in both models, and increased activism is 
associated with a decrease in satisfaction. For health, the negative effect operates 
consistently and significantly at all values of the dependent variable. The predicted 
probabilities displayed in Table 5.13 illustrate how changes in quintile of political 
activism affect the probability of being among the most and least satisfied quintile 
for health services, disaggregated by provider type. When education is set at 
medium and all other covariates are set at their means, the likelihood of being in 
the lowest quintile of satisfaction at the lowest level of political activism is 0.26 for 
public providers and 0.11 for NSPs. At the highest level of political activism, the 
equivalent probabilities are 0.38 and 0.19; the change in probability over the full 
range of political activism is 0.12 for state services and 0.08 for non-state. The 
changes are smaller in magnitude at the highest quintile of satisfaction, but higher 
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political activism still significantly reduces the likelihood of being among the most 
satisfied with health services. 
For education, the political activism factor violated the proportional odds 
assumption in the model and the negative effect is only significant at the fourth 
quintile of satisfaction. As evidenced by the predicted probabilities in Table 5.14, 
the estimated change in the probability of being in a particular quintile of 
satisfaction over a full range of change in political activism is insignificant at the 
first and fourth quintiles of satisfaction. At the fifth quintile, however, a household 
within the lowest quintile of political activism has a 0.22 chance of being among the 
most satisfied; at the highest level of activism, that probability decreases to 0.07.  
Table 5.13: Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Health Services 
 
Probability of being in 
the lowest quintile of 
satisfaction (1) 
Probability of being 
in the highest quintile 
of satisfaction (5) 
Change in 
probability 
(1-5) 
Provider Type State  Non-state State Non-state  State  Non-state  
Lowest quintile of 
interpersonal trust  0.43 0.22 0.03 0.08 -0.39
*** -0.12*** 
Highest quintile of 
interpersonal trust 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.17 -0.14
*** 0.08*** 
Change in probability -0.20*** -0.12*** 0.04*** 0.09***   
Lowest quintile of 
political activism  0.26 0.11 0.06 0.14 -0.20
*** 0.03* 
Highest quintile of 
political activism 0.38 0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.35
*** -0.11*** 
Change in probability 0.12*** 0.08*** -0.03*** -0.06***   
Education is set at medium and all other covariates are set at their means  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 	  
I ran a number of additional specifications of these models (not shown) to 
assess whether the factor for political activism could be capturing the effect of an 
omitted variable. All of the institutional trust factors were insignificant with and 
without political activism in the model, as were dichotomous indicators for 
affiliation with specific political parties, interactions between level of political 
activism and party affiliation, and measures of confidence in particular government 
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leaders and institutions.45 The pairwise correlation between political activism and 
public provider is insignificant and negative, so the effect cannot be attributed to a 
higher level of utilization of government health facilities and the decrease in 
satisfaction reported by users.  
Among the other social proximity factors, all of the measures of institutional 
trust were insignificant for both health and education, as was community 
involvement.46 Interpersonal trust, however, appears much more influential. Both 
bonding trust with relatives and neighbors and bridging trust are positively and 
significantly associated with higher satisfaction with health services. For the 
predicted probabilities in Table 5.13, all three factors for interpersonal trust were 
set at the lowest and highest quintiles for the high/low estimates. The changes are 
significant for both provider types at both ends of the range of satisfaction.  
At the lowest quintile of satisfaction, the effect of interpersonal trust is 
strongest for public health services. An average household with low interpersonal 
trust that seeks care at government operated facilities has a 43 percent chance of 
being in the lowest quintile of satisfaction, but that probability decreases to 23 
percent at a high level of interpersonal trust. The equivalent probabilities for 
average households utilizing non-state provision are 22 percent at the lowest level 
of interpersonal trust and 10 percent at the highest. The effect of changes in 
interpersonal trust on satisfaction is not as large at the highest quintile of 
satisfaction, though it remains significant. Among households utilizing public 
health services, the probability of being among the most satisfied is 0.07 for those in 
the highest quintile of interpersonal trust and 0.03 for those in the lowest quintile; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In all specifications, the z statistics for each of the variables not shown in the current model were 
less than 1.0. The sole exception was for the indicator for affiliation with the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) political party, and even then it was 1.02. I also added addition controls to the 
models, including self-reported health status, more specific indicators for education of the household 
head, and villages within the settlements. None were significant except for villages, but the addition 
of villages did not change the magnitude or significance of the coefficient on political activism. 
46 The institutional trust variables are excluded from the reported specifications due to their lack of 
significance and because doing so had no effect on the magnitude or significance of the coefficients 
for the other covariates. 
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for non-state provision the positive effect increases slightly to 0.17 for the highest 
quintile of trust and 0.08 for the lowest quintile.  
Table 5.14: Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction                                      
with Education Services 
Probability by quintile of satisfaction with education services 
 Lowest quintile  (1) 
 
 (4) 
 Highest quintile 
(5) 
Lowest quintile of 
bonding trust  0.26 0.18 0.09 
Highest quintile of 
bonding trust 0.11 0.30 0.22 
Change in probability -0.15*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
Lowest quintile of 
political activism  0.17 0.20 0.22 
Highest quintile of 
political activism 0.18 0.25 0.07 
Change in probability 0.01 0.05 -0.15*** 
Education is set at medium and all other covariates are set at their means.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 	  
In the education models, both measures of bonding trust (close relations and 
co-ethnic) were positively correlated with satisfaction, but the relationship is only 
significant for co-ethnic trust. The predicted probabilities in Table 5.14 indicate that 
the magnitude of the estimated change in satisfaction associated with a full range of 
change in bonding trust is similar at the first, fourth, and fifth quintiles of 
satisfaction. For the average household, a high level of bonding trust reduces the 
likelihood of being among the least satisfied to 11 percent from 26 percent at the 
lowest level of bonding trust. High bonding trust increases the probability of being 
in the fourth and fifth quintiles of satisfaction by 0.12 and 0.13, respectively. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to examine the effects of household-level social 
proximity factors on three dimensions of the micro-experience of health and 
education provision: utilization, perceptions of accessibility, and satisfaction. I 
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outlined three potential mechanisms by which social proximity factors could 
conceivably facilitate improvements in the micro-experience of services, though the 
data can be used only to test relationships between the factors and outcomes of 
interest and not the mechanisms themselves. I argue that the effects of social 
proximity are highly dependent on context, but I expected to find some consistent 
patterns within the geographically constrained sample. In reality there was little 
consistency, but a brief review of the results from all three sections reveals several 
interesting findings.  
First, community involvement—membership and activity in community 
organizations and groups, participation in community meetings, and contact with 
community leaders to address a problem—reduces the likelihood that members of a 
household are unable to receive medical treatment when needed and that age 
eligible members are not enrolled in school. It is the strongest and most significant 
predictor for non-enrollment and second only to lived poverty status for health 
service utilization. Additionally, in an ordered logit regression on the affordability of 
the fees at the most frequently visited health provider (not shown in earlier 
sections, but the results are provided in Appendix F), a high level of community 
involvement had a very strong positive effect on affordability. The estimated 
coefficient on community involvement was larger in both magnitude and 
significance than the coefficient on poverty status. 
Strong community ties appear to facilitate utilization; however, community 
involvement had either a slightly negative or an insignificant effect on perceptions 
of accessibility, satisfaction, and perceptions of affordability. This suggests that, 
just as community involvement is a structural component of social proximity rather 
than a cognitive one, it plays more of a functional role in accessing services. 
Community involvement does not affect perceptions of access or affordability, and it 
does not affect satisfaction once individuals get in the door. Instead, households 
may rely on community connections to gain access to services, obtain financial 
resources in urgent situations, and/or receive information that helps them decide 
when services are necessary and where to go to receive them. The ability to draw on 
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these resources may not affect households’ perceptions, but their utility is evident in 
the context of tangible access-related outcomes. 
A second finding is the unexpected association between political activism and 
at least one outcome from all dimensions of the micro-experience. Political activism 
is also a structural component of social proximity, and the nature of politics within 
the settlements sometimes means that supporters of particular politicians or parties 
are rewarded—occasionally through preferential treatment or access to services (de 
Smedt, 2009). Within the survey sample, however, higher levels of political activity 
are associated with higher probabilities that members of the household are unable 
to receive medical treatment when needed, lower perceptions of non-state primary 
school accessibility, and lower satisfaction with both health and education services. 
This finding is robust to a number of alternative specifications, regardless of party 
affiliation.  
One plausible explanation for the negative effects of political activism is that 
households are more likely to become politically active in response to negative 
experiences with health and education provision. Though entirely speculative, the 
negative association between perceptions of access to non-state schools and political 
activity could indicate that households’ inability to meet their health and education 
needs through government or non-state provision provides one impetus for political 
activity. Since party affiliation does not appear to wield any influence, the 
motivation for greater involvement could be a general response to inadequate 
provision, not a desire to contribute to the efforts of one party in particular.   
The third interesting finding is that there is widespread variation in the 
direction and significance of the factors for interpersonal and institutional trust. 
Trust is a cognitive component of social proximity, and the importance of the 
measures as a whole follow the opposite pattern from community involvement. 
Interpersonal trust factors are largely insignificant for utilization and affordability 
of the fees charged by the most frequently visited provider, but certain forms are 
highly significant predictors of perceptions of accessibility and satisfaction with 
services. Higher levels of bridging trust are associated with higher perceptions of 
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the accessibility of both health and education services provided by non-state actors, 
as well as increased satisfaction with health services.  
Bridging trust has either no effect or a negative effect on perceptions of public 
service accessibility, and no effect on satisfaction with education. The coefficients on 
both forms of bonding trust vary in direction, magnitude, and significance across 
the models. The effects are strong and too large in some models to dismiss 
interpersonal trust as an irrelevant explanatory factor, but it is clear that patterns 
and the ways in which various forms of trust affect the micro-experience of service 
provision are complex. One could speculate as to why co-ethnic trust may be 
beneficial in one area and detrimental in another, for example, but I expect that, to 
the extent that observed variations are truly representative of patterns among all 
residents of Kibera and Korogocho, explanations depend on contextual factors and 
must be explored further.  
Pairwise correlations indicate that trust in government and trust in NGOs 
are positively and significantly correlated across the entire sample, which suggests 
that institutional trust is not an either/or phenomenon. Perceptions of service 
accessibility do reflect an either/or relationship, however, as there is a very strong 
negative pairwise correlation between government and non-state accessibility: -0.41 
for both health and education. It is impossible to explain this using solely micro-
level data, because it could be stem entirely from the landscape of providers in the 
communities. Public clinics may be located in particular areas and non-state 
providers could be more concentrated in others.  
Though some of the individual associations are intriguing, including the 
differences between the effects of structural and cognitive components of social 
proximity, a holistic look at the results is fairly inconclusive. The findings do 
tentatively support the assertion that social proximity matters, but how and why it 
matters remain unclear. Additionally, the persistent significance of the fixed effect 
for settlement of residence—even after controlling for household-level socio-
demographic and sociopolitical characteristics—suggests that households’ 
experiences also depend on community-level factors. In the next chapter I step back 
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from the focus on the micro level that has characterized the dissertation thus far 
and explore how community-level differences, both in the landscape of service 
providers operating within the communities and in collective measures of social 
proximity factors, may affect the micro-experience of service provision and explain 
observed variations among survey respondents.  
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Chapter 6 
Meso-Level Context:  
Community Sociopolitical Factors 
 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I explored the relationships between 
households’ demographic, socioeconomic, and sociopolitical characteristics and their 
perceptions and experiences regarding access to, utilization of, and satisfaction with 
state and non-state health facilities and schools. Although several patterns 
emerged, there was less consistency across the various dimensions of the micro-
experience than expected. Furthermore, the fixed effect for settlement of residence 
was large and highly significant in many of the models. Despite the similar socio-
demographic composition of Kibera and Korogocho and the shared institutional 
context as informal settlement communities within Nairobi, household-level 
analyses frequently revealed distinct differences between slums and among villages 
within each settlement that could not be attributed to household characteristics.  
Existing studies on the individual and household determinants of health-
seeking behaviors suggest that the relationships between utilization and micro-level 
predictors vary across social and geographic settings (Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; 
Bashour et al, 2008; Navaneetham & Dharmalingam, 2002). Researchers have 
documented contrasting correlations (and effects of varying magnitudes and levels 
of statistical significance) between service utilization patterns and formal education 
(e.g., Goldman & Pebley, 1994; Kabakyenga et al, 2012; Raghupathy, 1996; Sakeah 
et al, 2014), socioeconomic status (e.g., Falkingham, 2003; Glei & Goldman, 2000; 
Lepine & Le Nestour, 2012; Navaneetham & Dharmalingam, 2002; Say & Raine, 
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2007), religion (e.g., Gyima et al, 2006; Navaneetham & Dharmalingam, 2002), and 
a number of other micro-level characteristics. Many of these studies used data from 
national household surveys, and the differences are often attributed to macro-level 
institutional and policy contexts and broad cultural differences (Babalola & Fatusi, 
2009; Bashour et al, 2008). However, the persistent significance of the fixed effect 
for settlement of residence in the preceding chapters suggests that local context is 
also important. 
The aim of this chapter and the companion chapter that follows is to explore 
how and to what extent community-level factors affect the micro-experience of 
health service provision.47 I begin by defining the meso-level context and explaining 
why it is important to examine the effects of these factors on households’ 
experiences. The remainder of this chapter focuses solely on community-level 
sociopolitical factors, while Chapter 7 addresses organizational factors. After 
reviewing the mechanisms by which the aggregate nature of associational, political, 
and social networks and interactions within a community could affect household-
level perceptions of, access to, and satisfaction with health services, I describe the 
construction of community-level indices and the multilevel modeling techniques 
used in the chapter. The fourth section examines descriptive statistical findings 
from the data, and the fifth reviews models on health service utilization, 
perceptions of accessibility, affordability, and satisfaction with services. The chapter 
concludes with a review of the findings. 
What are meso-level factors and why are they important? 
In the June 2015 edition of the Kibera newspaper The Ghetto Mirror, a 
Kibera native and current staff member of an NGO founded in the community 
offered the following reflection: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The analysis that follows focuses solely on health service provision. As only 641 out of the 1054 
households interviewed had at least one child of school age, the number of observations for the 
education data is smaller and does not permit robust analyses at the village level. Additionally, I 
was able to obtain access to secondary data on all health facilities located within Kibera and 
Korogocho but similar information was unavailable for schools. 
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Most informal settlements have organically grown economic, social, political 
and communal systems that closely imitate that of the rural villages they 
come from. These systems create a unique environment that incubates 
wellness by helping people survive amidst a reality of squalor, lack of services 
and poverty. (Mutua, 2015, p. 3) 
The statement was part of an essay explaining why nearly all of the apartments 
constructed for Kibera residents as part of an upgrading program led by UN-
Habitat and the Government of Kenya are now occupied by people from outside the 
slum. Mutua (2015) noted that these economic, social, political, and communal 
systems form a tightly woven “social fabric” where “life is based on social capital, 
bartering, and community support” (p. 3). Project beneficiaries quickly discovered 
that moving a short distance into the new apartments separated them from these 
systems on which their survival depends; they gave up their dwellings and returned 
to Kibera.  
The systems that Mutua describes operate at the meso level. Many attempts 
to improve conditions in informal settlements and other low-income communities 
are designed and implemented around micro-level (household or individual) and 
macro-level (institutional context, regional and national government policies, etc.) 
considerations, and the failure to take meso-level factors into account has led to 
unsustainable projects, “band-aid” solutions that either do not address the 
underlying problem or ignore its multiple dimensions, and inequitable distributions 
of benefits that perpetuate vulnerability and exacerbate inequality (Abdenur, 2009; 
Botes & van Rensberg, 2000; Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006; Kellet & Garnham, 
1995).  
The meso-level conditions, which I refer to as the community and 
organizational environments, include social, political, and cultural characteristics of 
the community and characteristics of the service providers—individually and as a 
holistic landscape of provision—operating within the community. On a theoretical 
level, the importance of context to health service provision and outcomes is widely 
acknowledged in existing literature on health and health service provision. 
Researchers study the individual- and household-level factors associated with 
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demand for and access to services. Others study service delivery and individual 
providers to identify sources of inefficiency, appropriate models of care, strategies 
for improving access and coverage, and other supply side variables. Epidemiologists 
and public health scholars investigate community-level characteristics in the 
context of health, though the majority of this research focuses on neighborhood 
effects and the social determinants of health. What is noticeably absent, however, is 
confluence of these contexts: the point at which the individual, community, and 
service provision contexts mutually and interactively shape the micro-experience of 
service provision.  
Despite this gap in knowledge, community-level structures and processes 
have been introduced into practice as a critical component of development strategies 
(Chambers, 2005). After limited success with sweeping global campaigns like the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative was attributed to the “disjuncture between theory and 
everyday practice” (Berry, 2010, p. 163) and “context-specific individual factors 
[and] interactions between individual level and health service-related factors” (Say 
& Raine, 2007, p. 816), there has been a shift toward community-driven 
development. Kenya’s second National Health Sector Strategic Plan seeks to 
purposefully utilize the relationship between communities and providers to improve 
service delivery:    
The overall thrust…is to involve the communities in addressing the 
downward spiral of deteriorating health status. The goal of reducing health 
inequities can only be achieved effectively by involving the population in 
decisions and in the mobilization and allocation of resources, and thereby 
promoting community ownership and control in the context in which they live 
their lives. This is a paradigm shift that requires a fundamental change in 
the way things are governed and managed, as well as in the way services are 
delivered. (Republic of Kenya, 2006, p. 4)  
 
The risk of devolving responsibility and control to the community level, however, is 
that meso- and micro-level contexts vary widely and wield a great deal of influence 
over the micro-experience of service provision. Harnessing the power of households 
and communities to promote equitable, inclusive, and sustainable health service 
delivery requires more information about how community- and organizational-level 
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factors shape both the service environment and the micro-experience of accessing 
services than is currently available in existing theoretical and empirical literature.  
Meso Level Sociopolitical Factors 
From a meso-level perspective, the key actors involved in health service 
provision within a community are the providers and the members of the community 
who depend on those providers for health services. Ignoring for now the individual 
and household levels and the diversity of providers, I consider the community as a 
collective entity and all of the providers operating within the community as the 
health system. The availability of accessible, quality healthcare depends on the 
characteristics of the health system, and the community’s ability to ensure that the 
system meets their needs depends on their power to hold the health system 
accountable. As Rifkin (2003) notes in a discussion of community empowerment and 
health equity, “accountability is only possible when those affected by decisions have 
ways to ensure that their needs and concerns are dealt with fairly” (p. 176). When 
you disaggregate the community and health system into their constituent 
individuals, groups, and providers and consider their competing interests, the 
complexity of the fragmented landscape of providers, and the information 
asymmetries inherent in health provision, ensuring accountability becomes much 
more complicated. Theories and evidence from existing literature suggests that it is 
here, at the interface between the community and the health system, that 
community-level sociopolitical factors can play a role in shaping residents’ 
experiences with health provision. 
According to Putnam (1993, 2000), social capital—understood as the 
aggregate of trust relationships, non-hierarchical associative networks, and norms 
of reciprocity that exist in society—bridges hierarchical relations and permits the 
development of a civic-oriented culture shared by all groups. Associative contacts 
and trust reduce opportunistic behavior and promote collective action that can 
improve the accountability and performance of government and non-government 
organizations (Putnam, 2000). Some scholars argue that social capital is only 
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possessed at the aggregate level; individuals’ social capital is derived from their 
membership in groups and networks, so it is the presence of the groups and 
networks and their activities that facilitate whatever advantages or disadvantages 
are attributed to social capital (Sretzer & Woolcock, 2004). According to this view, 
members of a community likely experience the same effects regardless of their level 
of participation and connections. 
Narayan and Pritchett’s study of the relationship between social capital and 
household incomes in rural Tanzania lends support to this assertion. Their analysis 
revealed a large, positive effect of a village’s level of social capital on the incomes of 
all households in the village, while household level measures of social capital had no 
effect (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Existing research in epidemiology and public 
health also suggests that social capital, conceptualized as a collective attribute and 
measured at the community level, may wield influence over health behavior and 
outcomes (Hendryx et al, 2002; Islam et al, 2006; Kim et al, 2006; Mozumder & 
Marathe, 2007; Steinberg & Baxter, 1998). 
Potential Mechanisms 
If community-level sociopolitical factors have any effect on the micro-
experience of health provision, they could do so by enhancing the micro-level 
mechanisms outlined in Chapter 5 and/or through additional mechanisms that 
operate only on the community level. For the former, it is not difficult to envision 
how increases in a community’s level of associational activity, political connections, 
and interpersonal trust may amplify and strengthen the transmission of knowledge 
and information, material assistance, and direct facilitation of access to services 
households derive from their social proximity. As the breadth and depth of networks 
and associational activity, the frequency of interactions, and the strength of 
connections inside and outside of the community increase, households have more 
opportunities to obtain information and assistance to help them access quality 
health services.  
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If the enhancement of micro-level mechanisms is the primary way that 
community-level sociopolitical factors affect the micro-experience of health 
provision, then the benefits should only accrue to households with higher measures 
of social proximity. There should be no effect on households who do not participate 
in groups, form networks, or trust other members of the community. Several studies 
do suggest, however, that community-level factors have an independent effect on 
household-level outcomes (see, for example, Helliwell & Putnam, 2004; Kawachi et 
al, 1999; Kim & Kawachi, 2006; Lochner et al, 2003; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; 
Wen et al, 2003; Wilkinson, 1996). The community-level effect is quite modest in 
several of these studies, and it is difficult to disentangle the effects of individual- 
and community-level factors. Other scholars have either found no community-level 
effects (e.g., Kennelly et al, 2003; Mohan et al, 2005; Veenstra, 2005) or conflicting 
or inconsistent effects (e.g., Franzini & Spears, 2003; Kelleher et al, 2002; Lynch et 
al, 2001; Milyo & Mellor, 2003).  
Despite the mixed results, the public health and social capital literatures 
offer insight into how community-level sociopolitical factors may affect the micro-
experience of health provision. Most existing research focuses on the role of social 
capital in creating and supporting mechanisms by which individuals and 
communities can hold providers accountable. Hendryx, Ahern, Lovrich, and 
McCurdy (2002) examined the relationship between self-reported access to health 
care and community social capital in 22 major cities in the United States and 
documented a consistent positive association. Individuals living in communities 
with higher levels of social capital reported significantly fewer problems accessing 
care. Although the study was not designed to test causality, the authors theorize 
that improvements in access result from accountability mechanisms facilitated by 
community social capital (Hendryx et al, 2002). Similar quantitative studies have 
documented a statistically significant association between community social capital 
and various health outcomes and cited accountability as a potential mechanism; 
however, they do not offer a detailed account of how higher levels of community 
social capital strengthen accountability and how enhanced accountability affects 
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experiences and outcomes at the household level (e.g., Kawachi et al, 1999; Kim & 
Kawachi, 2006; Wen et al, 2003; Wilkinson, 1996). Additionally, much of this 
research has focused on the United States and Western Europe. The structure of 
the health system is different across much of the globe, and many of the 
institutionalized channels for residents to hold service providers accountable are 
unavailable elsewhere.     
In the development context, Berlan & Shiffman (2012) outline several 
mechanisms for holding health service providers accountable and highlight the 
structural and social components of the mechanisms. Structural factors include 
regulatory oversight, financing channels, and the nature of competition between 
providers. In the context of slum communities in Nairobi, these structural factors 
are difficult to strengthen. The government does not have the capacity to enforce 
existing regulations, so changes in the regulatory environment are unlikely in the 
near future (Muriithi, 2013). Furthermore, in low-income and developing areas the 
structural factors often involve accountability to entities other than consumers—
most commonly governments and donors (Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 
2004; Hanson et al, 2008). The majority of slum households have little effect on 
revenue at the facilities they frequent, and providers’ decisions and the policies 
governing their operation are often shaped by the priorities and metrics of donor 
organizations and governments.48 These priorities do not necessarily align with the 
preferences and needs of residents, but the community’s power to induce change is 
limited. Residents with the resources to pay for higher quality care at clinics outside 
the settlements generally do so, leaving the lower-income residents to rely on 
subsidized government care, NGO and CBO clinics with no fees or sliding scales, or 
affordable chemists with little to no formal training (Adésínà, 2009; MacLean, 
2011). Consumer accountability is generally more influential as fees increase, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The low-cost private, for-profit health providers (largely chemists and practitioners lacking formal 
training and credentials) operating within informal settlements are an obvious exception to this, as 
neither the government nor donors are involved in their funding and oversight. As studies cited in 
previous chapters highlight, however, consumer accountability in the case of these providers has 
frequent negative consequences for individual and community health.  
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existing research highlights the trade-off between access and accountability (Berlan 
& Shiffman, 2012). The positive effects accrue only to the relatively high-income 
households.  
The second category of mechanisms identified by Berlan and Shiffman (2012) 
involve social factors, including consumer power and provider norms, both of which 
depend on citizens’ relationships with providers and their ability to hold providers 
accountable. According to the authors, empowering consumers and establishing 
provider norms that foster respect and responsiveness are more likely when there 
are official community participation mechanisms in the decentralization of health 
services, when consumers have widespread access to quality health information, 
and when community groups bring residents together to take action in support of 
service improvements (Berlan & Shiffman, 2012, p. 271). This is where community 
social capital could play an important role: community groups and social networks 
can assist with the transmission of information and facilitate collective action to 
exert influence on providers (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; Ogilvie, 2004; Steinberg & 
Baxter, 1998). Changes in a community’s health system driven by collective action 
could affect households’ micro-experience of services even if the individual 
household is not involved in the process. Findings from several studies illustrate 
how community collective action and information transmission have influenced 
service provision and health outcomes (Bhandari et al, 2003; Berlan & Shiffman, 
2012; Desmet et al, 1999; Opiyo et al, 2007; Pandey et al, 2007). Mozumbder and 
Marathe’s (2007) analysis of data from 70 countries, for example, showed that 
increases in the extent and strength of information and communication networks 
within a community are associated with a reduction in the probability of deaths of 
residents clinically identified as infected with malaria.  
While we can acknowledge that community-level conditions and actions may 
influence providers, general prescriptions for “collective action” and “participation” 
gloss over the complex sociopolitical realities involved in these processes (Mansuri 
& Rao, 2004). Collective action and participation may facilitate changes in the 
health system or particular providers, but whether the changes benefit all—or even 
	   191 
a majority of—households within the community depends on the social, economic, 
and political context, the nature of the participatory mechanisms and the actors 
involved, and the characteristics of the health providers in the community.  
Steinberg and Baxter (1998) began to consider the nature of change and the 
distribution of benefits in their examination of the relationship between community 
norms and values and health system change using qualitative case studies from 
twelve health markets in the United States. They observed situations in which 
communities were holding institutions accountable for health care costs, quality, 
and access and instances in which a lack of accountability was accompanied by 
escalating costs, deteriorating quality, and restricted accessibility. Defining 
community accountability as “the structures and processes communities use to 
make health system change consistent with local standards of behavior, shared 
values, or common goals” (Steinberg & Baxter, 1998, p. 149), they identify 
conditions under which shared values and goals exist and describe factors that both 
contribute to and detract from those structures and processes.  
Among community-level sociopolitical factors, Steinberg and Baxter (1998) 
found that less accountability and a weakened sense of collective efficacy are more 
likely when the community’s population is fluid, either through rapid population 
growth or frequent immigration and outmigration, and when ethnic or cultural 
divisions are socially, economically, and/or politically salient. Following Easterly 
and Levine’s (1997) paper attributing “Africa’s growth tragedy” to the under-
provision of public goods caused by ethnic fragmentation, a number of empirical 
studies have concluded that government failure associated with collective provision 
is more widespread in heterogeneous societies than their more homogenous 
counterparts. The incentive for public provision is the realization of economies of 
scale; in situations where fragments of society have different preferences, uniform 
provision becomes inefficient and the optimal level of public goods decreases 
(Alesina & Spolaore, 1997). Though most of the public goods literature examines 
state-based welfare provision (e.g., Alesina et al, 1999; Cutler et al, 1993; Easterly 
& Levine, 1997; McCarty, 1993; Miller, 1995), the mechanisms identified may 
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operate in ways that shape the landscape of non-state provision within the 
community. If groups do have different preferences for health services, different 
NSPs may provide services for different groups. If this is the case, such 
fragmentation limits the potential for community accountability and the realization 
of shared goals. Recent research on health programs in slum communities also 
suggests that geographically targeted programs may not distribute program 
resources effectively in heterogeneous urban slums (Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005).  
Empirical Strategy 
Community-Level Sociopolitical Variables  
I created community-level sociopolitical variables by aggregating responses 
from the household survey. The technique of constructing indicators of community-
level or contextual social characteristics by summarizing specific characteristics of 
individuals or households within the meso-level unit of analysis has been employed 
in many multilevel studies and is considered a “derived variable” (Islam et al, 2006). 
The village-level variables used in this chapter measure associational activity 
through group membership, bridging and bonding trust, political involvement and 
activism, ethnic fragmentation, and a social capital index generated by summing all 
social proximity variables. Each concept is represented by a standardized 
continuous score for each village and a discrete indicator of the village’s score in 
comparison with other villages in the sample (e.g., high, medium, and low). Detailed 
descriptions of each variable are provided in Table 6.1 and descriptive statistics are 
presented in the next section. 
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Table 6.1: Community-Level Sociopolitical Variables 
Variable Description 
zGroupV Continuous aggregate measure of associational activity in the village. Calculated by 
summing all of the group membership variables (which capture, group membership, level 
of activity, and leadership roles and frequency of attendance at community meetings) for 
each household across all households in the village and dividing by the number of 
households. The scores for each village were standardized with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1.  
GroupV Discrete variable indicating a village’s level of group membership and activity relative to 
other villages in the sample. 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
zBridgingV Continuous aggregate measure of bridging trust in the village. Calculated by summing 
the indicators of bridging trust for each household (includes trust in other communities, 
acquaintances with whom they do not have a relationship, and willingness to seek 
assistance from individuals and organizations they do not know well or belong to) across 
all households in the village and dividing by the number of households. The scores for 
each village were standardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
BridgingV Discrete variable indicating a village’s level of bridging trust relative to other villages in 
the sample. 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
zBondingV Continuous aggregate measure of bonding trust in the village. Calculated by summing the 
indicators of bonding trust for each household (includes trust in relatives, close neighbors, 
and co-ethnics) across all households in the village and dividing by the number of 
households. The scores for each village were standardized with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. 
BondingV Discrete variable indicating a village’s level of bonding trust relative to other villages in 
the sample. 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
zPCAV Continuous aggregate measure of political involvement, contact with leaders, and 
activism in the village. These were combined due to high correlation between the 
components. Calculated by summing the indicators of political involvement (includes 
voting, working for a campaign, attending a rally, contact with political party officials, 
and identification with a particular political party), contact (frequency with which 
members of household contact elected representatives, community and religious leaders, 
NGO and CBO staff, and traditional authorities), and activism (participation in issue 
groups formed to address a problem/concern, demonstrations, rallies, use of force for a 
cause, refusal to pay a tax for a cause) for each household across all households in the 
village and dividing by the number of households. The scores for each village were 
standardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
PCAV Discrete variable indicating a village’s level of political involvement/contact/activism 
relative to other villages in the sample. 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
SCV Discrete variable indicating a village’s level of social proximity relative to other villages in 
the sample. Calculated by summing all of the standardized scores for group membership, 
bridging trust, bonding trust, and political/contact/activism for each village and dividing 
the villages according to total score. 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
ELF Continuous measure of ethnic fragmentation for each village. Calculated using the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the form  where pi is the fraction of the population 
belonging to tribe i.  
 
1− pi2
i=1
n
∑
	   194 
Models 
In order to examine the extent to which household- and community-level 
factors affect various dimensions of the micro-experience of health provision, I 
employed multilevel mixed effects logistic and ordered logistic regression models. 
Multilevel regression analysis is regularly used in public health studies, as it 
enables researchers to include both individual and contextual factors and to 
determine how much of the variation in individual-level outcomes can be attributed 
to individual versus contextual characteristics (Islam et al, 2006; Kim & Kawachi, 
2006). For this study, multilevel models allowed me to assess the degree to which 
community sociopolitical factors influence households’ health service utilization, 
perceived accessibility, and satisfaction, either separately or in interaction with 
household characteristics.  
In previous chapters, I used fixed effects to control for the settlement of 
residence. The coefficient on the fixed effect parameter estimated the extent to 
which variation in outcomes not explained by the household-level covariates may be 
attributed to location-specific factors. With the addition of village-level covariates, 
however, ignoring the nested structure and assuming that all observations are 
independent could lead to biased coefficient estimates and deflated standard errors 
(Hedeker & Gibbons, 1994; Larsen & Merlo, 2005; Subramanian, 2004). Mixed 
effects models improve estimation by accounting for correlations within clusters. 
They include fixed effects intended to describe variation in the full sample, while 
the random effects allow for varying intercepts and slopes across subgroups 
(Hamilton, 2013). The use of random effects provides an opportunity to examine 
how outcomes are distributed within and between settlements and villages (Islam 
et al, 2006). The random intercepts represent the combined effect of all omitted 
cluster-specific covariates that cause a change in the dependent variable, allowing 
us to model unobserved heterogeneity (Santos et al, 2008; Skrondal & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004). 
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In most cases, levels of the models included settlement, village, and 
ethnicity.49 For each dependent variable, I generally tested three successive models: 
independent variables for the first were limited to the household level, the second 
included village-level sociopolitical variables, and the third added interactions 
between household and community sociopolitical factors. Versions with interactions 
are only reported when the interaction is significant. Household-level social 
proximity factors capture community involvement, political activism, bonding trust, 
and bridging trust. I separated each continuous factor into three quantiles—low, 
medium, and high—and generated dichotomous indicators for medium and high 
levels. Low levels became the reference category in the models. I included controls 
for socioeconomic status, age and education of household head, and gender of 
respondent and household head. I also ran separate regressions for each settlement 
and included the results when the findings suggested patterns not identified in the 
full sample results. Settlement-specific multilevel mixed effects models included 
random effects at the village and ethnicity levels, and I used standardized scores for 
village-level covariates rather than the quantile indicators employed in full sample 
regressions.      
There is some correlation among the community-level sociopolitical variables, 
particularly given the small number of villages and the use of indicators for high, 
medium, and low levels rather than raw scores to facilitate substantive 
interpretation of regression results. Including all measures in the models leads to 
biased coefficient estimates due to multicollinearity, and using the overall measure 
of village-level social capital calculated by adding all of the factors together obscures 
variation in the effects of different sociopolitical factors. After running each model 
with various combinations, I chose which village-level measures to include in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For models in which the dependent variable related to a specific health facility (e.g., satisfaction 
with services and affordability of fees at most frequently visited provider), a random effect was 
included for health facility.  
	   196 
results presented in the chapter based on existing theory and the explanatory power 
of the models.50  
In the sections that follow, I examine the relationship between community-
level sociopolitical factors and four dimensions of the micro-experience of health 
provision: utilization, perceived accessibility, affordability, and satisfaction with 
services. Utilization is measured by binary variables indicating whether one or 
more members of the household were unable to access health services last time 
treatment was needed (no_care) and whether one or more members of the household 
have received treatment from a public health provider (any_gov_health) and a non-
state provider (any_ngo_health) over the past year.  
In the second and third sections, the dependent variables are perceptions of 
accessibility and affordability of state and non-state health services, all of which are 
measured on ordinal scales. Respondents were asked: “How easy or difficult is it to 
obtain treatment at a public/non-state clinic or hospital?” and chose between very 
difficult, difficult, easy, and very easy. For affordability, respondents were asked 
how often they encountered unaffordable fees for services at public/non-state health 
facilities and chose between never, once or twice, a few times, and often. 
Affordability is also examined in the context of the health facility most frequently 
visited by members of the household. Respondents were asked whether service fees 
are not affordable, somewhat affordable, or affordable, and the outcome is reported 
as an ordinal variable.  
In the final section, two dependent variables capture different aspects of 
satisfaction with health services. The first measures the household’s satisfaction 
with the technical and functional quality and the facilities at the service provider 
most frequently visited by members of the household. Factor scores were separated 
into quintiles and the ordinal dependent variable indicates the household’s quintile 
of satisfaction. For the second ordinal measure, respondents were read the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 If a particular village-level sociopolitical factor was expected to have a certain effect based on 
existing literatures and/or my hypotheses, it is included in at least one specification of the model 
regardless of the statistical significance of the findings.  
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statement, “I am satisfied with the quality of the medical care available to members 
of my household,” and chose between strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and 
strongly agree. Descriptions of all dependent variables and controls from the 
chapter are provided in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Dependent and Independent Variables Used in the Models 
Variable 
(Stata name) 
Description 
Dependent Variables 
No health care access 
(no_care) 
Indicates whether the respondent or a member of the household was 
able to access health care services the last time he or she needed care. 
0 = able to access care last time it was needed; 1 = unable to access care 
last time it was needed. 
Government health 
service accessibility 
(GovHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of public health services 
measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it to obtain medical 
treatment at a public clinic or hospital?” 1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 
= easy; 4 = very easy. 
Non-state health service 
accessibility 
(NGOHealthAccess) 
Ordinal indicator of perceived accessibility of health services provided 
by non-state actors. Measured by response to “How easy or difficult is it 
to obtain medical treatment from non-government providers?” 1 = very 
difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = easy; 4 = very easy. 
Experience with 
government providers 
(any_gov_health) 
Indicates whether any member of the household has sought treatment 
at a public health facility in the past year. 0 = no experience with 
government providers; 1 = a member of the household has visited at 
least one government provider. 
Experience with non-
government providers 
(any_ngo_health) 
Indicates whether any member of the household has sought treatment 
at a non-state health facility in the past year. 0 = no experience with 
non-state providers; 1 = a member of the household has visited at least 
one non-state provider. 
Affordability of fees 
(fees) 
Indicates the affordability of service fees at the health provider most 
frequently visited by members of the household. 1 = not affordable; 2 = 
somewhat affordable; 3 = affordable. 
Affordability of public 
health 
(gov_health_cost) 
Indicates frequency of encountering fees for services that are too 
expensive at public health facilities over the past five years. 1 = never; 2 
= once or twice; 3 = a few times; 4 = often. 
Affordability of non-
state health 
(ngo_health_cost) 
Indicates frequency of encountering fees for services that are too 
expensive at non-state health facilities over the past five years. 1 = 
never; 2 = once or twice; 3 = a few times; 4 = often. 
Satisfaction with health 
services 
(healthsat_pc_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring satisfaction with health 
services. If members of household visited more than one provider, 
responses relate to experiences with most frequently visited provider. 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the least satisfied to 5 = household 
among the most satisfied quintile. For additional details see Appendix A 
in Chapter 3. 
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Health quality  
(health_qual_sat) 
Ordinal variable indicating the degree to which respondents agree with 
the following statement: “I am satisfied with the quality of the medical 
care available to members of my household.” 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = 
disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = strongly agree. 
Independent Variables  
Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of daily 
experiences (income, frequency of going without food, water, etc.). 
Ranges from 1 = household is among the most impoverished quintile to 
5 = household among the least impoverished quintile. For additional 
details see Appendix A in Chapter 3. 
Poverty (stock) 
(poverty_f2_qt) 
Quintiles of a factor variable measuring lived poverty in terms of assets 
(ownership of radio, bicycle, electricity, etc.). Ranges from 1 = household 
is among the most impoverished quintile to 5 = household among the 
least impoverished quintile. For additional details see Appendix A in 
Chapter 3. 
Age of household head 
(Age_hh) 
Age of household head (measured in years). 
Age squared 
(Age_hh2) 
Square of the age of the household head (in years). Controls for the 
curvilinear relationship between age and interaction with/need for 
health care services. 
Female  
(Female) 
Indicates the sex of the respondent and whether the household head is 
female. 0 = male respondent and household head; 1 = female respondent 
and male household head; 2 = female household head 
Low education 
(low_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or some primary school; 1 = completed primary school 
or higher. 
Medium education 
(med_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education or only some primary school or completed secondary 
education or more; 1 = completely primary school up to some secondary 
education (but did not complete secondary education). Used as the 
control so it does not appear in the models. 
High education 
(high_ed) 
Indicates the level of education attained by the household head. 0 = no 
formal education through some secondary education; 1 = completed 
secondary education or beyond. 
Ethnicity 
(ethnicity_fewest) 
Categorical variable for ethnicity of respondent. 1 = Kamba; 2 = Kikuyu; 
3 = Kisii; 4 = Luyha; 5 = Luo; 6 = other ethnicity. 
Public health 
(health_public) 
Indicates the operational entity of the most frequently visited health 
provider. 0 = not operated by the government; 1 = operated by the 
government. 
Health status 
(health_status_qt) 
Quintiles of a continuous variable capturing the number of days 
members of the household are unable to participate in their regular 
activities due to poor health in an average month.  
Household bonding 
trust 
(bonding) 
Sum of two bonding factors. Factor 1 (factor loadings in parentheses): 
trust in family (0.88); trust in neighbors (0.47); trust in members of your 
own ethnic group/tribe (-0.09). Factor 2: trust in family (-0.69); trust in 
neighbors (-0.03); trust in members of your own ethnic group/tribe 
(0.73). 
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Household bridging 
trust 
(bridging) 
Factor variable indicating trust in acquaintances (0.71); trust in 
members of other ethnic groups/tribes (0.71). 
Household community 
involvement 
(comm_pc) 
Sum of the 3 household-level community involvement factors. Factor 1: 
Membership and level of involvement in religious group that meets 
outside of worship (0.46); membership and level of involvement in 
savings group or merry-go-round (0.61); membership and involvement in 
a women’s group (0.63). Factor 2: Frequency of contact with a staff 
member of an NGO or CBO (0.65); frequency of contact with a 
traditional leader, religious leader, or other community leader (0.70). 
Factor 3: Frequency of attending any community meeting (0.71); 
frequency of getting together with others to raise an issue (0.67). 
Household political 
activism 
(political_pc) 
Factor variable measuring: frequency of contacting a political party 
official (0.47); campaign meeting or rally attendance (0.49); tried to 
persuade others to vote for a particular candidate or party (0.53); 
worked for a candidate or party during the last election (0.52). 	  
Descriptive Statistics 
Before examining any regression results, I briefly review community-level 
descriptive statistics to provide context for the analyses that follow. Table 6.3 
displays the mean values for several socio-demographic characteristics by slum and 
village. Across the board, the average household in Korogocho is poorer, less 
educated, and more likely to be headed by a female than the average household in 
Kibera. Though the difference in average household income between Kibera and 
Korogocho is relatively small, the histograms in Figure 6.1 illustrate the noticeable 
difference in income distribution. By village and settlement, the distribution is more 
skewed toward the lower income categories in Korogocho. 
Table 6.3: Socio-Demographic Statistics by Slum and Village 
 Poverty 
(Flow) 
Poverty 
(Assets) 
Low 
Education 
High 
Education 
% 
Female 
HH 
Age of 
Household 
Head 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE  Mean SE 
Kibera 3.44 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.45 0.02 18% 37.1 0.52 
  Kianda 3.49 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.45 0.04 18% 37.1 1.08 
  Kisumu Ndogo 3.52 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.45 0.05 17% 37.7 1.48 
  Laini Saba 3.45 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.45 0.03 17% 36.6 0.74 
  Raila 3.20 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.43 0.06 18% 37.9 1.32 
Korogocho 3.17 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.25 0.02 29% 36.1 0.51 
  Highridge 3.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.20 0.03 33% 36.6 0.78 
  Kisumu Ndogo 3.07 0.08 0.16 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.25 0.03 30% 35.7 0.88 
  Korogocho B 3.39 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.34 0.04 0.34 0.04 21% 35.6 1.05 
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Figure 6.1 The distribution of household monthly income by slum (left) and village (right). 
 
The factor scores for community-level sociopolitical factors are listed in Table 
6.4, and several patterns are worth highlighting. First, although ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) is not included in any of the models in the chapter, the 
correlation between fractionalization and other factors is interesting. Aggregate 
measures of group membership are higher when a particular ethnic group forms a 
majority or near majority. Looking at ELF scores and the visual representation of 
each village’s ethnic distribution in the pie charts in Figure 6.2, it is clear that the 
villages within each settlement with the highest concentration of a single ethnic 
group have the highest levels of associational activity in the settlement. This 
pattern initially appears to confirm the argument that heterogeneity reduces 
cooperation and hinders public goods provision and community accountability (e.g., 
Alesina & Spolaore, 1997; Easterley & Levine, 1997; Montgomery & Ezeh, 2005; 
Steinberg & Baxter, 1998). As analysis in Chapter 7 reveals, however, high levels of 
village associational activity are not correlated with perceptions of accessibility or 
satisfaction with services; in fact, the village with the highest level of group 
membership (Raila) has the lowest average score for health service satisfaction. 
This lends support to Seay’s (2009) argument that, based on her study of CSOs and 
social service provision in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ethnic 
heterogeneity can lead to successful social service organization.  
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Second—and somewhat surprisingly—neither high associational activity nor 
ethnic fractionalization are correlated with interpersonal trust. The village with the 
highest group membership, Raila, has the second to lowest score for bridging trust 
and overall interpersonal trust. Similarly, Kisumu Ndogo has the highest group 
membership in Korogocho and the lowest scores for both measures of interpersonal 
trust. This trend also reflects Seay’s (2009) observation that high levels of ethnic 
homogeneity were correlated with low levels of internal organizational cohesion. 
The correlation between group membership and political activism is also tenuous; 
some villages with high associational activity are also politically active (e.g., Raila, 
Kisumu Ndogo-Korogocho relative to other villages in Korogocho), others appear to 
have very low levels of activism (e.g., Kisumu Ndogo-Kibera).      
Finally, comparing the factor scores for the various sociopolitical factors to 
the aggregate measures of social capital listed in the last column of Table 6.4 
suggests that holistic assessments of social capital obscure key variations and 
reduce the utility of the concept. Since villages are not uniformly high in all 
categories, understanding how and to what extent community-level sociopolitical 
contexts affect outcomes requires a more nuanced account of the individual 
components.  
Table 6.4: Village Level Sociopolitical Factors 
 ELF Group Membership Political PCA 
Bridging 
Trust 
Interpersonal 
Trust 
Institutional 
Trust 
Social  
Capital 
Kibera         
  Kianda 0.274 0.885 1.275 1.085 0.512 0.120 -1.614 32.871 
  Kisumu Ndogo  0.302 1.327 -0.026 1.284 1.017 0.738 1.571 35.967 
  Laini Saba 0.247 0.165 -0.486 -0.163 1.293 0.994 1.008 34.007 
  Raila 0.356 2.280 2.367 1.797 -0.979 -1.176 1.247 35.759 
Korogocho         
  Highridge 0.204 -0.857 -0.561 -0.488 -0.022 0.746 -0.457 31.950 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0.303 -0.553 0.451 0.012 -1.487 -1.550 -0.773 30.888 
  Korogocho B 0.245 -1.137 -1.385 -1.865 -0.932 -1.055 -0.074 30.096 
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Figure 6.2 The distribution of ethnic groups by village. 
Findings 
Health Service Utilization 
Ability to Access Health Services when Needed 
The results of multilevel logit models examining the effects of community-
level sociopolitical factors on whether or not members of the household were able to 
access healthcare last time treatment was needed, disaggregated by slum, are 
displayed in Table 6.5. Both models include random effects for village and ethnicity, 
and the results reveal significant contrasts.51 At the outset, the Wald chi-square 
statistics indicate that the model has far more explanatory power for Korogocho 
than for Kibera. The variance of the random intercepts for both village and 
ethnicity are larger for Kibera, signifying that the household-level covariates 
account for less of the variation in Kibera than in Korogocho. The magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient estimates for lived poverty status are similar, but the 
estimates for all other coefficients—including all those of statistical significance—
are noticeably different. The decrease in difficulty accessing care associated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ideally I would use the original multilevel model with the full sample and allow the coefficients of 
all fixed effects to vary by slum. Given the large number if independent variables, however, doing so 
is computationally challenging in Stata. Separate models are less efficient, but I acknowledge this 
from the outset and only include results when there is noticeable variation between settlements.   
Highridge Kisumu Ndogo (Koch) Korogocho B
Kianda Kisumu Ndogo (Kibera) Laini Saba
Raila Total
Kamba Kikuyu
Kisii Luhya
Luo Other
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female respondents appearing in the results from the full sample in Chapter 5 
appears to be driven by the Korogocho subsample; the magnitude and significance 
of the effect are larger in model 1, while there is no relationship between female 
respondents and utilization in model 2.  
Similarly, the coefficient estimates for community involvement vary 
dramatically between settlements. One of the main findings regarding utilization 
from Chapter 5 was the association between community involvement and the ability 
to access health services when needed. Results appearing in Table 6.5 suggest, 
however, that the association is strong and significant in Korogocho and non-
existent in Kibera. Coefficient estimates did not change when village-level 
associational activity and bridging trust scores were added and neither of the 
village-level variables had a significant effect in either slum (results not shown).  
Table 6.5: Health Service Utilization by Slum 
 Model 1  
Korogocho 
 Model 2 
Kibera 
DV: no_care Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.588*** 0.081  0.546*** 0.084 
Poverty (assets) 1.163 0.168  1.040 0.143 
Age 0.892 0.063  0.916 0.062 
Age2 1.001 0.001  1.001 0.001 
Female respondent 0.408** 0.176  1.002 0.389 
Female HH 0.778 0.311  0.412 0.238 
Low education 1.966* 0.723  0.750 0.430 
High education 0.843 0.417  0.619 0.247 
Med political activism 0.820 0.382  2.430* 1.115 
High political activism 2.214** 0.806  1.713 0.807 
Med bridging trust 1.537 0.592  1.178 0.547 
High bridging trust 0.997 0.506  1.862 0.916 
Med bonding trust 0.372** 0.174  0.878 0.390 
High bonding trust 0.726 0.296  0.582 0.268 
Med community involvement 0.469* 0.183  2.006 0.965 
High community involvement 0.367** 0.158  1.153 0.625 
Constant 4.436 7.522  2.682 5.875 
Random Intercepts Variance SE  Variance SE 
Village  ≈0 --  0.055 0.174 
Ethnicity  0.026 0.130  0.352 0.475 
Wald χ2 44.40***   29.99**  
Observations 431   464  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Utilization of State and Non-State Health Services 
In the next set of models, utilization is indicated by interaction with state 
and non-state health providers. Though Table 6.6 only reports results from models 
with village-level sociopolitical variables, specifications with only household-level 
variables (not shown) explained little of the variation in outcomes and none of the 
coefficient estimates for social proximity factors are significant. The addition of 
aggregate measures of associational activity and bridging trust were similarly 
insignificant for utilization of public health services, but the magnitude and 
significance of all four village-level variables were large when the dependent 
variable indicated utilization of non-state health services.  
Table 6.6: Utilization of State and Non-State Health Facilities 
 Model 3 
Any Government Health 
 Model 4 
Any Non-State Health 
 Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.869*** 0.046  0.903* 0.052 
Poverty (assets) 0.887** 0.048  0.976 0.057 
Age 1.068** 0.033  1.047 0.033 
Age2 0.999 0.0004  0.999 0.0004 
Female respondent 1.515** 0.248  1.443** 0.262 
Female HH 1.485** 0.281  0.947 0.190 
Low education 1.128 0.213  0.744 0.148 
High education 1.090 0.185  0.757 0.143 
Med community involvement 1.074 0.187  0.980 0.183 
High community involvement 1.241 0.227  1.203 0.237 
Med political activism 0.854 0.150  1.134 0.219 
High political activism 0.861 0.145  0.995 0.182 
Med bonding trust 0.941 0.166  1.274 0.251 
High bonding trust 0.968 0.177  0.894 0.175 
Med bridging trust 1.217 0.204  0.938 0.171 
High bridging trust 1.282 0.261  0.941 0.210 
Village Level      
Med groupv 1.096 0.438  1.995*** 0.533 
High groupv 0.821 0.431  4.312*** 1.618 
Med bridgingv 0.889 0.383  2.188*** 0.631 
High bridgingv 0.598 0.205  1.987*** 0.445 
Constant 0.396 0.331  0.486 0.375 
Random Intercepts Variance SE  Variance SE 
Slum (N=2) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Village (N=7) 0.069 0.061  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=40) ≈0 --  0.005 0.040 
Wald χ2 41.73***   46.40***  
Observations 896   895  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The predicted probabilities displayed in Table 6.7 provide a more substantive 
interpretation of the effect. When all other covariates are set at their means, the 
probability of having sought treatment from a non-state health provider for 
households in villages with a low level of associational activity is 0.595. That 
probability increases to 0.719 for households in villages with a medium level of 
associational activity and 0.832 for households in villages with a high level. The 
changes in probability are statistically significant at all levels, and the full range of 
change means that an average household in a high level village is 24 percent more 
likely to interact with non-state providers than an otherwise identical household in 
a village with low group membership.  
Table 6.7: Predicted Probabilities from Model 4 
 Probability of having utilized  
non-state health services Change in probability 
Low village group membership 0.595 Med vs. low:  0.124*** 
Med village group membership 0.719 High vs. med:  0.113*** 
High village group membership 0.832 High vs. low:  0.237*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01                                               All other covariates are set at their means. 
 
Another notable observation from the results of model 4 is the fact that the 
community characteristics are far more influential than any of the household 
characteristics for non-state provision. Lived poverty status is barely significant 
(and the magnitude of the estimated effect is small) and the only other statistically 
significant association is the increased likelihood of utilization among female 
respondents. The insignificance of household-level variables and the strong 
significance of village-level associational activity and bridging trust suggest that 
access to health services provided by non-state actors—operationalized functionally 
rather than perceptually—is primarily a function of community-level factors. What 
the regression results cannot convey, however, is the degree to which the 
characteristics of the community create an atmosphere conducive to the broad-
based provision of health services by non-state actors. It could be that the presence 
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and activity of non-state providers (or certain types of non-state providers) 
encourage associational activity and strengthen bridging trust, or feedback effects 
may mean that the observed association can be attributed to both mechanisms.   
Perceptions of Health Service Accessibility 
The dependent variable in this section is an ordinal measure of the degree of 
difficulty or ease with which respondents are able to obtain health services from 
state and non-state providers. Unlike the indicators for utilization in the previous 
section, this is not an objective measure of access; respondents were given an 
opportunity to answer regardless of whether or not they had successfully accessed 
providers of either type. Beginning with public provision, the first specification 
depicted in Table 6.8 includes only household-level factors and the second 
introduces village-level bonding trust and political activism.52 The addition of 
village-level factors does not appreciably change the effects of household-level 
variables. The variances of the random intercepts at the slum and village level are 
small in model 5 (which includes only household-level variables) but become 
effectively zero with the addition of village-level variables in model 6, suggesting 
that the covariates for aggregate bonding trust and political activism account for 
the location-specific random effects in the previous model. Furthermore, the Wald 
chi-square statistic is 42.59 for model 6 and only 29.36 for model 5; the addition of 
village-level sociopolitical factors improves the explanatory power of the model 
considerably.  
Somewhat surprisingly, bonding trust measured at the household level likely 
increases perceived accessibility, but the estimated coefficient on the village-level 
measure of bonding trust implies that higher levels of bonding trust at the village 
level correlate with decreases in perceived accessibility. The effect of bonding trust 
is not linear for either the household or community levels; the largest positive effect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 As I mentioned in the methods section, the selection of village-level covariates is based on theory 
and the explanatory power of the models. Existing literature suggests that political involvement and 
connections may facilitate access to public health services (see, for example, Chen & Cammett, 2012), 
and bonding trust is a significant household-level predictor. Different combinations did not suggest 
the importance of other village-level sociopolitical factors.  
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of household bonding trust on accessibility occurs at the medium level, and the 
largest negative effect occurs at the medium level for community-wide bonding 
trust.  
Table 6.8: Perceptions of Public Health Service Accessibility 
 Model 5 
Household Level 
 Model 6 
Village Social Capital 
GovHealthAccess Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.989 0.047  0.983 0.047 
Poverty (assets) 0.911* 0.044  0.912* 0.044 
Age 0.990* 0.006  0.990* 0.005 
Female respondent 1.542*** 0.227  1.493*** 0.219 
Female HH 1.440** 0.284  1.408** 0.242 
Low education 1.112 0.189  1.063 0.180 
High education 1.067 0.163  1.077 0.164 
Community Involvement      
Med community involvement 0.797 0.125  0.802 0.125 
High community involvement 0.947 0.158  0.961 0.157 
Political Activism      
Med political activism 1.138 0.180  1.144 0.181 
High political activism 0.949 0.143  0.936 0.141 
Bonding Trust      
Med bonding trust 1.448** 0.229  1.448** 0.229 
High bonding trust 1.438** 0.140  1.423** 0.239 
Bridging Trust      
Med bridging trust 0.997 0.150  1.016 0.153 
High bridging trust 0.940 0.175  0.982 0.182 
Village Level      
Med bondingv    0.648** 0.135 
High bondingv    0.844 0.136 
Med PCAv    0.751* 0.120 
High PCAv    0.878 0.213 
Constant cut1 -2.160*** 0.373  -2.452*** 0.381 
Constant cut2 -0.191 0.364  -0.482 0.369 
Constant cut3 2.016*** 0.374  1.726*** 0.377 
Random Intercepts Variance SE  Variance SE 
Slum (N=2) 0.012 0.025  ≈0 -- 
Village (N=7) 0.002 0.037  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=40) 0.037 0.054  0.010 0.039 
Wald χ2 29.36**   42.59***  
Observations 895   895  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Turning now to perceptions of non-state health service accessibility, the 
regression results in Table 6.9 reveal a number of interesting findings. First, the 
significance and direction of the effects of covariates are almost opposite those for 
public health accessibility in Table 6.8; it appears that the conditions that promote 
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accessibility vary by provider type. Second, as has been the case in the previous 
models, the addition of village-level covariates to the model did not alter the 
coefficient estimates for the household-level variables. Aside from reductions in 
lived poverty status, bridging trust at both the household and community level are 
the only independent variables positively associated with increases in perceived 
accessibility. The odds ratios are much larger for bridging trust than for poverty 
status, signifying that bridging trust may be more influential than poverty. 
Additionally, the strong and significant positive effect of village-level bridging trust 
operates over and above the household-level association.  
Table 6.9: Perceptions of Non-State Health Service Accessibility 
 Model 7 
Household level 
 Model 8 
Village social capital 
 Model 9 
Interactions 
NGOHealthAccess Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 1.154*** 0.055  1.147*** 0.055  1.122** 0.053 
Poverty (assets) 1.157*** 0.055  1.156*** 0.055  1.158*** 0.055 
Female respondent 0.749** 0.109  0.760* 0.110  0.741** 0.108 
Female HH 1.077 0.183  1.114 0.189  1.071 0.181 
Community Involvement         
Med community involvement 0.788 0.123  0.774 0.121    
High community involvement 0.719** 0.117  0.709** 0.115    
Low com.inv. ✕ low groupv       ref  
Low com.inv. ✕ high groupv       0.401** 0.174 
Med com.inv. ✕ low groupv       0.658** 0.111 
Med com.inv. ✕ high groupv       1.018 0.297 
High com.inv. ✕ low groupv       0.645** 0.111 
High com.inv. ✕ high groupv       0.727 0.210 
Political Activism         
Med political activism 0.816 0.129  0.804 0.127    
High political activism 0.843 0.125  0.841 0.125    
Low pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       ref  
Low pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       1.425 0.398 
Med pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       0.867 0.153 
Med pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       1.126 0.345 
High pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       0.946 0.160 
High pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       1.045 0.268 
Bonding Trust         
Med bonding trust 0.814 0.127  0.809 0.127    
High bonding trust 0.698** 0.114  0.698** 0.115    
Low bonding ✕ low bondv       ref  
Low bonding ✕ high bondv       0.708 0.169 
Med bonding ✕ low bondv       0.628** 0.129 
Med bonding ✕ high bondv       0.890 0.222 
High bonding ✕ low bondv       0.531*** 0.114 
High bonding ✕ high bondv       0.756 0.179 
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Bridging Trust         
Med bridging trust 1.192 0.178  1.170 0.175    
High bridging trust 1.679*** 0.308  1.636*** 0.299    
Low bridging ✕ low bridgev       ref  
Low bridging ✕ high bridgev       1.297 0.351 
Med bridging ✕ low bridgev       1.149 0.201 
Med bridging ✕ high bridgev       1.833** 0.451 
High bridging ✕ low bridgev       1.395 0.308 
High bridging ✕ high bridgev       2.656*** 0.716 
Village Level         
Med groupv    1.177 0.260    
High groupv    1.486 0.442    
Med bridgingv    1.681** 0.389    
High bridgingv    1.988*** 0.358    
Constant cut1 -1.324*** 0.410  -0.768* 0.441  -1.481*** 0.373 
Constant cut2 0.175 0.406  0.738* 0.440  0.034 0.369 
Constant cut3 2.029*** 0.413  2.601*** 0.449  1.906*** 0.375 
Random Intercepts Variance SE  Variance SE  Variance SE 
Slum (N=2) ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Village (N=7) 0.045 0.045  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=40) ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 41.92***   61.00***   67.04***  
Observations 892   892   892  
Age and education controls included in models but not shown. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   
 
In order to provide a more substantive interpretation of the results from 
model 8, I calculated the predicted probabilities of finding it very difficult and very 
easy to access services provided by non-state actors at low, medium, and high levels 
of individual and village bridging trust (shown in Table 6.10). The probability of 
perceiving non-state services as very easily accessible for an otherwise average 
household with low bridging trust residing in a village with low bridging trust is 
0.117. If an otherwise average household has a high level of bridging trust and is 
located in a village with high bridging trust, the probability nearly triples to 0.301. 
The full range of change for the probability of viewing services as very difficult to 
access is also large, decreasing from 0.206 at low levels of bridging trust to 0.074 at 
high levels.  
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Table 6.10: Predicted Probabilities from Model 8 
  Village Bridging Trust 
  Low Med High 
  Pr(VD) Pr(VE) Pr(VD) Pr(VE) Pr(VD) Pr(VE) 
In
di
vi
du
al
 
br
id
gi
ng
 
tr
us
t 
Low 0.206 0.117 0.134 0.182 0.115 0.209 
Med 0.181 0.134 0.117 0.207 0.100 0.236 
High 0.137 0.178 0.086 0.267 0.074 0.301 
All other covariates are set at their means. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  	  
The graphs in Figure 6.3 illustrate the changes in probability attributed to 
both household- and village-level bridging trust with confidence intervals. The 
distance between the lines delineating levels of village bridging trust highlight the 
importance of this meso-level factor, particularly at the juncture between low and 
medium levels.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Predicted probability of finding it very difficult and very easy to receive treatment at 
non-state health facilities by household- and village-level bridging trust with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. 
 
Returning to the regression results in Table 6.9, model 9 includes 
interactions between household- and community-level sociopolitical factors. The 
interactions for bridging trust do not significantly change the predicted probabilities 
from model 8, but the interactions for bonding trust and community involvement 
suggest that contextual sociopolitical factors may modify the effects of household-
level factors on perceptions of accessibility. The statistically significant negative 
effects of community involvement observed in Chapter 5 and in the first two models 
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above challenge the theory that associational involvement facilitates access. Based 
on the strong correlation between community involvement and service utilization 
and affordability, I suggested that group membership may have a functional rather 
than cognitive effect on households’ experience of health provision. It may not affect 
perceptions, but membership and the social interactions it promotes allow 
households to access resources—information, material assistance, or a direct 
connection—that households’ can draw upon when needed. This theory might 
explain why community involvement does not affect perceived accessibility, but it 
offers no account for why it appears to have a negative effect. 
The interactions in model 9 place household-level community involvement in 
context and suggest a more nuanced relationship between group membership and 
perceived accessibility. The negative effect associated with higher levels of 
household involvement is only statistically significant when community-level 
associational activity is low. In this situation, low levels of aggregate involvement in 
the village mean that the pool of information and other resources made available by 
group membership is smaller, thereby attenuating the potential benefits of 
membership. It could even be that existing groups were formed with the goal of 
improving service provision; in this case, negative perceptions of accessibility would 
be expected among group members. Furthermore, when the level of household-level 
involvement is medium or high and there is a high level of associational activity in 
the village, the significance of the effect disappears.  
A similar pattern occurs with bonding trust. The models without interactions 
suggest a strong and statistically significant negative effect of high household-level 
bonding trust on the perceived accessibility of non-state services. The results 
produced by the addition of interaction terms, however, imply that the association is 
only significant when village-level bonding trust is low.  
Separate regressions for Kibera and Korogocho on perceived accessibility 
show divergent effects, particularly in relation to perceptions of non-state service 
accessibility. Results from models 12 and 13 in Table 6.11 show that household- and 
community-level sociopolitical variables appear to wield much greater influence 
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over perceptions of NSP accessibility in Kibera than in Korogocho. The covariates 
also explain far more of the observed variation in perceptions for Kibera than 
Korogocho; this is reflected in the Wald chi-square statistics and is also the case, to 
a lesser extent, when public health accessibility is the dependent variable.  
Table 6.11: Perceptions of State and Non-State Health Service    
Accessibility by Slum 
 Public Health Accessibility  Non-State Health Accessibility 
 Model 10 
Korogocho 
 Model 11 
Kibera 
 Model 12 
Korogocho 
 Model 13 
Kibera 
 Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.964 0.064  0.992 0.069  1.101 0.071  1.183** 0.083 
Poverty (assets) 0.906 0.063  0.919 0.063  1.128* 0.076  1.227*** 0.086 
Age 1.000 0.008  0.978*** 0.008  0.996 0.008  1.008 0.008 
Low education 1.103 0.231  1.222 0.357  0.828 0.171  0.979 0.289 
High education 1.640** 0.403  0.778 0.155  0.838 0.202  1.427* 0.281 
Female respondent 1.625** 0.354  1.439* 0.290  0.732 0.156  0.749 0.152 
Female HH 1.537* 0.368  1.338 0.344  0.976 0.225  1.155 0.295 
Med community inv. 0.838 0.184  0.784 0.178  0.699* 0.151  0.905 0.211 
High community inv. 1.223 0.276  0.800 0.199  0.640** 0.140  0.750 0.186 
Med political activism 1.068 0.244  1.096 0.245  0.892 0.202  0.804 0.180 
High political activism 0.814 0.175  1.088 0.233  0.740 0.156  1.033 0.221 
Med bonding trust 1.378 0.318  1.460* 0.321  1.040 0.236  0.623** 0.138 
High bonding trust 1.546* 0.374  1.289 0.301  0.916 0.217  0.509*** 0.119 
Med bridging trust 1.271 0.268  0.777 0.169  0.893 0.186  1.605** 0.351 
High bridging trust 0.999 0.275  0.963 0.245  1.169 0.314  2.291*** 0.588 
zGroupV 0.449* 0.190  0.595* 0.161  1.080 0.454  1.580* 0.422 
zBridgingV 0.917 0.084  0.618* 0.165  1.124 0.101  1.916** 0.502 
Constant cut1 -0.854 0.609  -3.556*** 0.638  -1.879*** 0.604  -0.374 0.618 
Constant cut2 0.949 0.668  -1.390** 0.616  -0.434 0.597  1.260** 0.614 
Constant cut3 3.107*** 0.624  0.944 0.628  1.103* 0.600  3.469*** 0.634 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE 
Village  ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 24.08   29.66**   16.18   44.18***  
Observations 433   462   431   641  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The differences between the two communities become even more striking 
when you look at odds ratio estimates for statistically significant independent 
variables, particularly for non-state accessibility (models 12 and 13). A one-quintile 
decrease in poverty significantly increases perceived accessibility of health services 
provided by non-state actors in Kibera, but the association is only weakly 
significant for asset poverty and inconsequential for lived poverty in Korogocho. 
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Among the household-level sociopolitical factors, the results diverge further. Higher 
levels of community involvement are associated with decreases in perceived 
accessibility in Korogocho, while the relationship is inconclusive for Kibera. 
Perceived accessibility decreases at medium and high levels of bonding trust in 
Kibera, but the results imply no relationship for Korogocho.  
The most significant household-level difference between the settlements is 
the effect of bridging trust. Neither medium nor high levels of bridging trust affect 
perceived accessibility in Korogocho, but there is a large and highly significant 
association in Kibera. The estimated odds ratios are 1.605 for the medium level and 
2.291 for the high level; of all of the covariates in the model, bridging trust is the 
most influential. At the community level, the effects associated with increases in 
village-level associational activity and bridging trust are statistically significant for 
Kibera and insignificant for Korogocho. A one-standard deviation increase in both 
factors increases perceived accessibility of services provided by non-state actors.    
Overall, disaggregating the sample by settlement highlights the importance 
of meso-level factors and lends support to the theory that meso-level effects on 
micro-level outcomes depend on both community-level sociopolitical and 
organizational factors. There is less diversity in organizational factors among public 
health providers, and there are relatively few differences between settlements in 
the estimated effects of the independent variables included in the models on public 
service accessibility. The contrasts in the magnitude and significance of household- 
and community-level sociopolitical factors in the two settlements in the non-state 
models, on the other hand, suggest that organizational factors may shape the 
relationship between sociopolitical characteristics and various dimensions of the 
micro-experience of non-state health provision. Features of the individual service 
providers and the health system created by the organizational landscape may 
increase the utility of some characteristics and decrease that of others. The 
processes for identifying potential facilities and accessing and paying for treatment 
are determined in part by the organizations directly and indirectly providing care, 
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so it makes sense that the tools and resources necessary to successfully navigate the 
system vary across service environments.  
Health Service Affordability 
Perceptions of Financial Accessibility 
In order to further explore the distinction between the functional and 
cognitive effects of social proximity and the extent to which household- and 
community-level sociopolitical factors contribute to both, I investigate the financial 
dimension of the micro-experience of health provision. Approaching the concept 
from multiple dimensions allows me to test the robustness of findings and provide a 
more nuanced account of the experience. The first dependent variable measures 
perceptions of financial accessibility. The ordinal variable indicates the frequency 
with which households encounter unaffordable fees at state and non-state health 
facilities. Like the accessibility measures in the previous models, the question was 
posed to all respondents regardless of their interaction with providers of each type, 
so it is a perceptual measure. This question, however, is more specific. Whereas a 
general difficulty accessing services could be attributed to any number of factors 
(e.g., awareness of services, distance to facility, waiting times, opening hours, etc.), 
responses should reflect perceptions of affordability only.53 
The regressions in Table 6.12 estimate the effects of sociopolitical factors on 
perceptions of the affordability of services provided by non-state actors. A review of 
the results yields several interesting findings. First, the addition of village-level 
covariates drastically improves the utility of the model; the Wald chi-square 
statistic increases from 25.21 to 80.16. Second, poverty status is not significantly 
associated with affordability. Decreases in poverty are correlated with increases in 
the affordability of public health services (results provided in Table G.2 in Appendix 
G), but the lack of significance for non-state affordability suggests that financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 I limit the discussion to the models on non-state health service affordability in the interest of 
brevity and relevance to the overall contributions of the chapter. The results for similar models 
where the dependent variable is public health affordability are displayed in Table G.2 in Appendix 
G.  
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circumstances play a smaller role in financial accessibility for non-state services. 
There is a major caveat to this statement, however, because the non-state health 
sector includes providers ranging from a traditional healer or a local chemist to a 
clinic run by an international NGO or a private hospital. The fees charged by these 
and other providers vary widely, and the response does not convey the type of 
provider(s) on which respondents based their assessment.  
Table 6.12: Non-State Health Service Affordability 
 Model 14 
Household Level 
 Model 15 
Village Social Capital 
 Exp(β) Robust SE  Exp(β) Robust SE 
Poverty (flow) 1.018 0.053  1.013 0.053 
Poverty(assets) 1.054 0.055  1.047 0.056 
Age 0.997 0.006  0.996 0.006 
Female respondent 0.609*** 0.098  0.626*** 0.101 
Female HH 0.822 0.151  0.822 0.151 
Low education 0.900 0.172  0.926 0.178 
High education 0.890 0.146  0.918 0.150 
Community Involvement      
Med community involvement 0.972 0.168  0.981 0.170 
High community involvement 1.003 0.179  0.998 0.179 
Political Activism      
Med political activism 1.034 0.182  1.059 0.187 
High political activism 1.444** 0.235  1.475** 0.240 
Bonding Trust      
Med bonding trust 1.096 0.188  1.095 0.188 
High bonding trust 0.804 0.146  0.829 0.151 
Bridging Trust      
Med bridging trust 1.167 0.194  1.165 0.194 
High bridging trust 0.921 0.185  0.916 0.186 
Village Level      
Med groupv    3.659*** 0.846 
High groupv    4.776*** 1.457 
Med bridgingv    2.195*** 0.526 
High bridgingv    1.661*** 0.314 
Constant cut1 0.360 0.524  1.779** 0.441 
Constant cut2 1.021* 0.525  2.442*** 0.445 
Constant cut3 1.889*** 0.529  3.312*** 0.452 
Random Intercepts Variance SE  Variance SE 
Slum (N=2) 0.245 0.256  ≈0 -- 
Village (N=7) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=40) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 25.21**   80.16*** 
873 Observations 873   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01     	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The third notable finding is the apparent unimportance of most household-
level factors. Female respondents are more likely to encounter unaffordable fees for 
services and households with a high level of political activism are less likely to 
report financial barriers. No other micro-level covariates are significant in either 
specification.  
The last and most interesting takeaways from the regressions on non-state 
health service affordability are the large and statistically significant associations 
between affordability and village-level group membership and bridging trust. The 
estimated odds ratios are very large, especially for medium and high levels of group 
membership. The graphs in Figure 6.4 illustrate the predicted probabilities of 
encountering unaffordable fees by frequency and village-level group membership. 
The largest change occurs between low and medium levels of village associational 
activity; the model predicts that an average household residing in a village with low 
group membership has a 0.06 chance of never encountering unaffordable fees, while 
the same probability for otherwise identical household in a village with high group 
membership is 0.21. At the opposite extreme, the probability of often encountering 
financial barriers in a village with low associational activity is 0.79. That 
probability decreases to 0.45 in a village with high activity.  	  
 
Figure 6.4 Predicted probability of never and often encountering unaffordable fees at non-state 
health facilities by village-level group membership. All other covariates are set at their means. 
Predictions include 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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The results in Table 6.12 suggest that the financial accessibility of non-state 
health services is largely a function of meso-level characteristics. It is important to 
note, however, that the strength and significance of the effects of community-level 
associational activity and bridging trust do not imply causation. A village’s 
sociopolitical characteristics may help strengthen accountability mechanisms and 
promote a collective culture that keeps out-of-pocket costs down. Conversely, the 
providers operating within the community could independently prioritize 
affordability and/or engage in activities that increase group membership and 
bridging trust. Additionally, both mechanisms may contribute to the observed 
correlation.54  
Affordability of Fees at Most Frequently Visited Health Provider 
The second dependent variable in this section is an ordinal indicator of the 
affordability of fees at the health provider most frequently visited by members of 
the household. I included it ascertain if the effects of the independent variables 
change when affordability is based on interaction with a specific health provider. 
The data set also includes the name of the provider, so I was able to include a 
random effect for each health facility and explore the degree to which affordability 
of fees at particular facilities varies by village and ethnicity.  
Results from three successive models are displayed in Table 6.13. The 
addition of village-level sociopolitical factors in model 17 and interactions between 
household- and village-level factors in model 18 both improve the explanatory power 
of the model and offer further insight into the nature of the effects. In model 16, the 
only significant micro-level variables are poverty status and community 
involvement; decreases in poverty and a high level of community involvement 
increase the probability of finding fees affordable. Household-level community 
involvement did not have a significant effect on perceived affordability in the 
models in Table 6.12, and the fact that it became significant when the dependent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It is also possible that the association may be either coincidental or a consequence of another 
factor entirely. This survey included 7 communities in 2 settlements, so more research over a larger 
number of communities is necessary to confidently establish the association. 
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variable shifted from a perception to a specific experience mirrors earlier findings 
regarding utilization and perceived accessibility. Group membership is a structural 
form of social capital (Harpham, et al, 2002), and it appears to have a greater effect 
on more objective outcomes.55 Membership may play a functional role by helping 
households navigate the system and collect the resources to pay for services when 
needed, but it does not necessarily change households’ perceptions of health service 
provision within the community. 
Table 6.13: Affordability of Fees at Most Frequently Visited                  
Health Provider 
 Model 16 
Household Level 
 Model 17 
Village  Social 
Capital 
 Model 18 
Interactions 
fees Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Public health provider 1.330 0.482  1.662 0.605  1.744 0.658 
Poverty (flow) 1.202*** 0.079  1.198*** 0.076  1.208*** 0.078 
Poverty(assets) 0.999 0.065  1.010 0.065  0.995 0.066 
Age 1.001 0.008  0.999 0.007  0.997 0.007 
Low education 1.075 0.238  1.073 0.233  1.089 0.241 
High education 1.155 0.240  1.127 0.230  1.131 0.234 
Female respondent 0.825 0.166  0.863 0.171  0.863 0.174 
Female HH 0.807 0.190  0.856 0.197  0.808 0.189 
Community Involvement         
Med community inv. 1.329 0.277  1.240 0.253    
High community inv. 1.718** 0.377  1.619** 0.349    
Low com.inv. ✕ low groupv       ref  
Low com.inv. ✕ high groupv       0.880 0.501 
Med com.inv. ✕ low groupv       1.115 0.239 
Med com.inv. ✕ high groupv       8.430*** 5.289 
High com.inv. ✕ low groupv       1.456* 0.329 
High com.inv. ✕ high groupv       9.499*** 5.487 
Political Activism         
Med political activism 1.188 0.259  1.158 0.247    
High political activism 0.768 0.154  0.757 0.150    
Low pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       ref  
Low pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       0.628 0.259 
Med pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       1.069 0.253 
Med pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       1.624 0.821 
High pol.act. ✕ low PCAv       0.562** 0.126 
High pol.act. ✕ high PCAv       1.667 0.710 
 
 
        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 There is still some subjectivity in this dependent variable, but the specificity of the question and 
the connection with a particular service experience conceivably reduce the degree of subjectivity in 
comparison with general perception questions targeting an entire sector of providers.  
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Bonding Trust 
Med bonding trust 0.847 0.182  0.867 0.181    
High bonding trust 1.029 0.229  1.011 0.221    
Low bonding ✕ low bondv       ref  
Low bonding ✕ high bondv       1.763* 0.571 
Med bonding ✕ low bondv       1.125 0.329 
Med bonding ✕ high bondv       1.159 0.386 
High bonding ✕ low bondv       1.142 0.344 
High bonding ✕ high bondv       1.648 0.538 
Bridging Trust         
Med bridging trust 0.815 0.170  0.816 0.166    
High bridging trust 0.746 0.184  0.761 0.183    
Low bridging ✕ low bridgev       ref  
Low bridging ✕ high bridgev       0.578 0.252 
Med bridging ✕ low bridgev       0.758 0.181 
Med bridging ✕ high bridgev       0.662 0.271 
High bridging ✕ low bridgev       0.510** 0.147 
High bridging ✕ high bridgev       0.892 0.391 
Village Level         
Med groupv    1.025 0.329    
High groupv    3.918*** 2.009    
Med bridgingv    1.501 0.498    
High bridgingv    1.273 0.385    
Constant cut1 -1.997*** 0.509  -1.604** 0.623  -1.98*** 0.554 
Constant cut2 -0.156 0.505  0.210 0.621  -0.123 0.550 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE 
Slum (N=2) ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Health facility (N=156) 1.020 0.428  0.868 0.375  0.972 0.416 
Village (N=222) 0.069 0.134  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=375) 0.096 0.193  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 23.04   38.37*** 
829 
 54.14*** 
829 Observations 829    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The variance of the random intercepts in model 16 is nonzero at all levels 
except between slums, and the variance of health facility random effects is very 
large. The nested structure of the random effects means that the variance at the 
village level describes a random effect for village of residence on affordability at a 
single health facility. This variance is reduced to zero by the addition of village-level 
sociopolitical factors. 
The addition of village level sociopolitical factors in model 17 did not produce 
appreciable changes in the coefficient estimates for household-level variables. High 
village-level group membership is the only significant meso-level covariate, and the 
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magnitude of the estimated effect is more than double that of household-level group 
membership and more statistically significant.  
When household-level sociopolitical variables are interacted with their 
community-level counterparts in model 18, the estimated odds ratios shed light on 
the connections between meso- and micro-level contexts. The strongest and most 
significant effect of household-level community involvement occurs when the 
village-level associational activity is high. The graphs in Figure 6.5 plot the 
predicted probabilities at each value of the dependent variable over household-level 
community involvement (on the x axis) and village-level group membership 
(represented by the different lines). When household involvement is low the level of 
village group membership has no effect on the predicted probability, but the lines 
diverge as household involvement increases.56 The benefits associated with higher 
levels of village associational activity accrue mainly to households that are more 
involved, and the benefits of community involvement at the household level are 
greater for residents of villages with high associational activity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Though is it difficult to see in the graphs due to the size and the scale on the probability axis, the 
village-level lines in the ‘not affordable’ graph diverge such that there is no overlap in the confidence 
interval. The portion of the sample that reported unaffordable fees is low, as is the probability. 
Nevertheless, the interaction between household- and village-level community involvement does 
produce significantly different predicted probabilities. 
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Figure 6.5 Predicted probabilities for affordability of health service 
fees at the health facility most frequently visited by members of the 
household by household and village levels of community involvement. 
Estimates generated from model 18 in Table 6.13 when all other 
covariates are set at their mean values. Each prediction is displayed 
with a 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
The addition of interaction terms also changed the estimated effects of 
household-level political activism, bonding trust, and bridging trust. For each of 
these, there is one combination of household and village levels that is statistically 
significant. A high level of household political activism is associated with a decrease 
in affordability when village-level activism is low. Ignoring statistical significance 
for a moment, the odds ratio for high activism at both the household and village 
levels is greater than one; high political activism may have a positive effect on 
affordability when the household is located in a politically active village, but the 
opposite is true in villages with low activity. Similarly, high household-level 
bridging trust is correlated with decreased affordability when village bridging trust 
is low. Estimates also suggest that low household bonding trust increases 
affordability when village-level bonding trust is high, but the effect is weakly 
significant. Though these three associations are tenuous and it would be imprudent 
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to draw conclusions based on these results, they do imply that the effects of micro-
level characteristics can be shaped by meso-level factors.  
Table 6.14: Affordability of Fees at Most Frequently Visited                   
Health Provider by Slum 
 Korogocho  Kibera 
 Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model 22 
fees Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Public Health provider 1.467 0.448  1.446 0.390  1.302 0.803  1.352 0.808 
Poverty (flow) 1.276*** 0.112  1.262*** 0.111  1.103 0.112  1.097 0.113 
Poverty (assets) 0.992 0.085  1.000 0.084  0.983 0.100  1.016 0.106 
Age 0.989 0.010  0.988 0.010  1.017 0.012  1.018 0.013 
Low education 1.152 0.298  1.146 0.292  0.849 0.383  0.802 0.363 
High education 1.230 0.395  1.235 0.392  1.145 0.324  1.125 0.319 
Female respondent 0.768 0.216  0.783 0.217  0.887 0.257  0.910 0.265 
Female HH 0.838 0.263  0.835 0.258  0.748 0.279  0.750 0.281 
Med community inv. 0.906 0.247  0.898 0.240  1.916** 0.623  1.810* 0.590 
High community inv. 1.523 0.444  1.480 0.423  1.704 0.577  1.453 0.496 
Med political activism 1.011 0.297  0.996 0.289  1.401 0.466  1.511 0.505 
High political activism 0.695 0.188  0.673 0.181  0.997 0.299  1.023 0.312 
Med bonding trust 1.342 0.406  1.331 0.402  0.536** 0.170  0.525** 0.168 
High bonding trust 1.253 0.366  1.189 0.349  0.863 0.298  0.776 0.270 
Med bridging trust 0.650 0.177  0.654 0.176  1.175 0.381  1.241 0.404 
High bridging trust 0.544* 0.186  0.559* 0.191  1.125 0.410  1.257 0.460 
zGroupv    1.033 0.795     4.463*** 2.407 
zBridgingv    1.320 0.295     2.496* 1.290 
Constant cut1 -2.453*** 0.655  -2.759*** 0.887  -1.584** 0.800  0.374 1.150 
Constant cut2 -0.478 0.642  -0.816 0.857  0.120 0.799  2.079* 1.157 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE 
Health Facility ≈0 --  ≈0 --  1.582 0.777  1.369 0.703 
Village  0.224 0.301  0.058 0.231  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity ≈0 --  ≈0 --  0.204 0.346  0.242 0.338 
Wald χ2 22.21   24.34   13.94   23.00  
Observations 391   462   438   438  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As was the case when the dependent variable measured perceptions of 
accessibility, running separate multilevel regressions for Kibera and Korogocho on 
affordability produced disparate results. It is important to note at the outset that 
none of the models in Table 6.14 explain a significant portion of the variation in 
outcomes, but I include them in this section for two reasons. First, the standardized 
scores for village-level associational activity and bridging trust are only significant 
in Kibera, and increased associational activity is strongly and significantly 
associated with affordability. Table 6.15 displays the predicted probabilities for 
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encountering not affordable, somewhat affordable, and affordable fees in a village 
with an average group membership score and at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. The changes in probability are large: an average household 
residing in a village with below average associational activity has a 0.235 chance of 
encountering affordable fees at the health facility they most frequently visit, while 
the same probability for an otherwise identical household in a village with above 
average activity is 0.755. There is a dramatic difference between these probabilities, 
and a slightly smaller, but still significant, change occurs when the outcome is not 
affordable.  
Table 6.15: Predicted Probabilities for Model 22                                   
Averaged Over Random Effects 
 Not Affordable Somewhat Affordable Affordable 
Low village group membership (-1) 0.461 0.304 0.235 
Med village group membership (0) 0.211 0.295 0.494 
High village group membership (1) 0.071 0.174 0.755 
Change in probability -0.391** -0.130** 0.520*** 
Note: Range of change in values of zGroupv is smaller than actual range in Kibera. 
All other covariates set at their means. 
 
The fact that the association between village-level group membership and 
affordability is limited to Kibera reinforces the importance of contextual factors. 
There may be something about the nature of associational activity or the activities 
of particular groups that facilitates affordability in Kibera that does not exist in 
Korogocho, or it could have something to do with the service providers in Kibera.  
The second reason I included the subsample models in the discussion further 
highlights the importance of meso-level organizational factors. I nested the levels of 
the models such that the health facilities comprise the top level; any variance at 
that level indicates differences between the effects of specific facilities. The variance 
in both Kibera models is very large, as I would expect given the diverse facilities 
represented and the wide range of service fees among them. By contrast, there is no 
health facility random effect in the Korogocho models. This suggests that specific 
health facilities do not independently affect affordability in a way that cannot be 
accounted for by the covariates in the model.  
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There is variance among the random intercepts at the village level for 
Korogocho, however, implying that affordability of fees at a particular facility varies 
by village of residence. To translate this into context, I calculated the random 
effects for model 20 and averaged the values by village for the three most widely 
utilized health facilities in Korogocho (displayed in Table 6.16). Household-level 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors and village-level sociopolitical factors have 
been accounted for, so the observed effects should not reflect systematic variations 
in these characteristics between villages. The relative random effects of the villages 
are not the same across all three facilities; in other words, one village is not 
consistently associated with the largest decrease in affordability. The three facilities 
include a public health center and two clinics run by a domestic and an 
international NGO, and the largest change in effect among villages occurs at the 
public health center.       
A similar variance among random effects occurs in Kibera among ethnicities, 
within villages, within a health facility. None of these effects can be explained by 
the framework of household- and village-level predictors employed thus far, and all 
affirm the need for the addition of organizational factors to the analysis.  
Table 6.16: Average Random Effects for Village within                           
Health Facilities in Korogocho 
 Korogocho Health Center 
(public) 
Tumaini Clinic 
(domestic NGO) 
Provide International 
(international NGO) 
Highridge 0.191 0.394 0.266 
Kisumu Ndogo -0.392 0.273 -0.026 
Korogocho B 0.335 0.025 -0.159 
 
Health Service Satisfaction 
Satisfaction with Service Experience 
The next set of models examines households’ satisfaction with health services 
at the facility most frequently visited by members of the household. The survey 
questions used to generate the dependent variable capture respondents’ 
assessments of the technical and functional quality of the services and the adequacy 
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of the facilities, and the factor scores generated using principal component analysis 
are divided into quintiles.57 Table 6.17 presents results for two models: model 23 
includes village-level bridging trust and activism and model 24 adds interactions 
between household- and village-level sociopolitical factors.  
In model 23, higher political activism at the household level is associated 
with a decrease in satisfaction, while high village activism appears to wield a 
positive influence on satisfaction. Both household- and village-level bridging trust 
are significantly correlated with higher satisfaction, but the village-level effect is 
strongest at the medium level. As has been the case in previous sections, the 
interaction terms in model 24 are instructive: the negative effects of high 
household-level political activism only occur when village-level activism is low, and 
the magnitude and significance of the positive effect of higher household-level 
bridging trust are larger at higher levels of village bridging trust.  
Table 6.17: Satisfaction with Health Services 
 Model 23 
Village Social Capital 
 Model 24 
Interactions 
 Exp(β) Robust SE  Exp(β) Robust SE 
Public facility 0.372*** 0.069  0.363*** 0.069 
Health status 1.169*** 0.061  1.168*** 0.061 
Poverty (flow) 1.212*** 0.064  1.204*** 0.064 
Poverty (assets) 0.936 0.049  0.932 0.050 
Female respondent 1.238 0.200  1.220 0.198 
Female HH 0.942 0.178  0.930 0.177 
Community Involvement      
Med community involvement 1.217 0.211    
High community involvement 1.012 0.179    
Low com.inv. ✕	 low groupv    ref  
Low com.inv. ✕	 high groupv    0.650 0.319 
Med com.inv. ✕	 low groupv    1.153 0.217 
Med com.inv. ✕	 high groupv    0.951 0.329 
High com.inv. ✕	 low groupv    1.049 0.199 
High com.inv. ✕	 high groupv    0.599 0.199 
Political Activism      
Med political activism 0.751* 0.129    
High political activism 0.537*** 0.090    
Low pol.act. ✕	 low PCAv    ref  
Low pol.act. ✕	 high PCAv    1.382 0.456 
Med pol.act. ✕	 low PCAv    0.692* 0.132 
Med pol.act. ✕	 high PCAv    1.369 0.487 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The survey questions and factor loadings are described in detail in Appendix A. 
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High pol.act. ✕	 low PCAv    0.520*** 0.099 
High pol.act. ✕	 high PCAv    0.956 0.288 
Bonding Trust      
Med bonding trust 1.226 0.211    
High bonding trust 1.258 0.222    
Low bonding ✕	 low bondv    ref  
Low bonding ✕	 high bondv    0.787 0.212 
Med bonding ✕	 low bondv    1.126 0.257 
Med bonding ✕	 high bondv    1.092 0.305 
High bonding ✕	 low bondv    1.357 0.319 
High bonding ✕	 high bondv    0.922 0.247 
Bridging Trust      
Med bridging trust 1.419** 0.232    
High bridging trust 1.485** 0.295    
Low bridging ✕	 low bridgev    ref  
Low bridging ✕	 med bridgev    1.735* 0.518 
Low bridging ✕	 high bridgev    2.785*** 1.044 
Med bridging ✕	 low bridgev    1.376 0.444 
Med bridging ✕	 med bridgev    3.098*** 0.929 
Med bridging ✕	 high bridgev    2.765*** 0.966 
High bridging ✕	 low bridgev    1.330 0.568 
High bridging ✕	 med bridgev    2.345** 0.806 
High bridging ✕	 high bridgev    4.129*** 1.503 
Village Level      
Med Bridgingv 2.869*** 0.931    
High Bridgingv 1.888** 0.472    
Med PCAv 1.722 0.687    
High PCAv 1.982*** 0.503    
Constant cut1 -0.074 0.526  -0.784 0.493 
Constant cut2 1.189** 0.526  0.488 0.491 
Constant cut3 3.882*** 0.546  3.192*** 0.501 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE 
Slum (N=2) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Health facility (N=153) 0.051 0.066  0.056 0.071 
Village (N=219) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=370) 0.078 0.129  0.075 0.092 
Wald χ2 96.60***  105.35*** 
Observations 811  811 
Age and education controls included in models but not shown. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The predicted probabilities in Table 6.18 provide a more substantive 
interpretation of the interactions in model 24. The probabilities are averaged over 
the random effects at all levels, so they capture the fixed effects and the average 
random effects. A household with a low level of bridging trust living in a village 
with low bridging trust has a 0.321—or slightly less than one in three—chance of 
being in the lowest quintile of satisfaction. For an otherwise identical household 
with a high level of bridging trust residing in a village with high bridging trust, the 
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same probability is just under one in nine (0.116). Disaggregating that change by 
village and household level reveals that changes at each level do not produce 
identical effects. Within in a low bridging village, the probability of being among the 
least satisfied decreases from 0.321 for a low bridging household to 0.269 for a high 
bridging household. If the low bridging household resides in a high bridging village, 
however, the probability decreases to 0.159. 
Table 6.18: Predicted Probabilities for Model 24                                 
Averaged Over Random Effects 
  Village Bridging Trust 
  Low Med High 
Quintile of satisfaction with 
health services 
 (low to high) 
1st 3rd 5th 1st 3rd 5th 1st 3rd 5th 
Household  
Bridging  
Trust 
Low 0.321 0.355 0.055 0.225 0.440 0.090 0.159 0.497 0.133 
Med 0.263 0.406 0.073 0.146 0.507 0.145 0.160 0.496 0.132 
High 0.269 0.401 0.071 0.181 0.479 0.116 0.116 0.526 0.181 
All other covariates are set at their means. 
 
The plot of marginal effects in Figure 6.6 illustrates the comparative 
consequences of changes in household- and village-level bridging trust on the 
probability of falling within particular quintiles of satisfaction. The visual 
representation reveals how much of the interacted effect can be attributed to each 
component. The marginal effects are smallest for both variables between the high 
and medium levels, but the magnitude of the effects for village-level bridging trust 
are larger than those for household-level bridging trust across all comparisons. 
Though bridging trust is significant at both levels, the community-level measure 
appears to be a more influential determinant of satisfaction. 
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Figure 6.6 Marginal effects of changes in household- and village-
level bridging trust on the probability of being in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 
5th quintiles of satisfaction with health services at the facility most 
frequently visited by members of the household. Estimates of 
marginal effects are based on Model 24 in Table 6.17 and are 
averaged over random effects. The numbers refer to the quintile of 
satisfaction. 
 
Satisfaction with Quality of Health Services in the Community 
The final dependent variable in this chapter is an ordinal variable indicating 
the extent to which respondents are satisfied with the quality of the medical care 
available to members of their household. The first specification includes household-
level covariates only, and the most significant effects are associated with lived 
poverty status and bridging trust. Both decreases in poverty and increases in 
bridging trust appear to increase the probability of satisfaction. Female respondents 
also have a higher probability of satisfaction. 
When village-level measures of associational activity and bridging trust are 
added to the model, the estimated odds ratios indicate that high group membership 
and medium and high bridging trust (at the village level) are significantly 
associated with increases in satisfaction. Household-level community involvement 
remains insignificant, suggesting that village-level associational activity may 
improve satisfaction regardless of households’ participation. The effect of village-
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level bridging trust is largest and most statistically significant at the medium level. 
The effects of household-level covariates are generally consistent with results from 
the previous specification, but the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on 
both female respondents and female-headed households increase. 
Table 6.19: Satisfaction with the Quality of Health Services              
Available to Members of the Household 
 Model 25 
Household Level 
 Model 26 
Village Social Capital 
health_qual_sat Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 1.268*** 0.062  1.260*** 0.062 
Poverty(assets) 1.032 0.050  1.038 0.051 
Age 0.990* 0.006  0.989** 0.006 
Female respondent 1.453** 0.216  1.484*** 0.224 
Female HH 1.172 0.200  1.801*** 0.320 
Low education 0.977 0.172  1.015 0.176 
High education 0.953 0.148  0.926 0.144 
Village Social Capital      
Med group membershipv    1.325 0.293 
High group membershipv    1.974** 0.582 
Med bridgingv    1.669** 0.396 
High bridgingv    1.413* 0.254 
Community Involvement      
Med community involvement 0.860 0.138  0.828 0.133 
High community involvement 0.964 0.162  0.925 0.157 
Political Activism      
Med political activism 0.978 0.160  0.963 0.157 
High political activism 0.781 0.121  0.775 0.121 
Bonding Trust      
Med bonding trust 0.825 0.135  0.826 0.136 
High bonding trust 0.983 0.165  0.978 0.164 
Bridging Trust      
Med bridging trust 1.501*** 0.234  1.496*** 0.233 
High bridging trust 1.878*** 0.353  1.815*** 0.341 
Constant cut1 -2.445*** 0.391  -1.952*** 0.440 
Constant cut2 0.015 0.361  0.520 0.418 
Constant cut3 2.558*** 0.373  3.080*** 0.432 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE 
Slum (N=2) 0.003 0.012  ≈0 -- 
Village (N=7) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity (N=40) ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 50.84***   59.13***  
Observations 898   898  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
To see if the coefficient estimates vary between Kibera and Korogocho, I re-
ran the models on settlement subsamples. Ignoring model 28 for a moment, the 
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results for Kibera and Korogocho reveal several contrasts. The effect of poverty 
status is similar and high household-level bridging trust is significant in both 
models, but the magnitude and statistical significance of the effect is larger in 
Kibera. Furthermore, medium household-level bridging trust is also associated with 
increased satisfaction in Kibera.  
Table 6.20: Satisfaction with the Quality of Health Services              
Available to Members of the Household by Slum 
 
 Satisfaction with Quality of Health Services in Community 
 Model 27 
Korogocho 
 Model 28 
Koch Interactions 
 Model 29 
Kibera 
 Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 1.229*** 0.084  1.234*** 0.085  1.285*** 0.094 
Poverty(assets) 1.097 0.077  1.105 0.078  0.994 0.071 
Age 0.981** 0.008  0.982** 0.008  0.998 0.008 
Female respondent 1.213 0.262  1.234 0.268  1.815*** 0.390 
Female HH 1.083 0.240  1.105 0.246  1.303 0.359 
Low education 1.087 0.232  1.071 0.230  0.859 0.260 
High education 1.037 0.258  1.050 0.261  0.899 0.204 
Community Involvement         
Med community involvement 0.663* 0.147  0.615** 0.139  0.974 0.235 
High community involvement 0.939 0.217  0.941 0.144  0.786 0.204 
Political Activism         
Med political activism 0.938 0.218  0.909 0.212  1.033 0.246 
High political activism 0.647** 0.143  0.652* 0.144  1.037 0.235 
Bonding Trust         
Med bonding trust 1.148 0.268  1.171 0.277  0.587** 0.139 
High bonding trust 1.220 0.293  1.259 0.305  0.775 0.189 
Bridging Trust         
Med bridging trust 1.375 0.293  1.487 0.472  1.640** 0.384 
High bridging trust 1.692* 0.467  2.697*** 1.021  2.188*** 0.587 
Village Social Capital         
zBridging trustv  1.102 0.177  0.908 0.223  2.116*** 0.605 
zGroup membershipv 0.999 0.461  0.988 0.456  2.097** 0.629 
Med bridging  ✕	 zbridgingv    1.115 0.361    
High bridging  ✕	 zbridgingv    2.067* 0.827    
Constant cut1 -2.626*** 0.691  -2.422*** 0.711  -1.445** 0.738 
Constant cut2 -0.237 0.667  -0.030 0.689  1.228* 0.694 
Constant cut3 1.108*** 0.674  2.199*** 0.698  4.220*** 0.728 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE  Var. SE 
Village  ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Ethnicity  ≈0 --  ≈0 --  ≈0 -- 
Wald χ2 31.93**   35.28**   41.87***  
Observations 433   433   465  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
	   231 
The results reveal additional contrasting effects for other household-level variables, 
but the most intriguing disparity occurs at the village level. The estimated odds 
ratios for village bridging trust and group membership are large and significant in 
Kibera, while neither variable appears to be related to satisfaction with the quality 
of services in Korogocho.  
The addition of interaction terms to the model, however, produces intriguing 
results. Coefficient estimates for the other covariates were mostly unchanged, but 
the magnitude and significance of high household-level bridging trust increased 
substantially; the odds ratio went from 1.692 to 2.967. The estimated odds ratio for 
the interaction between high household-level bridging trust and a one standard 
deviation increase in the village-level bridging score is 2.067. The addition of 
interactions did not affect the results in models 26 and 28, but there is clearly a 
greater degree of interdependence between the effects of household- and village-
level bridging trust on satisfaction in Korogocho. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter examined the effects of both household- and community-level 
factors on multiple dimensions of the micro-experience of state and non-state health 
provision. There were several common themes that emerged, particularly related to 
the role of structural forms of social capital, differences between the contributions of 
social capital to experiences with state and non-state services, the persistent 
importance of bridging trust, and the different effects of independent variables in 
models disaggregated by slum.  
In the first section, we saw that community-level factors did not appear to 
independently affect households’ ability to access health services when treatment 
was needed. When utilization was operationalized as receipt of services from state 
and non-state health providers, the effects of community-level sociopolitical factors 
were highly dependent on provider type. None of the household-level social 
proximity variables were significant in either model, and none of the community-
level factors were associated with use of public health providers. Conversely, higher 
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levels of village associational activity and bridging trust both strongly and 
significantly increase the likelihood of household interaction with non-state 
providers. Based on all indicators of utilization, it appears that both household-level 
community involvement and community-level associational activity play a 
functional role in facilitating access to services. The unimportance of both levels of 
community involvement to the perceived accessibility of services—and the negative 
association observed in some cases—suggests that, just as it is a structural rather 
than cognitive form of social proximity, it has a largely functional effect rather than 
a perceptual one.  
When the dependent variable measured affordability of health services, the 
contrasting utility of cognitive and structural forms of social capital largely 
continued. Both high village-level associational activity and household-level 
community involvement are significantly associated with households’ ability to pay 
fees at the most frequently visited health provider, and no cognitive forms of social 
capital were significant at either level. When affordability indicated the frequency 
with which households encounter unaffordable fees at non-state providers—and 
included responses regardless of whether the household had experience with non-
state provision—household-level community involvement was no longer significant. 
Village-level associational activity remained positively associated with affordability, 
but neither household- nor village-level community involvement was significant in 
any subsequent sections. 
The second identifiable theme is the particular importance of community-
level sociopolitical factors in the context of non-state provision. No village-level 
measures were significantly associated with access to or the affordability of 
government health services, and the significance and magnitude of the effects of 
community-level sociopolitical factors were larger when the dependent variable was 
only applicable to non-state services. This could be a reflection of the greater 
diversity in organizational factors among non-state providers, but additional 
research is necessary to establish a relationship. If sociopolitical factors measured 
at either level are more relevant in the context of non-state provision, this may 
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account for some of the observed variation in the results for Kibera and Korogocho. 
Village-level factors are often more influential in Kibera, but the portion of 
households citing non-state facilities as their most frequently visited provider is 
much higher there. The pattern suggests that accessibility and affordability of 
health services provided by the state are less dependent on households’ social 
positionality and communities’ sociopolitical context. If this is the case, efforts to 
improve equity should focus on strengthening and expanding public provision 
rather than supporting a fragmented system of NSPs. Furthermore, if micro- and 
meso-level sociopolitical contexts wield more influence over access, results suggest 
that the effects of specific factors vary by community; developing a generalizable 
strategy to promote access to NSPs may be problematic. 
The third conclusion from this chapter is the persistent importance of 
bridging trust to many dimensions of the micro-experience. Explaining the variation 
in its significance and in the size of the effect, however, is more complicated. Trust 
is a cognitive form of social capital, and it does seem to be particularly important 
when the dependent variable captures a subjective or perceptual dimension of 
households’ experience with health provision. In the context of Kibera and 
Korogocho, neither household- nor village-level bridging trust appear to 
significantly influence households’ ability to access health services when treatment 
is needed or to comfortably pay the fees at the most frequently visited provider. 
Bridging trust is particularly irrelevant for government health services, as 
household- and village-level measures have no effect on utilization of public health 
facilities or on perceptions of accessibility and affordability.  
Shifting the focus to non-state services, however, we begin to see an increase 
in the importance of bridging trust, particularly at the village level. Households in 
villages with higher levels of bridging trust are much more likely to have interacted 
with NSPs and to encounter unaffordable fees at non-sate facilities with less 
frequency. In both of these cases, household-level bridging trust has no effect. 
Village-level bridging trust is also positively associated with perceived accessibility 
of non-state services, and the inclusion of interaction terms in the model reveals 
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that the positive effect of higher levels of household bridging trust is only significant 
when village-level trust is high.  
Household-level bridging trust begins to have an independent effect on 
outcomes when the dependent variables relate to satisfaction with services. For 
satisfaction with the technical and functional quality and the facilities at the most 
frequently visited health provider, measures of bridging trust at both levels are 
positively associated with satisfaction. Though the magnitude of the effect is not as 
large, the results are similar when the dependent variable measures satisfaction 
with the quality of health services available to members of the household.  
These findings suggest that a village’s level of bridging trust is related to the 
accessibility and affordability of non-state health services and that higher levels of 
both household and village bridging trust increase a household’s likelihood of being 
satisfied with specific health services and with the quality of care available to them. 
Public health and social capital research suggests that bridging trust facilitates 
cooperation and collective action that may increase the accountability of NSPs to 
the community and reduce opportunistic behavior among providers to support 
community well-being. Community accountability mechanisms can promote 
accessibility and affordability as well as improvements in service quality, and the 
observed relationship between village-level bridging trust and these dimensions of 
the micro-experience may reflect gains from accountability (Hendryx et al, 2002; 
Steinberg & Baxter, 1998). The centrality of provider-patient relationships and 
interactions to individuals’ and households’ satisfaction with service experiences is 
also well documented in the literature, as is the potential for household-level 
bridging trust to enhance that relationship and to improve health outcomes by 
increasing the likelihood that patients will follow providers’ instructions and modify 
unhealthy behaviors (Gilson, 2003). This may explain why household-level bridging 
trust plays a larger (positive) role in shaping households’ satisfaction with service 
experiences and the overall quality of services available.       
While bridging trust is often positively associated with desirable outcomes, 
the mechanisms invoked in existing literature are generally vague and difficult to 
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assess. Reductions in opportunistic behavior and the promotion of collective action 
are useful mechanisms on a conceptual level, but if the goal of research is to 
facilitate tangible improvements in service provision, documenting the association 
as I have done in this chapter is inadequate. Are certain levels of bridging trust 
sufficient (i.e., will directing resources to fostering bridging trust promote the 
desired outcomes)? Is bridging trust actually a proxy for something else—something 
that can more easily be measured? Does the utility of bridging trust depend on 
organizational factors, and can organizational factors promote bridging trust? The 
concluding chapter explores the role of organizational factors in shaping the micro-
experience of health provision in Kibera and Korogocho.  
Finally, this chapter highlighted the importance of a multi-level approach to 
research, policy, and interventions on social service provision. Results suggests that 
meso-level sociopolitical factors have an independent effect on households’ 
experiences with health services, but these factors also condition the impact of 
household-level factors. The characteristics and resources that help individuals 
access quality services in one community may be irrelevant in other contexts, and 
the strategies for targeting un- and under-served households and groups may need 
to be adjusted accordingly. Just as previous chapters identified the utility of 
expanding conceptualizations of access to include perceptions and affirmed the 
relevance of both social and economic demand factors, these findings establish a role 
for meso-level considerations to be added to the micro- and macro-level variables 
routinely employed in existing studies.  
At the same time, the variations in the effects of both village- and household-
level sociopolitical characteristics across the settlements raise the issue of 
generalizability. Is it possible to conduct a systematic multi-level analysis, much 
less develop prescriptions for a multi-level approach that can be employed in 
different contexts? In the next chapter I explore the community-level organizational 
contexts and suggest that, rather than focus on specific measurable indicators at 
the community level, multi-level approaches should be informed by an 
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understanding of the key meso-level mechanisms that affect households’ 
experiences with service provision. 
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Chapter 7 
Meso-Level Context:  
Community Organizational Factors 
 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on the meso-level analysis in Chapter 6 by exploring how 
organizational factors may interact with community-level sociopolitical factors to 
shape the micro-experience of health provision for residents of the community. In a 
systematic review of studies on medical care utilization, Phillips, Morrison, 
Anderson, and Aday (1998) found that very few included specific characteristics of 
the healthcare system or the constituent service providers. To explain why such 
factors are often neglected, the authors identified three key challenges that limit 
the inclusion of provider-related variables: lack of data, analytical difficulties such 
as feedback loops, and poor conceptualization. Advances in multilevel modeling 
techniques and the incorporation of such models into mainstream statistical 
programs like Stata have helped with the second issue, but appropriate data can 
only be collected after the relationships and mechanisms have been conceptualized 
and operationalized. 
Existing studies that do incorporate provider-related variables at the 
community level generally employ objective indicators such as the number of 
providers in the target area, the number of beds or medical professionals, the ratio 
of residents to primary care facilities, and other aggregate measures (Babalola & 
Fatusi, 2009; Lepine & Le Nestour, 2012; Phillips et al, 1998). As this dissertation 
has argued from the outset, however, these measures are not adequate proxies for 
accessibility; such supply side factors ignore the role of perceptions and social 
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factors in shaping health-seeking behaviors. In a study of the demand for primary 
care services in rural Senegal, Lepine and Le Nestour (2012) include a number of 
household- and provider-level variables in a multi-level model. The authors 
discovered that the likelihood of utilizing a public health facility was very high 
despite the widespread poverty in the area, and they attributed the results to the 
accessibility of the facilities, the fact that most survey respondents reported that 
either they, a member of the household, or someone they knew were cured after the 
first visit, and the low service fees (Lepine & Le Nestour, 2012). These findings 
reinforce the importance of perceptions and suggest that organizational factors (e.g., 
quality, fees) and other community-level processes (e.g., the transmission of 
information about positive experiences) may mutually and interactively affect 
households’ experiences and health outcomes.  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation and the household data to 
thoroughly document the organizational context of Kibera and Korogocho and 
examine the degree to which various organizational factors affect both outcomes 
and the effects of other meso- and micro-level variables. Instead, I descriptively 
compare insights from the household survey and secondary data on civil society 
organizations and health service providers to identify organizational factors that 
may explain some of the observed differences between the communities. Drawing on 
findings from previous chapters and existing research, my goal is to identify key 
processes that operate on the meso level that affect households’ experiences with 
service provision and to examine the organizational factors that shape the 
processes.  
One of the challenges I identified in Chapter 6 is the issue of generalizability. 
Meso-level sociopolitical factors independently affect households’ experiences with 
health services and condition the impact of household-level factors, but the effects of 
both village- and household-level sociopolitical characteristics vary across the 
settlements. How can meso-level factors be incorporated into policy and practice if 
nothing is generalizable? In an attempt to address this issue, I focus less on the 
statistical associations themselves and more on the dynamics and processes that 
	   239 
may generate observed associations. I explore the “how” and the “why” of the 
interaction between micro- and meso-level factors. In taking this approach, I hope to 
address the conceptual challenges identified by Phillips and colleagues (1998) and 
suggest four areas for further research on the role of the meso-level context and the 
interaction between micro- and meso-level factors. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by outlining meso-
level organizational factors gleaned from existing literature, followed by a 
description of the secondary data used in the analysis. The third section details 
community-level differences in households’ experiences and the community-level 
variations in the effects of independent variables in the results from previous 
chapters. Then, I provide a detailed overview of the organizational contexts in 
Kibera and Korogocho, weaving in explanations as to how the contexts may explain 
the differences documented in the preceding section. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting four meso-level processes for further research. 
Meso-Level Organizational Factors 
Not much has changed in the years since Phillips and colleagues (1998) 
highlighted the absence of important meso-level factors in studies on health and 
health service provision. Though multi-level models increasingly include 
community-level measures, a comprehensive theoretical framework for meso-level 
factors and effects remains unavailable. In this section, I draw on public health and 
international development research to outline meso-level factors and conditions 
under which community accountability mechanisms are likely to promote 
responsive, affordable service provision that meets the needs of residents. 
Characteristics of Service Providers 
The type of organizations comprising the health system in the community is 
the first of the organizational components. The theoretical advantages and 
disadvantages of different types of providers (e.g., public, NGO, CBO, private for-
profit, etc.) and case studies of each organizational type pervade the literature, but 
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most scholars agree that effectiveness is also highly dependent on contextual factors 
(Teamey & McLoughlin, 2009). Nested operations and increasingly blurred 
boundaries between organizations have become the norm in many developing 
countries, making it even more difficult to disentangle the effects of singular types 
(Brass, 2010). To the extent that it is possible to document the types of 
organizations and the nested relationships present within the community, however, 
such an account may offer important insights. The organizational distribution may 
reveal information about the capacity of providers, sources of funding, and 
motivations for providing services.  
Viewing repeated historical failures to improve service provision across much 
of the developing world through the lens of the principal agent problem, Pritchett 
and Woolcock (2004) propose five elements of service provision that must be 
examined in order to structure the incentives of actors in a way that promotes 
equitable, sustainable provision. These elements—resources, information, decision-
making, delivery mechanisms, and accountability—are not prescriptive conditions 
or institutional arrangements but rather factors that must be considered in context 
before developing any policy, program, or practice to promote effective service 
provision.  
Sources of Funding  
Service providers’ source of revenue has implications for accountability to 
patients and the community; as providers’ dependence on resources obtained from 
or allocated by the community decreases, so does the community’s ability to hold 
providers accountable (Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2004; Hanson et al, 
2008). When most of an organization’s funding comes from the government and/or 
external donors, funders’ priorities are more likely to guide the organization’s 
activities. In addition to the sources of funding, however, the level at which the 
budget is controlled and the amount of discretion permitted at the point of service 
also affect providers’ responsiveness to local needs and priorities (Pritchett & 
Woolcock, 2004). If the community and facility staff have a say over how externally 
allocated funds are spent, there may be more accountability. 
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Decision-Making 
A second organizational characteristic is the decision-making authority and 
process. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) note that the nature of decision-making 
involves the de jure structures and procedures prescribed by policies and the de 
facto process by which decisions are actually made. If, for example, a community 
health committee is supposed to oversee the operation of a local clinic and 
participate in planning at the district level but neither the clinic staff nor the 
district officials incorporate feedback into decisions, community accountability is 
limited. In their study in the U.S., Steinberg and Baxter (1998) observed weakened 
accountability and responsiveness when the health system is characterized by what 
they refer to as the “branch office phenomenon,” where health providers are 
headquartered in other areas and there is less interdependence and integration into 
the sociopolitical fabric of the community. Similarly, accountability is also reduced 
when the health system is dominated by providers that serve a population that is 
not geographically defined (Steinberg & Baxter, 1998). In general, services are more 
likely to be responsive when the decision-making process is inclusive and decisions 
are made at the community level.  
Target Population 
The degree to which providers target specific populations likely affects both 
the potential for community accountability and collective action and the 
inclusiveness of the health system. Non-state actors do not face the same 
expectations of universality and equity as states providing citizen-based welfare 
services (Bebbington, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Douglas, 1987; Salamon, 1987).  
Some NSPs explicitly or implicitly favor some potential users over others, targeting 
beneficiaries based on class, gender, ethnicity, religion, partisanship, or some other 
form of social stratification (MacLean & Cammett, 2014). As the percentage and 
scale of NSPs operating within the community that either target certain 
demographic groups or require membership in order to access services rises, access 
to services for individuals and groups positioned outside the target demographics is 
likely to decrease.   
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Stability 
Shifting away from characteristics of specific health facilities, the remaining 
meso-level organizational factors capture aspects of the health system formed by all 
of the providers serving the community.58 The first of these, stability, refers to the 
durability over time of the providers operating within the community. At the meso 
level, Steinberg and Baxter (1998) observed that community accountability is 
strengthened when the health system is largely comprised of stable, established 
service providers with consistency in leadership and relatively infrequent staff 
turnover. Though they do not propose indicators for stability or suggest how much 
stability is required, they focus on the role of stability in facilitating mechanisms for 
community participation in decision-making and provider responsiveness.  
From the household perspective, constant turnover makes it difficult for 
citizens to navigate the system and establish a relationship with providers. 
Research on service provision suggests that health and education outcomes improve 
when there is an ongoing relationship between the individual and provider, and 
that continued interaction reduces the individuals’ perceived risk in assessing 
service quality (Berry et al, 2004). Gilson (2003) highlights the relational nature of 
health provision and focuses on the potential for interpersonal trust to promote 
responsiveness. She notes that most health policy analyses only tangentially 
address the role of human behavior and relationships and asserts that building and 
re-building trust within a health system can offer benefits to both providers and 
patients (Gilson, 2003). Health outcomes depend on both the services provided and 
the patients’ willingness to trust the diagnosis, follow post-care instructions, and 
modify unhealthy behaviors (Cahn, 1997). Stability among service providers and 
staff facilitates the development of relationships between patients and providers; 
patients may be more likely to trust providers with whom they have relationships, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Though the characteristics of service providers must be collected at the facility level, the meso-
level variables (or qualitative assessments) would indicate the degree of inclusivity, localized and/or 
discretionary decision-making, and the sources of funding among all providers (giving extra weight 
to the facilities that serve larger portions of the population). 
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and the mutual cooperation and respect could improve health outcomes and lead to 
higher satisfaction with services and assessments of quality.  
Fragmentation 
The last three meso-level organizational factors are interrelated—both with 
one another and with community sociopolitical characteristics. The first of these is 
the degree of fragmentation within the health system, as measured by the number 
and scale of providers operating within the community. MacLean and Cammett 
(2014) incorporate fragmentation into their theoretical framework for the political 
consequences of non-state provision as a dimension of the NSP-citizen relationship. 
They argue that greater fragmentation, or a larger number of smaller-scale NSPs, 
leads to a complicated service environment in which citizens’ ability to navigate the 
system and gain access to the appropriate services are reduced. Studies cited in 
previous chapters highlight the challenges facing residents of informal settlements 
and other low-income communities, as low levels of health literacy, the lack of 
regulation and institutionalized mechanisms to help consumers assess quality, and 
the diversity, opacity, and fragmentation of the health system make accessing 
quality care difficult (Baru et al, 2010; Barua & Singh, 2003; Kamat 2001; 
Michielson et al, 2011). Furthermore, the fragmentation created by the growing 
concentration of low-cost, private for-profit providers and the accompanying 
competition for patients has negative consequences for individual and community 
health. Brugha and Zwi (1998) cite a plethora of studies revealing that, particularly 
when providers lack proper training and technical knowledge, catering to 
consumers with limited knowledge leads to the dispensation of unnecessary (and 
sometimes harmful) drugs and the repeated and inefficient treatment of symptoms 
rather than underlying causes (also Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004).  
Strong Leadership and Organization around Health Issues  
The next meso-level organizational factor, strong organization and leadership 
around health issues, can involve both service providers and civil society 
organizations. Nearly every theory and study related to health service provision 
	   244 
cites the paramount importance of information to health-seeking behaviors and 
healthcare provision (e.g., Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Cavill & Sohail, 2003; Fotso & 
Mukiira, 2012; Gilson, 2003; Muriithi, 2013; Pritchett & Woolcock; Steinberg & 
Baxter, 1998). Ideally, the transmission of health-related information occurs at 
many levels: information flows between service providers and external supervisory 
and advisory entities, among providers in the community, between community 
members and groups and service providers, and among households in the 
community (just to name a few). In reality, the transmission of information that 
could promote health literacy and improve service accessibility and quality is 
limited, particularly in the organizational and service environments common in 
informal settlements.       
Steinberg and Baxter (1998) argue that community accountability is more 
likely when there is strong leadership and organization around health issues, either 
within the public sphere or civil society. What this meant in the U.S. context of 
their study is slightly different than its application in places like Kibera and 
Korogocho, particularly since government is not directly involved in the provision of 
health services and the capacity of government to regulate and enforce non-state 
providers is much greater.59 Leadership and organization around health issues can 
and does occur in the public sphere in Nairobi, but civil society organizations and 
cooperation between providers are particularly important.  
Studies on the role of NGOs in development efforts highlight that the small 
scale, localized focus, and funding limitations of most NGOs can lead to fragmented 
interventions plagued by duplication of efforts, wasted resources, insufficient 
coordination, and lack of sustainability (DiMuzio, 2008; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; 
Koppenjam & Enserink, 2009; Omenya & Huchzermeyer, 2006; Lizarralde & 
Massyn, 2008; Otiso, 2000, 2003; Post & Mwangi, 2009). Strengthening 
collaboration between fragmented providers is crucial to avoiding these problems, 
and the impetus for cooperation can come from the providers themselves or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 While the U.S. government is directly involved in health service provision in some contexts (e.g., 
veterans, public health departments, etc.) is it not the predominant provider in most communities.  
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community. Communities can organize around health issues and hold providers 
accountable, or the providers can form networks and improve effectiveness. Gilson 
emphasizes the centrality of networks to the nature of service provision within a 
community:  
The way the networks function determines not only whether individual 
providers have the range of resources necessary to provide care, such as 
drugs, equipment and access to referral services, but also the way they 
provide care, the range of services they offer and the people they seek to 
serve. (Gilson, 2003, p. 1460)  
 
The benefits associated with strong leadership and organization around health 
issues highlight the interrelated nature of meso-level factors, as both organizational 
factors and community-level sociopolitical characteristics can contribute to its 
development, and the cooperation it fosters can minimize the negative effects of 
highly fragmented health systems.  
Social Embeddedness/Integration of Health Services  
The final interrelated organizational factor is more conceptual. Alternately 
referred to as social embeddedness and the integration of health services into 
community life, it seeks to capture the extent to which the health system and the 
services it provides are socially embedded within the community. MacLean and 
Cammett (2014) employ the concept as an indicator of sustainability, stating that 
non-state provision is socially embedded when “communities and citizens have some 
ownership in the delivery process and are invested in the future” (p. 32). Steinberg 
and Baxter (1998) include a similar concept but articulate it differently, arguing 
that community accountability and health system responsiveness are more likely 
when there is widespread acknowledgement of the interdependencies between 
health services and other sectors and functions within the community—in other 
words, when health provision is part of the sociopolitical fabric of the community.  
At the household level, when the system of health provision is socially 
embedded within the community, residents are more likely to be aware of providers 
and the services they offer and have some connection with staff—either from service 
utilization, social interaction within the community, or perhaps through 
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involvement in decisions regarding services. All of these connections are likely to 
engender trust, reduce perceptions of risk, and improve residents’ experiences of 
non-state provision. At the community level, the integration of health services and 
providers into the sociopolitical fabric of the community can facilitate greater 
communication and cooperation between providers comprising the health system 
and between the health system and other service providers and community 
organizations, enhance mechanisms for community participation and accountability 
in decisions regarding health provision, increase health literacy among the 
population and disseminate information to help them navigate the system, and 
promote community engagement and organization around health issues.   
Feedback Effects 
Complicating meso-level analyses further, disentangling the effects of 
sociopolitical and organizational factors can be difficult given likely feedback effects. 
Community accountability can cause changes in the health system, but changes 
within the health system can also strengthen accountability mechanisms, 
disseminate quality health information, promote interpersonal trust, and launch 
associational activity (Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Gilson, 2003; Steinberg & Baxter, 
1998). Anecdotal evidence from my fieldwork in Kibera provides a good example of 
this. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Kenya Medical Research 
Institute (KEMRI) operate a clinic and demographic surveillance system in two 
villages in Kibera. For the approximately 28,500 persons enrolled in the study, 
basic health services are free at the CDC/KEMRI clinic (Njuguna et al, 2013). 
Additionally, the clinic, like several others in Kibera operated by NGOs, is very 
active in both the dissemination of health information and in efforts to organize the 
community around health issues. They hold regular community meetings and 
information and training sessions at the clinic, and staff members engage in 
outreach activities ranging from passing out fliers to going to door to door to 
administer vaccinations (Njuguna et al, 2013). When I asked people I encountered 
while in Kibera where they get their health information or for sources of 
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trustworthy information, a large portion cited the CDC/KEMRI clinic even though 
none of them lived near the facility or participated in the surveillance system. Most 
of them had never received services from the clinic60 but they utilized the 
information to make decisions regarding their health.  
Though this experience is purely anecdotal, it does highlight one potential 
role for service providers to not only shape the micro-experience of health provision 
but also to contribute to the development of interpersonal and institutional trust, 
associational activity, and other aspects of social capital. While the CDC/KEMRI 
efforts appear to be inclusive and broad-based, other organizations may exert 
influence that is either intentionally or unintentionally inequitable or otherwise 
detrimental to the overall health of the community. In a study tracing the historical 
development of primary education provision in Madagascar, for example, Wietzke 
(2014) describes how the early predominance of missionary schools significantly 
contributed to current inequalities in educational outcomes, uneven patterns of 
state provision, and group-based inequalities along ethnolinguistic and religious 
lines.  
Consequently, the centrality of the health system—both the individual 
service providers and the system as a whole, however fragmented and complex it 
may be—to the micro-experience is not adequately addressed in existing literature 
on the accessibility, quality, and equity of state and non-state provision in 
developing countries. Scholars certainly acknowledge the importance of the 
organizational environment, but the difficulty inherent in accounting for the 
plethora of formal and informal service providers operating within a defined area, 
the connections between them, and their effects on household-level experiences has 
made it much easier to focus on individual providers or a subset of providers. As 
Gilson (2003) noted in her work on health care as a social institution, however, 
“future analysis and policy development must recognize that health systems are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Some said it was too expensive or too far away, others cited high demand, and others said that, 
while they trust the information provided by the clinic they prefer to go to the chemist unless they 
have a major health problem. 
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complex sociopolitical institutions and not merely delivery points for bio-medical 
interventions” (p. 1463).  
Data 
In addition to the household survey, this chapter draws on data from the 
African Population and Health Research Center’s “Partnership for a Healthy 
Nairobi” study (2013). Recognizing that the delivery of primary health care to urban 
slum residents has been largely unsuccessful due the absence of government 
provision and inadequate partnerships among private sector actors, APHRC, with 
assistance from the Kenyan government and several other NGOs, designed the 
study to examine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of strengthening public-
private partnerships to provide integrated primary care in these settings. The study 
areas included both Kibera and Korogocho. Researchers collected extensive data on 
all identifiable civil society organizations in the communities, all health facilities 
(including chemists), and midwives and traditional birth attendants. The majority 
of the interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2010. Though the 
organizational landscape has changed over the past several years, having access to 
the data allowed me to make some broad characterizations of the health providers 
and community groups in the slums and villages selected for the household survey. 
I will review the descriptive statistics in the next section, but Table 7.1 lists the 
variables of interest from the data set and the factor variables employed in the 
analyses. The third column of the table lists the organizational or sociopolitical 
factor(s) related to the variable.61  
  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Though individual variables are unable to fully capture the factors as roughly conceptualized in 
the previous section, they may offer insight into particular dimensions. 
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Table 7.1: Organizational Variables 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
For each variable below, there are two values for each village and settlement. The first includes all 
CSOs regardless of the organization’s activities. The second includes only the subset of CSOs whose 
main focus is health. 
Variable Description Indicator 
Number of CSOs  The data set included the location of each 
organization by slum and village. I tabulated the 
number for each slum and each village. 
Associational activity 
Number of 
partners 
Each organization was asked to name all other 
organizations with whom the organization has 
worked with in implementing its activities. I 
calculated the mean number of partners for CSOs 
in each village and slum and the percentage of 
CSOs in each location that have partners.  
Cooperation, organization 
around health 
Network 
membership 
Each organization was asked whether it is member 
of a formal network or association within the slum 
or in the larger city. I tabulated the number and 
percentage of CSOs in networks by location. 
Networks, cooperation, 
organization around health 
Representation The community health committees, divisional 
health stakeholder forums, and district health 
stakeholder forums offer a formal mechanism for 
civil society groups and service providers to gather 
and jointly plan and review progress on health 
initiatives and goals. Each CSO was asked whether 
someone associated with the organization 
participates on the committee at each level. I 
calculated the number and percentage of 
organizations with representation.  
Integration/embeddedness, 
organization around health  
Community 
advocacy 
Indicates the number and percent of CSOs that 
reported undertaking advocacy activities directed 
at the community to support its activities.  
Social embeddedness, 
information transmission 
Decision maker 
advocacy 
Indicates the number and percent of CSOs that 
carry out advocacy activities to influence those in 
decision-making affecting their activities.  
Organization around health 
Donor funding Indicates the number and percentage of CSOs that 
received funding from an external donor in the 
previous five years. 
Capacity, integration 
Technical support Indicates the number and percentage of CSOs that 
reported receiving technical assistance or support 
from another organization. 
Cooperation 
Health Service Providers 
Number of 
providers 
Count of all health service providers operating 
within each slum and village at the time of the 
study  
Organization around health 
Electricity Number and percentage of providers in each 
location with electricity 
Quality of facilities 
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Inpatient care Number and percentage of providers that offer 
inpatient care or overnight observation  
Availability of services 
Immunization Number and percentage of providers that offer 
routine immunizations 
Availability of services 
Fees Number and percentage of providers that charge 
fees for services 
Organizational type 
Posted fees Of the providers that charge fees, the portion that 
had information about fees available for 
prospective patients 
Transparency, information, 
organizational type 
Uniformity of fees Of the providers that charge fees, the portion that 
applies those fees uniformly across all patients 
Organizational type 
Fee adjustments 
based on ability 
to pay  
Of the providers that charge fees that are not 
uniformly applied across the population, the 
portion that cited patients’ financial situation, 
socioeconomic status, ability to pay, or poverty 
level as criteria for determining how much patients 
are charged 
Organizational Type 
Factor Variables  
Representation Factor variable measuring CSO representation. 
Components, with factor loadings in parentheses, 
include: percent of CSOs represented on 
community health committee (0.23); percent of 
CSOs represented in divisional health stakeholder 
forum (0.16); percent of CSOs represented in 
district health stakeholder forum (0.49); number of 
CSOs with a focus on health (0.36). 
Integration, networks, 
collaboration 
Health CSOs Factor variable measuring integration of health 
CSOs in the community. Components, with factor 
loadings in parentheses, include the number of 
health CSOs that partner with other health 
organizations and providers in the community 
(1.17); percent of health CSOs represented on 
community health committee (0.64). 
Organization around health 
Fee Factor variable measuring the fee structure of 
service providers in the community. Low values 
indicate fewer fees and more flexibility to 
accommodate patients who cannot afford fees. 
Components, with factor loadings in parentheses: 
percent of providers that charge fees for services 
(0.48); percent of fee-charging providers that post 
fees (0.06); percent of fee-charging providers that 
apply fees uniformly (-0.50); percent of non-uniform 
fee-charging providers that take financial situation 
into consideration (-0.03). 
Organizational 
type/characteristics 
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Advocacy Factor variable measuring the advocacy efforts of 
CSOs and health CSOs. Components, with factor 
loadings in parentheses, include the percent of 
CSOs engaged in advocacy in the community 
(0.10); percent of CSOs that direct advocacy efforts 
towards decision makers (0.17); percent of health 
CSOs engaged in community advocacy (0.30); 
percent of health CSOs that direct advocacy toward 
decision makers (0.62). 
Organization and leadership 
around health 
Services Factor variable measuring availability of services 
in the community. Components, with factor 
loadings in parentheses, include the percent of 
providers with electricity (0.35); percent of 
providers that offer inpatient care (0.84); percent of 
providers that offer immunizations (0.40); number 
of providers in the community (0.10). 
Organizational 
characteristics 
	  
Community-Level Differences in the Micro-Experience  
Aggregate Experiences of Health Services 
The most noticeable pattern in the descriptive statistics in this section is 
that, on average, residents of Kibera view health services as more accessible and of 
higher quality than residents of Korogocho, and they report greater satisfaction 
with their experiences and fewer problems obtaining necessary treatment. 
Additionally, while there are clearly differences between villages, the magnitude of 
the variations is relatively small. Table 7.2 displays the average values of variables 
measuring respondents’ perceptions of health provision by settlement and village.62 
At the slum level, Korogocho residents report, on average, fewer feasible options for 
service providers, more difficulty accessing non-state services, lower quality 
provision by both state and non-state actors, lower satisfaction with the quality of 
health services in the community, and lower confidence that most people in the 
community are able to access quality services. The largest difference occurs for the 
accessibility of non-state services, but the perceived accessibility of public health 
services is higher in Korogocho. At the village level, Raila generally has the lowest 
or one of the lowest scores among villages in Kibera across the table. This is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Additional descriptive statistics on perceptions and assessments of service provision by village are 
listed in Appendix H. 
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particularly true for the quality of public health provision and satisfaction with the 
quality of services available in the community.  
Table 7.2: Health Perception Descriptive Statistics by Slum and Village 
 Number of 
Health Provider 
Options 
Accessibility 
of Public 
Providersa 
Accessibility 
of Non-State 
Providersa 
Quality of 
Public Health 
Provisionb 
Quality of 
Non-State 
Provisionb 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Kibera 1.58 0.07 2.34 0.04 2.82 0.04 5.42 0.08 8.20 0.04 
  Kianda 1.68 0.25 2.35 0.07 2.81 0.09 5.74 0.18 8.28 0.08 
  Kisumu Ndogo  1.58 0.09 2.20 0.09 2.91 0.09 5.18 0.18 8.27 0.09 
  Laini Saba 1.54 0.06 2.40 0.05 2.86 0.06 5.54 0.11 8.17 0.07 
  Raila 1.55 0.08 2.33 0.11 2.61 0.09 4.88 0.18 8.10 0.12 
Korogocho 1.49 0.04 2.52 0.04 2.58 0.04 5.27 0.07 8.04 0.05 
  Highridge 1.52 0.05 2.50 0.06 2.61 0.07 5.22 0.11 7.95 0.08 
  Kisumu Ndogo 1.54 0.08 2.45 0.06 2.54 0.08 5.36 0.13 7.83 0.11 
  Korogocho B 1.40 0.06 2.63 0.07 2.59 0.09 5.25 0.14 8.48 0.07 
a Measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where one is the least accessible and 4 is the most accessible. 
b Factor scores, where min≈2 and max≈9. 
 
 Satisfaction with 
Quality of Health 
Services 
Community-wide 
Access to Health 
Services 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Kibera 2.83 0.03 2.62 0.03 
  Kianda 2.85 0.06 2.68 0.07 
  Kisumu Ndogo  3.00 0.07 2.58 0.08 
  Laini Saba 2.80 0.04 2.59 0.05 
  Raila 2.69 0.07 2.63 0.10 
Korogocho 2.73 0.03 2.44 0.04 
  Highridge 2.76 0.05 2.46 0.06 
  Kisumu Ndogo 2.69 0.06 2.33 0.06 
  Korogocho B 2.70 0.07 2.53 0.07 
Satisfaction and access are measured from lowest to highest on a 
scale of 1 to 4 
 
Table 7.3 provides average values for measures of utilization and satisfaction. 
On average, residents of Korogocho were less able to access services last time 
treatment was needed, visited fewer facilities, relied on public providers for most of 
their health services, reported fewer interactions with non-state providers, and 
were less satisfied with services at the facility most frequently visited by members 
of the household. The percentage of respondents that had experience with public 
health providers was the same in both Kibera and Korogocho. At the village level, 
satisfaction with services was noticeably lower in Raila than in other villages in 
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Kibera. Households in Raila are more likely to utilize public services, however, and 
they frequent government health centers. By contrast, most of the public facilities 
visited by households from other villages are district and national hospitals, where 
average satisfaction scores are higher than government health centers. The 
experiences of Raila residents more closely resemble households from Korogocho, 
where most respondents that interacted with government providers utilized public 
health centers and few visited hospitals.  
Table 7.3: Health Service Utilization and Satisfaction Statistics                  
by Village and Slum 
 
No Care 
Number of 
Facilities 
Visited 
Any Non-
State Health 
Any Public 
Health 
Public 
Provider 
Satisfaction 
with Health 
Services 
 Avg. SE Avg. SE Avg. SE Avg. SE Avg. SE Avg. SE 
Kibera 0.09 0.01 2.03 0.05 0.77 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.32 0.02 6.93 0.03 
  Kianda 0.13 0.25 1.95 0.10 0.75 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.38 0.04 7.04 0.04 
  Kisumu Ndogo  0.07 0.09 2.10 0.13 0.61 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.15 0.04 7.05 0.06 
  Laini Saba 0.07 0.06 1.93 0.07 0.75 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.33 0.03 6.90 0.04 
  Raila 0.09 0.08 2.36 0.16 0.75 0.05 0.64 0.06 0.39 0.06 6.65 0.10 
Korogocho 0.14 0.02 1.65 0.05 0.60 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.47 0.02 6.63 0.04 
  Highridge 0.15 0.05 1.71 0.07 0.63 0.03 0.49 0.03 0.43 0.03 6.67 0.06 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0.15 0.08 1.69 0.09 0.86 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.48 0.04 6.57 0.07 
  Korogocho B 0.13 0.06 1.47 0.07 0.52 0.04 0.58 0.04 0.52 0.05 6.65 0.09 
 
Differences in Regression Results from Chapter 5 
In addition to the comparatively favorable perceptions and experiences of 
households in Kibera, results from multilevel mixed effects models in Chapter 5 
suggest that the effects of household- and community-level sociopolitical 
characteristics on the micro-experience of health provision vary by settlement. 
When the dependent variable indicated whether the household was able to access 
services last time treatment was needed, higher household-level community 
involvement correlated with decreases in the probability of being unable to receive 
care in Korogocho, but the sociopolitical variables were not significant for the 
Kibera subsample. For all other dependent variables, however, sociopolitical factors 
at both the household and village levels wielded much greater influence over 
outcomes in Kibera. Household-level bridging trust and village-level bridging trust 
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and associational activity were all significantly and positively associated with 
perceived accessibility of non-state health services in Kibera. For Korogocho, 
household-level community involvement was the only statistically significant 
association, and higher levels of involvement were negatively associated with 
accessibility. The last dependent variable for which separate models revealed 
disparate results was the affordability of fees at the service provider most 
frequently visited by members of the household. Village-level associational activity 
and bridging trust were both positively associated with affordability in Kibera, but 
neither was significant in Korogocho.       
Community-Level Differences: Organizational Context 
The differences highlighted above and the limited ability of the household-
level factors and community-level sociopolitical variables from previous chapters to 
fully explain observed variations in the micro-experience of health services suggest 
that other meso-level factors shape households’ capacity to access quality services. 
According to existing research, the availability of accessible, equitable, quality 
healthcare depends on the characteristics of the health system, and the 
community’s ability to ensure that the system meets their needs depends on their 
power to hold the health system accountable (Berlan & Shiffman, 2012; Rifkin, 
2003). Therefore, in addition to the organizational factors related to the providers 
and health system, the prospects for accountability depend on characteristics of civil 
society organizations and the relationships between service providers and 
community groups and organizations. 
Health Service Providers 
The APHRC data on health service providers operating in Kibera and 
Korogocho offer limited insight into the service environment. Facility names were 
excluded from the microdata, so I am unable to compare service indicators with 
households’ experiences. Furthermore, the study focused on factors related to 
staffing, availability of equipment and supplies, and services offered. Though this 
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information can be used to assess the technical capacity of providers, it offers no 
indication of providers’ target population, cooperation with other providers, 
participation in formal and informal networks, governance and oversight 
procedures, length of time in operation, staff turnover, relationship with community 
organizations and the government, and other characteristics that affect households’ 
experiences.63  
Table 7.4: Health Facilities by Managing Authority 
 Government FBO NGO CBO Private for-profit Total 
Kibera 2 9 13 5 149 178 
  Kianda 0 0 0 0 1 2 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0 0 2 1 1 4 
  Laini Saba 0 1 2 1 35 39 
  Raila 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Korogocho 2 7 10 8 157 184 
  Highridge 0 2 0 0 1 3 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0 0 0 0 3 3 
  Korogocho B 0 0 1 1 2 4 
Source: APHRC, 2013 
 
In spite of the limitations, available measures provide a general overview of 
the providers operating within the communities.64 Table 7.4 lists the number of 
health facilities (excluding chemists and pharmacies) operating in each settlement 
and village by managing authority.65 Some of the providers are not located within 
the boundaries of Kibera and Korogocho but are included because they serve 
residents of the settlements.66 Given the perceptual and experiential differences 
highlighted above, it is surprising that the number of providers in each slum is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The civil society data includes some of this information for a limited number of NSPs operated by 
NGOs and CBOs, so I address some of these factors in subsequent sections. 
64 Additional statistics on health providers can be found in Appendix H. 
65 The numbers are not current as the data was collected in 2009, but the table portrays a more 
accurate picture of the service landscape than the Master Facility List disseminated by the Ministry 
of Health. A large number of providers are not registered and do not appear on formal lists, but all 
facilities were included in the APHRC data. 
66 This is particularly true for government facilities. The data was collected before the public 
Korogocho Health Center opened in 2014, so both government providers connected with the 
settlement are located in nearby communities (Kariobangi and Babadogo). The situation is similar in 
Kibera; the DO Health Center is located at the chief’s compound at the entrance to the slum, but the 
other (Langata Health Center) is a short distance south of Raila. 
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roughly equal—particularly since the population of Kibera is much larger. With the 
exception of Laini Saba, the number of providers located in each village is small.  
The characteristics of the service providers in Table 7.5 show few differences 
at the slum level. The portion of facilities with electricity and that offer inpatient 
and immunization services is higher in Korogocho, but the availability of both 
immunizations and inpatient care is low across both settlements. There is more 
variation at the village level; service availability is not evenly distributed 
geographically in either slum.  
Table 7.5: Characteristics of Health Service Providers 
 Percent 
with 
electricity 
Continuous 
electricity a 
Obtains drugs 
from Ministry of 
Health 
Inpatient Immunizations 
Kibera 83% 43% 12% 9% 16% 
  Kianda 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 75% 50% 50% 25% 75% 
  Laini Saba 82% 54% 3% 13% 10% 
  Raila 50% 0% 50% 0% 50% 
Korogocho 89% 58% 14% 17% 20% 
  Highridge 100% 100% 0% 33% 33% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 100% 67% 0% 0% 0% 
  Korogocho B 50% 50% 0% 0% 25% 
a Electricity was continuous if there were no major disruptions in service during the week prior to the 
interview.  
Source: APHRC, 2013 
 
Table 7.6 displays an overview of the services offered by health providers in 
Kibera and Korogocho. The total number of facilities is 178 in Kibera and 184 in 
Korogocho, but the low number of providers offering many services reveals some of 
the inadequacies of the health system in both communities. The official populations 
of Kibera and Korogocho are approximately 200,000 and 50,000 respectively, and 
the median number of rooms among all facilities is 3 (total number of rooms, not 
just exam rooms). With only one or two providers offer common services like 
assisted delivery and x-rays, households’ ability to access these services is likely 
limited.  
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Table 7.6: Services Offered at Clinics and Health Facilities 
 Kibera Korogocho 
Offers TB diagnosis 20 25 
Offers TB treatment 13 9 
Offers immunizations 29 36 
Offers HIV testing 64 77 
Offers antiretroviral therapy 13 8 
Offers treatment of opportunistic infections 86 78 
Offers minor surgery and wound care 69 131 
Offers assisted delivery 1 2 
Offers caesarian section 1 0 
Offers oral health care 93 57 
Offers inpatient care 16 32 
Offers ultrasound 1 0 
Offers x-ray 1 0 
Offers CT scan or MRI 1 0 
Offers blood transfusion 1 0 
Offers oxygen 1 0 
Operating theater available 1 0 
Offers trauma surgery 1 1 
Facility has a clinical officer and either an RN or registered midwife 33 47 
Facility has a clinical officer only 36 25 
Facility has either a registered nurse or registered midwife only 47 66 
Facility does not have a CO, RN, or RM 62 46 
Source: APHRC, 2013   
 
One set of questions included in the APHRC service assessment instrument 
captures information about service fees, providing insight into the financial 
dimension of the micro-experience. Table 7.7 lists the percentage of facilities that 
charge fees for health services, as well as the portion of fee-charging facilities that 
post or furnish a list of fees, apply fees uniformly across all patients, and consider 
financial situation when adjusting fees. Fewer facilities in Kibera collect fees, but 
more fee-charging facilities in Korogocho adjust fees based on patients’ ability to 
pay. 
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Table 7.7: Indicators of Service Fees by Village and Slum 
 Charges 
fees for 
services 
Fees posted 
 (% of those that 
charge) 
Fees 
uniformly 
applied 
Non-uniform fees 
depend on financial 
situation 
(% of those without uniform fees) 
Kibera 89% 51% 60% 31% 
  Kianda 50% 0% 100% -- 
  Kisumu Ndogo 50% 50% 50% 100% 
  Laini Saba 95% 49% 49% 21% 
  Raila 100% 50% 50% 0% 
Korogocho 96% 21% 23% 23% 
  Highridge 100% 33% 0% 33% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 100% 0% 0% 33% 
  Korogocho B 75% 100% 0% 33% 
Source: APHRC, 2013 	  
Civil Society 
Organizations 
Within the APHRC data on civil society organizations located in Kibera and 
Korogocho, there are several variables that relate to meso-level sociopolitical and 
organizational conditions that may affect households’ micro-experience of health 
provision. Table 7.8 displays the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
operating in each village and slum when the data was collected in 2009. Given the 
population differences across settlements and villages, the distribution of CSOs by 
location does not offer much insight. Even after accounting for population, however, 
the large number of CSOs in Korogocho B is initially puzzling. Based on the 
household survey, Korogocho B has the lowest level of associational activity out of 
all villages in the sample. This discrepancy highlights the danger in using singular 
measures such as the number of organizations to represent a factor like 
associational activity when the theoretical concept and mechanisms depend on the 
depth and breadth of the interactions facilitated by group membership. The village 
is located at the center of Korogocho, and a closer look at the organizations listed for 
Korogocho B shows that the majority of these CSOs do not promote associational 
activity within the village. Several are non-formal schools, others are external 
NGOs with operations in the slum, and some are service providers that do not 
involve group membership or activities.  
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Though not conveyed in any of the quantitative indicators in the tables in 
this section, a review of the mission statements of all CSOs yielded a noticeable 
difference in the nature of associations in the settlements. Of the 259 organizations 
in Korogocho, 86 are inwardly focused; their mission statements reference 
“members,” and goals are limited to securing benefits for members. The most 
common activities include providing financial assistance to members in need and 
supporting one another. Among the 317 CSOs in Kibera, only 16 expressed an 
inward focus; an additional 11 included references to both members and the larger 
community.  
The relative concentration of membership-focused organizations in Korogocho 
and community-focused organizations in Kibera may partially account for several of 
the differences noted in the previous section. First, the number of CSOs that 
provide support to members in Korogocho could explain why higher household-level 
community involvement is associated with a decrease in the probability of being 
unable to access care when treatment was needed. In Kibera, where fewer 
formalized channels for assistance exist, community involvement has no effect on 
access. Second, the larger share of CSOs targeting community-wide improvements 
and support in Kibera may explain why village-level associational activity is 
positively and significantly associated with the accessibility of non-state services 
and the affordability of fees at the facility most frequently visited by household 
members. Steinberg and Baxter (1998) argue that community accountability 
promotes affordability and access, and effective mechanisms for accountability 
require collective action and organization around health concerns. Though the 
presence of organizations working for community-wide changes is an insufficient 
proxy for accountability, it may indicate greater potential for effective 
accountability compared to communities without such organizations. 
Partnerships and Networks 
As a possible indicator of the extent of cooperation among groups and the 
strength of networks, I calculated the average number of partners the organizations 
reported working with in implementing their activities. Both the average number of 
	   260 
partners and the percent of all CSOs with partners are higher in Kibera. Comparing 
the average number of partners by village in Kibera to some of the village-level 
sociopolitical factors from Chapter 6 (in Table 6.4), the relative values of average 
partners correlate perfectly (and positively) with group membership but not with 
bridging trust. One of the consistent findings from previous chapters was the 
difference between the effects of structural forms of social capital (e.g., group 
membership) and the cognitive forms (e.g., bridging trust). The correlation between 
organizational partnerships and group membership may suggest a similar pattern 
at the organizational level.67  
Table 7.8: Civil Society Organizations and Partnerships                                
by Slum and Village 
 Number 
of CSOs 
Mean Number 
of Partners 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Percent of all 
organizations 
 with partners 
Kibera 317 2.21 2.11 0 9 73% 
  Kianda 19 2.11 2.23 0 7 68% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 9 2.78 2.59 0 7 78% 
  Laini Saba 42 1.88 2.11 0 9 74% 
  Raila 7 3.86 2.54 0 7 86% 
Korogocho 259 1.42 1.71 0 6 54% 
  Highridge 18 1.22 1.77 0 5 44% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 12 1.17 1.59 0 5 50% 
  Korogocho B 40 1.68 1.54 0 5 70% 
Source: APHRC, 2013     
 
The percentages reported in Table 7.9 provide additional information about 
the organizational context. The portion of CSOs in each location that belong to 
formal networks closely mirrors the data on partnerships, though fewer 
organizations participate in networks. One component of Kenya’s second National 
Health Sector Strategic Plan and its focus on community empowerment was the 
creation of committees and forums at the community, division, and district levels to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 A high level of interpersonal trust among households within a community may not be necessary 
for the formation of organizational partnerships. Since the effectiveness of partnerships is likely 
what matters in the context of health and education provision, however, interpersonal trust may still 
be a crucial determinant of effectiveness. Though purely speculative and based on a small sample, 
these observations once again caution against the use of indicators that are insufficient proxies for 
the concept of interest. 
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bring together community groups, civil society organizations, and government 
officials to jointly review progress toward health targets and give the public 
opportunities to help shape policies and programs (Luoma et al, 2010). The portion 
of CSOs with representation on the community health committee, divisional health 
stakeholder forum, and district health stakeholder forum may be indicators of both 
cooperation among organizations and the integration of health services into 
community life. The focus of the vast majority of these CSOs is not health, but their 
participation in committees designed to facilitate coordination and cooperation and 
improve health outcomes may be indicative of broad-based organization and 
collaboration around health concerns and service provision. To the extent that 
health service providers in the community also actively participate in these 
committees, there may be greater emphasis on the interdependence of health 
provision and other areas of community activity and providers may be more socially 
embedded in the communities. The significantly higher share of CSOs represented 
at all levels in Kibera may contribute to the differences in the micro-experience 
between the settlements. 
Table 7.9: Civil Society Organizations and Representation                           
by Slum and Village 
 Percent of 
CSOs in 
networks 
Percent represented 
in community 
health committee 
Percent represented 
in divisional health 
stakeholder forum 
Percent represented 
in district health 
stakeholder forum 
Kibera 62% 66% 46% 33% 
  Kianda 26% 58% 37% 26% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 33% 56% 44% 33% 
  Laini Saba 48% 86% 64% 40% 
  Raila 43% 43% 29% 14% 
Korogocho 53% 49% 17% 14% 
  Highridge 61% 56% 17% 11% 
  Kisumu Ndogo 17% 42% 8% 17% 
  Korogocho B 58% 40% 18% 15% 
Source: APHRC, 2013 
 
Health Partnerships 
Whereas statistics in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 include all CSOs operating within 
each settlement and village, the figures displayed in Table 7.10 are limited to CSOs 
whose main focus is health. Partnerships with other health organizations may be 
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indicative of cooperation and coordination, and organizations that undertake 
advocacy activities directed toward the community may increase engagement and 
social embeddedness. Advocacy activities directed at decision makers and 
representation in the area stakeholder forums could signal strong organization and 
leadership around health, service coordination, and mechanisms for community 
participation. Additionally, public officials and health providers are generally 
involved in the community, divisional, and district forums; high levels of 
participation by NSPs and health organizations may strengthen ties between the 
public and private sectors. Research on the relationship between non-state 
providers and the state suggests that the extent and nature of linkages between the 
state and NSPs have important implications for access, equity, and sustainability 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002; Cammett & MacLean, 2011; Mercer, 1999, 2002; Teamey & 
McLoughlin, 2009).  
A quick glance at the table is instructive. According to the community-level 
sociopolitical scores in Table 6.4, Raila has the highest level of associational activity 
and political activism of all the villages. At the same time, average satisfaction with 
service experiences, satisfaction with the quality of services available in the 
community, and perceptions of the quality of both state and non-state services are 
among the lowest in the sample (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3). This is surprising given 
the theorized role of associational activity and activism in promoting accountability 
and accessibility, but data from Tables 7.9 and 7.10 indicate that there is very little 
organization within the village around health concerns. Among all CSOs in the 
village, representation on community, district, and divisional committees is the 
lowest in Kibera. There are no CSOs with a health focus, and no groups appear to 
be engaging community members and leaders in dialog or efforts to improve health 
service provision.  
At the household level, group membership and community involvement may 
facilitate the transmission of information and resources to help navigate the health 
system and access services, and the level of associational activity within the village 
likely enhances these mechanisms by providing more opportunities for involvement 
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and a larger base of knowledge and experiences to draw from. For these 
mechanisms, the purposes of the groups and the goals they seek to accomplish could 
be irrelevant. At the community level, however, the independent effects of 
associational activity on the micro-experience of service provision may depend on 
the nature of the informal and formal organizations. Strong organization and 
leadership around health issues is a condition specified in the theoretical 
framework, and its importance is heightened in contexts like informal settlements 
where the service environment is fragmented, regulatory mechanisms are weak or 
non-existent, and health literacy is low. CSOs and community groups can play a 
major role in disseminating health information, promoting cooperation and 
coordination among providers, and establishing and strengthening accountability 
mechanisms.  
Table 7.10: Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations                          
with a Health Focus  
 Number 
of CSOs 
Have 
health 
partners 
Community 
advocacy 
Decision 
maker 
advocacy 
Community 
Committee 
Divisional 
Forum 
District 
Forum 
Kibera 49 26 46 41 40 36 32 
  Kianda 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 
  Kisumu Ndogo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Laini Saba 6 1 5 5 5 5 4 
  Raila 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korogocho 24 10 20 16 16 11 9 
  Highridge 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Korogocho B 5 4 5 4 3 2 1 
Source: APHRC, 2013    
 
As is often the case, going beyond the number of partnerships and exploring 
the nature of the partnerships reveals additional organizational-level differences. 
One of the key conditions outlined in the first section is the integration or 
embeddedness of health issues and health services into the sociopolitical fabric of 
the community. In Kibera, 64 CSOs have at least one partner that is either a health 
service provider or an organization formed to promote improvements in health 
provision and community health. Only 26 of these CSOs are primarily focused on 
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health; the fact that 38 non-health organizations have health partners signals some 
level of integration and embeddedness. The situation is different in Korogocho, 
where only 27 CSOs report partnerships with health organizations. Ten of these are 
health-focused organizations, and the most-frequently cited health partner is 
APHRC, an external policy research organization with an office in the settlement. 
While APHRC does promote improvements in health service provision in Korogocho, 
it is unlikely that external leadership and organization around health concerns 
engenders strong community accountability—unless and until the community takes 
ownership of externally imposed efforts (Bose, 1983, Otieno, 2012; Steinberg & 
Baxter, 1998).  
Looking even more closely at the individual partnerships and organizations 
involved further accentuates the contrast between Kibera and Korogocho. CSOs in 
Kibera that either directly provide health services or focus on improving health 
outcomes and/or service provision frequently partner with schools, self-help groups, 
youth groups, and other organizations concentrating on sanitation, public safety, 
and community development. Table 7.11 describes some of these partnerships and 
comparable relationships in Korogocho. Although the data does not indicate the 
nature of the partnerships or the activities involved, the breadth of the 
relationships between service providers and CSOs suggests a significantly higher 
level of social embeddedness of health provision in Kibera than in Korogocho. 
Involvement in community development, sanitation, and safety efforts fosters 
integration between health and other sectors. Furthermore, the dissemination of 
information is a key component of accountability mechanisms, broad-based 
accessibility, and other conditions on which the micro-experience of services depend. 
By interacting with schools and youth groups, service providers have opportunities 
to promote health literacy and preventative care from an early age.    
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Table 7.11: Partnerships between CSOs and Health Service Providers 
 Kibera Korogocho 
Schools 
20 CSO schools in Kibera cited at 
least one CSO health service provider 
within the community as a partner. 
No partnerships documented. 
Self-
Help 
Groups 
65 self-help groups work with at least 
one CSO health service provider 
within the community. 12 of these 65 
self-help groups focus on HIV/AIDS. 
5 self-help groups partner with CSO service 
providers. 2 of the groups focus on HIV/AIDS, and 
one group supports “mentally handicapped” 
residents and partners with Mathari Hospital, the 
government mental health care facility in Nairobi 
(located outside Korogocho). 
Youth 
Groups 
6 youth groups have a partnership 
with at least one CSO health service 
provider in Kibera. 1 of these groups 
focuses on sports, and 1 is organized 
by a health facility (AMREF). 
No partnerships documented. 
Other 
CSOs 
4 additional partnerships: 1 is a 
community policing CBO, 1 is a 
sanitation CBO that organizes 
garbage collection, and 2 are 
community development 
organizations. 
5 additional partnerships: 4 AIDS NGOs, two of 
which are located outside of Korogocho in 
Kariobangi, partner with CSO and public health 
service providers. APHRC (external policy research 
organization with office in Korogocho) partners 
with 2 CSO health service providers. 
Source: Author’s analysis of APHRC data (2013) 
 
In addition to offering insight into the social embeddedness of the health 
system, data on partnerships between non-state service providers may present one 
indication of the level of cooperation and coordination within the service 
environment. Since the data only includes NGOs, FBOs, and CBOs and similar 
information is unavailable for public health facilities and the plethora of private for-
profit providers, insight into cooperation and coordination is limited. Nevertheless, 
contrasts are immediately apparent. Chemi Chemi ya Uzima is a small but heavily 
utilized faith-based clinic in Kibera, and its partners include a nearby NGO service 
provider, a private for-profit clinic, the nearest public health center, and Kenyatta 
National Hospital. Chemi Chemi ya Uzima is also in a formal network with another 
public health center and is represented in stakeholder forums at the community, 
division, and district levels. Similarly, Frepals Community Nursing Home, an NGO 
clinic in Kibera, partners with the Ministry of Health and a number of other NGO 
and private for-profit service providers in the settlement, belongs to a formal 
network of health facilities, and is represented at the community and divisional 
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levels. Of the 14 CSO service providers in Kibera, 10 list at least one other health 
service provider in the community as a partner.  
In Korogocho, however, such partnerships are rare. Service providers may 
have partners, but the partner organizations do not provide health services and are 
often external groups. Makwak, a CBO clinic in Korogocho B utilized by a number 
of respondents, cites Nairobi City Council and the international organization World 
Vision as partners. It does not participate in any networks and is not represented in 
health committees at any level. Vision Peoples in Mission is a faith-based provider 
frequently visited by survey participants, and its only partner is the Christian 
Health Association of Kenya (CHAK), a national umbrella organization for faith-
based health organizations. The sole partner of one organization whose mission is 
“to advise the community on health issues” is the National AIDS Control Council, 
and the CSO is not represented beyond the community health committee and does 
not belong to any networks. Of the 14 CSO health service providers in Korogocho, 4 
report partnerships with other providers, and all of the services available at 2 of 
these CSOs are intended for patients with HIV/AIDS.  
Another example that relates to both coordination and social embeddedness 
is the divergent organizational characteristics of community health workers 
(CHWs) in Kibera and Korogocho. Though the role and activities of CHWs vary by 
location, utilizing community members to assist with basic health services is central 
to Kenya’s health strategy to address the shortage of health professionals and to 
empower communities to take ownership and responsibility for health services 
(Otieno, 2012). Three of the CSOs in the APHRC data set are associations of CHWs; 
two are located in Kibera and one is in Korogocho. The Korogocho Community 
Health Workers are represented on the community health committee, but not at the 
district or division forums. The group does not participate in any networks, and it 
has no partnerships with service providers or organizations in Korogocho. A more 
recent in-depth study of CHWs in Korogocho noted that only 35 of 400 CHWs are 
active, and there is little coordination among them (Otieno, 2012). In Kibera, both 
CHW organizations are represented at the community, division, and district levels 
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and partner with service providers and other CSOs located inside and outside the 
settlement.   
In general, there appears to be far less coordination and cooperation between 
service providers in Korogocho than in Kibera, and service providers are much less 
likely to participate in stakeholder forums. A number of external organizations do 
partner with individual providers. This may improve capacity or promote higher 
quality services, but such partnerships can contribute to fragmentation rather than 
coordination.  
Additional Observations 
Before concluding the review of the organizational contexts in Kibera and 
Korogocho there are two additional observations of note. The first is the potentially 
outsized role of individual organizations in fostering and sustaining the integration, 
embeddedness, cooperation, coordination, and accountability mechanisms 
associated with improvements in health service provision. Many—if not most—of 
the partnerships between service providers and CSOs in Kibera include clinics 
operated by the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) and Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF). The AMREF facility is located in Laini Saba, while MSF 
runs clinics in Kisumu Ndogo and Olympic. Both of these international NGOs 
receive significant external funding, both have been working in the slum for many 
years, and community engagement and health promotion are central to the 
activities of both organizations. Though examining the contributions of AMREF and 
MSF and assessing the degree to which they are primarily responsible for existing 
contextual features is not possible without additional research, it warrants further 
investigation. Experiences cited in existing literature suggest that externally 
imposed organization and mobilization are ineffective, particularly in empowering 
communities to hold health service providers accountable (Bose, 1983; Otieno, 2012; 
Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Steinberg & Baxter, 1998). If partnerships and 
organization around health within civil society facilitate accessible, equitable, and 
sustainable service provision, understanding if, how, and under what conditions 
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individual providers and external organizations can initiate effective partnerships 
is crucial. 
The second lingering issue is the role of community-level bridging trust. One 
of the key findings from Chapter 6 is the persistent significance of community-level 
bridging trust, particularly in the context of non-state provision. However, a 
statistical association offers little insight into the mechanism or mechanisms by 
which trust facilitates improvements in health service utilization and satisfaction. 
As communities and community organizations play an increasing role in public 
health policies and development strategies, applied research must offer more than 
vague invocations of collective action and accountability. Though the sample size is 
small, exploring the relationship between village-level bridging trust and other 
meso-level factors suggests possible areas for further research.  
Table 7.12: Correlations Between Village-Level Variables 
N=7 Health Sat Rep 
Health 
CSO Advocacy Fee Services ELF Group PCA Bridging 
Avg. HealthSat 1.00          
Representation 0.61 1.00         
Health CSO 0.21 0.01 1.00        
Advocacy 0.46 0.52 0.83** 1.00       
Fee -0.90*** -0.33 -0.22 -0.33 1.00      
Services 0.31 0.21 -0.28 -0.20 0.01 1.00     
ELF -0.02 -0.14 -0.51 -0.35 -0.22 -0.40 1.00    
Group mem. 0.43 0.14 -0.41 -0.15 -0.54 -0.03 0.78** 1.00   
PCA 0.43 0.14 -0.62 -0.39 -0.54 0.10 0.73* 0.93*** 1.00  
Bridging trust 0.87*** 0.78** 0.18 0.52 -0.58 0.56 -0.31 0.23 0.22 1.00 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients displayed in Table 7.12 reveal several 
notable correlations. As implied by regression coefficient estimates in previous 
chapters, the correlation of 0.87 between village-level bridging trust and the 
average health satisfaction score among households in the village is strong, positive, 
and highly significant. Bridging trust is also positively correlated with the factor 
scores for integration of health CSOs into the community, CSO advocacy activities, 
available services, associational activity, and political activism. It is negatively 
correlated with service fees and ethnolinguistic fragmentation. What is most 
interesting, however, is the strong, positive, statistically significant correlation 
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between bridging trust and the factor score for representation of both general CSOs 
and health CSOs on the community, division, and district health committees.  
The relationship makes sense on a theoretical level: bridging trust may 
contribute to the existence of CSOs focused on community-wide issues and 
improvements, encourage cooperation among CSOs, and promote involvement in 
internal and external efforts to strengthen health provision within and beyond the 
community. Health committees and stakeholder forums provide an institutionalized 
channel for community members and organizations to offer feedback, shape policy, 
and potentially hold public and private sector actors accountable to the needs of the 
community. To the extent that bridging trust promotes more inclusive associational 
activity and cultivates CSOs and community leaders that seek to represent the 
entire population, the benefits of representation may be more equitably distributed 
when bridging trust is higher. Though the relationships between bridging trust, 
inclusivity, and equity cannot be ascertained from data available for the 
dissertation, future research examining the nature of health-related associational 
activity, partnerships, representation, and organizational-level factors in 
communities with varying levels of bridging trust may help clarify the mechanisms 
involved in the association between bridging trust and the micro-experience of 
health services.  
Conclusion 
Through a qualitative comparison of the meso-level organizational contexts 
in Kibera and Korogocho, this chapter explored two puzzles. First, secondary data 
on health service providers in the two settlements offered no evidence of significant 
differences in the capacity or technical quality of provision between settlements, but 
indicators across the dimensions of the micro-experience were consistently more 
favorable in Kibera than in Korogocho. Furthermore, multi-level models including 
household socio-demographic characteristics and household- and community-level 
sociopolitical factors revealed differences in the effects if these explanatory 
variables between the two slums. Given the shared macro-level and institutional 
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contexts as informal settlements in Nairobi, what community-level factors account 
for the observed differences? The second puzzle is more conceptual and 
methodological. If meso-level sociopolitical and organizational contexts shape 
households’ access to, utilization of, and satisfaction with health services, how can 
meso-level factors be incorporated into research and policy development?  
To address these questions, I compared patterns from the household survey 
and the data on CSOs and CSO service providers through the lens of several meso-
level organizational factors found in existing literature. The qualitative 
examination yielded several findings relevant to the both puzzles, but two offer 
guidance for the theoretical and methodological challenges. First, many of the 
quantitative indicators proved to be inadequate proxies for the concepts. The 
numbers were occasionally misleading, and the most valuable insights came from 
reviews of organizational mission statements and partnerships.  
The second finding follows from the first; rather than relying on quantitative 
indicators, this analysis suggests that research on the meso-level context should 
focus on several key processes that operate on the meso level and affect households’ 
experiences with health services. Derived from existing literature and the analysis 
in this chapter, these processes are: 1) the transmission of information; 2) the 
integration or social embeddedness of services into the sociopolitical fabric of the 
community; 3) strong organization around health issues; and 4) representation in 
the decision-making processes. I will review each of these in more detail in Chapter 
8 and suggest questions for further research to generate an understanding of how 
the mechanisms operate in different contexts and the degree to which they explain 
household-level outcomes. 
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Chapter 8 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
 
This dissertation set out to explore how the increase in non-state social 
welfare provision and the ceding of what is traditionally viewed as the 
responsibility of the state to a diverse group of actors has affected poor households’ 
access to services. In seeking to answer this question, my research deviated from 
conventional theoretical and empirical approaches employed in studies on state 
retrenchment and non-state provision in developing countries in several ways. 
First, I adopted a multi-dimensional conceptualization of access that expands on 
standard indicators of spatial proximity and service quantity and includes 
perceptions of accessibility and quality, preferences, utilization, and satisfaction 
with services. Second, rather than focusing on a particular sector or organization, I 
gathered information about the full range of state and non-state health and 
education providers operating in the communities. I wanted to know how and to 
what extent the entire landscape of service providers meets the needs of community 
residents. Finally, I explored the relational and contextual nature of service 
provision through a multi-level analysis that included micro- and meso-level 
sociopolitical factors and meso-level organizational factors. All three of these 
deviations from the conventional approach yielded findings relevant to both policy 
and practice for service provision in low-income urban communities.  
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Key Findings and Implications 
Perceptions Matter 
Social welfare service delivery is widely viewed as a technical exercise, and 
concerns with the quantity and technical quality of services and providers guide 
most research, policy, and interventions designed to improve provision and health 
and education outcomes in developing countries. While these supply side factors are 
important, outcomes also depend on individuals’ service-seeking behaviors. These 
behaviors are strongly affected by perceptions and preferences; service provision is 
deeply relational, and slum dwellers make decisions about service utilization based 
on past experiences, preconceived notions, and a combination of information and 
misinformation (Bazant et al, 2009; Tooley & Dixon, 2006). Perceptions directly and 
indirectly affect outcomes, and interventions must either: a) be informed by and 
responsive to the perceptions of intended beneficiaries; or b) actively work to change 
perceptions, dispel misinformation, and widely disseminate information to help 
residents make informed decisions. 
Bring the State Back In 
A key finding facilitated by the inclusion of perceptions and preferences in 
the analysis is the continued credibility of the state as a health provider. Despite 
regularly encountering problems related to inadequate staffing and drug and other 
supply shortages, the majority of surveyed households would choose to visit a public 
health facility even if they had the means to go elsewhere. Even among the most 
secure households, 46 percent prefer government providers. Households that view 
government health providers as accessible are less likely to under-utilize health 
services or to not utilize services at all. Furthermore, while multi-level models in 
Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that household- and community-level sociopolitical 
factors affect perceptions, utilization, and satisfaction in the context of non-state 
health provision, I did not find similar associations for outcomes related to public 
provision. The fact that experiences with state providers depend less on households’ 
social positionality and the community sociopolitical context suggests that 
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improvements in equity and universal access to basic health care are more likely to 
occur under state provision. Rather than continuing to divert aid and donor support 
to non-state providers, I argue, based on this research, for refocusing on the role of 
the state in service provision and redirecting efforts toward improving state 
capacity and service quality.  
My argument for reconsidering the role of the state was buttressed by the 
picture of the non-state sector gleaned from literature reviews, secondary data, and 
personal observations and experiences from the field. The high-quality, efficient, 
responsive system of private health providers described in the theoretical and 
ideological literature promoting the shift toward non-state service provision does 
not reflect the reality on the ground in Kibera, Korogocho, and many other low-
income urban communities across the developing world. The non-state sector is 
increasingly populated by small-scale, low cost, private for-profit providers catering 
to the poor. This sector is unregulated, and information about the facilities and the 
quality of services they provide is generally unavailable. What research has been 
done suggests that the combination of untrained staff and the incentives created by 
profit motives and accountability to generally uninformed consumers leads to the 
over prescription of drugs, repeated treatment of symptoms rather than the 
underlying causes, and poor health outcomes. Though wealthier citizens may 
benefit from access to quality services provided by non-state actors, the non-state 
sector available to poor households looks very different. 
Need for a Multi-Level Approach    
Through the addition of household- and community-level sociopolitical 
variables to the analyses and the use of multi-level models, I highlighted the 
importance of the meso-level context in shaping the demand for, access to, and 
effective use of services. The immediate challenge posed by these findings, however, 
is the problem of generalizability; variables at the different levels condition the 
effects of variables at other levels. The vague notions of “participation” and 
“empowerment” at the community level mentioned over and over again in the 
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development literature and manuals of best practices offer little guidance for how to 
incorporate the meso level into research and practice. By qualitatively exploring the 
meso-level organizational context in the two settlements and examining how this 
context could explain observed variations at both the household and community 
level, I identified key meso-level processes that affect households’ experiences with 
health services: 1) the transmission of information; 2) the integration or social 
embeddedness of services into the sociopolitical fabric of the community; 3) strong 
organization around health issues; and 4) representation in the decision-making 
processes. Though further research is necessary to generate an understanding of 
how these mechanisms operate in different contexts and the degree to which they 
explain household-level outcomes, I provide a theoretical framework for future 
studies in the next section. 
Collectively, empirical findings from this dissertation suggest that any effort 
to improve health outcomes in low-income urban communities must adopt a multi-
level approach that addresses factors affecting service accessibility and utilization 
at various levels. Health literacy in these communities is low, and misinformation is 
rampant. Perceptions affect actions, and community sociopolitical and 
organizational contexts affect perceptions. In particular, interventions, programs, 
and service providers working at the community level should focus on the 
integration of health services into the sociopolitical fabric of the community and on 
the widespread and equitable dissemination of health and health service 
information. 
Areas for Further Research 
Throughout this dissertation, a recurring theme has been the limited utility 
of mainstream models of health and education service utilization to explain 
observed variations in households’ perceptions and experiences. The number of 
service providers and the availability of specific services did not indicate significant 
differences in the capacity or technical quality of provision between settlements, but 
outcomes were consistently more favorable in Kibera than in Korogocho. Even after 
	   275 
models were expanded to include household- and community-level sociopolitical 
factors, the effects of explanatory variables differed by provider type and 
settlement. Each successive chapter carved out a greater role for meso-level 
contextual factors and highlighted the potential for context to condition the effects 
of micro-level factors and to shape the micro-experience and the strategies and 
resources on which households rely to access services. Comprehensive conditions 
and characteristics at the meso level are routinely omitted from research and 
consideration during the policymaking process, but the dissertation suggests that 
doing so creates a significant gap in knowledge and leads to a myriad of unintended 
consequences and ineffective interventions. 
A second theme that emerged was the inadequacy of available quantitative 
measures to characterize the concepts and mechanisms of theoretical and practical 
interest. An understanding of the complex sociopolitical conditions, relationships, 
and organizational environments cannot be gleaned from the standard quantitative 
measures customarily employed in research on service provision in developing 
countries. Furthermore, the reliance on large data sets and regression models—
including those in the preceding chapters—limits our knowledge to statistical 
associations without providing insight into the mechanisms that produce the 
associations. If we hope to develop strategies to improve the accessibility, equity, 
and sustainability of service provision in diverse low-income communities like 
Kibera and Korogocho, we have to understand the mechanisms.  
Insights from this dissertation and existing literature suggest that centrally 
conceived large-scale, technocratic policies and programs are probably not the 
answer to problems with service delivery. Rather than developing universal 
manuals of best practices and policy imperatives that suggest formulaic steps to 
improve access to quality services, the goal should be to develop an understanding 
of the most relevant processes and key relationships and interactions at the 
confluence of the individual, community, organizational, and institutional contexts. 
To that end, I offer four interrelated areas for future research. 
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Information 
Many of the micro- and meso-level mechanisms associated with 
improvements in health service provision and households’ ability to access 
appropriate care relate in some way to the dissemination and receipt of information. 
Individuals need to know when, where, and how to seek quality treatment. Service 
providers need to know how to provide effective care for patients, both technically 
and relationally. Community members, groups, and CSOs need to know how to 
evaluate available services, how to advocate for improvements, and how to hold 
providers accountable. Some of the inequalities in service utilization and health 
outcomes stem from an inequitable distribution of information. Information plays 
an important role at all levels, and many of the variables used throughout the 
dissertation capture potential mechanisms or conditions for transmission (e.g., 
education and age of the household head, household- and village-level community 
involvement and political activism, trust, etc.).  
Many existing studies ask individuals where they go for health-related 
information and what sources they trust, but the micro-level focus doesn’t provide a 
clear picture of the flow of information in the community. Furthermore, it cannot 
help identify successful strategies for transmitting important information to 
everyone, including the most vulnerable and difficult to reach. Can external 
organizations facilitate this process? Are particular types of community groups or 
service providers more effective under certain conditions? Do formal partnerships 
between service providers and schools, self-help groups, or other organizations play 
a particular role? What about links between both community groups and service 
providers and external networks? Research that seeks to answer these questions 
may provide invaluable insight for future efforts to improve access and equity. 
Coordination and Cooperation 
The experiences of surveyed households, secondary data on service provision 
in Kibera and Korogocho, and existing research on service provision in informal 
settlements depict fragmented service environments populated by many small- and 
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medium-scale providers offering limited services. The absence of consistent 
regulation and oversight eliminates one institutionalized channel for cooperation 
and coordination between service providers, and evidence suggests that effective 
provider- and community-initiated mechanisms for collaboration are exceptions 
rather than the norm. Under these conditions, however, communication and 
cooperation at all levels maximizes efficiency in the use of resources, promotes 
broad accessibility, enhances the flow of information, and strengthens 
accountability.  
In order to better understand the role of coordination in facilitating 
improvements in service provision and households’ experiences, additional research 
must explore the meso-level organizational context and identify the incentives and 
mechanisms that promote coordination. Stability within the service environment is 
likely an important factor, as the relationships and trust required to establish and 
sustain effective partnerships require repeated interaction and demonstrated 
commitment among actors. Beyond that, are formal, institutionalized channels for 
cooperation (like the community health committees) most effective, or do informal 
partnerships appear conducive to more organic efforts that better align with the 
priorities of providers and the community? Is coordination more successful when 
initiated by service providers or community groups and organizations? To what 
extent can external networks and NGOs provide a framework for sustained 
coordination? Evidence from Kibera and Korogocho suggests that the levels of 
coordination and the role of individual service providers in promoting coordination 
are very different, so interviews with the CSOs and service providers identified in 
the dissertation may help to answer some of these questions.  
Integration/Social Embeddedness 
Health systems research from the U.S. identifies the integration of health 
provision with other types of services and economic sectors as a condition for 
community accountability and provider responsiveness. Due to the technical nature 
of medical care, the legacy of centralized provision, and past models of service 
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delivery, health services are not integrated or embedded by default. In the context 
of informal settlements like Kibera and Korogocho, however, integrated and socially 
embedded health services may be even more critical for service accessibility, 
utilization, and the overall health of the community. As expressed in an op-ed in 
Kibera’s Ghetto Mirror newspaper, the organically grown, highly interdependent 
economic, social, political, and communal systems in these communities form a 
tightly woven social fabric where social capital, bartering, and community support 
are central to slum dwellers’ livelihood strategies (Mutua, 2015). Embeddedness 
increases providers’ awareness of households’ needs and the constraints they face in 
seeking care. The interaction between providers and community members and 
groups also helps build the trust and relationships on which responsiveness, 
cooperation between providers and patients, and positive health outcomes depend. 
When health services, health promotion, and the transmission of health-related 
information are not embedded in this fabric and integrated into these systems, 
however, the prospects for community accountability and effective provision 
diminish. Siloed health systems exist outside the context of households’ lives, and 
the tools and resources on which they rely to meet other needs may not be relevant. 
Under these conditions, accessing services from trusted providers is far more 
difficult.  
The extent and nature of integration is a key component of the meso-level 
context, and further research is needed to understand the micro-level effects of 
integration and document the conditions under which service provision is socially 
embedded. Strong leadership and organization around health is likely important, 
but is this organization initiated by providers or community groups (or both)? Are 
certain types of networks, partnerships, or providers particularly successful at 
facilitating integration? What strategies may promote integration when services are 
not socially embedded? 
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Representation  
Finally, one of the notable observations from the organizational comparisons 
in Chapter 7 is the apparent correlation between bridging trust and the formal 
representation of CSOs in committees and stakeholder forums at higher 
administrative levels. Representation is related to the previous areas: it provides 
opportunities for the transmission of information, for improved coordination, and for 
the integration of services into the sociopolitical fabric of the community. The 
potential benefits of representation extend beyond those functions, however, as 
formal channels for representation should enhance accountability and give 
communities and constituent households a greater role in the decision-making 
processes that govern service provision.  
Like the transmission of information, the nature and extent of representation 
is relevant at multiple levels. Evidence from Kibera and Korogocho suggests that 
the representation of CSOs and health service providers on community, divisional, 
and district health committees may increase coordination and give actors with 
contextual knowledge a say in policies and strategies developed externally but 
implemented internally. One of the components of community health initiatives in 
Kenya and other developing countries is the creation of committees at the facility 
level to involve community members in the governance and oversight of public 
health providers (Luoma et al, 2010). To the extent that these committees are 
inclusive and actively involved in decision-making, formal mechanisms for 
representation like the committees may be very beneficial for accountability, 
coordination, and integration.  
Additional research is needed to examine institutionalized systems of 
representation at the meso level. How do governing committees at the facility level 
function, and do similar mechanisms exist among non-state providers? Under what 
conditions are representatives and channels for representation likely to include all 
of the diverse interests in the community or to perpetuate the exclusion of 
vulnerable groups? Do higher levels of bridging trust facilitate representation that 
is more likely to improve households’ experiences of service provision? As 
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responsibility and ownership is increasingly devolved and the task of improving 
equity and accessibility is placed on communities, an understanding of the 
institutional and sociopolitical mechanisms that facilitate equity and accountability 
may help to avoid repeating the failures of the past. 
Conclusion 
Meeting the health and education needs of poor households in slums and 
other disadvantaged urban communities has proven challenging for governments, 
NGOs, and other actors involved in service provision. Improvements in outcomes 
have been slow and uneven. In spite of the challenges, ensuring access to and 
utilization of quality health and education services for these populations is crucial. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the provision of social welfare services has 
important effects on poverty, democracy, economic growth, political stability, and 
social cohesion. Though this research was conducted in two informal settlements in 
Nairobi, similar trends in urbanization and the provision of health and education 
services are evident in many developing countries. Current events suggest that the 
need for accessible, equitable, and sustainable health and education services in poor 
urban communities will only intensify in the future. It is my hope that this 
dissertation contributes to a reframing of the state vs. non-state debate that is 
informed by households’ perceptions and experiences, without which we cannot 
understand how to improve both the technical and functional quality of services and 
the accessibility and utilization on which outcomes also depend.  
 
 
	   281 
Appendices 
	   282 
Appendix A: Factor Variables 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Factor Variables 
Factor 
(Stata name) Components and Loadings Obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Lived Poverty Factor analysis with polychoric correlation  (2 factors explain 99% of variance) 
Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1) 
Monthly income (0.31); frequency 
of going without food (0.73); 
frequency of going without water 
(0.58); frequency of going without 
medical treatment/medicines 
(0.68); frequency of going without 
fuel for cooking (0.78); frequency 
of going without a cash income 
(0.60) 
997 3.30 0.93 0.32 4.86 
Poverty (assets/stock) 
(poverty_f2) 
Monthly income (0.46); radio 
ownership (0.44); television 
ownership (0.71); motorcycle 
ownership (0.40); bicycle 
ownership (0.33); electricity (0.62) 
997 0.14 0.34 -0.75 2.00 
Community Involvement Principal component analysis with polychoric correlation  (3 factors explain 75% of variation) 
Community group 
membership 
(comm_pc1) 
Membership and level of 
involvement in religious group 
that meets outside of worship 
(0.46); membership and level of 
involvement in savings group or 
merry-go-round (0.61); 
membership and involvement in 
a women’s group (0.63) 
1006 1.42 1.24 -0.35 5.28 
Contact with leaders 
(comm_pc2) 
Frequency of contact with a staff 
member of an NGO or CBO 
(0.65); frequency of contact with 
a traditional leader, religious 
leader, or other community 
leader (0.70) 
1006 0.97 1.11 -0.39 4.83 
Attendance at 
community meetings 
(comm_pc3) 
Frequency of attending any 
community meeting (0.71); 
frequency of getting together 
with others to raise an issue 
(0.67) 
1006 2.23 1.48 -0.44 5.83 
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Community 
involvement 
(comm_pc) 
Sum of the 3 community 
involvement factors. This 
summary factor was created to 
resolve multicollinearity 
problems when the individual 
factors were used in models. 
1006 4.62 2.71 0 13.35 
Interpersonal Trust Bonding: principal component analysis with polychoric correlation (2 factors explain 83% of variation) 
Bonding: close 
relations 
(bonding_rel) 
Trust in family (0.88); trust in 
neighbors (0.47); trust in 
members of your own ethnic 
group/tribe (-0.09) 
1043 2.62 1.07 -0.26 4.04 
Bonding: co-ethnic 
(bonding_ethnic) 
Trust in family (-0.69); trust in 
neighbors (-0.03); trust in 
members of your own ethnic 
group/tribe (0.73) 
1043 1.82 1.07 -0.35 3.91 
Bonding 
(bonding) 
Sum of two bonding factors. This 
single measure of bonding trust 
was created for use when effects 
of the two factors were strongly 
correlated. 
1043 4.44 1.79 0 7.34 
 Bridging: principal component analysis with polychoric correlation 
(1 factor explains 77% of variation) 
Bridging 
(bridging) 
Trust in acquaintances (0.71); 
trust in members of other ethnic 
groups/tribes (0.71) 
1018 2.36 1.11 0.21 5.39 
Institutional Trust Principal component analysis with polychoric correlation (3 factors explain 81% of variation) 
Government 
(confidence_gov) 
Confidence in the President 
(0.48); Prime Minister (0.39); 
Parliament (0.57); Local 
government council (0.55) 
886 2.52 1.55 -0.16 6.47 
NGO 
(confidence_ngo) 
Confidence in Kenyan NGOs 
(0.71); confidence in 
international NGOs (0.71) 
886 2.60 1.46 -0.41 5.49 
Community 
(confidence_cbo) 
Confidence in CBOs (0.71); 
confidence in traditional leaders 
(0.71) 
886 0.65 1.12 -1.84 3.85 
Political Involvement Principal component analysis with polychoric correlation  (2 factors explain 75% of variation) 
Political Activism 
(political_pc1) 
Frequency of contacting a 
political party official (0.47); 
campaign meeting or rally 
attendance (0.49); tried to 
persuade others to vote for a 
particular candidate or party 
(0.53); worked for a candidate or 
party during the last election 
(0.52) 
1032 0.48 0.60 -0.003 1.73 
Voting 
(political_pc2) 
Voted in the last election (0.99) 1032 0.84 0.34 -0.12 1.12 
Perceptions of Services Principal component analysis with polychoric correlation (1 factor explains 76% of variation for non-state, 68% for public)   
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Quality of government 
health services 
(govhealthqual_pc) 
Frequency of encountering: lack 
of medicines and other supplies 
(0.45); rude and/or unhelpful 
staff (0.49); absent doctors 
(0.49); long waiting times (0.44); 
dirty facilities (0.35) 
990 5.34 1.66 2.22 8.88 
Quality of non-
government health 
services 
(ngohealthqual_pc) 
Frequency of encountering: lack 
of medicines and other supplies 
(0.43); rude and/or unhelpful 
staff (0.44); absent doctors 
(0.47); long waiting times (0.42); 
dirty facilities (0.47) 
983 8.12 1.08 2.23 8.93 
Satisfaction with Services Principal component analysis with polychoric correlation (1 factor explains 84% of variation for edu, 69% for health)   
Satisfaction with 
health services 
(healthsat_pc) 
Satisfaction with: opening hours 
of facility (0.36); availability of 
staff (0.43); capability of staff 
(0.41); respectfulness of staff 
(0.44); adequacy of equipment 
and other supplies (0.40); 
recovery of patients treated by 
provider (0.41) 
931 6.78 0.79 3.20 7.33 
Satisfaction with 
education services 
(satedu_pc) 
Degree to which the following 
are a problem at the school: 
insufficient number of teachers 
(0.31); poor performance on 
exams (0.35); poor quality of 
school buildings or facilities 
(0.32); classroom overcrowding 
(0.32); students unsafe in school 
building (0.35); school is located 
in unsafe area (0.34); students 
are not being taught (0.36); not 
enough textbooks (0.33); 
corruption with finances (0.32) 
527 6.96 1.82 3.00 8.99 
Village-Level Organizational Factors 
Representation 
(rep) 
 
Factor variable measuring CSO 
representation. Components, 
with factor loadings in 
parentheses, include: percent of 
CSOs represented on community 
health committee (0.23); percent 
of CSOs represented in 
divisional health stakeholder 
forum (0.16); percent of CSOs 
represented in district health 
stakeholder forum (0.49); 
number of CSOs with a focus on 
health (0.36). 
7 0 0.99 -0.90 1.96 
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Health CSOs 
(health_cso) 
 
Factor variable measuring 
integration of health CSOs in 
the community. Components, 
with factor loadings in 
parentheses, include the number 
of health CSOs that partner 
with other health organizations 
and providers in the community 
(1.17); percent of health CSOs 
represented on community 
health committee (0.64). 
7 0 0.99 -1.12 1.80 
Fee 
(fee) 
 
Factor variable measuring the 
fee structure of service providers 
in the community. Low values 
indicate fewer fees and more 
flexibility to accommodate 
patients who cannot afford fees. 
Components, with factor 
loadings in parentheses: percent 
of providers that charge fees for 
services (0.48); percent of fee-
charging providers that post fees 
(0.06); percent of fee-charging 
providers that apply fees 
uniformly (-0.50); percent of non-
uniform fee-charging providers 
that take financial situation into 
consideration (-0.03). 
7 0 0.89 -1.54 0.84 
Advocacy 
(advocacy) 
Factor variable measuring the 
advocacy efforts of CSOs and 
health CSOs. Components, with 
factor loadings in parentheses, 
include the percent of CSOs 
engaged in advocacy in the 
community (0.10); percent of 
CSOs that direct advocacy 
efforts towards decision makers 
(0.17); percent of health CSOs 
engaged in community advocacy 
(0.30); percent of health CSOs 
that direct advocacy toward 
decision makers (0.62). 
7 0 0.99 -1.16 1.30 
Services 
(sevices) 
Factor variable measuring 
availability of services in the 
community. Components, with 
factor loadings in parentheses, 
include the percent of providers 
with electricity (0.35); percent of 
providers that offer inpatient 
care (0.84); percent of providers 
that offer immunizations (0.40); 
number of providers in the 
community (0.10). 
7 0 1.25 -1.56 1.29 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
(Stata name) 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
No health care utilization 
(no_health)  
1054 0.088 0.284 0 1 
No health care access 
(no_care) 
1043 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Experience with government providers 
(any_gov_health) 
1045 0.512 0.500 0 1 
Experience with non-government 
providers 
(any_ngo_health) 
1044 0.684 0.465 0 1 
Not enrolled in school 
(not_enrolled) 
639 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Low enrollment percentage 
(low_enroll) 
639 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Experience with public schools 
(any_public_school) 
641 0.409 0.492 0 1 
Experience with non-state schools 
(any_ngo_school and any_ngo_school) 
641 0.803 0.398 0 1 
Satisfaction with health services 
(healthsat_pc_qt) 
931 2.585 1.143 1 5 
Satisfaction with education services 
(satedu_pc_qt) 
527 2.981 1.399 1 5 
Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1_qt) 
997 2.998 1.415 1 5 
Poverty (assets) 
(poverty_f2_qt) 
997 2.986 1.417 1 5 
Age of household head 
(Age_hh) 
1054 36.595 11.877 18 100 
Age squared 
(Age_hh2) 
1054 1480.12 1028.87 324 10000 
Female respondent 
(Female = 1) 
1054 0.373 0.484 0 1 
Female household head 
(Female = 2) 
1054 0.226 0.418 0 1 
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Low education 
(low_ed) 
1054 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Medium education 
(med_ed) 
1054 0.419 0.494 0 1 
High education 
(high_ed) 
1054 0.347 0.476 0 1 
Kibera 
(kibera) 
1054 0.493 0.500 0 1 
Public health 
(health_public) 
951 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Public school enrollment 
(pub_sch_pct) 
641 0.300 0.404 0 1 
Perception of government health quality 
(qualgovhealth_pc) 
990 5.345 1.659 2.221 8.883 
Perception of non-state health quality 
(ngohealthqual_pc) 
983 8.119 1.084 2.233 8.934 
Perception of government health service 
accessibility 
(GovHealthAccess) 
1043 2.430 0.842 1 4 
Perception of non-state health service 
accessibility 
(NGOHealthAccess) 
1039 2.700 0.934 1 4 
Perception of government health service 
affordability 
(gov_health_cost) 
1005 3.157 1.058 1 4 
Perception of non-state health service 
affordability 
(ngo_health_cost) 
1018 1.846 1.139 1 4 
Perception of public school accessibility 
(GovEduAccess) 
1037 2.515 0.858 1 4 
Perception of public school quality 
(qualgovedu_pc) 
904 6.496 2.044 2.640 10.559 
Perception of non-state school 
accessibility 
(NGOEduAccess) 
1045 2.707 0.933 1 4 
Perception of public school affordability 
(gov_edu_cost) 
983 3.231 1.027 1 4 
Perception of non-state school 
affordability 
(ngo_edu_cost) 
936 2.345 0.721 1 4 
Health status 
(healthstatus_qt) 
1054 2.950 1.432 1 5 
Affordability of health service fees 
(fees) 
960 2.621 0.633 1 3 
Health quality  
(health_qual_sat) 
1047 2.777 0.740 1 4 
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Appendix C: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 4 
 
Table C.1: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables in Chapter 4 
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Poverty (flow) 
(poverty_f1_qt) 1.000            
Poverty (stock) 
(poverty_f2_qt) -0.150 1.000           
Age of household head 
(Age_hh) 0.012 0.067 1.000          
Age2 
(Age_hh2) 0.012 0.053 0.980 1.000         
No formal education 
(no_ed) -0.107 -0.064 0.114 0.100 1.000        
High education 
(high_ed) 0.175 0.219 -0.016 -0.023 -0.150 1.000       
Female 
(female) -0.178 -0.188 -0.117 -0.107 0.154 -0.152 1.000      
Kibera 
(kibera) 0.100 0.175 0.049 0.046 -0.139 0.272 -0.191 1.000     
Public school enrollment 
(pub_sch_pct) -0.032 0.032 0.178 0.144 0.054 -0.039 -0.018 0.034 1.000    
Public health utilization 
(health_public) -0.018 -0.095 0.058 0.061 0.042 -0.022 0.085 -0.194 0.032 1.000   
Government health quality 
(govhealthqual_pc) 0.149 -0.086 -0.101 -0.087 -0.022 0.008 0.110 0.039 -0.061 0.082 1.000  
Non-state health quality 
(qualngohealth_pc) 0.133 -0.026 -0.033 -0.016 -0.043 0.047 -0.045 0.041 -0.040 -0.076 0.044 1.000 
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Table C.2: Average Satisfaction Score by Health Facility 
Health Facility Mean SE Health Facility Mean SE 
Neema Hospital 7.329 0.001 Comboni Sisters 6.691 0.224 
Yes 2 Kids 7.329 0.001 Mama Lucy Kibaki Hospital 6.690 0.399 
Empire 7.328 0.001 Kariobangi North Health Center 6.607 0.303 
Siaya District Hospital 7.328 0.001 Catholic Dispensary 6.526 0.398 
St John 7.328 0.001 Korogocho Dispensary 6.518 0.468 
Coptic 7.226 0.102 Chemist 6.486 0.345 
Kibera Health Center 7.211 0.075 Wema Clinic 6.372 0.186 
Frepals 7.192 0.135 Olympic Health Center 6.369 0.959 
Kawanga 7.161 0.041 Huruma  6.335 0.343 
St Mark's Hospital 7.130 0.200 Langata/Otiende 6.316 0.190 
Ushirika Health 7.126 0.109 Kariobangi Medical Clinic 6.310 1.017 
Swap 7.123 0.204 Korogocho Health Center 6.290 0.084 
Jamii Clinic 7.099 0.130 Kariogangi Health Centre 6.222 0.338 
Kibera DO Health Center 7.052 0.118 Korogocho Community Dispensary 6.189 0.109 
Private 7.051 0.278 Makwak 6.145 1.182 
Shofco Health Center 7.049 0.173 Babadogo Health Centre 6.097 0.441 
St Mary Hospital 6.988 0.090 Kakamega General Hospital 4.658 0.257 
Provide Health Centre 6.969 0.162    
Tumaini Clinic/Hospital 6.958 0.064    
Kibera South Health Center 6.956 0.082 KEY   
Nairobi West 6.956 0.221 Public Hospital   
Empire 6.934 0.393 Public Health Center   
Saola Health Center 6.931 0.126 NGO/CBO   
Kariobangi Hospital 6.927 0.273 FBO   
Rosade Clinic 6.921 0.406 Private for-profit   
Vision Peoples in Mission 6.919 0.178    
Kariobangi Mission Dispensary 6.914 0.252    
Chemichemi Clinic 6.852 0.119    
CDC Health Centre 6.846 0.481    
AMREF Health Centre 6.793 0.094    
Nazareth Mission Hospital Kiambu 6.771 0.560    
Mbagathi District Hospital 6.762 0.101    
St Mark 6.752 0.221    
Kenyatta National Hospital 6.743 0.097    
Korogocho City Council 6.700 0.628    
Marura Nursing Home 6.696 0.450    
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Appendix D: Theoretical Background on Social Capital 
Definitions of Social Capital 
Though the exact origins of the concept of social capital are disputed, the 
importance of social cohesion, trust, and other facets of social structure to 
democratization, consolidation, economic growth and development, conflict, and 
other macro-level processes is historically pervasive across the social science 
disciplines. Beginning in the 1970s, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) described the 
social relations that an individual (or group) can mobilize to his or her benefit as a 
form of cultural capital, introducing the idea that social structures and inequalities 
are produced and reproduced by more than the traditional forms of economic, 
physical, and human capital.     
In the field of economics, social stratification and exclusion approaches have 
sought to re-introduce culture into the study of economic mobility. Defined as the 
unequal distribution of resources over identifiable status groups and cohesion 
among members of such groups, social stratification acknowledges the critical role 
played by social and cultural resources in the production and reproduction of 
inequality (Hoffman, 2006). Highlighting the challenges racial and ethnic divisions 
and social exclusion pose for economies, Loury (2009) contends that “each individual 
is socially situated, and one’s location within the network of social affiliations 
substantially affects one’s access to various resources” (p. 102).  
In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam and colleagues (1993) employed 
an institutional and essentially macro version of social capital theory to account for 
differences in democratic and economic performance in Italy. According to their 
model, social capital—understood as the aggregate of trust relationships, non-
hierarchical associative networks, and norms of reciprocity that exist in society—
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bridges hierarchical relations and permits the development of a civic-oriented 
culture shared by all groups. Associative contacts and trust reduce opportunistic 
behavior and promote collective action. This culture and the coordination it 
facilitates provide the fuel for more efficient public administration, better 
governance, and superior economic performance. Tracing political cultures of 
northern and southern Italy back for centuries, Putnam (1993) finds a very durable 
pattern of culture and a connection between social capital and economic growth.  
By contrast, James Coleman (1990) skips the institutional intermediary and 
employs a more direct and micro-level interpretation of the concept. Forms of social 
capital, he asserts, “consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate 
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” (p. 302). In Coleman’s 
(1988; 1990) view, social capital has the capacity to foster reciprocal expectations 
and obligations, reduce transaction costs for private agents, facilitate the circulation 
of information, and establish norms of cooperation that resolve prisoner’s dilemmas.  
Coleman’s micro-level perspective is more popular among development scholars, 
and a strand of literature has emerged that emphasizes the role of social capital in 
fostering cooperative behavior, easing coordination problems, and reducing the 
vulnerability of the poor by enabling them to better cope with uncertainty and risk 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Edelman & Mitra, 2006; Krishna, 2004; Nyangena, 2008; 
Putnam, 2000).  
As some scholars have noted, however, many definitions and theorized effects 
of social capital do not clearly delineate whether it is an individual attribute or a 
collective characteristic (Islam et al, 2006). The exception is sociologist Alejandro 
Portes, who contends that social capital  
…refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue 
of their membership in networks or broader social structure…to possess 
social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is these others, not 
himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage. (1998, p. 12)  
 
The nature of the social structure and the existence and extent of networks depend 
on collective characteristics of the community or society in which the individuals 
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reside, but their positions within them and the benefits they are able to draw from 
those positions constitute the individuals’ social capital.  
Regardless of the level at which it operates, treatments of social capital have 
generally taken one of two forms. Some authors stress its structural features, as 
evident in the range of formal and informal associations in a community and the 
extent to which residents participate in them. Others emphasize the cognitive 
aspects: the feelings of mutual trust and collective efficacy that are fostered by 
robust and vibrant local associations (Harpham, et al, 2002; Montgomery & Ezeh, 
2005; Uphoff, 2000). 
Critiques of Social Capital Research 
Criticisms of social capital explanations are numerous and varied. The 
ambiguity of the concept, the lack of consensus on both the definition of social 
capital and its empirical operationalization, and the purported utility of social 
capital (in its many forms) in explaining a wide range of social, political, and 
economic processes and outcomes lead some scholars to dismiss social capital as a 
rather useless analytical concept invoked to account for outcomes that theories and 
models fail to explain (Englebert, 2002; Lin, 2001; Ogilvie, 2005; Portes & Landholt, 
2000; Schuller et al, 2000). For example, in research evaluating the effects of social 
capital on economic development, the World Bank defines social capital as “the 
institutions, relations, attitudes, and values that govern exchanges among people in 
society and contribute to economic and social development” (Grootaert & van 
Bastelaer, 2001, p. 4). By equating social capital with institutions, it becomes 
impossible to examine the effects of the elements of social capital on the 
institutions. Furthermore, by limiting the definition of social capital to only include 
those institutions and values that effectively contribute to economic and social 
development, the effect is guaranteed by the cause.  
Similarly, in much of the literature social capital is regarded as an 
unequivocally positive attribute. Critics of Putnam’s theory that associative life 
generates relations of trust and reciprocity that promote collective action and 
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democracy countered with the existence of criminal associative networks and 
exclusive groups that polarize social relations and are anemic to both collective 
action and democracy. In response, Putnam accounted for the contradiction by 
distinguishing between different types of social capital. “Bonding” associative 
activity reinforces existing groups, while “bridging” activities bring distinct groups 
together. Putnam (2000) acknowledges that bonding can have negative 
consequences at the macro level while simultaneously benefiting its members at the 
micro level. This creates an ex post distinction based on the effects rather than on 
the intrinsic characteristics of social capital, however, and reduces the analytical 
utility of the concept.  
Aside from conceptual and methodological concerns, there are important 
implications for development practice. Policymakers increasingly promote 
investments in social capital and social networks as opposed to efforts to strengthen 
state capacity or address other institutional problems, particularly in developing 
countries (Brett, 1996; Coleman, 1988; Ogilvie, 2005; Putnam, 1993; UNDP, 1993; 
World Bank, 2001). Conceptualized at the community or societal level, however, 
social capital is about the articulation and promotion of collective interests. For 
participatory mechanisms to function in this way, communities must be devoid of 
hierarchies, social, political, and economic schisms, inequitable distributions of 
power, and other forces that create conflicting interests, elevate some residents’ 
interests above others, or impede collective coordination and cohesion (Mitlin, 2001; 
Post & Mwangi, 2009). However, many communities—particularly the informal 
settlements on which this study is focused—are often stratified by income, 
ethnicity, religion, language, or other cleavages, all of which can be socially, 
politically, and/or economically salient and divisive (Dagdevrin & Robertson, 2009; 
K’Akumu & Olima, 2007; Kellet & Garnham, 1995; Mitlin, 2001; Otiso, 2003; Post 
& Mwangi, 2009; Wit & Berner, 2009; Yap & De Wandeler, 2010). In this context, 
there are critical obstacles to establishing an organizational structure that 
equitably represents the diversity of interests, promotes collective action, and 
functions effectively. 
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First, fieldwork has revealed that social interaction, reciprocal relationships, 
and collective action in slums occur more often within the subgroups created by 
these cleavages than at the ‘community’ level (Beall, 2000). Many welfare 
organizations and CBOs are based on ethnic or religious affiliations and are only 
supported by part of the community, facilitating the exclusion or marginalization of 
other identity groups from the intervention process (Jha et al, 2007; McFarlane, 
2008; Mitlin, 2001; Post & Mwangi, 2009; Rakodi et al, 2000). Furthermore, the 
scarcity of resources available often creates competition both among subgroups and 
within the community at large; this competition leads individuals and groups to 
pursue patronage rather than collective mobilization as a means to achieving their 
desired outcome (Benjamin, 2000; Botes & van Rensburg, 2000; Edelman & Mitra, 
2006; Ward, 1990; Wit & Berner, 2009). As Ogilvie’s historical research into pre-
industrial guilds suggests, the ‘particularized and differential trust’ engendered by 
subgroup associative activity does not facilitate collective action, reduce inequality, 
or strengthen institutional capacity. Instead, the particularization is remarkably 
durable and actively impedes the development of the ‘generalized and uniform trust’ 
on which the positive macro-level effects of social capital depend (Ogilvie, 2005).  
Second, several dynamics within CBOs often limit their representativeness.  
Patterns of participation in CBO activities often reveal the exclusion of women and 
other minority groups.  As an investigation into the membership composition of 
services-oriented CBOs in Nakuru, Kenya, attests, youth and younger adults are 
largely excluded from membership, and women’s participation is limited to 
subordinate roles that provide few opportunities to help shape policies and 
programs or establish connections with external partners (Post & Mwangi, 2009).  
According to Post and Mwangi’s literature review, the “disempowering impact of 
women’s participation in collective action” in informal settlements is widespread 
(2009, p. 677). Participation also tends to be higher among households with higher 
incomes and more education, leaving the most vulnerable residents without a voice 
(Asthana, 1994; Berner & Phillips, 2005; Jha et al, 2007; Jenkins et al, 2010; 
Lizarralde, 2010; Mitlin, 2001; Otiso, 2003; Vakil, 1996; Yap & De Wandeler, 2010). 
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In some cases, membership in CBOs is restricted to residents who can pay dues, 
and benefits are allocated exclusively to members (Otiso, 2003; Vakil, 1996).  Based 
on research in Asia, Wit and Berner contend that:      
Collective action and slum-wide organizations inevitably reflect local 
divisions and inequalities and tend to be controlled by local elites…we show 
[using case studies from India] that in many cases the CBO label is used by a 
clique of a few shrewd entrepreneurs to obtain benefits which are not widely 
shared, be it in terms of money or information. (2009, p. 936) 
 
Assuming that the benefits of a community’s social capital and the collective action 
it facilitates are widely distributed is problematic; micro-level examinations of the 
components of social capital and the effects across the population are critical to 
understanding the role of socio-cultural factors in social welfare provision (Asthana, 
1994; Berner & Phillips, 2005; Botes & van Rensburg, 2000; Jha et al, 2007; Mitlin, 
2001; Post & Mwangi, 2009).  
As a consequence, the analyses in Chapter 5 do not employ a collective or 
community level conceptualization of social capital, nor do they view the 
households’ social characteristics as a form of capital that individuals can possess 
and utilize in some tangible way (see critique by Bowles & Gintis, 2002). Instead, I 
seek to examine plausible mechanisms by which households’ social connections, 
relationships, and levels of interpersonal and institutional trust affect the micro-
experience of service provision. I view these factors as intervening variables whose 
effects are likely dependent on a number of contextual variables. Within a 
particular institutional and structural context, elements of social proximity may 
explain the ways in which people act. Assuming that the rules, norms, and 
constraints imposed by the institutional and social structures permit a variety of 
options, social proximity may shape the way in which the actors perceive their 
options and the costs and benefits associated with each choice. Social factors are 
probabilistic and will not determine the choices people ultimately make, but social 
proximity likely affects the lens through which they assess the opportunities, 
identify possibilities, and evaluate options.  
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Appendix E: Awareness of Service Providers 
Figure E.1 Distribution plots depicting respondents’ awareness of  
health providers by type for Kibera and Korogocho 
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Figure E.2 Distribution plots depicting respondents’ awareness of  
primary schools by type for Kibera and Korogocho 
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Appendix F: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 5 
Table F.1: Correlation Matrices for Covariates  
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poverty_f1_qt 1.00                 
poverty_f2_qt -0.14 1.00                
Age_hh -0.11 0.09 1.00               
Female -0.17 -0.10 0.02 1.00              
low_ed -0.17 -0.11 0.22 0.14 1.00             
high_ed 0.23 0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.40 1.00            
kibera 0.13 0.12 0.04 -0.21 -0.26 0.21 1.00           
community inv. -0.01 0.14 0.10 -0.12 -0.12 0.14 0.13 1.00          
political activism 0.00 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.09 0.21 1.00         
co-ethnic bonding -0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00        
bonding trust -0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.42 1.00       
Bridging trust -0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.45 0.28 1.00      
confidence_gov 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.15 1.00     
confidence_ngo 0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.27 1.00    
confidence_cbo -0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.25 1.00   
health_public -0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.14 -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 1.00  
pub_sch_pct -0.04 -0.05 0.19 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.16 0.14 -0.00 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.05 1.00 
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Table F.2: Affordability of Fees at Most Frequently Visited Health Provider 
 
Dependent Variable  
Affordability of fees at most 
frequently visited health 
provider 
(fees) 
Response to “The fees charged by [name of facility] for services are…” 
1 = not affordable; 2 = somewhat affordable; 3 = affordable. 
 
fees Affordability 
 Exp (β) Robust SE 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC   
Public health 0.956 (0.151) 
Poverty (flow) 1.125** (0.067) 
Poverty (assets) 0.921 (0.053) 
Female respondent 0.840 (0.155) 
Female HH 0.954 (0.206) 
Kikuyu 1.470 (0.415) 
Kisii 2.137* (0.948) 
Luyha 1.758** (0.474) 
Luo 1.867** (0.505) 
Other ethnicity 1.365 (0.442) 
Kibera 1.280 (0.215) 
SOCIAL PROXIMITY   
High community involvement 1.527*** (0.241) 
High bonding (rel) 1.118 (0.176) 
High bonding (co-ethnic) 1.009 (0.171) 
High political activism 1.006 (0.159) 
High bridging trust 0.733* (0.126) 
Constant cut1 0.159*** (0.075) 
Constant cut2 0.831 (0.378) 
Wald Χ2 29.08** 
829 Observations 
Reference ethnicity is Kamba. Age and education controls included but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix G: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 6 
Table G.1: Health Service Utilization 
 Model 1:  
Household Level 
 Model 2: 
Village Social 
Capital 
DV: no_care Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE 
Poverty (flow) 0.572*** 0.056  0.564*** 0.056 
Poverty (assets) 1.134 0.097  1.120 0.090 
Age 0.915** 0.040  0.914** 0.040 
Age2 1.001* 0.0005  1.001* 0.0005 
Female respondent 0.613* 0.171  0.609* 0.170 
Female HH 0.625 0.191  0.622 0.190 
Low education 1.383 0.391  1.400 0.403 
High education 0.727 0.219  0.718 0.218 
Med political activism 1.453 0.436  1.439 0.433 
High political activism 1.882** 0.522  1.832** 0.511 
Med bridging trust 1.447 0.413  1.495 0.427 
High bridging trust 1.543 0.515  1.547 0.513 
Med bonding trust 0.555* 0.170  0.540** 0.166 
High bonding trust 0.647 0.189  0.640 0.187 
Med community involvement 0.829 0.226  0.846 0.233 
High community involvement 0.497** 0.155  0.513** 0.161 
Village Level      
Med groupv    1.938 0.876 
High groupv    2.029 1.304 
Med bridgingv    2.108 1.120 
High bridgingv    0.830 0.352 
Constant 3.209 3.261  1.662 1.847 
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE 
Slum (N=2) ≈0 --  ≈0 --              
Village (N=7) ≈0 --  ≈0 --              
Ethnicity (N=40) 0.190 0.213  0.180 0.192 
Wald χ2 56.31***   58.29***  
Observations 895   895  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table G.2: Public Health Service Affordability 
 Household Level  Village  Social Capital  
 Exp(β) SE  Exp(β) SE  
Poverty (flow) 1.203*** 0.063  1.197*** 0.062  
Poverty(assets) 0.972 0.050  0.973 0.049  
Age 0.989* 0.006  0.989* 0.006  
Low education 1.054 0.192  1.027 0.185  
High education 1.088 0.179  1.110 0.180  
Female respondent 1.520*** 0.239  1.491** 0.231  
Female HH 1.684*** 0.312  1.698*** 0.312  
Community Involvement       
Med community involvement 0.769 0.132  0.773 0.132  
High community involvement 0.544*** 0.097  0.561*** 0.098  
Political Activism       
Med political activism 1.289 0.222  1.252 0.214  
High political activism 1.397** 0.227  1.366* 0.220  
Bonding Trust       
Med bonding trust 0.849 0.145  0.841 0.143  
High bonding trust 0.749* 0.130  0.742* 0.128  
Bridging Trust       
Med bridging trust 0.639*** 0.105  0.650*** 0.107  
High bridging trust 0.562*** 0.110  0.588*** 0.114  
Village Level       
Med PCAv    0.537* 0.198  
High PCAv    0.484*** 0.127  
Med bridgingv    0.790 0.234  
High bridgingv    0.624** 0.145  
Constant cut1 -2.448*** 0.447  -3.094*** 0.495  
Constant cut2 -1.550*** 0.440  -2.204*** 0.488  
Constant cut3 -0.360 0.437  -1.024 0.482  
Random Intercepts Var. SE  Var. SE  
Slum (N=2) 0.077 0.966  ≈0 --  
Village (N=7) ≈0 --  ≈0 --  
Ethnicity (N=40) 0.116 0.088  0.015 0.038  
Wald χ2 68.93***   86.96*** 
864 
 
Observations 864    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
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Appendix H: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 7 
Table H.1: Preferred Health Provider by Slum and Village 
 Government NGO CBO FBO Private Company Chemist 
Traditional 
Healer 
Don’t 
Know 
Kibera 44% 17% 1% 2% 36% <1% -- -- 
   Kianda 44% 13% -- 3% 40% -- -- -- 
   Kisumu Ndogo 27% 23% -- 2% 48% -- -- -- 
   Laini Saba 51% 19% 1% <1% 27% <1% -- <1% 
   Raila 39% 13% 3% 2% 43% -- -- -- 
Korogocho 61% 5% <1% 3% 28% <1% <1% <1% 
   Highridge 62% 6% -- 3% 28% <1% -- <1% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 60% 4% 1% 2% 32% -- <1% <1% 
   Korogocho B 62% 5% 1% 5% 26% -- -- 1% 
 
Table H.2: Community-Wide Health Service Accessibility 
Most people in this community are able to get adequate medical treatment. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 7% 31% 54% 8% 
   Kianda 8% 27% 54% 11% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 6% 36% 52% 6% 
   Laini Saba 7% 31% 58% 4% 
   Raila 11% 30% 45% 14% 
Korogocho 14% 37% 41% 8% 
   Highridge 15% 34% 41% 10% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 17% 38% 41% 4% 
   Korogocho B 8% 40% 42% 10% 
 
Table H.3: Role of Financial Resources in Facilitating Access to Care 
Adequate medical treatment is available in this community  
but only for those with money. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 1% 15% 62% 22% 
   Kianda 3% 17% 61% 19% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 2% 18% 52% 28% 
   Laini Saba 0% 13% 70% 17% 
   Raila 3% 13% 52% 32% 
Korogocho 2% 14% 51% 33% 
   Highridge 3% 15% 49% 33% 
   Kisumu Ndogo <1% 10% 52% 38% 
   Korogocho B 2% 15% 56% 27% 
	   304 
Table H.4: Role of Information in Facilitating Access to Care 
Many people are not able to get adequate medical care because  
they do not know where to go when they need treatment. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 14% 47% 35% 4% 
   Kianda 14% 45% 36% 5% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 19% 45% 30% 6% 
   Laini Saba 12% 51% 34% 3% 
   Raila 13% 40% 42% 6% 
Korogocho 13% 40% 37% 10% 
   Highridge 14% 36% 39% 11% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 11% 43% 37% 9% 
   Korogocho B 14% 43% 34% 9% 
 
Table H.5: Community Leaders and Health Service Accessibility 
Being a community leader or having connections with a community leader  
makes it easier to get adequate health care. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 8% 30% 49% 13% 
   Kianda 13% 32% 45% 10% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 10% 33% 34% 23% 
   Laini Saba 5% 33% 52% 10% 
   Raila 4% 18% 66% 12% 
Korogocho 8% 35% 47% 10% 
   Highridge 8% 33% 50% 9% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 7% 37% 43% 13% 
   Korogocho B 10% 35% 49% 6% 
 
 
Table H.6: Community Involvement and Health Service Accessibility 
Being a member of a community organization makes it easier  
to get adequate health care. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 8% 33% 49% 10% 
   Kianda 13% 36% 43% 8% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 5% 27% 48% 20% 
   Laini Saba 5% 38% 47% 10% 
   Raila 9% 23% 61% 7% 
Korogocho 9% 37% 49% 5% 
   Highridge 9% 36% 51% 4% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 12% 34% 45% 9% 
   Korogocho B 7% 43% 48% 2% 
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Table H.7: Views on Government Health Provision 
The government does a good job providing health services. 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Kibera 8% 30% 51% 11% 
   Kianda 8% 30% 50% 12% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 14% 20% 50% 16% 
   Laini Saba 6% 34% 52% 8% 
   Raila 5% 29% 53% 13% 
Korogocho 7% 25% 53% 15% 
   Highridge 9% 22% 52% 17% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 6% 28% 52% 14% 
   Korogocho B 6% 25% 54% 15% 
 
 
 
Table H.8: Views on Health Provision by International NGOs 
International NGOs do a good job providing health services. 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know 
Kibera 2% 13% 59% 20% 6% 
   Kianda 0% 17% 56% 19% 8% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 2% 3% 48% 41% 6% 
   Laini Saba 2% 15% 64% 14% 5% 
   Raila 5% 8% 61% 18% 8% 
Korogocho 3% 19% 58% 12% 8% 
   Highridge 4% 21% 53% 16% 6% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 1% 19% 64% 9% 7% 
   Korogocho B 2% 17% 61% 10% 10% 
 
Table H.9: Views on Health Provision by Kenyan NGOs 
Kenyan NGOs do a good job providing health care services. 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know 
Kibera 2% 15% 63% 12% 8% 
   Kianda 2% 19% 61% 7% 11% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 2% 7% 55% 29% 7% 
   Laini Saba 1% 17% 69% 7% 6% 
   Raila 3% 14% 56% 14% 13% 
Korogocho 3% 24% 51% 12% 10% 
   Highridge 5% 24% 48% 14% 9% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 0% 27% 52% 12% 9% 
   Korogocho B 2% 23% 55% 8% 12% 
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Table H.10: Views on Health Provision by CBOs 
Community groups and organizations do a good job providing health care. 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know 
Kibera 5% 23% 51% 10% 11% 
   Kianda 5% 24% 56% 6% 9% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 4% 12% 52% 22% 10% 
   Laini Saba 5% 28% 47% 7% 13% 
   Raila 6% 17% 55% 12% 10% 
Korogocho 4% 31% 44% 6% 15% 
   Highridge 4% 31% 46% 7% 12% 
   Kisumu Ndogo 2% 33% 46% 7% 12% 
   Korogocho B 5% 28% 39% 4% 24% 
 
 
Table H.11: Health Facilities by Level of Care 
 Health 
Center Clinic 
Health 
Post Dispensary 
Maternity 
Home 
Nursing 
Home Hospital Other Total 
Kibera 9 123 5 36 1 0 1 3 178 
  Kianda 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
  Kisumu Ndogo 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
  Laini Saba 2 24 1 10 1 0 0 1 39 
  Raila 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Korogocho 8 153 4 3 5 7 2 2 184 
  Highridge 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
  Kisumu Ndogo 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
  Koch B 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Source: APHRC, 2013 
 
Table H.12: Characteristics of Chemists and Pharmacies by Slum 
 Kibera Korogocho 
 Yes No Missing Yes No Missing 
Registered by Pharmacy & Poison Board 76 90 4 41 86 2 
Licensed by Nairobi City Council 111 52 7 83 45 1 
Inspected by Kenya Pharmacy & Poison Board 49 117 4 49 77 3 
Facility has access to water source 100 68 3 102 26 1 
Facility has access to running water 76 92 2 80 48 1 
Dispenses non-OTC medicines 109 61 0 70 58 1 
Facility has a list of registered drugs 32 132 6 4 122 3 
Prescribes for minor acute ailments 161 9 0 100 28 1 
Prescribes for chronic ailments 22 148 0 14 114 1 
All basic infectious disease drugs available 56 114 0 17 112 0 
All basic malaria medicines available 6 164 0 2 126 1 
All basic pain relief drugs available 169 1 0 123 5 1 
All basic cardiovascular drugs available 12 124 34 1 89 39 
All basic parasitic infection drugs available 108 61 1 59 69 1 
Has a systematic patient recording system 82 88 0 31 96 2 
Patient records seen 51 29 90 13 17 99 
Dispensing room at least 10x10 109 59 2 49 78 2 
Has a refrigerator 23 145 2 14 114 1 
Has a measuring cylinder  20 148 2 16 112 1 
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